

WILLIAM JAMES'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE PERSON: THE CONCEPT OF THE STRENUOUS LIFE

by Don Browning

In this essay I want to set forth certain aspects of William James's philosophy of the person. In the process of doing this I will also attempt to place James in the context of selected contemporary visions of the nature of the person which are receiving attention by the reading public. It is not my goal to argue that James's vision of the person is superior to these more recently articulated points of view. Rather, I want to demonstrate the richness of James's vision and show how this position might relate to and possibly clarify some of the issues at stake in the contemporary debate about a viable image of the human to guide modern life.

Although James never directly speaks about a philosophy of the person, it is clear that the issue of the meaning of the person or the individual was a preoccupation which runs throughout his writings. In fact, James is often criticized for his preoccupation with the individual and charged with overlooking the social and cultural dimensions of man. This limitation is said to be all the more serious in his psychology and philosophy of religion. Here, it is claimed, James's decision to study and think about the personal experience of religion helped provide the philosophical grounds for certain modern forms of religious pietism. To some extent these charges are justified, but a careful investigation of his writings will demonstrate that both his philosophy of the person and his philosophy of religion have more social and cultural dimensions than they are often believed to have.

There are two dimensions of James's philosophy of the person which I want to emphasize—his romanticism and his asceticism. Other important topics such as James's view of the self and his understanding of consciousness cannot be discussed in this brief essay.¹

Both of these dimensions of the person gain heightened clarity and proper emphasis if organized under James's preferred concept for

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articulating his normative vision of the human—the concept of the strenuous life. Human beings are in their highest form when they forego what James calls the “easy-going mood” and adapt the “strenuous mood.” James says this about these two different moods as stances of life: “The deepest difference, practically, in the mood life of man is the difference between the easy-going and the strenuous mood. When in the easy-going mood, the shrinking from present ill is our ruling consideration. The strenuous mood, on the contrary, makes us quite indifferent to present ill, if only the greater ideal be attained.”² The strenuous mood is motivated by the deeper and wilder “passions” of life, but at the same time it also orders and restrains these passions in the name of goals outside the self. The strenuous mood involves an orientation toward the future; it is an attitude of active care and concern for the future and should be contrasted with the attitude of “I don’t care” typical of the easygoing mood. Although the strenuous mood entails this orientation toward the future, it is not solely motivated by the “claims of a remote posterity—the last appeal,” according to James, of philosophical humanism. In fact, the strenuous life, as James conceives it, is intimately related to the idea of God and, in fact, a particular concept of God at that. According to James, the strenuous life is most likely to be found in connection with an understanding of a finite God who is the chief but certainly not the sole causal influence in a basically pluralistic, changing, and evolving world.

ROMANTICISM AND THE STRENUOUS MOOD

James was fully aware that his concept of the strenuous mood as an optimal image of the person had affinities with certain ascetic ideals to be found in his puritan heritage. But if Max Weber’s work on the protestant ethic can be trusted here, classic puritan asceticism was basically motivated by fears of damnation and took a far more methodical and unheroic form than is the case with the ideal image of man projected by James.³

For the strenuous life to emerge, it must build upon the energies of the “passional” nature of man. For James, the self-sacrificing and ascetic elements within the strenuous mood presuppose a romantic appreciation for the deeper vitalities of the person. It is a fundamental axiom of James’s pragmatism that our knowledge and practical actions are grounded in our affective and passional life. James frequently refers to our “passional natures” with the phrase “willing natures.” But James’s concept of the will is not restricted to only “deliberate volitions.” The will for James also includes such factors as “fear and hope, prejudice and passion, imitation and partnership, the circumpressure of our caste and set.”⁴

The recognition of the importance of our willing natures takes on heightened significance for James's philosophy of the person when placed in the context of his brand of evolutionary thinking. In addition, the evolutionary dimension of James's thinking recently has been sadly neglected by commentators such as John Wild, Bruce Wilshire, and Hans Linschoten and their discovery of the phenomenological and existential dimension of James's approach to man.⁵ There is little doubt that James at times was an early practitioner of a type of phenomenological description and that he profoundly influenced some of the formative insights of Husserl. But it is also true that his incipient phenomenology never led him to repudiate his adherence to his own particular brand of evolutionary thinking.

Evolutionary thinking goes to the heart of James's philosophy of the person and is pervasive throughout his thought, from early until late. Two important articles written early in his career, "Great Men and Their Environment" (1880) and "The Importance of Individuals" (1890), signal the direction of his thought. The question which motivates these articles is one which few commentators have observed that James was concerned with: "What are the causes that make communities change from generation to generation?" James advances an argument designed to refute the evolutionary determinism of Herbert Spencer, who maintained that historical change was always brought about by environmental forces. James's answer to why communities change is this: "The difference is due to the accumulated influences of individuals, of their examples, their initiative, and their decisions."⁶ In saying this, James does not mean that individuals are the only cause of historical change; he means they are a major cause and one worthy of study by the scientist and the philosopher.

In overemphasizing environmental determinants, Spencer was faithful to only one-half of the Darwinistic heritage over which he presumed to preside as chief interpreter. James pointed out that there were two aspects to Darwin's theory of evolution—free variation and natural selection. Free variation has to do with the internal and invisible emergence of new capacities in a member of a given species, probably brought about at the biological level by mutations of errors in genetic transmission. Natural selection, on the other hand, refers to how the environment maintains (or destroys) these variations because of their ability (or inability) to fit the ecological demands of that environment. James admits that it was to the great credit of Darwin's genius that he chose to study the more observable manifestations of natural selection and explicitly left for later generations the study of mysterious and invisible processes of free variation.⁷

As we will see, James's philosophy of the person will emphasize both free variation and natural selection, but when it comes to his

theory of how creative individuals affect historical change, free variation carries the greater weight. In one place he writes that the social philosopher

must simply accept geniuses as data, just as Darwin accepts his spontaneous variations. For him as for Darwin, the only problem is, these data being given, How does the environment affect them, and how do they affect the environment? Now, I affirm that the relation of the visible environment to the great man is in the main exactly what it is to the "variation" in the Darwinian philosophy. It chiefly adopts or rejects, preserves or destroys, in short selects him. And whenever it adopts and preserves the great man, it becomes modified by his influence in an entirely original and peculiar way. He acts as a ferment, and changes its constitution, just as the advent of a new zoological species changes the faunal and floral equilibrium of the region in which it appears.⁸

Is James only speaking here of the great leader—the charismatic individual, the religious prophet, Jesus, Alexander the Great, or Charlemagne? The answer is no; James has the average individual in mind as well: "We see this power of individual initiative exemplified on a small scale all about us, and on a large scale in the case of the leaders of history."⁹

These two dimensions of biological evolution—free variation and natural selection—James thought applied equally well to social evolution. James is often critical of evolutionary theory, but generally for its Spencerian tendency to put too much weight on natural selection and environmental determinism. Throughout his philosophy James emphasizes not only the need to test values and ideas for their workability against the selective power of the environment but also the mysterious, creative, and romantic powers of individuals to introduce, to begin with, new values and concepts into the environment.

James's appreciation for the creative power of the individual gives him an affinity with several different contemporary schools of psychology. The so-called human-potential movement with its emphasis upon the productive, growth-oriented tendencies of the individual is syntonic with the romantic substratum of James's thought. The Jungian trust in the mysterious archetypal forces of the individual and the recent tendency of psychoanalytic ego psychology to blur the distinction between the ego and the id and to assign creativity and organizational capacities to both are all consistent in tone with the Jamesian sensibility.¹⁰ But on top of James's romanticism is built an ascetic superstructure that finally puts him miles away from the ethos of human potential advocates such as Carl Rogers, William Schutz, and Fritz Perls, although less far away from the Jungians and the ego psychologists.

On the other hand, James's emphases upon both free variation and

natural selection place him far away (and yet not so far) from behaviorists such as B. F. Skinner. The philosophical basis of Skinner's behaviorism puts him in the same camp with Herbert Spencer and the latter's stress on environmental determinism and natural selection. Skinner says as much himself when he articulates in *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* the philosophical foundations of his concepts of positive and negative reinforcement. In the following quotation, Skinner is writing about the role of natural selection in the formation of species and individuals: "Behavior is followed by reinforcement; it does not pursue and overtake it. We explain the development of a species and of the behavior of a member of the species by pointing to the selective action of contingencies of survival and contingencies of reinforcement. Both the species and the behavior of the individual develop when they are shaped and maintained by their effect on the world around them. That is the only role of the future."¹¹ James would agree with Skinner up to a point. The selective and reinforcing capacities of the environment constitute the tail end of James's pragmatic theory of truth and value. The true and the good are always those which have been submitted to the testing and selecting power of the environment. The true and the good are always those which bear fruit in terms of that environment. But in contrast to Skinner, James also celebrates the mysterious and creative forces of the inner man—what Skinner so derisively refers to as "autonomous man."

ASCETICISM AND THE STRENUOUS MOOD

James's appreciation for the passional dimension of man is only one aspect of his philosophy of the person. Although, according to James, the passional in man has form and emits possibilities for action which have value for the creative adaptation of both the individual and the species, he also believed that these deeper forces needed discipline. Man's passional nature is rich, varied, and somewhat chaotic. Not all aspects of man's instinctual and emotional life are of equal value or of equal relevance for the unique ecological demands of different environments. Therefore, a person's instinctual and emotional life must be selected, chosen, ordered, and parts of it denied or sacrificed by the disciplines of consciousness, attention, decision, and effort. Creative adaptation and historical change do not occur by expressiveness alone. In the terms of the contemporary discussion (which are not quite appropriate to James), James opts for both Dionysus and Apollo. Although he trusts the Dionysian in man more than does Freud, James is still close to Freud in his appreciation for the need of the Apollonian, controlling, and decisional dimensions of man—what Freud called the "ego."

Freud characterized the instinctual life of man as a center of form-

less energy—a “boiling cauldron.”¹² James’s theory of instincts has some interesting similarities and differences to Freud’s position. Whereas in his mature theory Freud believed that there were only two instincts, sexuality and death, James believed that man was the most instinctually rich and complex of all creatures.¹³ But, for this very reason, he also believed that man’s instinctual life was highly unstable and plastic—too complex to regulate itself. Therefore, although James and Freud differ significantly in their valuation of man’s instinctual life, in the end they both agreed that it must be supplemented and to some extent guided by higher principles of mental life.

According to James, it is precisely the function of consciousness to stabilize the instability of man’s passional life. Consciousness is a selective agency which stabilizes the highly complex character of man’s brain processes, both the lower instinctual processes and the higher processes of the cerebral cortex. As James writes: “The brain is an instrument of possibilities, but of no certainties. But the consciousness, with its own ends present to it, and knowing also well which possibilities lead thereto and which away, will, if endowed with causal efficacy, reinforce the favorable possibilities and repress the unfavorable or indifferent ones.”¹⁴ In spite of the creativity which James assigns to our passional life, consciousness is needed to “load the dice” of its wide range of capacities and bring “a more or less constant pressure to bear in favor of *those* of its performances which make for the most permanent interest” of the person.¹⁵

This evolutionary-adaptative discussion of the function of consciousness occurs relatively early in James’s monumental two-volume *Principles of Psychology*, toward the end of a long discussion of the physiology of the brain. It signals the shift in methodological starting place to the subject matter of psychology, which is to follow only a few pages later in his famous chapter, “The Stream of Thought.” This chapter, it is now widely agreed, marks the emergence of the incipient phenomenological point of view in James. This is the point at which he begins to do psychology from the point of view of the person consciously experiencing his relations to his world, rather than from the perspective of the physiological mechanisms of the brain. Although his phenomenological point of view—now known to have been profoundly influential on the founder of European phenomenology, Edmund Husserl—was never consistently maintained throughout his psychological writings, it was extremely important for his descriptions of “attention” and “effort”—two qualities of consciousness fundamental to the strenuous mood and the person’s efforts to give form to his passional life and creatively to confront his environment.

James has an almost Kierkegaardian appreciation for man’s

capacities for attention and decision. These qualities of volition are at the very top of the hierarchy of characteristics which make man uniquely human and personal. As is well known, the depression which marked James's early adult life was cured when he hit upon the idea that the capacity to focus sustained attention on a single idea or object was fundamental to the possibility of freedom.¹⁶ James is aware that there is such a thing as automatic or nonvolitional attention which springs from the interesting qualities of an object. But above this there is for James a more distinctively human type of attention—an attention requiring strain and effort to maintain.¹⁷ James's ideo-motor concept of action suggests that decisions follow somewhat freely when one idea or concept gains the center of attention over other competing ideas.¹⁸ But because our consciousness is ridden with conflicting impulses, to settle on this dominant idea frequently requires a strenuous effort.

James does not give us a clear picture as to how this effort is possible. In fact, he clearly admits that discussions about the possibility of effort (and the freedom which it implies) belong more properly to metaphysics than to scientific psychology as he has tried to define it. In one place he does say that the experience of "effort feels like an original force,"¹⁹ suggesting something close to what the ego psychologists call "independent ego energies."²⁰ But, aside from these difficulties in his presentation, it is clear that there is a strong association among his psychology of effort, his view of morality, and his understanding of the essence of the human. In one place he writes, "If a brief definition of ideal or moral action were required, none could be given which would better fit the appearances than this: *It is action in the line of the greatest resistance.*"²¹

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PERSON AND THE "VARIETIES"

Seen from the perspective of this philosophy of the person, the typologies in James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* between the religion of the "healthy mind" and the religion of the "sick soul" parallel his early distinction between the "easy-going" and "strenuous" moods. When seen in the context of his writings as a whole, the *Varieties* is as much a philosophical extension of his vision of the good man as it is a psychology of religion as such. In addition, his decision to study the religion of the individual rather than institutional forms of religion is based on presuppositions similar to his early understanding of the relation between the creative individual and historical change. For, in the *Varieties*, James is not simply studying personal religious experiences; for the most part he is studying the creative religious projections of individuals who were founders of religious movements which,

in fact, attracted large groups of followers.²² Hence, the theme of the relation of the creative individual to his environment is, I submit, the proper framework in which to read the *Varieties*.

James's description of "healthy-minded" and "sick-souled" religion is differential; he has positive and negative things to say about them both. John Wild has already pointed out the parallels between James's understanding of healthy mindedness and Kierkegaard's description of the aesthetic stage of life.²³ Healthy-minded religion (the religion of the once born) accepts the fundamental goodness of life, attempts to think positive thoughts, and minimizes the experiences of evil. Healthy-minded religion is likely to preach a doctrine of relaxation and an acceptance of a grace or assurance that is already at hand, available through a simple opening of the heart.

James had real appreciation for healthy-minded, once-born religion. Its gospel of relaxation could serve as a temporary relief from the overemphasis on moral rigorism of his puritan heritage.²⁴ But he also saw it as an inferior style of religion in comparison with the religion of the sick soul or, its more appropriate name, the religion of the "twice born."²⁵ The gospel of relaxation implicit in the religion of the once born becomes integrated into the religion of the twice born as a creative moment of relief from the challenges of the strenuous life. The religion of the twice born is founded upon a deep sense of the reality of evil. Life for the twice born is not simple. There are real disjunctions, real conflicts, and real agonies which sooner or later beset life for all of us. The religion of the twice born is based upon the decision to give up the easygoing attitude of healthy mindedness and confront the necessity of transforming oneself and one's world in radical ways. There is a certain dividedness of spirit in the twice born (*homo duplex*) which in some instances can take almost pathological forms.²⁶ But, on the whole, James sees this type of religious sensibility closer to the nature of life, that is, that there are in life real conflicts, real antagonisms, real suffering, guilt, and evil. For this reason, James believes that spiritual unification which the twice born achieve is of a higher and more lasting character than that of the once born.

The ascetic motif is pervasive throughout James's discussion of the various types of religious sensibility. It is also found in his description and evaluation of saintliness. It is also clear that there is a strong relationship between the strenuous life, asceticism, and saintliness. It is interesting to note that he opens the first of his two chapters on saintliness with the words ". . . here if anywhere is the genuinely strenuous life." Later, in discussing the asceticism of most saints, he writes that ". . . in moderate degrees it is natural and even usual to the human nature to court the arduous."²⁷ James believes that all of life is

lived within the dialectic of “yes” and “no.” James associates asceticism with the modality of “no.” Life cannot be lived simply as a passive “yes.” In identifying asceticism with the modality of “no,” James is not contending that asceticism means that certain aspects of our passional life are denied in the name of higher principles. For James, moderate asceticism would mean denying one aspect of our passional life in the name of another. For James, we indeed have instinctive energy behind our highest ethical inclinations.²⁸

Although the saint may be the highest exemplification of the strenuous mood, James does not give a blanket approval to all so-called saintliness. In fact, his method of evaluating the saint constitutes a profound insight into his philosophy of the person. James’s brand of evolutionary philosophy is nowhere more apparent than it is in these passages. According to this point of view, there is no “ideal type of man”—all ideals are matters of relation.”²⁹ Here he is willing to follow Spencer when he writes, “Ideality in conduct is altogether a matter of adaptation.”³⁰ There is for James no absoluteness to the excellence of the saint, just as is the case with any type of person. Excellence in character is relative to the ecological demands of environments, and the saint must be judged by his usefulness just as must all other people, ideas, and actions.

But having said this, James moves on and gives a far more subtle exposition of this idea than is normally recognized. Seen from a narrow evolutionary perspective, the saint is not very adaptive; in fact, he is the person most vulnerable to extinction. But seen from a broader perspective, his ecological and adaptive values are remarkable. If not overdetermined and severed too completely from other interests, the saint’s tenderness, charity, simplicity, fidelity, and self-discipline may have significant value, especially for the upgrading of the wider community, its adaptive strength, and improved vision of life. As is the case with most evolutionary thinkers, James develops a populational theory of value. The value of the religious leader is seen largely, although, as we will see later, not entirely, in terms of what he contributes to the adaptive strength of the population (community) to which he is related. In other words, James is telling us here that the value of the saint depends in part on what the community and the environment which surround the saint “select” (in the sense of natural selection) as truly serviceable to creative adaptation.

Hence, James’s particular brand of functionalism builds in a significant place for self-sacrificial modes of living. All individuals (including saints) are finally judged by what they contribute of enduring value to the community which they serve. In saying this, I do not mean to convey the idea that James deprecates the playful and the

intrinsically valuable in either general experience or the religious experience of the saint. James explicitly says in one place that the "intrinsic" satisfaction of an experience (including religious experience) is part of the grounds upon which its value should be judged. But, although intrinsic satisfactions are admitted into the court of judgment, value to the wider community finally gets an even higher place in James's philosophy. In one place James writes that the value of an act, even an action on the part of a saint, must be seen from three perspectives: (1) the actor himself, (2) the goals of his action, and (3) the recipients of the action.³¹ Good intentions are not enough. The virtues of charity, sympathy, and self-control are not enough. The action of the saint must fit a context. Or, as James puts it, "intention, execution, and reception" should be "suited to one another."³² Free variation, yes, but natural selection, too! Intrinsic value, yes, but the value to the community as well! Good intentions, certainly, but attention to execution and reception, in addition!

Therefore, although the saint is not the only person to be valued and although, in some cases, his saintliness is of little value at all, James does believe that in the total economy of things the saint does fulfill a unique and valuable role in human life. In contrast to Nietzsche who downgrades the saint and extolls the virtues of the "strong men" of history, James believes that the saint is adapted to a "millennial society" where justice and love would thrive in ways available to us now only among "good friends in small groups."³³ In this way the saint living the strenuous life is adapted to the "larger environment of history" and contributes to the rest of us by upgrading our capacity to envision and some day live in this ideal world ourselves.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PERSON IN THE LATER WRITINGS

Not only is James's *Varieties* an amplification of his philosophy of the person, but many of his later philosophical and metaphysical writings also carry forward his concept of the strenuous life. James spends a great deal of time in his later writings developing, among other topics, his metaphysics of pluralism. James found the metaphysical monism of his time spiritually and morally offensive. The monistic idealism of his day to be found in Hegel, Lotze, Royce, and Bradley suggested that God was absolute, the presupposition of all thinking, and the sole determiner of all finite realities.³⁴ James contrasts this with a pluralistic view of the world where God is finite, the chief, but neither the only nor an all-powerful being among beings. This finite God also participates in real time in the real world of other finite, individual, and interesting actualities.³⁵

For our purposes, it is interesting to note the way in which James associates these two metaphysical visions with different styles of living. The strenuous mood is clearly associated for James with his pluralistic metaphysics and his vision of a finite God. On the other hand, monism permits the possibility of the strenuous life but is valued by James primarily for the way in which it gives sanction to what he calls "moral holidays." In a brief article entitled "The Absolute and the Strenuous Life" (1906), written in defense of an earlier criticism of monism, James develops some of the most interesting ideas about the connection of pluralism and the strenuous life. Here he contrasts the "belief that the world is still in process of making" with the belief that there is an "eternal edition" of the world "ready-made and complete."³⁶ The idea that the world is still in the process of being made is the one that is consistent with James's pluralism and pragmatism. James believes that both pluralism and monism confirm our strenuous moods; but, as James writes, "Pluralism actually demands them, since it makes the world's salvation depend upon the energizing of its several parts, among which we are."³⁷ Monism sanctions both our moral holidays and our strenuous moods because it tends to see whatever is as an expression of the divine will. Hence, both quietists and fanatics can receive inspiration from absolutistic schemes.

James admits that there are some spiritual deficiencies in pluralism's emphasis upon the strenuous mood. In its meliorism, in its vision that the world is still in the making and that it depends partially upon the efforts of individual persons, pluralism is vulnerable, uncertain, and open to insecurity. If as pluralists we grant ourselves "moral holidays," "they can only be provisional breathing-spells, intended to refresh us for the morrow's fight."³⁸ One of the strengths of monism is that its assurances are absolute and constitute a psychologically unshakable assurance to the truly broken spirit. The pragmatism and pluralism which James defends tend to fall back on a certain "ultimate hardihood" and a certain willingness to live without absolute assurances and guarantees. So James, admitting that there must be a place for moral holidays and moral quietistic approaches to life, finally concludes on the sterner note: "Within religion, emotion is apt to be tyrannical; but philosophy must favor the emotion that allies itself best with the whole body and drift of all the truths in sight. I conceive this to be the more strenuous type of emotion. . . ."³⁹

In summary, James's philosophy of the person has certain affinities with the innerworldly asceticism of his puritan heritage. But his asceticism is built on top of a positive appreciation for the passional dimensions of human life and was in no way motivated by fear of damnation as was the case in the classic Calvinist forms. Rather, the

asceticism of the strenuous life was for James derived from his philosophical anthropology, one which saw both the creativity and instability of man's passional nature. His vision of the person gave full realization to how the rhythms of life must ebb and flow between relaxation and strenuousness, always finally giving a higher valuation to the more active, morally intentional modality. But his understanding of the fact that persons cannot maintain themselves at a high pitch of ethical activity at every moment gave him a profound appreciation for the emphases upon forgiveness and grace in Lutheranism and Methodism and the emphasis upon positive mindedness and relaxation in the so-called mind-cure movement prevalent in his own day.

His emphasis upon strenuousness was partially motivated by his own sociological and cultural assessment of the ecological demands developing in the West at the turn of the century. There is little secret to the fact that James was not an outstanding sociologist, although, as I have pointed out, the social dimensions of his thought are more prominent than often admitted. He did believe that there were several types of forces at work in the modern world tending to render human beings passive, immobile, and hopeless about the importance of individual action. James saw at one and the same time among Americans a great deal of anxious activism and a great lack of vigorous and enduring moral activity. In this analysis, James was very close to contemporary commentators such as Erik Erikson and Erich Fromm who very much want to replace American activism with a deeper kind of moral activeness—what Fromm calls productiveness and what Erikson calls generativity. In this conviction that modern man is becoming more passive, more alienated from serious moral action, more self-absorbed and privatized, James is agreeing with a wide range of modern commentators such as Peter Berger, David Riesman, Philip Rieff, and Fromm, although he lacks most of the sophisticated modern sociological concepts to build his case. In addition, it can be assumed that James would look at the gospels of total expressiveness, such as Norman Brown's, the various contemporary gospels of self-realization, and certain current romantic-mystical trends both within and outside of the counterculture, very much in the same way that he did the mind-cure movements of his own day—with a mixture of skepticism and appreciation.

NOTES

1. I plan to expand the following essay into a book-length study tentatively entitled *Joy, Care, and Control: The Cultures of Contemporary Psychology*.
2. William James, *The Will to Believe* (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), p. 211.

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3. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 98–127.
4. James, *Will to Believe*, p. 9. See also the excellent article by Frank Lentricchia on the aesthetic and romantic dimensions of James, "William James' Romanticism," *Salmagundi* (Winter 1974), pp. 81–108.
5. John Wild, *The Radical Empiricism of William James* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1970); Bruce Wilshire, *William James and Phenomenology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968); Hans Linschoten, *On the Way towards a Phenomenological Psychology: The Psychology of William James* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1968).
6. James, *Will to Believe*, p. 218.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 221.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 226.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 227.
10. Heinz Hartmann, *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* (New York: International Universities Press, 1958), p. 46.
11. B. F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 136.
12. Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1933), p. 136.
13. William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: Dover Publications, 1950), 2:390.
14. *Ibid.*, 1:141–42.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
16. Ralph Berton Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1935), 2:323.
17. James, *Principles*, 2:560.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 522.
19. William James, *Psychology: The Briefer Course* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), p. 306.
20. Robert White, *Ego Reality in Psychoanalytic Theory* (New York: International Universities Press, 1963).
21. James, *Psychology*, p. 311.
22. William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York: Bantam Books, 1950), p. 40.
23. Wild, p. 296.
24. James, *Varieties*, p. 101. See also "Gospel of Relaxation," in *Talks to Teachers on Psychology* (New York: Dover Publications, 1962), pp. 99–112.
25. James, *Varieties*, p. 139.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 288.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*, p. 276.
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*, p. 289.
34. William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism and A Pluralistic Universe* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1971), p. 139.
35. James, *Pluralistic Universe*, p. 269.
36. William James, *The Meaning of Truth* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970), p. 226.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 227.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 228.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 229.