

THE AUGMENTATION OF PSYCHOLOGY

by R. Harré

In posing our question in the form "What does psychology leave out?" I do not think we express exactly the relationship of psychology as it recently has been practiced to a study which would yield an adequate knowledge of the nature of man. I believe we can reformulate this question as follows. There is, first of all, the question as to what psychology has as a matter of fact left out and, second, whether it must leave out of account those aspects of human life and human nature which it currently leaves out. This question is made all the more poignant in that currently we take it to be obvious that psychology is science and we are inclined to assume that when we identify some item which psychology currently leaves out, that item is not susceptible of scientific investigation. There is, of course, no a priori reason why the extent of the scientific study of man should match exactly the extent of the current state of the study of psychology. It will be part of my purpose to show in this paper how that which quite patently has been left out of psychological study can be incorporated without any loss of scientific standing. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, much that we currently think of as scientific psychology is scientific in name only in that it violates many of the canons of the physical and biological sciences as we know them.¹

INADEQUATE PSYCHOLOGY

What then has psychology in its current form left out? I think it is easy to show that there are two essential human attributes of mankind, found only in rudimentary forms in other animals, which current methodology of psychology excludes almost completely from scientific investigation:

Self-management. The active role of the self in managing life is perhaps the most striking feature of human beings. The active self appears both in the control of the person in action and in what I shall

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call self-construction, reflexive action of a person upon himself. This is reflected in the traditional idea that a man is responsible both for what he does and for what he is.

The idea of self-control and self-construction was central to that view of human nature which was dominant in the religious ages of Western man and was reflected in the traditional morality in the conception of sin and moral responsibility. The psychological aspect of those two traditional aspects is that of the capacity a person has both to control himself and to build himself as he goes along. A human being on the traditional view is never complete, and his incompleteness leaves a field of action open to him, in which he can act upon himself.

Recent psychology has been so constructed as to exclude agency. The idea of the controlling variable of the human response as merely mediated by the nature of man, a conception of a human being as essentially a one-dimensional entity, has dominated positivistic conceptions of human life. I hardly need to document this point. The psychology of the recent tradition is built around an essentially mechanistic conception of human action. The methodology of dependent and independent variables, treatments and subjects and responses, preempts the issue because that methodology contains mathematical and logical features which are exactly isomorphic with the mechanistic model of man. Again it is hardly to my purpose to repeat arguments here which are well known and to which I have devoted myself already in other places. For the purpose of this paper, all I need to emphasize is that the very methodology advocated by the scientific psychologist as he currently conceives of himself effectively prevents the self-constructive and self-controlling features of human life from being examined at all, even if lip service is paid to their existence. As the "scientific view" comes to preempt the "truth," these features of human life which are so central to our psychic functioning tend to drop out of account in popular, political, and clinical conceptions of man, and in that peculiar and dangerous way in which the psychological theories of one era become the psychological facts of another we shall shortly cease to be capable of self-control and self-construction since these concepts will form no part of our concept of ourselves. That this is no idle warning can be seen by reflecting on the monstrous society conceived by B. F. Skinner in his recent book, in which the world is deliberately impoverished so that people can behave in it only in such ways as can be investigated and modified and controlled as in a psychological laboratory, that most desert of all places.²

Fortunately for the future of mankind, at the same time as such

views as those of Skinner have acquired notoriety another guru has risen in popular esteem, the sociologist Erving Goffman.³ His enormous importance for the science of psychology derives from the fact that he has provided a theoretical scheme within which features of human life excluded from the recent tradition can be brought back into a central position. He has emphasized the inescapable necessity of recognizing the central place that capacities for self-portrayal, self-control, and self-construction play in many commonplace activities of the social world. Restaurants are scenes of self-presentation, asylums are scenes for moral careers mediated by dramaturgical skills, and fairgrounds and bus stations are the scenes for the management of various identities which have been spoiled by the chances of everyday life. It is these performances which psychology must not deny to be possible. It must explain to us how the microsocial worlds which Goffman's genius has made visible to us are psychologically possible.

Meaning. No less central than self-control and self-construction to our operation as human beings is the process by which we give and grasp meanings. If the physical and the physiological states of a person become psychologically relevant only as they come to be endowed with meaning, then psychology must become the study of the rise and development of meaning structures and of their principles of order. To the understanding of the processes of the giving and grasping of meaning, the dependent-independent variable rhetoric is wholly inappropriate. Meanings do not have the kind of independence one from another that independent variables do. Nor do subsequent meanings depend upon the meanings from which they are generated in the way that dependent variables depend upon the independent. So it will not do to try to acknowledge the importance of meaning by merely adding it as a further independent variable since variables in the sense they exist in science are parameters, that is, they can stand independently one of another.

The method of controlling variables so that one only is varied while every other feature of the system remains the same not only is technically impossible in the case of meaning; it is logically impossible.

Thus I assert that two central subjects have been either ignored or grossly maltreated by the scientific psychology of the recent laboratory tradition. It is also plain that the literary, historical, moral, and artistic investigations of our intellectual tradition have much to offer by way of observation and of concept in these areas. Literary, dramatic, and artistic sources can give us ideas about what patterns of meaning are possible, what modes of self-control there might be, and, more importantly still, what the varieties of self-construction are and

what kinds of selves there might be. If, then, we acknowledge the genuineness of some of the insights of the arts and literary and religious writings, and the pseudoscientific character of some recent psychology, how do we rebuild psychology so as to let in the one and exclude the other? It will be part of my task in this paper to suggest the way in which the sources of knowledge which we have so far identified can be drawn into a single science of man. I will confine myself to four sources of knowledge from what one might call the humanities.

UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPTUAL SYSTEMS FOUND IN HUMANITIES SOURCES

Humanities sources are common knowledge, literature (including religious literature), drama, and history (including the history of religion). In each of these we can discern patterns of meaning and conceptions of possible selves and ideas about the constraints and techniques by which those meanings may be manipulated and those selves may be changed. But we also know that each of these sources is, for rather different reasons, not wholly critical in its deployment of its knowledge. Common knowledge is deployed as much for dramaturgical as for scientific purposes as, for example, in the pursuit of gossip. Both literature and drama have purposes other than those of an accurate delineation of human character and its possible predicaments. Finally, though historians strive for a mastery of reality, we know that they operate within stylistic constraints which make it possible for that mastery to be continuously called in question. Thus the knowledge we draw from these sources must be passed through a sieve of criticism. It has, too, another universal feature. With few exceptions, common knowledge, literature, drama, and history use ordinary language, whatever that might mean. And whatever that might mean exactly, it is clear that the ordinary vernaculars are not innocent of theory.

The knowledge that we draw then from our humanities sources must be passed through a critical process. This will involve two stages. We first must be clear as to the underlying conceptual and metaphysical system which is universally present in all those studies for which we use, primarily, ordinary language. And second we must not forget that most of our psychological performances of a fundamentally human character are carried out in ordinary language. We admonish ourselves and others. We heap criticism upon them. We praise them. We lie to ourselves and others. We plan and excuse and justify our actions, usually in ordinary language. So our attention to ordinary language is not just because our humanities sources are usually couched in it, but it is the very stuff of psychological performance.

From whom do we glean the structure, resources, and pre-suppositions of ordinary language? Well, it has become clear in recent years that this ought to be, in one way or another, the province of moral and mental philosophy. The ordinary-language movement did not, of course, as it has sometimes been alleged, blindly advocate the universality and finality of the system of ordinary language; rather it insisted upon the priority of ordinary language to all other forms of thought and thus drew attention to the pervasive character of the system embedded within it. It is upon that point that I would wish to insist. Nevertheless, though ordinary language does incorporate a confusedly overlapping ensemble of theories about human nature and human psychological functioning, these theories are not immune from conceptual and scientific criticism.

There already exists a professionally ensconced criticism of literature and drama, in much of which important material for psychology is embedded. The critique of character is a central theme in literary and dramatic criticism and religious writing, and the psychologists of personality ignore it at their peril. The subtleties which have emerged in the long abrasion between literature and its critics, starting I suppose in the sixteenth century, surely must contain an enormous source of conceptions of possible persons, upon which I am certain that no psychologist of my acquaintance has ever drawn.

Two conceptual systems derive from the philosophical and critical examination of those sources I have called humanities. The first is a conceptual system for the analysis of action, involving the concept of a person, of responsibility, of intention, and the like. And this recently has been at the focus of much philosophical study and lately illuminated by some fine analysis by M. Boden.⁴ But there is another conceptual system of equal psychological importance to be found in these sources. This is the system having to do with the formation and presentation of character and personality, its recognition and its development. This is the conceptual system around the actor. It has been a central theme of much dramatic criticism in the sense of the critique of the stage and in the works of Kenneth Burke has been drawn upon for a theory of the psychology of the microsocial world.⁵ The combination of these two conceptual systems, both of which are operative in our ordinary real life and are highlighted in the humanities sources, makes up the view of our psychological nature which has come to be called the ethogenic theory. This theory is now well established in the scientific studies of the microsociologists—George Herbert Mead, H. Garfinkel, Goffman, and so on.⁶ Only very recently it has been proposed as a social psychological theory by P. F. Secord and me (1972) and as a personality theory by A. Brittan.⁷ It has yet to have its

full impact upon the study of child development.⁸ It draws attention to capacities which have not been studied very deeply by the students of child development, namely, the capacities for ceremonial action and for the taking of roles formal, informal, and conventional. For example, we know little about the reasons for the almost universal existence of the kind of "slots" that are found in school classrooms—the fat boy, teacher's pet, fleabag, etc. It seems that a middle-sized group of children have these slots and find someone to fill them. A person only moderately rounded in form finds his way into the slot of "fat boy," and much of the character that he is permitted to present derives from the standard role that is required of one who fills that slot; and the same goes for the relatively clean "fleabag" and the relatively honest "teacher's pet."

Now the ethogenic conception of man as a self-monitoring, self-controlling, self-constructing, meaning-giving and -receiving, autonomous individual is not incompatible with certain of the courses which we find already existing in the currently delineated science of man. After all, despite the influence of certain individuals whose theories are explicable only on the assumption that their minds have been taken over temporarily by invading aliens from another galaxy, many of the sciences of man have dealt with human beings and human problems in a human way. For example, despite certain excesses of enthusiasm, much that structuralist anthropology has to say about the organization of meanings in human thought is probably of permanent value. I believe we have yet soberly to evaluate the contributions of the currently unfashionable functionalist school. It may well turn out that functionalism expresses one of the theories of the human predicament which some human beings actually have used to regulate and make sense of their lives. And there is already in psychology a great mass of information. Much of it, I believe, is meretricious and is explicable only as an artifact of the false situation of the mock laboratory in which much psychology is done. However, by applying a sensitive but ruthless criticism we certainly shall be able to rescue a good deal of that material and even utilize the artifactual character of some of it in the theory of a generation of social artifacts. For a classical example of how this can be done, one can scarcely do better than refer to D. Mixon's brilliant reworking of the experiments of Milgram.⁹

There is a criterion which can be applied to identify and reject the utterly bogus from that which can be given a new lease on life in a reinterpreted science of psychology. This is the famous maxim of L. Vygotsky.¹⁰ According to this maxim, we must exercise the greatest care that our empirical investigations as psychologists do not drop below the level of meaning which is psychologically potent. That is, we

must investigate physiological conditions, physical situations such as the distances people stand from one another or their orientations one to another, the expressions of faces, the movements of muscles, the sounds that issue from larynxes, insofar as these are meaningful entities. I shall have more to say in greater detail about the application of this maxim in a later section of this paper where I will turn in detail to the question of the meaning of social meaning. Some social psychological work such as that which deals with a wholly semantically undifferentiated frequency of presentation as a psychological variable can be ruled out a priori as worthless. Other work done under the old scientific paradigm, such as M. Argyle's studies of the role and effect of gaze in human interaction, can be reinterpreted in a semantically satisfactory fashion and incorporated in an adequate psychology.¹¹ Some studies performed under the old tradition come through absolutely unscathed since it turns out that in some subtle way they already assume the ethogenic orientation in their methodology. For example, one can cite the studies of the emotions that began with Stanley Schachter.¹² It would hardly be sensible to deny the place of physiology and biochemistry in the study of man. However, it is enormously difficult to say precisely how the effect of physiological and biochemical facts of human functioning are relevant to psychology. I believe this can be stated clearly, but it is not simple.

THE USE OF PHYSIOCHEMICAL SOURCES

In order to understand the way in which physiological and biochemical facts can be relevant to a psychology whose central notion is that of meaning, one must understand a fundamental conceptual or philosophical point about the way in which physiological problems are identified and the corresponding way in which physiological entities are picked out. This is the theory of taxonomic priority.

The taxonomic priority thesis asserts that the criteria by which functionally relevant states and processes in the physiology of a human being or animal are identified and individuated are derived from psychological states and processes, that is, the taxonomy of physiology as a functionally relevant science is dependent on the taxonomy of psychology or, in the case of animals, ethology. For example, body acidity is identified as the physiological basis of smoking, that is, a functionally relevant entity for the study of smoking only via the prior identification not only of the practice of smoking but of "wanting a cigarette."

The connection of taxonomic priority, though strong, is not strictly logical, as shown by the following argument. Suppose some psychological state *P* is used to identify a physiological state or structure *S*,

and then on a subsequent occasion when *P* is reported a physiological state *T*, physiologically different from *S*, is found. Alternative moves are open to the psychophysicist in this situation. The hypothesis that *S* and *P* are correlated may be rejected and *T* treated as a counterinstance, or *P* may be correlated with the disjunction of the known physiological states *S* or *T* and a hidden physiological variable common to both *S* and *T* postulated. The latter move preserves the principle "For every kind of psychic 'state' there is a kind of physiological state." However, it is clear that if the disjunction move should be resorted to too often for a particular state *P*, when other and different physiological states occurred with *P*, the above principle would be called in question. Of course, it remains strictly contingent that acidity in fact should have been found with a felt desire to smoke most of the time.

The disjunctive move can be regarded as an application of one of the currently fashionable concepts of nonlogical necessity to the particular case of the problem of how physiological facts enter psychological science in that it supposes that the psychic state is the product of the same generator as the disjoined physiological states, namely, whatever is described by the hidden physiological parameter.

The sense in which the above principle is necessary is different from the sense in which the particular correlations established under it are necessary. It has the necessity we ascribe to principles that we are determined to preserve perhaps for methodological reasons and which shows itself in the choice of a disjunction and hidden variables rather than a falsification in the case described above. It is what I have called "conventional necessity." The issue is complicated by the fact that feelings enter social reality and are relevant to the planning of intentional action sequences only insofar as they can be given meaning. This important qualification has been emphasized by Schachter's discoveries about the importance of cognitive and social factors in the identification of the emotions which have profound significance for the philosophy of psychology generally and for the taxonomic priority thesis in particular. We all know that some physiological states and processes come through into consciousness as feelings. If we reflect a little, we also know that many feelings, such as tension, are ambiguous and need to be given meaning to be transformed into emotions in order to become operative in the higher-order life of a person.

Schachter showed that feelings are just as conceptually disconnected from their meanings (emotions) as are bodily movements such as gestures from their meanings. He showed this in a wide-ranging series of studies, the upshot of which was the discovery that the emotions of a person in a given state of physiological arousal can

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be manipulated by meaning change alone. From the presence of adrenaline it is not possible to infer the feeling of generalized arousal since only through the taxonomical priority of feelings is adrenaline known to be the arousing agent.

This line of thought recently has been reinforced by H. Becker's studies of psychedelics. He showed that what happened on a "trip," specifically whether the "trip" was good or bad, which is said to be a differentiation of emotional tone, is, as popular rumor has it, determined by beliefs, situational meaning, and the like, that is, by factors which bear upon the meaning assigned to the feelings produced by the state of arousal.

I conclude then that there is a good deal of reason for thinking that it is not through their close-coupled feelings that states of arousal are connected with action preparation and performance but only as the feelings are given meaning and thus become emotions. A necessary condition for meaning endowment is a prior understanding of the social or personal situation. This understanding may be quite difficult to come by, and in such cases the feeling associated with arousal floats free, or the understanding may be inappropriate or go wrong in other ways.

It follows that if we consider the psychic and the physiological aspects of a person then there will be the possibility of disparate modes of organization under each aspect since the very same state of arousal will have an emotional correlate of one sort under one endowment of meaning, logically connected with one set of beliefs, plans, etc., and of another sort, differently connected under another. So far as we know, the gross physiological process in which the state of arousal is embedded by reference to physiological mechanisms is unaffected by meaning change. Of any more delicate physiological mechanisms we know absolutely nothing. And because of the priority of the system of identification we can call "social semantics," the physiological correlates may be organized either as matching the organization of the meaning structure or by reference to causal sequences and physiological generating mechanisms. As I have hinted, there is some reason for thinking that feelings unendowed with meaning have an organization matching that of their physiological counterparts; for example, anxiety declines when adrenaline declines. But the specific contingency of such an apparent identity is borne out by the effect of placebos in alleviating pain and reducing anxiety and by the complementary phenomena of free pains and hysterical paralysis in which the part which is painful, or which is paralyzed, is a conceptual unit like "arm" and not a physiological unit.

There is a temptation in psychology to place reliance on the mode

of organization that derives from the identifiable and known physiochemical mechanisms, productive of physiological change, as, for instance, the attempt by R. Zajonc to identify liking with reduction of response competition, identified physiologically.¹³ The temptation arises in part, I believe, because the mode of organization under the psychosocial criteria is much less easily discoverable, requiring analysis of accounts and so on, and it may even be negotiable, that is, a person can be talked out of an identification of a feeling as a particular emotion or mood by focusing attention on the reasons for the original identification—and in part because it seems to structure the situation for a ready application of the naive causal paradigm. But if the disparity is as great as I suppose, then the structure of the physiological correlates of the elements of a psychosocial structure such as an emotional passage will not yield to explanation in terms of known physiological-generating mechanisms.

A further consequence of the taxonomic priority thesis is that it opens the way for the physiological correlates of a given kind of organization of psychic states at the level at which meaning endowment has taken place to be highly idiosyncratic, from person to person. There seems to be only one common physiological feature associated with the mental life and that is generalized arousal, and it is notoriously idiosyncratic in origin and in the meaning which any individual gives to it.

This empirical work then seems to reinforce the general contention that while the taxonomic priority thesis requires the necessity of some general relation between kinds of psychic states and kinds of physiological states there is a high degree of specific contingency. The specific form of the identity thesis seems to have its most plausible point of application at the physiological-psychic interface between generalized arousal and feelings, or lesions and pains. It is much less plausible as a theoretical basis for understanding the relation between physiological processes and meaning-endowed processes and structures. Indeed it is not plausible at that interface at all.

The mode of organization of action sequences, thought patterns, emotional passages, etc., seems to be *sui generis* and not necessarily associated with particular physiological passages and structures, to which the classical causal paradigms apply, be this either linear Humean concomitances or the non-Humean natural necessity of the established sciences where causal sequences are mediated by generating mechanisms.

While following P. Strawson and S. Hampshire in a general anti-Cartesianism and granting the necessity for the location and endurance of the person as well as his characteristic powers, by following

Schachter, Becker, etc., we see that, even in the case of particular correlations where the disjunctive correlates are short and we could utilize psychosocial criteria to identify relevant physiological correlates, there is little of interest in this fact since in general the physiological patterns so identified do not match the patterns within which physiological mechanisms can establish natural necessity for the level at which the most characteristic human psychic functioning occurs, that is, where meaning is involved. Thus, for all practical purposes, we can throw away physiology, and hence any necessity to apply the causal paradigms that are found in normal physiology, which are of the non-Humean, generative mechanism sort.

A CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND FOR A SCIENCE OF HUMAN
NATURE: THE MEANING OF SOCIAL MEANING

It now becomes an open question whether this is any reason for applying that causal paradigm or some suitable analogue to mental structures, emotional passages, and action sequences. If there is none we are free to call upon other causal paradigms to provide a conceptual background for a science of human nature, specifically those drawn from the psychological explanations of everyday, from literature, history, and religious traditions, and from the analyses of Goffman et al. which use a dramaturgical conceptual system, drawn from a stage tradition.

The idea of meaning is central to a reformed psychology. But what is meaning for psychological purposes? Philosophers have built their theories of meaning out of two main ideas, the referent of a symbol and the shared intention of the users of the symbol. In settling on these notions as central they have turned their attention away from two other items, once central to the analysis of meaning, namely, the penumbra of feeling with which a symbol is endowed and the linguistic equivalent of that symbol. Insofar as the shared intention of the users can be said to include some awareness of the referent of the symbol the one notion can be said to include the other. Insofar as explaining the use of a symbol involves the mention of its linguistic equivalents they too are involved in the user's intentions. This sort of account seems adequate to cases like "the meaning of a facial expression" but less than adequate for the meanings we assign to rules and ceremonials, for example. In the latter case, to give the meaning seems to be to explain the significance of the ceremonial, usually by locating it within an account of the construction and maintenance of a social system, thus making clear what act is performed in the action of the ceremony. Finally one can see that if the act performed is the meaning of a social action and a conscious agent performs the action,

then it is the act which he intends and which must be attributed to him by those who read his meaning in the meaning they identify in his action.

The other very general idea that comes from taking everyday life and literary sources seriously is that of the human being as agent, capable of giving a sense of order to actions that have occurred or generating patterns of action by acting in accordance with a certain principle of order. The idea of human agency would hardly be relevant to the study and explanations of pattern in social action if agency were always mere caprice or impulse. The agent as giver of order can be said to be a generator and follower of rules. This idea needs considerable elaboration and qualification. In discussing it here I shall organize my remarks around two general questions. Why should we introduce the idea of a rule? And, having argued for the utility, indeed necessity, of that idea, I shall turn to the question, What rules? Or, better, what kind of rules can we expect to identify as operative in social life? We shall seek them both in the process of generation of social action and in its justification, in both action analysis and account analysis.

To get a grip on a psychology concerned with the basis of shared meaning we need to break with the philosophical tradition that sees all causal production in terms of efficient causes, a philosophical tradition that has much influenced the way psychology is pursued as a science. Causal production is involved in the form or structure a product takes as it is in the conditions that lead to its existing. The philosophical background to ethogenics involves an express emphasis on formal causality as a productive process to be studied empirically, postponing the study of the highly problematic matter of the efficient causality of action for the time being. Indeed it is our contention that the notion of efficient causality has no place in a social psychological study of certain phenomena at all. These are the cases where there is a flow of action whose efficient determinants are physiological but which is shaped and formed so as to appear in social space, so to speak, having a structure of elements at the level of social meaning. A typical case would be the discovery by Schachter that there is a physiological causal pattern of the efficient-cause type leading to someone lighting a cigarette which is not available to the consciousness of that person or anyone in social contact with him—the body acidity referred to above—but that the lighting up is given an interpretation within a fragment of autobiography that assigns to it a definite social meaning, perhaps as part of a performance of impression management.

Efficient-cause determination involves the idea of production as a

cause-effect sequence on the model of event-laws as they sometimes occur in the physical sciences, the cause and effect being conceptually as well as physically distinct. So far as we can tell, the uses of efficient-cause determination in human social affairs which are at the level of meaning may be so idiographic as to be idiosyncratic.

The study of formal-cause determination, on the other hand, requires us to treat the production of orderly sequences of structured actions on the model of template and product between which there may be the communality of structural isomorphism or even the stronger communality that exists when product is a transformation of the template, leaving nothing behind. "Intentions vanish in action" (K. Lewin). In the case of formal causality it is a necessary feature for the template to be the formal cause of the product that they come in the measure of their isomorphism, under the same description.

Examples of the way the distinction works in social science are very common. For instance, it may be that what brought a particular individual to suicide was a unique combination of factors, both biographical and environmental, physiological and social. But the form that that suicide takes is not idiosyncratic but depends upon the templates available in the society and known to the person involved, that is, individually represented, for this type of action sequence. Our knowledge of these stereotypes may be available to us only from literary or folk sources. The Japanese tradition of formalized suicide depends for its continuity on literary, historical, and religious sources, from which the template for a "proper" suicide reaches each individual and is made available to shape his actions.¹⁴ It is quite essential for the person performing the act to conform to the local template of action, for otherwise he may fail altogether to have his death read as having the social meaning he intends, and his actions fail to be a successful performance of the act of suicide. To put the same point in terms of prediction, while we may not be able to complete an idiographic study sufficiently detailed to say whether he will commit suicide, let alone when and where, if we know enough about the available conceptions of proper suicides in his community we will be able to predict the structure or form of the action sequence that any suicide of his will take, including the one he actually commits. We can divine these only from a study of literary and historical sources. At a more explicitly formal level, what brings you before the altar with a particular other may be highly idiosyncratic and hence that you should so appear be extraordinarily difficult to predict, but the form your actions will take in the course of the wedding proceedings is highly determined since the structured product, the ceremony, is produced by the following of another structured object, the order of service as template.

In general the production of structured objects from structured objects can occur in three ways: (1) by the putting together, under certain constraints, of structured components—for instance, a crystal is a structured object and is a product of the structural properties of the component ions constraining the way a multitude of ions can be assembled; sometimes the overall structure is an isomorph of the structure of the components, as in the case of diamonds and the tetrahedral valencies of carbon, but sometimes it is not; (2) by the projection of the structure of the template onto the product, each being a distinct existent—this again may take two forms, in that sometimes the material in which the structure is represented may be different in template and product as in the musical score and the tune, and sometimes it may be the same as in the desert terrain and a sand map of the terrain; and (3) by the evolution of the template into the product under the constraint of some invariant—this may involve a change of material or medium; sometimes it does not.

In general it is the second and third ways of production of structured objects that we find in social science. The second way is exemplified in acting according to plan, where the action sequence is the projection of the plan into the medium of overt action, and both template and action sequence are distinct existences. The third way is exemplified in some kinds of intentional action in which the intention evolves into the action, and in the coming to be of the action sequence the intention ceases to be a distinct existent.

Conceived according to this prescription, a science that seeks to understand the relation of individuals to their social actions must seek to reveal the structure of the products, action sequences, and the structures which, as templates, serve to determine the form of these sequences. The ethogenic method depends upon the assumption that the structured action sequence endowed with meaning as both actions and act is not the only product of that template and not the only manifestation of this form in a publicly available object. It also is revealed in the content and sociogrammar of accounts, the speech which accompanies action and which serves to underline the meaning of the action and to make the microsocial interactions of people smooth.

If both action sequences and accounts are manifestations of the templates or formal causes of a matching, structured element in each, how is the template represented in individual people? Clearly it can be neither in the mode of speech nor in the mode of action. Transformational grammarians, whose general approach is very similar to the ethogenic standpoint in social science, seem to have been unable to avoid the damaging assumption that the base structures underlying

the manifested linguistic object, the utterance, are also linguistically represented. This surely must be wrong. From the point of view of social science we must develop an abstract mode of representation that is neither action nor speech. But we must beware the formalist temptation of seeking the means of this mode of representation in formal logic since that study highlights only content-free or content-neutral structural properties of speech whereas we are very much concerned with content itself, with specific understandings and theories of the social world and our places in it.

The microsociology requisite to the action-analysis stage is essentially that of Goffman, extended by incorporating the explicit insights of ethnomethodology into the ways in which the social world is an artful creation of human skills kept in being by the largely verbal remedy of actual and possible infractions. I emphasize three principles of this type of sociology especially germane to an ethogenic psychology: (1) Action sequences are not identifiable independently of the acts they allow people to achieve; (2) the meanings of acts and action sequences are part of the folk knowledge of sociality and essential to competence in social action and in a literate society are embodied in literary and theatrical and religious traditions; and (3) since actions are effective in accomplishing acts only insofar as they have the meaning attributed to them by the folk, they are what the folk take them to be, on the microsocial scale, though both macrosocial-historical discoveries and the necessity for individual psychodynamic interpretations may force more layers of meaning upon them.

Goffman's microsociology is based upon three central principles:¹⁵ (1) In performing the tasks required of us as contributors to the solutions of the technical and biological demands of living together we display our social selves in the style in which we perform. Identifying the task reveals the instrumental aspect of social life; identifying the style reveals the expressive aspect. Expressive aspects of action are often cooperative but may become competitive or agonistic.¹⁶ (2) The expressive aspects of the performances that make up social life are directed toward creating and maintaining a public reputation, the change and development of our public reputations constituting our "moral careers." The centrality of public reputation and presentational properties of the self in this conception of social life leads to much attention being directed to its enhancement and protection. (3) Interactions between people are accompanied often by rituals of amelioration of offense actual and possible, by conventionalized expressions of deference and respect, and, when the self takes the

offensive, by formalized insult and the ceremonial denigration and debasement of the character of others.

To understand how these complex interactive performances are achieved successfully we need to deploy the act-action distinction and the methodology based upon formal causality both at the level of instrumental acts and actions, such as marrying, signing checks, robbing banks, and so on, and at the level of expressive acts and actions, such as giving way graciously, losing a match badly, resisting an attempt at put-down in such a way as to expose the pretensions of the down-putter, and so on. If there is method in human action at both the instrumental and the expressive levels of act and action, that is, both in the technical performance of tasks and in the style in which they are carried out, the task of the social psychologist is to reveal the basis in individual cognitive functioning and personal knowledge of society of the skillful deployment of that method.

Account analysis, the study of the speech forms in which action is explained and justified, is aimed at revealing the basis of skills used in the methodic control of action, control which usually falls short of the self-consciousness of the Machiavellian whose lightest act is calculated and probably rehearsed. Such study yields a representation of the knowledge acquired by socially competent individuals, of social meanings, situations, standards of propriety, and so on.¹⁷ For example, violent schoolchildren can account for their actions in speech which, when analyzed, reveal a well-articulated, orderly, and systematically applied theory of situations. These rules concern action at both the expressive and the instrumental level.

Such accounts reveal a capacity to distinguish among a dozen distinct social situations, including the two matching pairs, "home"—a real place—with "marriage" its fantasy counterpart, and "school"—a real place—with "college" its fantasy counterpart. The rules involved in the guidance of action in the two real situations are interestingly isomorphic. They are related to categories of perceived offense, and the form of violence can be understood as the retribution visited upon parent or teacher appropriate to the category of an offense. If the parent's or teacher's action was regarded as falling under the heading of some form of contempt, "not knowing my name," "treating me like a kid," a rule of equilibration operated calling for action to restore lost dignity, an equilibration of personhood. If the offense was mere insult a principle of reciprocity operated requiring the return of insult for insult.

The analysis of accounts is directed toward the study of speech which accompanies action serving to make it meaningful and to justify

it. But folk social theory and technique also are revealed in aspects of the speech which accomplishes action. A particularly striking example of this is to be found in B. Torode's sociogrammatical studies.¹⁸ Torode has revealed not only that the grammar of the speech used by teachers to their pupils is systematically related to their capacity to create order by speech alone but also that the grammar involves tacit social theory of a very fundamental kind. A well-known Torode example is the speech of "Mr. Crimond," a highly successful creator of order by predominantly verbal means. Mr. Crimond uses a socially potent grammar of the first person, exemplified in his remark: "We don't have any talking when we do compositions. I hope that is clear." In this remark there are two distinct "we" usages. Let us call them *w1* and *w2*: *w1* refers to a realm of persons beyond the classroom (the transcendental realm) who are the source of order; they are the ones who "don't have things"; *w2* refers to the immanent realm of the inhabitants of the classroom, the boys and Mr. Crimond. The possibility of interpreting the transcendental realm to the immanent realm is instantiated in the person of Mr. Crimond, who is the only person who has a place in both realms, and as the "I" of the third clause lays claim to the role of interpreter. Not surprisingly Mr. Crimond's speech forms prevent the boys from addressing the transcendental realm directly on matters pertaining to the issue of order, for this also is the reserved role of Mr. Crimond. Not surprisingly he is inclined to represent the transcendental realm as reserving judgment on many issues with the characteristic speech form "We'll have to see."

This kind of analysis is manifestly the use of a skill which is common to the studies a literary critic would make of a poem or a passage in a novel and in the cause of sociogrammar is very similar to the skills used in structuralist poetics.¹⁹

The product of ethogenic analyses of accounts includes much material that naturally would be called "rules," that is, statements representing a structured content, say, "If *A* occurs then do *B*" which is isomorphic with the action sequence "*A* happens, followed by the doing of *B*." Rules then would be one form of verbal representation of the templates of the forms of both action and accounting. Sometimes it is the rule itself that seems to be the template, standing between the deep template and the production of the action. This can be understood in two different modes. There is the literal case of rule following, in which the agent who produces the action sequence is active and the rule or what corresponds to the rule is a passive template. A case would be a musician carefully and deliberately following a score. Also common in the production of human action is a process, metaphorically called rule following, in which the actor lets himself become

passive and the template, now usually lost from awareness as an explicit rule, is the apparent source of action, as when a musician plays "from memory" as we say. But as Ludwig Wittgenstein pointed out, the agent in a way has to take actively the role of a person passively following the action template: "It [the rule] makes it possible for me to hold by it and make it compel me."²⁰ The notion of rule then seems to pick out two forms of human autonomy, as it is represented in accounts.

CONCLUSION

Returning to literary, dramatic, and religious sources for hypotheses as to the meaning and mode of action of much human activity is to be supplemented by restoring depth to psychology as a science by re-introducing literary and philosophical forms of analysis as a proper part of empirical psychology, by the help of which the structure and significance of the speech which rehearses, accomplishes, and justifies action can be understood. Attention to the religious tradition is an essential part of this reform since that tradition embodies psychological theories in accordance with which real people have tried more or less successfully to reconstruct themselves. We ignore these innumerable, real-life, social-psychological experiments at our peril and to our impoverishment.

NOTES

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