

## THE HEURISTIC VALUE OF A PSYCHOANALYTIC MODEL IN THE INTERPRETATION OF PAULINE THEOLOGY

by Robin Scroggs

For many people, both in and out of the church, the apostle Paul has a decidedly bad odor (so already Nietzsche). Seen as personally irascible and rigid, Paul bequeathed the church, so this view goes, a dark and pessimistic theology which consigned outsiders to damnation and insiders to a stultifying, pietistic life-style for the sake of rewards in some vague and future eternal life. This world is totally sinful and those in the church do not seem to be much better. Still he implies an elitist position; believers at least have hope that they will be saved.

Paul's theology, furthermore, seems hopelessly mythological. Sin and Satan, Jesus as a divine Son of God, the magic waving of the wand which excuses sin under the phrase "justification by grace," the very notion of salvation itself, eternal life in heaven—all these seem irredeemable in today's scientific world. And while there are good reasons to be pessimistic today, one can be pessimistic only in scientific terms. Thus Paul is dismissed without really being listened to.

A more positive approach might see Paul's mythology as a giant

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symbolic network in which Paul, and those he convinced, felt very much at home, so much at home, in fact, that with regard to most of the symbols Paul never had to explain what he meant. Now for all the sympathy we may have it is very difficult for most of us to be at home within that symbolic world. If we wish to understand Paul we in some ways have to translate him into language compatible with our own, perhaps equally mythical, world. At the same time we need to keep always in mind that one can never translate symbols; at best one can explain enough of a symbol so that it can come alive. Thus the inevitable tension: We must translate, yet we cannot. All our attempts to understand Paul need to be qualified by that tension.

It is my conviction, given the qualification stated above, that a psychoanalytic model can provide us today with an important and insightful translation of Paul. I refer explicitly to Freudian analysis of culture as modified and developed by later thinkers, primarily Norman O. Brown and Herbert Marcuse.<sup>1</sup> In this paper Paul's symbolic-theological world will be interpreted out of this model, which I label the psychoanalytic vision. Purely apart from analogies of content, which will be explored below, these two "worlds" are structurally similar: (1) Both plumb the depths of human existence and the dynamics of human transformation. Since they operate at the same depth level, it is possible to compare the anthropology that is at least implicit in each world. (2) Neither world is a developed thought system, and thus neither is an intellectualistic approach to reality. I mean by that simply that Paul is not a systematic theologian, although he "has" a theology that is basically consistent. In somewhat the same way Freud's theories developed out of his clinical practice, and he constantly was changing his theories to fit new insights gained from clinical experience. In sum, both worlds are created out of experiencing the human dynamic, and both worlds intend to express that dynamic. This is not of course to deny that Paul's world claims a transcendent dimension Freud's did not include. However, Paul Ricoeur may imply that Freud's world itself contained mythological elements—eros, thanatos, and ananke.<sup>2</sup> Whether that means Freud's world was also, ultimately, in touch with the transcendent will not be discussed here.

What follows are brief descriptions of the psychoanalytic vision, Paul's mythological vision, and a discussion of analogies and mutually interpenetrating insights. What then may be the heuristic value of this exercise?—not that Paul will be reduced to a primitive psychoanalyst but rather that through the insights of the psychoanalytic vision Paul's mythological world may come alive for us once more; that we may see more clearly the depth dynamic of his theology; and that ultimately we may be thrown back into that world where we may be touched

directly and moved by it, in that "second naïveté" Ricoeur has taught us about.

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC VISION

In one of his later books, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud concluded that all human culture, that is, all civilization, was neurotic: "If the evolution of civilization has such a far-reaching similarity with the development of an individual, and if the same methods are employed in both, would not the diagnosis be justified that many systems of civilization—or epochs of it—possibly even the whole of humanity—have become 'neurotic' under the pressure of the civilizing trends?"<sup>3</sup> For Freud this could be only a picture of horror, for "civilizing trends" meant for him a gradual and constant increase in the sense of guilt and human aggression.<sup>4</sup> The most pessimistic dimension of this movement is that it is determined and irreversible. There was, for him, no way out. The most one could hope for was that somehow eros and thanatos—the life and death drives—would balance themselves, so that civilization might continue to exist, however precariously.<sup>5</sup> Sublimations could help, yet they are also part of the neurotic process.<sup>6</sup> Fantasy and art he evaluated positively but clearly could put little hope in them—art is at best a mild narcotic.<sup>7</sup> Besides the eros drives, Freud's only hope lay in the ego and the reality principle.<sup>8</sup> The ego, while *ein armes Ding*, was nevertheless educable by the reality principle, and the two could join, Freud hoped, as allies to war against the unrealistic demands of both id and superego.

These judgments, which Freud was not able to put into a comprehensive critique of culture, are based of course on his analysis of the psyche of the individual and its movement through the infantile stages of sexual development to the denouement of the oedipal crisis. Fortunately these stages are so well known that they do not need repeating here.<sup>9</sup> Two ideas mark out the deterministic pessimism of the later Freud. One is his conclusion that a whole set of drives belongs under the umbrella term "death drive," that is, a biological direction toward death inherent in every living organism.<sup>10</sup> The second is that the chief and most destructive "representative" of this death drive is aggression, either as it is turned outward against the world or inward against the self in the form of the superego, which is the final inheritance from the stages of sexual organization.<sup>11</sup> If anything the latter, the superego, is more destructive than the former. At least in his later writings it is my impression that Freud heightens his stress on the demonic and unrealistic nature of the demands of the superego.<sup>12</sup> We need to keep in mind that the force of the superego is not to be equated with, or limited to, conscious feelings of guilt. The

superego is largely unconscious, and what a person in society “feels” is precisely the discontent, the malaise which Freud was trying to identify and analyze—thus the more civilization the more aggression, outward and inward; the more unhappiness the more malaise.<sup>13</sup> The original edition of *Civilization* ended with the sentence: “And now it is to be expected that the other of the two ‘Heavenly Powers’ . . . , eternal Eros, will make an effort to assert himself in the struggle with his equally immortal adversary.” In the second edition the lengthening shadows of the early thirties led him to add: “But who can foresee with what success and with what result?”

Brown begins with this pessimistic social analysis of Freud and, so far as possible, proceeds to intensify it.<sup>14</sup> The key word is repression.<sup>15</sup> As a result of the stages of sexual organization, the self is a repressed being, and that means it is alienated from, denied the basic reality it desires—does not even know what that reality is. All societal manifestations are the end product of the repressive mechanism that has its root in the unreal wishes and fears, both oedipal and preoedipal, of the infant. From the very beginning the infant reacts against the loneliness of separation, of withdrawal, reacts, that is, against the fear of death, and flees death, either backward as a desire to return to the womb or forward into the stages of sexual organization.<sup>16</sup> Thus for Brown repression is a concept identical with flight from death, and he can say that a person represses death as much as he represses life.<sup>17</sup>

Nothing in civilization is thus able to escape repression and radical distortion—neurosis—no matter how dearly cultural artifacts, such as art, philosophy, logic, or economics, cry out to be valued. True, Brown allows that certain prophets can catch a glimpse of humanity’s present condition and think of some notion of salvation. Neurosis contains within itself the attempt at a cure, and culture can be seen as the projection of infantile complexes into the open where they can be seen and a vain attempt made to master them.<sup>18</sup> Thus there are philosophers such as Nietzsche, litterateurs such as Jonathan Swift and William Blake, theologians such as Luther who have glimpsed dimensions of what humanity truly has become.<sup>19</sup> Psychoanalysis itself is part of this process.<sup>20</sup> Awareness of truth, however, does nothing to bring salvation. In a sentence reminiscent of R. Bultmann, Brown writes: “The hard truth which psychoanalysis must insist upon is that the acceptance of death, its reunification in consciousness with life, cannot be accomplished by the discipline of philosophy or the seduction of art, but only by the abolition of repression.”<sup>21</sup> This sentence also makes clear the connection between repression and flight from death. If repression is a flight from death, the abolition of repression involves an acceptance of death.<sup>22</sup>

Marcuse, four years prior to the appearance of Brown's work, laid out a system with sizable affinity to that of Brown.<sup>23</sup> Marcuse also begins with the later Freud and argues for the reality of the eros and death drives. He too accepts the universalness of neurosis, aggression, and repression. He also has caustic things to say about Freudian "revisionism."<sup>24</sup> Marcuse is most interested, however, in showing how the domination and control by society intensify the distortion and repression under which the individual lives. He develops carefully a correlation between the individual process and the societal. The societal correlation of the individual repression is "surplus repression," and the correlation of the individual reality principle is the "performance principle."<sup>25</sup> The result of repression and reality principle in the individual is that the person is forced to renounce the gratification, the pleasure, of the now and accept toil in place of pleasure. The performance principle extends and intensifies the individual renunciation. In civilization a person's value depends upon his production—his deeds—and he is subjected to continual (and unnecessary) domination and repression by hierarchical structures which control his life and reward him only with promises of future salvation. Marcuse of course is concerned primarily with economic and labor repression, but he seems to say that all of the individual's actions in the world are under the domination of the performance principle. It hardly takes much introspection to realize that our own self-valuation and the esteem of others do depend mostly upon our performance, whether it be our work, our beauty, our athletic skills, moral performance in society, or religious performance in the church.

These sober scientists thus are united in pointing to a sickness that lies at the very root of the person as historical being.<sup>26</sup> No distinction is being made between good people and bad people. It is not a question of piety or moral choice or of what one thinks about oneself. The issue is joined at a level which infects all people, all society, and all productions of society—a judgment just as sweeping and purely negative as that of Paul himself! And Marcuse's conclusion of his later book, *One-Dimensional Man*, is every bit as pessimistic as Freud. He quotes Walter Benjamin: "It is only for the sake of those without hope that hope is given to us."<sup>27</sup>

If Brown sounds gnostic, it is because he is one, of a sort, but it has to be added that he is an apocalyptic gnostic. That is, his most significant departure from Freud is his conviction that there is a way out, indeed, a salvation, and the last chapter of *Life Against Death* is tantalizingly titled "The Resurrection of the Body." We must ask what he means.

The flaw in Freud's pessimism, according to Brown, is that the

process of sexual organization is based always upon unreality. While there is a death drive, it is really the flight from death which leads to repression. Thus the sick society is built not actually upon a biological necessity but rather upon a historical flight from that necessity. And since neurotic existence is built upon fantasy, not biological necessity, it is conceivable to imagine that a different mode of being is possible.<sup>28</sup> This new mode would be the reversal of the flight from death (i.e., from loneliness and isolation) which resulted in the stages of sexual organization. The resurrection of the body means for Brown not a step forward toward perfection, or a step upward, out of this world, but rather a step backward, a movement back behind the process of sexual organization, back to that original state of primal narcissism, or what Brown likes to call "polymorphous perversity," a term Freud himself seems to have coined.<sup>29</sup> Here we must be careful lest we misunderstand and distort Brown.

In this eschatological stage the self is directed not selfishly to itself (here Brown corrects or "perfects" Freud) but to joyful union with its environment in unrepressed libido, or eros.<sup>30</sup> It is enjoyment without the need, or desire, to possess. Brown is careful to distinguish this state of being from both Platonic eros and Christian agape: "Platonic Eros is the child of defect or want."<sup>31</sup> It needs to possess the object to fill up the lack in the self. Agape, on the other hand, must extinguish the self. The former is aggressive; the latter, masochistic. Polymorphous-perverse eros, in distinction from both, stems out of fullness and delight and enjoys the "other." This love, because it is polymorphous, is by no means sexual in the explicit genital meaning of the term. It is, to the contrary, a defusion of genital sexuality.<sup>32</sup> Marcuse says much the same thing in his chapter titled "The Transformation of Sexuality into Eros." Thus the "resurrection of the body" means a return in adult form to a stage in which body and soul are united, where the self has again a wholeness and integrity it has not had under the domination of sexual organization. For Marcuse the mythic models for this existence are Orpheus and Narcissus, over against Prometheus; for Brown it is Dionysius against Apollo.<sup>33</sup>

In sum, this would be existence in which repression and therefore hostility and aggression did not exist. It would be a world in which the performance principle no longer dominated a person's life; a world in which people enjoyed salvation now—an overthrow of the postponement principle; a world in which differences among people would not be transformed into hierarchies of power and value—an overthrow of the importance principle.<sup>34</sup> People would work but not be dominated by it. They would think, but their thinking would be stimulated by the erotic mode of being, not restricted by a repressive logic. They would

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live and die, but they would not live bound by history and time; for time, Brown argues, is a creation of repression.<sup>35</sup> And finally death would be conquered in that one no longer would flee from it but would integrate it into the fullness of the self. It would be eschatological existence, in fact.

### PAUL'S MYTHOLOGICAL VISION: HEURISTIC ANALOGIES

I wish here to lay out Paul's theological structure in its baldly mythological language. God created humanity as beings of honor and glory; had it not fallen into sin, the community created by God would have remained in its plenitude of being and its authentic humanity and full relationship with God.<sup>36</sup> People sinned, however, and God decreed death for all mankind (Rom. 5:12). Sin and death ruled over all races of people, including Israel (Rom. 3:9–20). The Torah, instead of creating righteousness among Israel, actually increased sin (Rom. 5:20), although Paul never doubts that the legal requirements can be fulfilled. Thus pious Jews, struggling to be righteous under the law, are actually disobedient to God (Rom. 10:3). The whole world is helplessly under the power of sin and death.

The saving act, however, has come in from "outside." Through Christ God has justified, that is, acquitted, the whole world even though it was living in sin (Rom. 3:21–26, 4:5). This act of pure grace through Christ must be consciously accepted, however, and this acceptance Paul calls faith. Paul sees the life of faith as restoration to God's creational intent and calls the restored individual and community the new creation (II Cor. 5:17, Gal. 6:15). Thus salvation is a present phenomenon, although final realization awaits the resurrection of believers into spiritual bodies (I Cor. 15). The world and unbelievers will be destroyed, and apparently only the faithful will continue to exist, presumably in heaven (I Cor. 7:31, II Cor. 4:3, I Thess. 4:13–18).

I believe that Paul shares with the psychoanalytic vision the same deep insights into human reality and dynamic, despite the apparent enormity separating the language systems. It is, in fact, partly my studies in Freudian theory which have convinced me that Paul is not pushing a mythological ideology, although that is his language system, but that he reflects that same deep sense of the tragic reality of human existence, similar to that brought to consciousness by Freud. Freud himself suggested that Paul made an important step toward bringing the repressed to consciousness.<sup>37</sup> I believe this is true far beyond what

Freud believed, for it is my conviction that Paul's sense of the dynamic of salvation moves in the same directions as does that of Brown.

To substantiate these claims obviously would require a book-length treatment. What I can do here is to point to three analogies which are central to that dynamic: the analysis of the historical person, the dynamic of the "way out," and the description of the new history of the saved community.

#### THE ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORICAL PERSON

Both the psychoanalytic vision and Paul are in agreement that there is something seriously wrong with persons as historical beings. For both, the totality of human achievement in culture and society is evil, sinful, and under the domination of the performance principle and the death drive. For both, pious manifestations of culture are as much under that domination as are obvious acts of violence and destructiveness.

The radicality of Paul's judgment can perhaps best be grasped by contrasting his eschatological perspective with that of other apocalyptic systems. All such systems are to a greater or lesser extent critical of some dimensions of civilization. Their *raison d'être* is in fact a view that present life is not that life which God intended for Israel. Eschatological thinkers, however, do not usually totally reject human culture. Most often it is some form of outside civilization, that is, repression, that is denounced as evil, as for example the rulers and princes of the world in the Parables of Ethiopian Enoch.<sup>38</sup> The eschaton will be a vindication of the righteous of Israel, that is, of Israel's culture. Even the most pessimistic authors, such as the writers of II Baruch and IV Ezra, have as their criterion for salvation the key dimension of their culture: the observance of the law.<sup>39</sup> Christian eschatology also often reveals the same kind of critical acceptance of some form of culture. The Gospel of Matthew, for example, sees the Torah, as interpreted by Jesus, as normative. The criterion for entrance into the entirely future world is the proper life of obedience within this world.

Paul says the reverse. The criterion for entrance into the present kingdom is an obedience which consists in the willingness completely to give up one's world, one's civilization. All of "this world" is in bondage to sin; it lives under the evil powers and principalities, the god of this world who is opposed to Yahweh.<sup>40</sup> As I have suggested, Paul directs himself primarily to culture *per se*, not to obviously sinful or perverse acts or people. When Paul denounces life under the law, he is attacking one of the finest manifestations of moral culture in the



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ancient world. It is, in fact, the heart of what had been his own civilization. And what is wrong with it? As interpreted by Pharisaic Judaism, it is pure performance principle, or so Paul saw it; thus it is a classic societal expression of human repression and renunciation and of aggression. The Torah is indeed holy because it is God's Torah. For Paul, however, what the Jew has done is to transform that divine revelation into a culture of performance, where one boasts in and stands on his own accomplishment.<sup>41</sup> Life under this repression is, he tells the Galatians, nothing else than a life in subjection to the powers and principalities, that is, subjection to sin and death.<sup>42</sup> In I Corinthians Paul provides us with a skeleton of a similar, all-inclusive rejection of Hellenistic culture. Greek rationality and rhetoric are folly and have failed to reach their presumed goal.<sup>43</sup> As Bultmann has suggested, such rationality is also performance principle because it seeks to secure its existence by establishing a rational structure in which the self can feel comfortable and secure.<sup>44</sup> But for Paul this world with all its glory and boasting is totally opposite to that eschatological reality intended and now being brought into existence *ex nihilo* by God:

God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise;  
God chose what is weak in the world to shame the strong;  
God chose what is low and despised in the world, even things  
that are not, to bring to nothing things that are,  
so that no human being might boast in the presence of God.

[I Cor. 1:27–29]

Thus the apostle, with a radical vision equalled by no one in early Christianity besides the author of the Gospel of John (and perhaps the "protognostics"), sees the demonic character of this world and knows its complete estrangement from true life. No matter how hard one tries no one can be justified, that is, find life. As Brown might interpret this language, Paul realizes that universality of the repressive and performance-oriented civilization and asserts that the result of the tendencies of this civilization means the triumph of the death drive over the life drive: "I was once alive apart from the law, but when the commandment came, sin revived and I died; the very commandment which promised life proved to be death to me. For sin, finding opportunity in the commandment, deceived me and by it killed me" (Rom. 7:9–11).

And what is this commandment? With insight that says more than he could have been conscious of, Paul cites the command against covetousness as the epitome of the law. What life under the performance principle has done is to create an existence qualified by "all

covetousness" (Rom. 7:7–8).<sup>45</sup> And covetousness is a primary expression of aggression—the attempt to possess, control, seize from another, kill. It stems from lack rather than fullness. What Paul here is struggling to express is the startling claim that the obedient life under the Torah is just that life qualified by all covetousness. To be obedient to the Torah in an attempt to justify oneself by works is to express that primal hostility and aggression stored in the superego. Richard Rubenstein expresses this beautifully. Writing about himself in explicit relation to the Pauline passage about covetousness, he says: "Every attempt I made to comply with the Law, thereby subordinating myself to God, contained an incitement to rebel against him."<sup>46</sup> There is in fact a "peculiar mixture of rebelliousness and submissiveness involved in the act of obedience."<sup>47</sup> Thus both desire to fill the lack and hostility against the father can be expressed in the act of obedience to the commandment. Paul knows about the hostility as well as the lack, for reconciliation is always a reconciliation of mankind with the father, not the reverse. And why does mankind need reconciliation? Because it hates God. "For if, while we were hostile, we were reconciled to God . . ." (Rom. 5:10). Hostile to whom? To God! Thus Paul in his judgment about the universal and qualitative nature of sin shows the closest affinity to psychoanalytic theory.<sup>48</sup>

#### THE DYNAMIC OF THE WAY OUT

For Paul this tragically distorted world is not the final reality for humankind. The kingdom of God already has broken into the present, a transcendent reality created by the spirit, an eschatological community—in short, the new creation.<sup>49</sup> The world of repression, sin, and death is passing away. The believer does not have to live in that old order; he and she now can live in the new creation. Thus the community under Christ and in the spirit cannot be compared with this world, that is, distorted civilization. It does not live out of its values, is not bound to its mores, its laws, its roles. As the new creation it is freed from the curse laid on the old. When Paul is describing eschatological existence he goes not to Genesis 3, where sin and death enter as distortions of God's intent for a person, but to Genesis 1 and 2, out of which he develops Christ as the eschatological Adam, who fulfills God's original intent for humanity and who bestows that reality on the believer.<sup>50</sup>

Paul is here dependent upon Jewish mythology, which identifies Adam before his sin with eschatological humanity.<sup>51</sup> In this mythology the way to salvation, while pointing to the future, is at the same time a way back, back to a person's original, undistorted existence. For Paul the same thing is true. If once I was alive before the law and I am

and will be alive in Christ after the law, then eschatological existence is as much a way back as a way forward. In any case true life and freedom from the "ought" of the law are joined inseparably. Thus both Paul and Brown have a sense that a life of unrepression which mirrors a person's original possibility is possible; for Paul, a life in God's creational intent; for Brown, a life in that erotic perfection which lies behind the repressive stages of sexual organization.

How is it possible to leave the one world for the other, to be free to live in the unique culture of the eschaton? For Paul it was possible, of course, only through appropriation of God's act in Christ, and for our purposes it is highly instructive to see how the apostle speaks about this event. When he discusses the significance of the death of Jesus he mostly passes by the sacrificial metaphor, as is well known by now.<sup>52</sup> The heart of his christology is his claim that the cross is God's eschatological act of judgment upon the world. This act has two dimensions. On the one hand, it is a judgment of doom upon this world, upon the civilization of repression. Christ is bringing to naught the powers and principalities which dominate humanity, and he equally brings to an end the law, the demonic enslavement of mankind to the performance principle.<sup>53</sup> On the other hand, the act of justification means an acquittal of people from the guilt accumulated in the old, repressive civilization and, what is more, the possibility of liberation from that civilization since the performance principle now no longer need exist and the superego no longer be in demonic control. As an acquittal of the impious, the act of the cross is God's sheer gift of grace and is independent of any human act or accomplishment.<sup>54</sup> Mankind has gone its own aggressive way, which Paul describes as covetousness and hostility, but God has broken into that circle of civilized death and sin and freed people both from guilt and from that civilization which creates and accumulates guilt—the civilization of law demand.<sup>55</sup> Only life that is sheer gift can live out of a new world because only this life is full and does not act out of need, thus does not seek to justify itself with works. Only life in sheer grace can live without covetousness.

With this act God has cut away the performance principle and the significance of personal status in the eschatological community. Thus he brings an end to domination of some people over others. He has severed the connection of the believer with the old world, its values and structures, since these are now nothing to the self which receives all its value from the act of God in Christ. It is this liberation from bondage to these value systems that Paul is pointing to when he speaks of being crucified to the world.<sup>56</sup>

If these judgments are right, then we may have further insight into Paul's dissatisfaction with the sacrificial metaphor. This metaphor

does speak to the issue of guilt of one's past, but it still lives within the culture of that past. Its conclusion could be only: Go and sin no more. It does not create a new world in which new guilt would not accumulate.<sup>57</sup> The final eschatological act of judgment which brings an end to the old world does enable, however, a new world to come into being.

Yet this new life is not only a life in Christ. It is also a life before the father. This is the father against whom one previously had hostility and with whom the believer is now reconciled. As Freud showed long ago, the Jewish notion of God as father is a projection onto a cosmic scale of the oedipal scene.<sup>58</sup> But how can one become reconciled with this father? Only by learning that one's old image of the father was wrong. This may be the reason Paul continually emphasizes that the act of Christ is really an act of the father. This act reveals that the father of the law demand is a fantasy existing in the minds (ego and superego) of the son. The true father is different. He is the father of Jesus Christ who restores mankind to its original fullness in the gift of grace and thus reveals himself as totally different from the feared fantasy father. In this respect the basic movement of Paul's theology could be seen as a redefinition of the meaning of God.<sup>59</sup>

In summary, the basic christological affirmation of Paul focuses upon the power of Christ to break the bondage of mankind to civilization, to this world, and to release for it the power of true humanity, so that one now may live freely and joyously in the eschatological reality. Thus just as Paul shows by his descriptions of the old and new eons a view of a radical discontinuity so he shows by his christology how a person can move from one reality to the other.

#### THE NEW HISTORY OF THE SAVED COMMUNITY

For Brown the "saved" individual has moved back behind the stages of sexual organization to a new narcissism which is joyous union with the world without the need to possess and dominate. At this point Brown becomes reticent to speak other than in generalities, and furthermore he speaks only of the individual, not of a community of people creating a new, nonrepressive history. Since for Paul the individual is always seen in relation to the community of faith, my analysis of necessity will move beyond the hints in Brown, yet remaining sensitive to his insights.

There are two initial problems. The first is that Paul intends to describe not just another culture but a unique, that is, eschatological culture. The analyses by Brown and Marcuse help us to understand how it indeed may be unique insofar as its basis remains rooted in grace, that is, unrepressive and non-performance-principle reality. And yet this culture perforce must use building blocks of contiguous

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civilizations—words, symbols, even rules. These “old” building blocks, however, should not blind us to the fact that the structure itself may be new.<sup>60</sup>

The second problem is that Paul was not always able himself to appropriate existentially his own gospel. Nor could he be expected to comprehend, or bring to adequate expression, all the potential ramifications of his new vision. However, we must not allow the finiteness of Paul to obscure what was a radically new reality.

One possible anxiety must be laid to rest at the beginning. Would an unrepressed community be anarchic, completely frenzied, single-mindedly devoted to sexual intercourse? Would it have no rules, no work, no thinking, no concern outside of selfish self-love? Brown and Marcuse make it quite clear that in their judgment none of these things would hold. A return behind genital organization to polymorphous perversity actually would lessen the explicit sexual contact, and the real sexual perversions, such as rape, the use of sex for conquest and dominance, sadism-masochism (inside and outside of the marriage bed) would cease. As Marcuse has suggested, the unrepressive community would enshrine eros in the broadest sense, one which reaches out joyously to outside reality.<sup>61</sup> Eros in this context would be community inclusive, while explicit sexuality tends to be community exclusive. Marcuse even speaks of a “non-repressive mode of sublimation” and argues that the so-called higher values of civilization, by which he seems to mean reason and other sublimational products, can be recharged in the freed society with eros and thus made susceptible to legitimacy in the eschatological community.<sup>62</sup> The question then is not whether there would be orders and structures but whether these structures are based on love, on caring enjoyment without the desire to possess and dominate.

I want to suggest three primary characteristics of the unrepressive community and then attempt to demonstrate that the eschatological community Paul describes manifests—or is in his judgment supposed to manifest—these characteristics:

1. There would be an emphasis upon present enjoyment and fulfillment and a deemphasis upon postponement. Life would not be exhausted in the expectation of a future happiness, while in the present a person remains enslaved to the performance principle. Even a life in hope, however much hope qualifies existence, would not be adequate in the unrepressed and unrepressive community.

2. In this community there would be no domination of person over person. Each would be accepted as she or he is and valued equally with all others. While there might be societal structures for pragmatic reasons, they would not be vehicles of lust for power and aggression.

3. Since the community would not be based on the performance principle, rules would be used to express the “is” more than the “ought.” If a person’s present life is the good and if the human ego is not absorbed in the struggle for power, then there will be an acceptance of the present without the urge to push toward some other perfection or to attempt to force others in that direction. Rules might be needed to show how care could best be channeled and expressed, but “salvation” would not depend upon subjection to the rules. As someone said a long time ago, a good tree produces good fruit.

With these rubrics in mind let us now turn to Paul to see whether he expects his communities to live out of these realities.

1. *The Present Reality.* One can think instantly of many places in the letters where Paul insists upon or implies the present actuality of eschatological reality without in any way diminishing his expectation of the future. Here is a key difference between Paul and most other apocalyptic thinkers. For them ultimate reality is postponed because their eschatology is based on the performance principle. For Paul the reality is present. What I want to stress here, however, are the words he uses to describe the quality of life of the believer in community. While we may think first of “faith” and “love,” there are other words which are almost equally important. Peace, joy, rejoicing, freedom—all these play prominent roles in Paul’s vocabulary.<sup>63</sup> They clearly point to an unrepressed and joyous life in the present. The fruits of the Spirit he lists in Galatians 5:22–23 are instructive: love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control. What a beautiful list of unrepressive qualities! Savor again the words “gentleness” and “patience.” Here is a sensitized care for the neighbor that is a world apart from aggression and hostility. And is it necessary to point out that this list traditionally would be called a list of “feminine” virtues? For Paul, however, these are virtues for all people. Even self-control, because it comes out of the individual’s joy and love, is not repressive or imposed. It is life put in the care of the other.<sup>64</sup>

Of course Paul also enjoins obedience, but he means by obedience the willingness to live out of the faith that God has given life as sheer gift, apart from the performance principle.<sup>65</sup> And this leads to an understanding of faith, which is linked so closely with obedience. For Paul faith is the constant confidence that God has brought to naught the performance repression and the willingness to remain in that confidence, not to be frightened back into the repressive world by threats of the loss of salvation, or by anxiety about security, not timidly, fearfully to turn or return to the law. A Christianity under law is for Paul a self-contradiction; that is why he can denounce even an angel

who might bring a gospel of law into the church.<sup>66</sup> Faith is thus the life beyond the performance principle, the reality of the unpostponed pleasure of salvation.

Paul's emphasis on love needs to be viewed from this perspective. We usually are presented at the beginning of such a discussion with a contrast between agape and eros, between love which sacrifices itself, which offers itself to the neighbor independent of the quality of the neighbor, and love which is based on desire, a love which, acting out of lack, needs something from the other.<sup>67</sup> Paul of course avoided as did other Christians the word eros in favor of agape, but here he not only is simply following the common vocabulary of Hellenistic Judaism but also is echoing secular vocabulary.<sup>68</sup> This is now known from a study by Robert Joly.<sup>69</sup> Thus the use of a particular word group tells us nothing about the context of the concept pointed to. Indeed, if Brown's definition be our guide, caring enjoyment without possession, both Paul's letters and his life seem to reflect an awareness of this kind of love. "Love one another with brotherly affection" is his interpretation of the injunction to love one's neighbor as oneself.<sup>70</sup> Notice the strong stress here on mutuality, which recurs frequently in his ethical admonitions.<sup>71</sup> Love is patient, kind, not jealous, boastful, arrogant, rude, does not seek its own way, that is, is not corrupted by that hostility and aggression which one finds in repressed society.<sup>72</sup> Love is therefore the opposite of covetousness.

Paul was himself dependent upon that mutuality in his life with fellow workers and his churches. When he came to Troas, even though opportunities presented themselves for a fruitful mission, he could not psychically endure it because Titus was not there, for whose presence (and from him news of the Corinthian situation) he so longed.<sup>73</sup> His love for the Philippians is well known, and it is no simple rhetorical flourish when he tells them that he yearns for them.<sup>74</sup>

These passages could be multiplied. They at least suggest what I believe can be demonstrated: that the thesis of Anders Nygren is psychologically and exegetically false.<sup>75</sup> His definition of agape seems almost to fit better into the repressive old eon than in the new. Despite Nygren's disclaimers, it is performance oriented, for, since the act toward the other is independent of evaluations, agape can hang over the self as an ought. Erotic exuberance, on the other hand, sees that the problem is not the undesirability of others—as agape seems continually to imply—but that the self in its repressed state is blind to the reality of other people. As Abraham Maslow has shown, there is an important noetic quality to true love.<sup>76</sup> Perhaps we need at the least a new definition of agape, but it would be one which should be based on

that eros pointed to by Brown and Marcuse. In the words of the latter, "the notion that Eros and Agape may after all be one and the same—not that Eros is Agape but that Agape is Eros—may sound strange after almost two thousand years of theology."<sup>77</sup> It may sound strange, but it also may be true and give us a better insight into Paul and his eschatological counterculture.

Paul's judgments about sex and marriage further reflect his primary concern for the quality of eschatological existence. His preference for the single state in I Corinthians 7 is clear. Equally clear, however, is his refusal to say that sexuality is an illegitimate part of human life, even in the earthly eschatological community. Sexual expression within marriage is one way of caring for the other. He also implies that an essential dimension to a marriage is the quality of peace.<sup>78</sup>

Why then does he argue that the single state is preferable?—primarily because it frees one to be devoted entirely to the Lord.<sup>79</sup> Surely this means the caring and loving within the broader community of believers. In this case love has not been repressed but unshackled from genital organization to be directed to larger goals. As already suggested, explicit sexuality is community exclusive; the un-repressed eros is community inclusive.<sup>80</sup> For Paul, as for Jesus, the community is the true family of the believer.

2. *The End of Domination.* Paul knows that believers have different talents and capacities: There are the weak and the strong, the variously distributed gifts of the spirit; there are male and female.<sup>81</sup> But his central theme, God's sheer gift of life for impious, that is, aggressive humankind, leads him to see the absolute equality of all people before God and within the community. Thus Galatians 3:28 is no mere passing, rhetorical statement but a direct and necessary corollary to his basic premise: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus." Societal or economic status is irrelevant for God's purposes, and no believer can boast in anything but the gift of God.<sup>82</sup> Paul acknowledges no church hierarchy. The community is to handle problems whether as a committee of the whole or by individual members acting out of their own wisdom.<sup>83</sup> The very function of Paul's body motif in I Corinthians 12 and Romans 12 is to deny the validity of both dominating and abasing postures. Paul acknowledges distinctions; he rejects all value judgments derived from these distinctions.

Contrary to what has been thought for hundreds of years, Paul carries this egalitarian structure over into the relation between male



and female. In my judgment it has been demonstrated successfully that Paul shared with his church understandings of the equality of male and female, and I will not repeat the arguments here.<sup>84</sup> Paul accepts women as church leaders (Rom. 16; I Cor. 11:2–16), assigns them equal rights and responsibilities to male in familial and sexual situations (I Cor. 7), and everywhere assumes their equal status. Even that very ambiguous passage about the head covering in I Corinthians 11 does not raise the question about the validity of women leading worship.

3. *The Abolition of the Performance Principle.* For Paul a Christianity of law is a self-contradiction—thus his fierce struggle to keep law out of the Gospel. This by no means indicates that the apostle was an ethical anarchist, although he has been suspected of that in his day as well as ours. Quite the contrary, he does expect a high standard of ethical behavior, and he knows what that would look like. One could even suggest that for Paul such behavior was the surest indication that a believer really was living in justification by faith. But the actual righteousness which exists comes not out of doggedly following rules but out of the act of Christ which, through the Spirit, enables the community to live without aggression and guilt, in love. Most of the ethical admonitions in the authentic Pauline corpus are general maxims, almost commonplaces, such as catalogues and wisdom sayings.<sup>85</sup> Even the Jesus tradition is, with few exceptions, absent perhaps because Paul was afraid that the teaching of Jesus could become for many believers a new law, as in fact it later actually became. For Paul no command, whether coming from God or Jesus, must be allowed to threaten justification by grace. S. Lyonnet perceives this clearly. The Gospel commandment “does not justify any more than did the Old Law, since its nature is not different; it remains a norm of conduct, not a principle of activity.”<sup>86</sup> He can even appeal to Aquinas. Speaking of II Corinthians 3:6, the Angelic Doctor says: “The letter denotes any writing that is external to man, even that of the moral precepts such as are contained in the Gospel. Wherefore the letter, even of the Gospel, would kill, unless there were the inward presence of the healing grace of faith.”<sup>87</sup>

We all know of course that Paul does at times lay down rules. Most of these are clearly for the sake of forwarding the communications of love and are thus consonant with the unrepressive society. Others are evidence of Paul’s zealous attempt to guard the purity of the community, so that his strictures seem harsher on believers than on unbelievers.<sup>88</sup> He is determined that this world and its distorted life shall not invade the church, and one gets the feeling sometimes that he is repressive in his attempt to eliminate repression. Yet at basis it shows

the seriousness of Paul's project. There is to be no compromise with the world.

Paul was not able entirely to eradicate the performance principle from his own life, but that does not dim his vision of a community which lives out of the fruit of the spirit rather than the law. And of course his vision was that the new reality is not a human project, as it has to be for Brown and Marcuse: It is only through the father's act in Christ that the old repressive civilization can be brought to an end. What is so striking about his vision is the consonance he was able to create between his christology and his ecclesiology. The old eon is brought to an end precisely through the abolition by God of the basis for that repressive existence. Thus and thus only can the new life of unrepressed joy emerge as the eschatological culture.

#### CONCLUSION

Probably one of the greatest obstacles against our receiving ideas as Paul confronts us with here is that they sound too much like a fairy story, a fantasy of a child not yet sufficiently taught by the stern reality principle. Yet it is precisely our enslavement to the reality principle that has blinded us to the potential for human existence, to the reality God has always intended. We must not lose hope in such a vision just because it seems so to collide with the world and its ways. Indeed, with the imminent collapse of all civilization staring us in the face, it may be that only the radically different vision will save. Speaking of utopian vision, Brown wrote, back in the still seemingly safe days of 1959: Utopian visions "are a way of affirming faith in the possibility of solving problems that seem at the moment insoluble. Today even the survival of humanity is a utopian hope."<sup>89</sup>

Paul believed, however, that he was not carrying the gospel of a utopian ideology but a gospel of real happenings, real transformation, and a really new community. It is my hope that these analogies from the psychoanalytic vision may give us a little better grasp of how Paul might be correct, how embedded in the Christian symbol structure is a depth dynamic of human transformation out of a performance-principle world into the new community of grace. If the analogies are at all correct, they show that Paul's gospel in fact is rooted in the structure of human existence and shows an awareness of how in a real way that structure can be transformed. But it will not happen by talking or constructing utopias. Just as Brown knows that his vision can become reality only by the actual elimination of repression, so Paul knows equally passionately that the new creation comes into being only through that liberating act of God the father through Jesus Christ. That act, however, is not the magic waving of a wand but

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the engagement of persons in the depth of their being. If the psychoanalytic vision has clarified that process for us, it has, I believe, heuristic value indeed.

### NOTES

1. Such an analysis already has been used fruitfully by Richard Rubenstein in his *My Brother Paul* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). Interestingly Rubenstein uses Freud and Norman O. Brown to explore those Pauline motifs usually collected under the rubric "Christ mysticism." My own approach centers on the other major thematic in Paul, justification by grace through faith.
2. Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 261-309.
3. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, trans. Joan Riviere (London: Hogarth Press, 1949), p. 141.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
6. E.g., *ibid.*, p. 44.
7. Freud seems to have been somewhat ambivalent about artistic expression; see the discussions in Ricoeur, pp. 163-77; Norman O. Brown, *Life against Death* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1959), pp. 55, 67; Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), pp. 127-33. For art as a mild narcotic see Freud, pp. 27-28.
8. Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, trans. Joan Riviere, rev. ed. (London: Hogarth Press, 1962), p. 46, and *Civilization*, p. 88.
9. For a convenient summary see Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (Harmondsworth [England]: Penguin Books, 1973), pp. 150-64, and *Ego*, pp. 21-26.
10. First stated in Sigmund Freud's *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1970), the German original appearing in 1920.
11. Freud, *Ego*, p. 24.
12. E.g., in his *Civilization*, pp. 81-92.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.
14. The subtitle of Brown's *Life Against Death is The Psychoanalytic Meaning of History*.
15. Throughout Brown. See his opening statement: "There is one word which, if we only understood it, is the key to Freud's thought. The word is 'repression'" (p. 3).
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 110-34.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
19. See Brown's chapters on Jonathan Swift and Luther. Brown frequently turns to William Blake as well as Jacob Boehme as allies.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 145-56.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 108-9.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 307-8.
23. Marcuse, *Eros*. Brown, however, refers to *Eros* only once in *Life*, p. 141.
24. Marcuse, pp. 217-51; Brown, p. 98.
25. Marcuse, p. 32.
26. The word "historical" is crucial in this sentence. The sickness is not located in the individual "nature" of a person but rather comes into being as this individual is grafted into civilization.
27. Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 257.
28. Brown, pp. 87-109.
29. E.g., *ibid.*, pp. 26-27, 48, 308.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-49.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

32. "The abolition of repression would abolish the unnatural concentrations of libido in certain particular bodily organs . . ." (ibid., p. 308). Cf. also pp. 25–26, 176. Also Marcuse, *Eros*, pp. 184–85.

33. Marcuse, *Eros*, pp. 159–71; Brown, 174–76.

34. A coinage of Brown in his *Love's Body* (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 235.

35. Brown, *Life*, pp. 272–78.

36. The pre-Fall state in glory is never explicitly described by Paul, but it is hard to doubt that he assumed this idea which seems to have been universally accepted in postbiblical Judaism. He hints at it in Rom. 3:23.

37. Sigmund Freud, *Moses and Monotheism*, trans. Katherine Jones (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1939), pp. 111–14.

38. Chaps. 62–63.

39. E.g., II Bar. 46:3; IV Ezra 7:29.

40. Rom. 8:38–39; I Cor. 15:26–27; Gal. 4:8–9; II Cor. 4:4.

41. Rom. 4:2, 9:30–32; 10:3; Phil. 3:9.

42. Gal. 4:8–9.

43. I Cor. 1:17–25. This reveals my judgment that Paul is speaking in this section against Greek rhetoric and quasi philosophy rather than gnostic speculations; cf. my argument in "Paul: ΣΟΦΟΣ and ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ," *New Testament Studies* 14 (1967–68): 33–55. The basic point, however, would hold even if Paul were attacking gnosticism, as many scholars argue today. Cf. Charles Kingsley Barrett, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 55.

44. R. Bultmann, *Primitive Christianity in Its Contemporary Setting*, trans. R. H. Fuller (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1962), p. 183.

45. The inclusiveness of covetousness as a symbol for all sin is seen also by Stanislas Lyonnet. Thus Rom. 7:7 is not a specific citation from the ten commandments but an "all-embracing formula." See Lyonnet's *St. Paul, Liberty and Law* (Rome: Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1962), pp. 5–6. Lyonnet argues in more detail in "L'Histoire du salut selon le chapitre VII de l'Épître aux Romains," *Biblica* 43 (1962): 144–47. He cites as additional evidence I Cor. 10:6, where *epithumein* used absolutely is inclusive of all sin.

46. Rubenstein (n. 1 above), p. 11.

47. Ibid.

48. Bultmann's existential interpretations are also, as should be obvious by now, extremely congenial to the psychoanalytic interpretation. See his *Existence and Faith*, trans. and comp. Schubert M. Ogden (London: Hodder, 1961), pp. 145–57, and "Christ the End of the Law," in *Essays: Philosophical and Theological*, trans. J. C. G. Greig (New York: Macmillan Co., 1955), pp. 36–66.

49. E.g., II Cor. 5:17; Gal. 6:15; I Cor. 15:49 (reading the subjunctive with p. 46, χ, Α, C, D, G, and many other witnesses) and the many passages which speak of the presence of the spirit.

50. Cf. I Cor. 15:44–49; II Cor. 4:4–6; Rom. 5:12–21; Phil. 3:20–21; and the discussion in my *The Last Adam: A Study in Pauline Anthropology* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), pp. 92–112.

51. See my *Last Adam*, pp. 23–29, 54–58.

52. Sacrificial images appear in the Pauline letters because they are an established part of tradition, but in R. Bultmann's judgment they "do not contain Paul's characteristic view" (*Theology of the New Testament*, trans. Kendrick Grobel, 2 vols. [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951–55], 1:296).

53. I. Cor. 15:24–26; Rom. 10:4, where *welos*, since it is in the closest connection with the theme of justification by faith, has to be taken in the sense of *finis*. Cf. now P. Stuhlmacher, "Das Ende des Gesetzes," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 67 (1970): 14–39, for a strong statement of this position.

54. Rom. 4:4–5; 5:15–21; I Cor. 1:26–31.

55. Rom. 5:10; 7:7–11; I Cor. 10:6; II Cor. 5:18–20.

56. Gal. 6:14.

57. According to Freud, civilization is always accumulating more and more guilt (*Civilization*, p. 80). It is interesting to see that the Epistle to the Hebrews, with its

extreme emphasis upon sacrificial images, still has to worry about postbaptismal sin, e.g., in 10:26–27, in whatever form the author might have conceived of such sin.

58. Freud, *Moses*, pp. 171–74. Also Sigmund Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, trans. W. D. Robson-Scott (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1964), pp. 27–28, 71. This judgment says nothing, of course, about the existence or nonexistence of God.

59. It is precisely at this point that I am forced to part company with Rubenstein's provocative essay. He interprets what commonly is called Christ mysticism out of Freud's theory of the primal horde, with the ensuing murder of the father. Identification with Christ as elder brother is the solution to the problem of the guilt for the murder of the father (*ibid.*, pp. 78–113). I do not doubt that moments of identification are present in the believer's relation with Christ. To base an interpretation of Paul on this theory is, however, to give priority to phylogenesis rather than ontogenesis and to depend upon what is acknowledged today as a mythic statement rather than the documented clinical work of Freud the scientist. The implication here is that the symbol of God the father must be retained in Christian theology, despite the understandable misgivings of some thinkers; see Mary Daly, *Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women's Liberation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973). Yet there is a sense in which even so one can speak of a movement "beyond God the Father." It could perhaps even be described as a movement toward God the mother (reunion motifs), but nevertheless this movement could not avoid dealing with God the father. Certainly the process involves coming to terms with the mother image. Rubenstein can even say: "Thus, at the deepest level, fear of the infanticidal parent is fear of the mother" (n. 1 above, p. 67). However that may be, I think the desire toward reunion greater than the fear.

60. From the perspective of the sociology of knowledge Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann show how groups which have radically "unworldly" views of reality even attempt to keep the sect apart from the world (*The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1967], pp. 156–61).

61. Marcuse, *Eros* (n. 7 above), pp. 201–5; also Brown (n. 7 above), pp. 25–26.

62. Marcuse, *Eros*, pp. 169, 196.

63. "Peace," noun and verb, about twenty-six times; the verb "rejoice" about twenty-three times; the noun "joy" about eighteen times. Various forms of the root for "freedom" about twenty-two times. I developed analysis of these terms in my *Paul for a New Day* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), pp. 29–37.

64. I have argued elsewhere that these words in Gal. 5:22–23 describe an existence of fullness and thus are not repressive "oughts" (see my "The Next Step: A Common Humanity," *Theology Today* 34 [1977–78]: 395–401).

65. Esp. Rom. 10:3–4 where disobedience is seen as the refusal to accept Christ as the end of the law.

66. As he does in Gal. 1:8 in the general context of his struggles on behalf of a law-free gospel.

67. The classic treatment, of course, is Anders Nygren's *Agape and Eros: A Study of the Christian Idea of Love*, trans. A. G. Hebert and Philip S. Watson, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1932–39).

68. The *agapan* family is used in the LXX for all kinds of love, including lust and rape, e.g., in the story of the rape of Tamar by Ammon (II Sam. 13:1, 4, 15). The subject is treated decisively by B. Warfield in his "The Terminology of Love in the New Testament," *Princeton Theological Review* 16 (1918): 1–45, 153–203.

69. Robert Joly, *Le vocabulaire chrétien de l'amour est-il original?* (Bruxelles: Presses universitaires de Bruxelles, 1968). His statistics prove that in the pre-Christian centuries the use of the verb *philein* was declining while that of *agapan* increasing.

70. Rom. 12:10; 13:8–10; Gal. 5:13–14.

71. In addition to the above note see among others I Thess. 3:12, 4:18, 5:11; Gal. 6:2, I Cor. 12:25; Rom. 1:12, 12:5, 14:13, 19, 15:7, 14, 16:16. The theme of "building up" the church is similar.

72. I Cor. 13:4–7.

73. II Cor. 2:12–13, 7:5–7.

74. Phil. 1:8.

75. For the psychological side cf. Erich Fromm, *Man for Himself* (New York: Rinehart, 1947), p. 130; and for the theological, Martin Cyril D'Arcy, *The Mind and Heart of Love, Lion and Unicorn: A Study in Eros and Agape* (New York: H. Holt & Co., 1947), p. 70. The few remarks I have made in this paper obviously do not count as a refutation of Nygren's exegesis. I hope to do that elsewhere.

76. Abraham H. Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1968), p. 43.

77. Marcuse, *Eros*, p. 210.

78. I Cor. 7:15.

79. See my "Paul and the Eschatological Woman," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 40 (1972): 296-97.

80. In a beautiful study of nineteenth-century American sects R. Kantor shows that sects or communes usually make some attempt to keep erotically motivated splinter groups from emerging in the context of the larger whole (*Commitment and Community* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972], pp. 9-18, 44-45, 86-91).

81. E.g., Rom. 12:3-8; Rom. 14; I Cor. 12.

82. I Cor. 1:26-31; Rom. 3:27.

83. I Cor. 5:3-5; Gal. 6:1. It is true that in the salutation of the letter to the Philippians he does greet the bishops and deacons (1:1), and in the earlier I Corinthians, in a list of different kinds of activities in the church, he uses the word *kubernesis* ("administration"), perhaps a general term foreshadowing the later technical term *episkopos*.

84. See my "Paul and the Eschatological Woman" (n. 79 above), pp. 283-303, and my "Paul and the Eschatological Woman, Revisited," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 42 (1974): 532-37; Wayne A. Meeks, "The Image of the Androgyne: Some Uses of a Symbol in Earliest Christianity," *History of Religions* 13 (1974): 165-208; Calvin J. Roetzel, *The Letters of Paul: Conversations in Context* (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975), pp. 99-101. I consider Colossians, Ephesians, and the Pastorals as post-Pauline. For the most recent marshaling of the evidence for and against authenticity see Norman Perrin's *The New Testament: An Introduction* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), pp. 121-23, 129-31, 264-65.

85. The law is summed up and fulfilled in loving the neighbor. Paul feels content to use the Hellenistic catalogues of vices and virtues to make his general ethical points. The ethical performance—which Paul certainly expects—is the result of the Spirit and stems from the Faith existence of the believer. It is important to note that while Paul feels completely free to adopt Hellenistic ethical forms he studiously avoids that particular one called by scholars the *Haustafel*, although it appears in the deuterio-Pauline literature (Eph. 5:21-6:9; Col. 3:18-4:1, among others). Paul's avoidance of this form is hardly accidental. The *Haustafel* is subordinationist and role oriented and thus explicitly accepts the inequality of people. Paul can use the catalogues because they do not imply roles of domination. See my *Paul for a New Day* (n. 63 above), pp. 57-74, for a more detailed exegesis of Pauline ethics.

86. Lyonnet, *St. Paul* (n. 45 above), p. 16.

87. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* II, 1, q. 106, a. 2, cited in Lyonnet, p. 16.

88. Contrast I Cor. 5:1-5 with 5:9-13; see my *Paul for a New Day*, pp. 51-56.

89. Brown, p. 305.