## THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT FOR AMERICAN PROTESTANT THEOLOGY: LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY RESOLUTIONS AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY PROBLEMS

by Hans Schwarz

The significance of evolutionary thought for nineteenth-century American Protestant theology is a topic that exceeds by far the possibilities of a single research paper. The reason for this is not simply that there is so much primary and secondary literature to cover but that the impact of evolutionary thought occurred on many different levels. First, one must note that in the second half of the nineteenth century there are at least two significant impulses that advanced evolutionary thinking in the United States, the one connected with the name of Herbert Spencer, the other associated with Charles Darwin and his work. It is difficult to determine which of the two had a more lasting influence. Second, the theological reflection upon evolution was not confined to theologians proper. Any respectable American scientist in the nineteenth century who dealt with evolution also made statements that deliberately transcended the realm of science. Third, unlike where one encounters one or two established confessions, in America the theological scene is highly pluralistic, which again makes it difficult to assess the theologians' response to the issue of evolution. If we want to study the significance of evolutionary thought for American Protestant theology in the second half of the nineteenth century we must at least therefore deal with Spencer and Darwin and their impact on the academic community in general and on the religious community in particular. Since the theology of the nineteenth century does not simply vanish with the end of that century but poses a host of problems to be dealt with far into the twentieth century, we

Hans Schwarz is professor of systematic theology and contemporary theological issues, University of Regensburg, 8400 Regensburg, West Germany. This paper is a revised version of "The Significance of Evolutionary Thought for Late Nineteenth-Century American Protestant Theology," which Schwarz presented at the 1978 annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion, New Orleans, Louisiana.

must also consider how the nineteenth century extends its issues into our current century.

THE RECEPTION OF EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT IN THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY

When Darwin's *The Origin of Species* appeared in 1859, its immediate reception in the United States was quite different from the head-on confrontation it experiences in England. Bishop Samuel Wilberforce had written such a strong rejection of Darwin's theory in the July 1860 edition of the *Quarterly Review* that Darwin's strong defender, Thomas H. Huxley, was rightly incensed. In the United States, however, a possible widespread indignation over Darwin's theory was delayed since the public was occupied with the events leading up to the Civil War and its aftermath. Thus, at least initially, the new evolutionary developments were discussed only by professional scientists and a few intellectuals. Furthermore, Asa Gray, the distinguished botanist at Harvard University, had been in correspondence with Darwin and was well aware of the progress of his research and the conclusions he was going to draw.

Asa Gray, the Interpreter of Darwin. In March 1860 Asa Gray published a long and careful review of The Origin of Species in the American Journal of Science and Arts.2 Gray, who was a member of the First Church in Cambridge (Congregational), freely admitted that not everyone would agree with Darwin's ideas. He mentioned, for instance, James Dwight Dana, the editor of the American Journal of Science and professor of natural history at Yale, who he was sure would not accept Darwin's doctrines.3 He also cited the outstanding American naturalist, Louis Agassiz, who referred the phenomenon of origin and distribution of the species directly to the divine will and therefore was not able to accept Darwin's proposal of a "natural" origin and distribution of the species. Although Gray judged Agassiz "to be theistic to excess," he suggested that there "need be no ground of difference here between Darwin and Agassiz."4 Gray showed that teleologists such as Agassiz were quite selective. They only referred particular facts to special design but left an overwhelming array of the widest facts inexplicable. This meant that, taking the picture of nature as a whole into consideration, one could only say that it was so because it had so pleased the creator to construct each plant and animal. Now Darwin proposed a theory which showed how each plant and animal was created, and therefore we could trust that "all was done wisely, in the largest sense designedly, and by an intelligent first cause."5

Gray admitted that Darwin's doctrine of "natural" selection could also be denounced as atheistical. Yet he cautioned that such state-

ments should not be made on scientific grounds. Gray reminded us that Newtonian physics was already compatible with an atheistic universe. But he was convinced that "it is far easier to vindicate a theistic character for the derivative theory."6 In conclusion Gray asserted again that Darwin's book is not a metaphysical treatise: "The work is a scientific one, rigidly restricted to its direct object; and by its science it must stand or fall."7 Although he was not sure from the first edition of Darwin's book, he suggested that Darwin probably had not intended to deny with his book any creative intervention in nature. On the contrary, the idea of natural selection implied so many manifoldly repeated independent acts of creation that the whole process was considered "more mysterious than ever." Before his review went to press, Gray saw the second edition of Darwin's book and noticed "with pleasure the insertion of an additional motto on the reverse of the title page, directly claiming the theistic view which we have vindicated for the doctrine."8

In this perceptive review two points gained special emphasis: (1) Darwin's theory of evolution was not a denial of religion but a scientific theory substantiated on scientific grounds and therefore to be refuted only on these grounds. (2) Darwin's theory did not diminish God's creative activity. If interpreted theistically it even enhanced our understanding of the magnitude of divine creation.

In a series of articles that followed his review, Gray assured that Darwin's theory of descent, or any other such theory, should not yet be accepted as true and perhaps might never become truth. He insisted, however, that the same care should guide any nonacceptance of such a theory, that is, the claim that there are no secondary causes which account for the existence of the manifoldness of plants and animals. With these assertions Gray did not want to flee into aloof neutrality, but he wanted to make sure that scientific truth must rest on unambiguous proofs. This stage he claimed had not yet been attained with evolutionary theory. But he was certain that the theory of descent would become more and more probable, and if it were ever established, it would be so "on a solid theistic ground." 9

Gray was convinced that natural science raised no formidable difficulties to Christian theism.<sup>10</sup> But we should not settle for a system of interpreting nature "which may be adjusted to theism, nor even one which finds its most reasonable interpretation in theism, but one which theism only can account for."<sup>11</sup> The latter, he assured, had been found in Darwinism. Of course he conceded immediately that the opposite hypothesis is possible, namely, that there is no overall design in nature. Yet "the negative hypothesis gives no mental or ethical satisfaction whatever. Like the theory of immediate creation of forms, it explains nothing."<sup>12</sup>

Gray was evidently walking a tightrope here. He did not want to say that Darwin's theory offered a compelling belief in a personal divine being. But he also wanted to assure any possible doubters of Darwin's theory that a theistic interpretation was the only satisfying one. Since the ethical and mental satisfaction with this kind of interpretation evidently does not come from external (natural) evidence, or from authority of Scripture (supernatural evidence), it must rest with the individual. Thus Gray's theistic interpretation of Darwin's theory is a personal predilection though reinforced by overwhelming consent of other scholars. However, it is not anchored in necessity of nature or of the human individual (cf. Immanuel Kant) but rests on persuasion. Therefore it is a vulnerable argument if personal preferences changed.

John Fiske, the Interpreter of Spencer. When we turn to John Fiske, popular lecturer, writer, and assistant librarian at Harvard, we encounter an ardent defender of evolutionary thought. As a junior at Harvard he already had the reputation of being a well-equipped Darwinian, and he was reprimanded by President Cornelius C. Felton for reading the positivist philosopher August Comte in church. Less than ten years later when he was asked to give a series of lectures on "The Positive Philosophy" (1869-70)—a change of presidency and educational goals had since then taken place at Harvard—it was clear that Fiske had left Comte behind to adopt Spencer as his philosophical mentor. The lectures eventually evolved into a two-volume work, Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy Based on the Doctrine of Evolution, with Criticisms on the Positive Philosophy (1875). He even made a special trip to England to converse with Spencer, Darwin, Huxley, and others before publishing the work.

As with Gray's relationship to Darwin, Fiske was not a blind follower of Spencer. While Spencer attempted to provide an interpretation of the cosmos from a purely scientific point of view, relegating all implications of evolution for understanding God to a secondary place, Fiske wanted to show the religious side of the cosmic philosophy as well as the scientific one. <sup>14</sup> In arriving at a cosmic theism which left the anthropomorphic theism behind, he wedded theism much closer to scientific data than Gray dared do. Fiske declared: "The existence of God—the supreme truth asserted alike by Christianity and by inferior historic religions—is asserted with the equal emphasis by that Cosmic Philosophy which seeks its data in science alone." <sup>15</sup> He gave this assurance: "Though science must destroy mythology, it can never destroy religion; and to the astronomer of the future, as well as to the Psalmist of old, the heavens will declare the glory of God." <sup>16</sup> Fiske's God, however, bears little resemblance to the God encountered in the

Psalms. This is illustrated by Fiske's statement: "There exists a POWER, to which no limit in time or space is conveivable, of which all phenomena, as presented in consciousness, are manifestations, but which we can know only through these manifestations." <sup>17</sup>

We are not surprised that such disembodied theism would not pass unchallenged by theologians. But it is much more significant that both Spencer and Darwin, though pleased with Fiske's work, avoided any comments about the religious implications that Fiske had drawn. Darwin, for instance, told him, "I think that I understood nearly the whole—perhaps less clearly about Cosmic Theism and Causation than other parts," and then proceeded to emphasize that he, Darwin, was mainly an inductive and empirical thinker and therefore Spencer's deductions impressed him although they could not convince him. 19

Like Gray, Fiske did not introduce to the American audience Spencer's philosophy or Darwin's theories but his own theistic interpretation of their work. This was, for instance, totally different from the materialistic interpretation of Darwin's theory by the agnostic Ernst Haeckel when he introduced it to the German audience. Fiske's deep concern and interest come to the fore especially well in a speech at the farewell dinner given to Spencer in New York on November 9, 1882, at the conclusion of his visit to the United States.

In the speech, entitled "Evolution and Religion," Fiske showed that Spencer's services to religion had been no less than those to science.<sup>20</sup> The reason for this was that the doctrine of evolution asserted "that there exists a Power to which no limit in time or space is conceivable, and that all the phenomena of the universe," material and spiritual alike, "are manifestations of this infinite and eternal Power."21 This power, Fiske claimed, forms the basis of all religions. Yet the doctrine of evolution also has an ethical side. As Spencer had shown, moral beliefs and moral sentiments are products of evolution. Therefore, contrary to anybody today who would question the binding value of morals, Fiske affirmed: "When you say of a moral belief or a moral sentiment that it is a product of evolution, you imply that it is something which the universe through untold ages has been laboring to bring forth, and you ascribe to it a value proportionate to the enormous effort that it has cost to produce it."22 Fiske shows that the theory of evolution has an intrinsic ethical dimension since right living is intimately connected with the whole doctrine of the development of life on earth. (What is right tends to enhance the fullness of life and what is wrong tends to diminish it.)

Agassiz and Le Conte, a Cautious Reaction. Agassiz, the Swiss born American naturalist who later taught at Harvard, was so greatly influenced by his teacher Georges L. Cuvier that he opposed the theory of

evolution until his death in 1873.<sup>23</sup> While Agassiz admitted minor modifications within the species, he argued that the animals first called into existence were followed by a succession of creations until the time "when, as the crowning act of the Creator, man was placed on the earth at the head of creation."<sup>24</sup>

It is significant that Agassiz did not oppose evolutionary theory on ideological grounds. He conceded that the existence of living beings could be the products or results of laws established by the Almighty or that they were the work of the Creator directly. 25 But he insisted that one must decide on the basis of scientific facts between these two possibilities, the former held by the evolutionists and the latter held by Agassiz. According to Agassiz scientific investigation showed that there had been interruptions in the sequence of living species. The first set of animals had gone on multiplying up to a certain period or to a certain level "and then disappeared to make room for another set of animals, and so in their turn each set of newcomers had vanished to give place to others."26 Since these successions did not occur as if one generation made room for another but indicated interruptions with great disturbances in the natural course of events and extensive changes in the prevailing conditions of the earth, and since there was no indication that the animal world had grown from small and simple beings to its present diversity, Agassiz sided with catastrophism.

The rejection of Darwinism by Agassiz did not occur on theological or religious grounds. He was convinced that Divine Providence was compatible with Darwinism. But he repudiated Darwin's theory for strictly scientific reasons. His student Joseph Le Conte attempted to update Agassiz by showing that he had actually laid the groundwork for the success of the evolutionary theory when he demonstrated the geological successions of different forms of animals and the embryonic recapitulation of these successions.<sup>27</sup>

While Agassiz was unwilling to accept Darwin's theory, Le Conte was less hesitant. Contrary to John Fiske's flamboyant advocacy of evolutionism, Le Conte proceeded more cautiously. He distinguished between organic evolution and human evolution. The former, he taught, arises slowly according to the principle of natural selection.<sup>28</sup> Since our spiritual nature would forbid a ruthless struggle for human survival, our only hope for human evolution would be in accord with the Lamarckian idea "that useful changes, determined by education in each generation, are to some extent inherited and accumulated in the race."<sup>29</sup>

For Le Conte the kingdom of God is not something soon to be attained in the evolutionary process, as Fiske made us believe. Evil, we hear, will not soon be eliminated; but it "has its roots in the necessary law of evolution. It is a necessary condition of all progress, and pre-

eminently so of moral progress."<sup>30</sup> Evil allows us a choice, and it makes us go forward to acquire virtue. When we hear, however, that "virtue is the *goal of humanity*; virtue cannot be given, it must be *self-acquired*," we wonder whether these deliberations do not imply a similarly self-redemptive moralism as Fiske advocated.<sup>31</sup> When we notice further that Le Conte understood God's sovereignty to work strictly within the limits of the laws of nature, we need not be surprised that initially theologians were rather hesitant to accept any evolutionary model of the world, fearing that it would endanger the truth of the Christian faith.<sup>32</sup> But within the learned community evolutionary ideas had become more and more acceptable.

In the early 1860s the Atlantic Monthly published expositions by Gray on the Darwinian theory, and it also allowed Agassiz to present the opposite view. Much more on the side of Darwin and Spencer was Appleton's Journal, founded in 1867, and the successful Popular Science Monthly, started in 1872, which brought the evolutionary theory to more than ten thousand subscribers. 22 Soon college students' interest in English science (i.e., Spencer, Darwin, and Huxley) replaced that in English literature; and in 1872 an editorial in the Atlantic Monthly claimed that natural selection had "quite won the day in Germany and England, and very nearly won it in America." But how did the religious community respond to the new evolutionary theories of Spencer and Darwin?

## THE RECEPTION OF EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT BY PROTESTANT THEOLOGY

If we consult Andrew D. White's A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom (1896), we get the impression of "the myriad attacks on the Darwinian theory by Protestants and Catholics." Richard Hofstadter conveys the same idea when he says: "The last citadels to be stormed were the churches." Frank Hugh Foster, in his meritorious book, The Modern Movement in American Theology: Sketches in the History of American Protestant Thought from the Civil War to the World War (1939), was much closer to the truth when he suggested: "In strict accordance with its own principles, the appearance of evolution on the theological stage and the perception of its importance for the philosophy of religion was a very gradual affair." Indeed there was no Gray among the theologians who immediately introduced Darwin and his theories to them.

The Initial Reaction in Periodical Literature. When we take a quick look at theological periodical literature, we find one of the first mentions of Darwinism in 1863 in a brief review of Dana's Manual of Geology in Bibliotheca Sacra. There the reviewer stated: "The support-

ers of Darwinism will find but little comfort in this volume. Professor Dana fully believes in the creation of successive races of animals and plants at different periods."<sup>38</sup>

In 1867 a long article in two installments appeared in *Bibliotheca Sacra*: "The Relations of Geology to Theology" by C. H. Hitchcock of New York City. With reference to the works of Dana and because of the scanty scientific evidence for proving the evolutionary theory, Hitchcock rejected the idea that one species developed from another, especially if applied to humanity. But then he stated:

Granting the truth of Darwinism, or any judicious modification of its principles, the foundation of our argument is rather strengthened than destroyed. The theory of development may be used like the nebular hypothesis. The latter was devised by La Place to sustain atheism, but after being avoided by theologians as long as possible, has been generally adopted by them, and is turned against its original friends. Hence we say to the development school, go on with your investigations, and if you succeed in establishing your principles we will use your theory for illustrating the argument for the existence of God.<sup>39</sup>

This is certainly not an endorsement of evolutionary thought. But such was not given by all the leading scientists either (cf. Dana and Agassiz). Yet Hitchcock did not slam the door to the acceptance of evolution. He rather encouraged science to continue its research, assured that once the new theory had sufficient credibility it would be amenable to the Christian faith.

When we turn to the *Baptist Quarterly* we notice the first treatment of evolutionary thought in 1868, in its second volume, with an article, "Development versus Creation," by Heman Lincoln of Providence, Rhode Island. In his extensive review of Spencer and Darwin, Lincoln came to the conclusion that "if the theory of development cannot be accepted as an established scientific *law*, it is at least entitled to favor as a scientific *hypothesis*, which explains many curious riddles in the organic and animal kingdoms. We concede readily that it relieves some perplexities, and explains satisfactorily some phenomena, and may claim attention as an ingenious hypothesis, which, in a future day may possibly unfold into a well-defined law."40

Thus again the new evolutionary theory was not completely rejected. Lincoln even assumed that if the theory of development "should ever be found to rest on a substantial basis of facts, it need not shake one's faith in a divine author of the universe. It may be held also without impairing faith in a true creation, or in the divine government of the world."

In 1874, the *Baptist Quarterly* published an article by F. B. Palmer of Brookport, New York, in which he took Huxley and, to a lesser degree, Darwin to task for removing any design from their theories and especially for ridiculing theology. A review of Charles Hodge's *What* 

Is Darwinism? in the same year agreed with Hodge's verdict that the exclusion of design from nature is tantamount to atheism.<sup>42</sup> But the same year also carried an article by Lewis E. Hicks of Granville, Ohio, "Scientists and Theologians: How They Disagree and Why." There Hicks showed that scientists were divided into unbelievers, doubters, and believers, but there was no necessary conflict between science and Christianity, only between its doubting or unbelieving adherers.

Looking now at the Methodist Quarterly Review we find the first and extensive review of Darwin's Origin of Species in an 1861 article by W. C. Wilson of Dickinson College, "Darwin on the Origin of Species." The informed review did not deal with theological issues. Siding with Dana, Agassiz, and even Gray, Wilson came to the conclusion that, apart from whatever scientific value the ingenious work of Darwin had, it failed "to re-establish on a scientific basis the often rejected theory of the transformation of species" and soon would be consigned "to its appropriate place in the museum of curious and fanciful specialities."<sup>43</sup>

Henry M. Harman of Baltimore, Maryland, wrote on natural theology in the *Methodist Quarterly Review* of 1863. When we read that "the only form of infidelity from which Christianity has anything to fear is the Theory of Development," we are sure that he would reject Darwin's theories. <sup>44</sup> But again he did so on scientific grounds citing many of the scientists who were opposed to Darwin's theory. He also chided Darwin for doing away with design in nature, although he admitted that Darwin's theory explained some facts, as any hypothesis would do. In 1865 we find in the same journal an extensive review by John Johnston of Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut, of Dana's *Manual of Geology*. Johnson hailed it as "an excellent treatise... [which] will make an era in the History of American Geological Science." This indicates that in the mid-sixties Darwin's theory was far from being accepted by scientists or theologians.

When we quickly look at the popular *Religious Magazine and Monthly Review* we must wait until 1871 to encounter an article on evolutionary thought, entitled "Darwin's Descent of Man" and signed "G. E. E." The writer tells us that the fright and indignation that existed among so many at the prospect of this book had subsided to a large degree. The reason was twofold: (1) Scientists assured that Darwin's theory is at no point hostile to or inconsistent with "an unimpaired religious faith in God and Christ and immortality." (2) Many people realized that Darwin's theory, "as applied to man, falls so short of being demonstrated or proved." Nevertheless the writer called Darwin's book fascinating and recommended it to readers.

When we finally come to the Lutheran Quarterly, first published in 1871, we notice in its first volume two review articles dealing with

evolution. The first, an extensive one by M. Valentine, "The Theistic Argument from Final Causes," was largely negative on Spencer, Huxley, and Darwin since their work ran contrary to the accepted principles underlying natural theology and Christian truth. 48 "But," Valentine stated, "were the entire Development Theory, from the nebular hypothesis of LaPlace to the evolution scheme of Darwin, verified as true cosmogony and science, it would not even then necessarily destroy the evidence of design. It would require the same infinite intelligence to create a universe out of nebular matter and primordial conditions, by the long process of development, as by the direct exercise of creative power. A development theory might be held, in harmony with a certain kind of theism." 49

Then the author continued to show that the theory had not yet been accepted as science. This seemed to indicate that, though rejected on grounds of novelty and weak scientific backing, evolutionary theory might in the future be accepted without endangering the Christian faith.

The second article is a review of St. George Mivart's *The Genesis of Species*. The book, the reviewer said, opted for a thoroughly theistic interpretation of evolution and natural selection and was "refreshing" and "entitled to the highest consideration." While the reviewer did not want to follow the author in every detail, he regarded Mivart's general theory as "perfectly consistent with genuine theism." <sup>51</sup>

The following year we find in the Lutheran Quarterly a long review by Cyrus Thomas De Soto (of the U.S. Geological Survey) of The Descent of Man. Thomas's review reaffirmed that the Darwinian theory was untenable and that natural selection could not be the origin of the species. Yet Thomas conceded "that nothing even in Mr. Darwin's theory, as then put forth, and a fortiori in evolution generally, was necessarily antagonistic to Christianity."52 He even called Huxley "one of the great scientific teachers of the day" but one who wages war against Christianity.<sup>53</sup> In the latter assessment he was certainly not incorrect. While Thomas did not admit that natural selection was the only cause of the development of the species, he indeed thought that there was a development. But he objected that all animals could not have developed from one primordial form; nor could humanity have descended from the animals.<sup>54</sup> Thus Thomas opted for a modified evolution without accepting the Darwinian theory and arrived at this position from his understanding of Scripture and his knowledge of natural history.

We could continue our review of theological periodical literature of the 1860s and 1870s in much more detail, and it would reinforce our present observations. During that period there were not many outright rejections of evolutionary thought in general. Yet many implied that the Darwinian theory of natural selection was founded on a shaky basis. The main argument did not come from theology. Theologians did not conduct a battle between the biblical truth and the knowledge of science. But they gained their arguments by listening to respectable scientists of their time and from their own scientific knowledge. They quite often conceded that if the Darwinian theory should be proven to be correct it would not pose any threat to the Christian faith since it could be interpreted theistically.

The Fears of Charles Hodge. The most significant and influential attack on evolutionary thought came from Hodge, professor of theology for more than fifty years at the theological seminary in Princeton. He was the leading theologian in his own Presbyterian denomination and, having just published his three-volume Systematic Theology (1871), one of the most prominent in the United States. In 1874 he published What Is Darwinism? in which he sought to demolish the Darwinian heresy. According to Hodge, Darwin's "grand conclusion is 'man (body, soul and spirit) is descended from a hairy quadruped, furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably arboreal in its habits, and an inhabitant of the Old World.'"55 Yet Darwin did not say anything about the human soul, as Hodge implied. Darwin also would have rejected Hodge's suggestion: "In using the expression Natural Selection, Mr. Darwin intends to exclude design, or final causes."56

Though enjoying a certain degree of overkill in his argument, Hodge did not want to be unfair to Darwin. He conceded that Darwin explicitly and repeatedly admitted the existence of a creator. But then he chided him for not saying anything about the nature of the creator or of his relation to the world.<sup>57</sup> Hodge seemed to forget that in his empirical work a scientist must establish his theories without reference to God to remain credible. This inability to distinguish between empirical and metaphysical arguments became clear when Hodge exclaimed with reference to complicated organs of plants and animals: "Why doesn't he say, they are the product of the divine intelligence? If God made them, it makes no difference, so far as the question of design is concerned, how He made them: whether at once or by a process of evolution. But instead of referring to the purpose of God, he laboriously endeavors to prove that they may be accounted for without any design or purpose whatever."<sup>58</sup>

Like Agassiz, Hodge admitted that God could have made the living beings at once or gradually through the process of evolution. But unlike Agassiz, he did not fault Darwin for advocating evolution. What he rejected was the notion that evolution was explained in natural terms instead of supernatural ones. By explaining the evolutionary process in natural terms and by natural causes, Hodge implied that Darwin had effectively banished God from the world. It is important to note that Hodge distinguished here between "Darwinism," meaning the explanation of the development of the world without reference to God, and "evolution," referring to the evolvement of the world through God's design.<sup>59</sup> He realized that one could affirm evolution without admitting Darwinism.

The reason for Hodge's uneasiness with Darwinism is evident. "God, says Darwin, created the unintelligent living cell. . . . after that first step all else follows by natural law, without purpose and without design." To remove design from nature is therefore the dethronement of God the creator. Thus Hodge reached this verdict: "The conclusion of the whole matter is, that the denial of design in nature is virtually the denial of God. Mr. Darwin's theory does deny all design in nature; therefore his theory is virtually atheistically; his theory, not he himself. He believes in a Creator." Hodge's evaluation of Darwin culminated in the paradox: "A man, it seems, may believe in God, and yet teach atheism." 62

Before we reach an assessment of Hodge's position, we must clarify one point: Hodge did not reject evolution in general but Darwin's theory of evolution. What made him react so vehemently against Darwin's theory? We might get a clue when we consider whom he adduced to confirm his fears concerning the implications of Darwin's theory. We notice Russell Wallace, Huxley, Ludwig Büchner, Carl Vogt, Haeckel, and David Friedrich Strauss. For instance, he quoted Haeckel as saying that Darwin's theory of evolution led inevitably to atheism and materialism. Since Hodge was familiar with the continental discussion about Darwin and the antireligious propaganda by people such as Vogt, Büchner, Haeckel, and Strauss, he was afraid that the same might happen in the United States.

But his fears were unfounded for two reasons: (1) The evolutionary ideas that came from England were not so much those of Darwin as those of Spencer. Darwin never visited the United States as Spencer had done. On his 1882 visit to the United States, Spencer was celebrated and treated like royalty. (2) Neither Darwin's nor Spencer's theories were simply received in the United States without adaptation. As Hodge perceptively noted, Darwin's most fervent advocate in America, Gray, though an avowed evolutionist, was not a Darwinian. He interpreted Darwin's theory theistically. <sup>64</sup> The same happened with Spencer's philosophy through the writings of Fiske. In the United States materialists and atheists had no chance of turning evolutionary theory into an instrument that would advance their cause.

There was still another reason for the theistic reception of evolutionary thought in the United States. Most institutions of higher learning which would provide the platform for an intellectual exchange

concerning evolution were church operated or at least in some way affiliated with the church. In England and especially on the continent, however, they were mostly stated owned and thus provided a more liberal intellectual environment unrestrained by ecclesiastical guidance.

In May 1874 Gray published an extensive review of What Is Darwinism?, declaring that one should not blame a naturalist for leaving the problems of purpose and design to the philosopher and theologian. For Purpose on the whole, Gray asserted, was not denied but implied by Darwin. Gray was right when he surmised that Hodge's treatise "will not contribute much to the reconcilement of science and religion." As a result of Hodge's pamphlet many people who had never read a line of Darwin became convinced that Darwin was the great enemy of the Christian faith. But by now the great opponent of evolution, Agassiz, had died (1873); Dana, the leading figure among American geologists, had in the 1874 edition of his Manual of Geology endorsed the concept of natural selection; and George F. Wright of Andover had helped Gray publish his Darwiniana (1876).

From Hesitancy to Enthusiasm. That even conservatives had become amenable to evolution could be seen in J. William Dawson, who had once supported Hodge and in 1890 stated in his book, Modern Ideas of Evolution as Related to Revelation and Science that the current Darwinian and neo-Lamarckian forms of evolution "fall certainly short of what even the agnostic may desiderate as religion." But then he asserted: "Creation was not an instantaneous process, but extended through periods of vast duration. In every stage we may rest assured that God, like a wise builder, used every previous course as support for the next; that He built each succeeding story of the wonderful edifice on that previously prepared for it; and that His plan developed itself as His work proceeded." Evolution was no longer something objectionable as long as it was not Darwinian, that is, proceeding with blind force and blind chance, or Lamarckian, proceeding along the impact of the environment.

Even before Dawson, James McCosh, a philosopher-theologian and president of Princeton College, had accepted evolutionary thought in Hodge's own backyard. McCosh was critical of Darwin's theory, especially of his attempt to attribute the whole evolutionary process to natural selection. He also doubted that humanity should be as closely associated with the animal kingdom as Darwin had claimed. But then he confessed: "There are clear indications, in the geological ages, of the progression from the inanimate up to the animate and from the lower animate to the higher. The mind, ever impelled to seek for causes, asks how all this is produced. The answer, if an answer can be

had, is to be given by science, and not by religion; which simply insists that we trace all things up to God, whether acting by immediate or by mediate agency."<sup>69</sup>

Here a leading figure of American Presbyterianism declared his acceptance of the Darwinian theory. Yet he was not simply going with the times. As McCosh acknowledged, it had become known "that Darwin was a most careful observer, that there was great truth in the theory, and that there was nothing atheistic in it if properly understood." But McCosh was also compelled by an evident pastoral concern:

I have all along had a sensitive apprehension that the undiscriminating denunciation of evolution from so many pulpits, periodicals, and seminaries might drive some of our thoughtful young men to infidelity, as they clearly saw development everywhere in nature, and were at the same time told by their advisers that they could not believe in evolution and yet be Christians. I am gratified beyond measure to find that I am thanked by my pupils, some of whom have reached the highest position as naturalists, because in showing them evolution in the works of God, I showed them that this was not inconsistent with religion, and thus enabled them to follow science and yet retain their faith in the Bible.<sup>71</sup>

When Wright's review article ("Recent Works Bearing on the Relation of Science to Religion. No. V: Some Analogies between Calvinism and Darwinism") argued that Darwinism was the Calvinistic interpretation of nature since it was antisentimental, realistic, and to some extent fatalistic, the article was a sign that evolutionary thought had become respectable.<sup>72</sup>

This became even more obvious when the most prominent preacher of that time, Henry Ward Beecher, finally came out in favor of evolution. In *Evolution and Religion* Beecher declared that "the theory of evolution is the *working* theory of every department of physical science all over the world." He claimed that it was taught in all schools of higher education and the children were receiving it since it was fundamental to astronomy, botany, and chemistry, to name just a few. But Beecher insisted that evolution was "substantially held by men of profound Christian faith" and although theology would have to reconstruct its system, evolution would "take nothing away from the grounds of true religion."

The reason for Beecher's confidence regarding evolution was his belief in two kinds of revelation: "God's thought in the evolution of matter" (nature) and "God's thought in the evolution of mind" (reason and religion).<sup>75</sup> Our task is to unite and to harmonize them; and then we will notice that the interpretation of evolution "will obliterate the distinction between natural and revealed religion, both of which are the testimony of God."<sup>76</sup> Beecher was convinced that there could be no disharmony between the God who was active in nature

and the God disclosing himself in Scripture. But he even went one step further, a step that eventually caused the protest from the conservative side, asserting that God disclosed himself as much in nature as in religion. Thus natural religion was revealed religion.

Under Beecher's influence Lyman Abbott, Beecher's successor at Plymouth Church (Congregational), joined the ranks of theistic evolutionists and contributed much through his sermons and his journalistic efforts to the idea that Darwinism was acceptable to Protestant thought.<sup>77</sup> In his *Reminiscences* (1915) Abbott confessed that he studied Spencer in 1866 but not Darwin or Huxley since he was not much interested in science.<sup>78</sup> In his *The Theology of an Evolutionist* (1897), however, he called himself "a radical evolutionist" or "a theistic evolutionist." We are immediately assured that he reverently and heartily accepts "the axiom of theology that a personal God is the foundation of all life" but that he also believes "that God has but one way of doing things; that His way may be described in one word as the way of growth, or development, or evolution, terms which are substantially synonymous." <sup>80</sup>

While Abbott noticed that all biologists were evolutionists, he also observed that not all were Darwinians, that is, not all regarded the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest as adequate statements of the process of evolution.<sup>81</sup> He understood evolution as the history of a process, and not an explanation by giving causes. Therefore he accepted Fiske's aphorism: "Evolution is God's way of doing things."<sup>82</sup>

By the 1890s evolution had become a universal system and was also applied to the Bible. Here of course the big problem was how to reconcile the story of the fall with the descent, or rather ascent, of man. Abbott discovered that, apart from Genesis 3, the story of the fall played no role in the Old Testament. Even in the New Testament there is no mention of it, except by Paul when he talks of the struggle between flesh and spirit. Abbott found that Paul's description of this struggle was effectively interpreted by "the evolutionary doctrine that man is gradually emerging from an animal nature into a spiritual manhood."83 Abbott understood Paul to say that sin "enters every human life, and the individual 'falls' when the animal nature predominates over the spiritual."84 Incarnation is then interpreted as the perfect dwelling of God in a perfect man. For Abbott Christ lived and suffered "not to relieve men from future torment, but to purify and perfect them in God's likeness by uniting them with God."85 Since Christ did not appease God's wrath, he simply laid down his life in love that others might receive life.

As was Beecher, Abbott was convinced that God, dwelling in the world, spoke through all its phenomena. Suddenly evolution not only

had become acceptable to Christian faith but also had become the tool with which to interpret the Christian faith and religion in general.<sup>86</sup>

## THE RELATIVELY EASY RECEPTION OF DARWINISM

With relative ease Darwinism became accepted in America in a thoroughly theistic fashion. This was different from the bitter struggle over Darwin between the freethinkers and the conservatives in Germany that carried well into the twentieth century. But actually it was not Darwin and his theory of natural selection that became accepted but Spencer and his cosmic theory of an all-encompassing evolutionary process and of the survival of the fittest. For a young and expanding country like the United States it was only fitting that the biological theory of Darwin became an appendix to the social, economic, and philosophical theory of Spencer.

The Social Darwinism, or rather Spencerianism, of William Graham Sumner, John D. Rockefeller, and Andrew Carnegie is still with us when those on welfare are classified as lazy, or when, regardless of our calls for hidden and overt government support, we find that free enterprise is the best economic system, or when competition is believed to supply us indefinitely with oil and natural gas. According to its own principles, this kind of Darwinism will have to modify itself either through pressure from outside or from within; or, if it does not change, it will be modified through the collapse of the socioeconomic system. But this Darwinism, widely advocated by the so-called political conservatives, did not make much stir in theology. It has therefore been widely neglected by theologians since theology, being usually exercised by members of the socioeconomic establishment or the "fittest," benefits from it.

There is also a liberal Darwinism, which is perhaps even causally related to the first kind. This optimistic evolutionism considers development and evolution as God's way of doing things. As William James perceptively noted, "the idea of a universal evolution lends itself to a doctrine of general meliorism and progress which fits the religious needs of the healthy-minded so well." 87

It is interesting that James, who once learned and taught together with Fiske at Harvard, discovered the shortcomings of this new optimistic religion of nature, in which form Darwinism was introduced by Fiske, Beecher, and Abbott. James criticized it for its attempt to explain evil away instead of seeing it as an intrinsic part of existence. He correctly stated: "The method of averting one's attention from evil, and living simply in the light of the good is splendid as long as it will work." And it did work as long as America was expanding and was still unaware of its boundaries and limitations. But with World War I and the Great Depression things appeared in a different light.

Then many people discovered, as James did in 1902, that Christianity was not synonymous with the gospel of the essential goodness of humanity and of eternal Darwinian (better: Spencerian) progress. They remembered that Christianity was essentially a religion of deliverance, that we were called to die before we could be born again into real life.<sup>89</sup> People felt betrayed by the unjustified evolutionary optimism, and some demanded that evolutionary theories should be outlawed altogether.

The course of events might have been considerably different if evolutionary thought had not made its strongest impact on the American mind through Spencer and his interpreter Fiske who declared that evolution was God's way of doing things. If it would have been through Darwin and his interpreter Gray who confessed himself to be "a Darwinian, philosophically a convinced theist, and religiously an acceptor of the 'creed commonly called the Nicene,' as the exponent of the Christian faith," both Social Darwinsim and the conservative backlash might have been avoided. 90

The End of the Gilded Age. We must remember how Darwin was received in America if we want to assess properly the lasting impact of his ideas. Darwin's evolutionary theory was introduced in America in a decidedly theistic framework. This initially mitigated the possible clash with the tenets of the Christian faith concerning creation and Providence. The vast majority of American Protestant theologians initially saw nothing in Darwin's theory that was irreconcilable with the Christian faith, provided the theory was scientifically acceptable and was clad in a theistic framework that maintained a personal God who created and sustained the world. In the wake of the expansion of the new American continent. Darwin's theory was seen as part of Spencer's comprehensive evolutionary theory, which also included socioeconomic aspects. After its initial overwhelming success, this idealistic and speculative system clashed with the reality of radical evil and injustice exhibited in history and society. Failing to distinguish between Spencer and Darwin, more conservative theological minds began to react against evolutionary theory in general; and some wanted to ban it from the earth altogether.

The Social Gospel Movement at the turn of the century still accepted evolutionary categories in its attempt to address the social injustices that accompanied the phenomenal expansion of America by emphasizing the social dimension of sin. This is evident in remarks by Walter Rauschenbusch, the most prominent representative of this movement: "Jesus was not a pessimist. Since God was love, this world was to him fundamentally good. He realized not only evil but the Kingdom of Evil; but he launched the Kingdom of God against it, and

staked his life on its triumph. His faith in God and in the Kingdom of God constituted him as a religious optimist."91 For him, Jesus took his illustrations from organic life to express the idea of the gradual growth of the Kingdom. He was shaking off catastrophic ideas and substituting developmental ideas.92 The evolutionary, forwardreaching and upward-moving process was central to the ideas of social betterment espoused by the social gospel. Yet Rauschenbusch also recognized that World War I "has deeply affected the religious assurance of our own time, and will lessen it still more when the excitement is over and the aftermath of innocent suffering becomes clear."93 Although the progressive drive was deeply entrenched in the American spirit, there were ominous signs that affairs might not continue as usual. World War I had been a relatively short episode for America, since America entered it only at the tail end. But the many thousands of European immigrants pouring into America as a result of the war showed that the victory gained had not solved many problems.

The Conservative Backlash. In America, conservative movements picked up significant momentum in the first decades of the twentieth century. For instance, the temperance movement, interrupted by the internal strife of the Civil War, gained amazing popularity and finally led to prohibition starting in January 1920. This was celebrated by evangelicals as a major victory against social evils such as poverty and the corruption of morals. A few years earlier the publication of a series of small volumes of essays entitled The Fundamentals (1910-15) had meant another breakthrough for the conservative cause. Against the ever-growing influence of continental European theologians such as Albrecht Ritschl, Martin Rade, and Adolf von Harnack, an influential group of British, American, and Canadian writers presented the conservative stand. In this somewhat uneven series, conservative but scholarly contributions were mingled with dispensationalist articles. These contained extensive reference to evolution and included one combination with the characteristic title "The Decadence of Darwinism." Financed by two wealthy lay people, eventually three million copies of The Fundamentals were distributed to pastors, evangelists, missionaries, theology students, and active lay people throughout the English-speaking world. The five fundamentals testified to in these volumes were the inerrancy of the Bible, the virgin birth, the atonement, the resurrection, and the second coming of Christ. While The Fundamentals could not stop the liberal trend by rallying the conservative forces, it widened the gulf between the two.

The fundamentalists' determination to stamp out wherever possible teachings which appeared to contradict Scripture was sooner or later prone to lead to a clash with the theory of evolution. This clash was

even more likely since not everyone was preoccupied with progress. Large numbers of people outside metropolitan centers and places of learning were virtually unaffected in their beliefs and habits by the intellectual and cultural climate of the day. They lived in essentially the same way, in the same world, and with the same beliefs as their pioneer ancestors had. Their conservative mood needed only to be rallied around a common cause, and they could form a respectable force in society.

One such rallying point proved to be the teaching of evolution in public schools. Between 1920 and 1930 some thirty-seven anti-evolution bills were introduced in twenty state legislatures and passed in several states such as Tennessee, Mississippi, and Arkansas. For instance, in Tennessee, fundamentalist groups had become powerful enough to pressure the state legislature in 1925 to adopt legislation making it unlawful to "teach any theory that denies the story of divine creation of man as taught in the Bible."

The anti-evolution issue came to a climax when, in the summer of the same year, the high school teacher John Scopes of Dayton, Tennessee, was accused and put on trial for violating the recently passed statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution in tax-supported schools. The trial gained lasting fame since two prominent people took sides in it. On the side of the law was William Jennings Bryan, three-time presidential hopeful and ardent champion of the fundamentalist cause; and on the side of the accused, Clarence Darrow, famous criminal lawyer and militant agnostic who presented a sharp ridicule of biblical literalism. The trial aroused not merely national but international attention and was accompanied by an immense amount of publicity. Although Scopes's conviction in the lower court was overturned by the Supreme Court of Tennessee on grounds that the fine had been improperly imposed, the effect of the publicity on the general public was to discredit fundamentalism. As time passed, fewer and fewer thoughtful people took seriously the categoric rejection of evolution by fundamentalists; and this extreme form of the issue has virtually passed from the American scene. Of course there are still people today who advocate the teaching of the first chapters of Genesis as an alternative to the teaching of evolution in public schools; but the very fact that they advocate it as an alternative indicates that they assume the biblical creation stories and the theory of evolution actually cover the same ground. This means that they have not really discerned the difference between the scientific or physical level of reality and the spiritual or metaphysical one.

The Benign Neglect. Langdon Gilkey described the obvious dichotomy of modernity very precisely when he defined man as "help-

less patient in the backless hospital shift and yet as mighty doctor in the sacral white coat."95 The large spectrum of twentieth-century conservative or neoorthodox theology has never even intended to relate carefully the scientific claims concerning evolution to the spiritual claims of creation. When we briefly look at the most prominent representatives of neoorthodoxy in America, Reinhold and H. Richard Niebuhr, we do not find any reference to evolution in their major writings. For instance, Reinhold Niebuhr in his seminal work The Nature and Destiny of Man (1941) does not mention evolution, Darwin, or Spencer. Referring to that modern view of man, he briefly describes the idea of progress as one which, after eliminating the Christian doctrine of sinfulness, relates "historical process as closely as possible to biological process and which fails to do justice either to the unique freedom of man or to the demonic misuse which we may make of that freedom."96 Similarly in his essay "The Truth of Myths" (1937), Niebuhr mentions the myth of creation and claims that one ought to distinguish between what is "primitive and what is permanent, what is pre-scientific and what is supra-scientific in great myths."97 While he discerns the inadequacy of purely rational approaches to the world, he does not relate the scientific to the religious insights. He simply wants to keep each of them in check so that they do not conflict with each other.

H. Richard Niebuhr in his widely read book Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (1943) has a long chapter, "Radical Faith and Western Science," discerning a parallel structure between the closed-society faith in religion and the closed-society faith in science. He is not worried that science would conflict with the religious element in religion but rather with the dogmatic truth systems of a closed-society faith. Niebuhr's argument could be interpreted to mean that belief in God the creator and sustainer of all things does not exclude the notion of evolution but might even imply it. But this remains speculation. He does not make mention of evolution or of its major interpreters. Neoorthodox theology was so intent to define its own task of espousing God's word that it neglected the actual dialogue with other disciplines. This is quite different in a more current movement in theology, the so-called process theology.

A New Optimism? The spiritual founder of process thought, the Anglo-American mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, warrants by his own training that the scientific angle of inquiry does not get lost. The notion of an organismic relationship and of interaction between God and the cosmos through mutual feedback is at least amenable to evolutionary thought. God is no longer conceived of as the primordial agent at whose fiat everything

came into existence; but, through a theism of a second type (Charles Hartshorne), God is declared in some ways perfect and in other ways perfectible, in some ways finite and in other infinite. God is dipolar, having a primordial nature and a consequent nature: "The primordial nature is conceptual, the consequent nature is the weaving of God's physical feelings upon his primordial concepts."98

Since there is continuous interaction between God and the world, God is no longer the absolutely controlling power or the one who created absolutely out of nothingness. There is rather a creation out of chaos that leads to increasing orderliness. "Each stage of the evolutionary process represents an increase in the divinely given possibilities for value that are actualized. The present builds upon the past but advances beyond the past to the degree to which it responds to the divine impulses. This advance is experienced as intrinsically good, and it also provides the condition for an even richer enjoyment of existence in the future." Process theology is convinced that it makes intelligible that God acts creatively in the world and that this creative activity is the expression of his divine love: "There are not actual entities that first are self-contained and then have accidental relations to God. God-relatedness is constitutive of every occasion of experience." 100

This approach which conscientiously relates the cosmic process to God's ongoing activity is certainly commendable and should help those who want to understand what they believe. Yet similar to the earlier exuberance of Fiske and Spencer-why are their names so conspicuously absent in the writings of process theologians?—the fact of so much suffering and meaninglessness of life seems to clash rather harshly with the increase of enjoyment and participation that is promised. While we might agree that the positive values of enjoyment and participation are not possible without the negative values of suffering, we wonder if there is not a much more intrinsic evil that is not simply attributable to God's risk taking but is destructive of it. While the shortcomings of liberal enthusiasm at the beginning of this century were not responsibly dealt with in the fundamentalist backlash which followed, neither is process theology's evolutionary optimism a complete corrective to the benign neglect of evolution by neoorthodoxy. Perhaps, if we consider together the intrinsic concerns behind each of these currents, of liberal theology and process thought (evolution is God's way of doing things), of neoorthodoxy (God and humanity are total opposites, and humanity is usually at odds with God's will), and of fundamentalism (through God's word alone do we know who has created and does sustain us), we might arrive at a better starting point from which to correlate the processes of nature with God's divine will.

## NOTES

- 1. Thomas H. Huxley, "On the Reception of the 'Origin of Species'," in The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin Including an Autobiographical Chapter, ed. Francis Darwin, 2 vols. (London: John Murray, 1887), 2:182-83. For the clash between Thomas H. Huxley and Bishop Samuel Wilberforce cf. also William Irvine, Apes, Angels, and Victorians: Darwin Huxley, and Evolution (Cleveland: World, Meridian Books, 1959), pp. 6-7.
- 2. Reprinted in Asa Gray's Darwiniana: Essays and Reviews Pertaining to Darwinism (New York: D. Appleton, 1878), pp. 9-61.
  - 3. Ibid., p. 11.
  - 4. Ibid., p. 14.
  - 5. Ibid., p. 53.
  - 6. Ibid., p. 54.
  - 7. Ibid., p. 56.
  - 8. Ibid., p. 61.
  - 9. Ibid., p. 175.
- 10. Cf. Asa Gray, Natural Science and Religion: Two Lectures Delivered to the Theological School of Yale College (New York: Scribner's 1880), p. 65.

  - 11. Ibid., p. 91. 12. Ibid.
- 13. For details cf. H. Burnell Pannill, The Religious Faith of John Fiske (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1957), p. 12.
  - 14. Ibid., pp. 22-23, esp. n. 68.
- 15. John Fiske, Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy Based on the Doctrine of Evolution, with Criticisms on the Positive Philosophy, 2 vols. (Boston: James R. Osgood, 1875), 2:415.
  - 16. Ibid., p. 416.
  - 17. Ibid., p. 415.
- 18. Cf. the extensive review article by B. P. Bowne, "The Cosmic Philosophy," Methodist Quarterly Review 58 (October 1876): 678, where Bowne doubts "if the new doctrine will much advance the interest of either religion or science."
- 19. Charles Darwin, "Letter to John Fiske, December 8, 1874," in Darwin (n. 1 above), 3:193.
- 20. John Fiske, Excursions of an Evolutionist (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1884), pp. 294-305. For details of Spencer's enthusiastic reception in the United States see Herbert Spencer on the Americans and the Americans on Herbert Spencer, comp. Edward L. Youmans (1883; reprint ed., New York: Arno Press, 1973).
  - 21. Fiske, p. 301.
  - 22. Ibid., p. 303.
- 23. For details cf. the informed study by Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, rev. ed. (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1969), pp. 17-18.
- 24. Louis Agassiz, The Structure of Animal Life: Six Lectures (New York: Charles Scribner, 1866), p. 6.
  - 25. Ibid., p. 91.
  - Ibid.
- 27. Joseph Le Conte, Evolution, Its Nature, Its Evidences, and Its Relation to Religious Thought, 2d ed. (New York: Appleton, 1892), p. 44. Surprisingly Le Conte also claims that Agassiz rejected evolution since it conflicted with his religious convictions. That his rejection of Darwin's theory was based on religious grounds seems to be a misunderstanding as I have shown above.
  - 28. Cf. ibid., pp. 96-97.
  - 29. Ibid., p. 98.
  - 30. Ibid., p. 373.
  - 31. Ibid., p. 372.
- 32. Joseph Le Conte, Religion and Science: A Series of Sunday School Lectures on the Relation of Natural and Revealed Religion, or the Truths Revealed in Nature and Scripture (London: Bickers & Son, 1874), p. 301, where he says: "God himself works in Nature only within the limits of law. He cannot do otherwise (I speak it with reverence), He cannot violate law, because law is the expression of his will, and his will is the law of reason.'

- 33. According to Hofstadter (n. 23 above), p. 22.
- 34. As quoted in ibid., p. 23.
- 35. Andrew D. White, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom, 2 vols. (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1897), 1:78.
  - 36. Hofstadter, p. 24.
- 37. Frank Hugh Foster, The Modern Movement in American Theology: Sketches in the History of American Protestant Thought from the Civil War to the World War (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1939), p. 38.
  - 38. Bibliotheca Sacra 20 (1863): 222.
  - 39. Ibid. 24 (1867): 371.
  - 40. Baptist Quarterly 2 (1868): 270.
  - 41. Ibid., p. 264.
  - 42. Ibid. 8 (1874): 375.
- 43. Methodist Quarterly Review 43 (1861): 627. Foster's observation that the quarterly, "from 1860 to 1880, has no single attempt at a discussion of any theological or scientific bearings of Darwin's work!" is certainly mistaken (n. 37 above, p. 42).
  - 44 Methodist Quarterly Review 45 (1863): 183.
  - 45. Ibid. 42 (1865): 378.
  - 46. Religious Magazine and Monthly Review 45 (1871): 502.
  - 47. Ibid.
  - 48. Lutheran Quarterly 1 (1871): 182.
  - 49. Ibid., pp. 184-85.
  - 50. Ibid., p. 477.
  - 51. Ibid., p. 480.
  - 52. Ibid. 2 (1872): 241.
  - 53. Ibid.
  - 54. Ibid., p. 376.
- 55. Charles Hodge, What Is Darwinism? (New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1874), pp. 39-40.
  - 56. Îbid., p. 41.
  - 57. Ibid., p. 27.
  - 58. Ibid., p. 58.
  - 59. Ibid., p. 104.
- 60. Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner, 1871), 1:15.
  - 61. Ibid., p. 173. Cf. Hodge (n. 55 above), p. 148.
  - 62. Hodge (n. 60 above), 2:19.
  - 63. Hodge (n. 55 above), p. 95.
  - 64. Ibid., pp. 174-75.
  - 65. Nation (May 28, 1974), reprinted in Gray (n. 2 above), pp. 266-82.
  - 66. Ibid., p. 279.
- 67. J. William Dawson, Modern Ideas of Evolution as Related to Revelation and Science (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1890), p. 226.
  - 68. Ibid., p. 230.
- 69. James McCosh, Christianity and Positivism: A Series of Lectures to the Times on Natural Theology and Apologetics (New York: Robert Carter, 1871), p. 63.
- 70. James McCosh, The Religious Aspect of Evolution (New York: Charles Scribner, 1890), p. vii.
  - 71. Ibid., pp. ix-x.
  - 72. Bibliotheca Sacra 37 (1880): 76.
- 73. Henry Ward Beecher, Evolution and Religion (New York: Fords, Howard & Hulbert, 1885), as reprinted in part in Evolution and Religion: The Conflict between Science and Theology in Modern America, ed. Gail Kennedy (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1967), p. 18.
  - 74. Ibid., p. 19.
  - 75. Ibid., p. 15.
  - 76. Ibid., p. 20.
- 77. Ira V. Brown, in his interesting study, Lyman Abbott, A Christian Evolutionist: A Study in Religious Liberalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 141.
  - 78. Lyman Abbott, Reminiscences (Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1915), p. 285.

- 79. Lyman Abbott, The *Theology of an Evolutionist* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1897), p. 9.
  - 80. Ibid.
  - 81. Ibid., pp. 6-7, 19.
  - 82. Abbott (n. 78 above), p. 460, and many other places.
  - 83. Ibid., p. 459.
  - 84. Abbott (n. 79 above), p. 186.
  - 85. Ibid., p. 190.
- 86. Cf. Washington Gladden, Who Wrote the Bible: A Book for the People (Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1891), in which he attempted to demonstrate that the Bible had a "natural history" as well as a supernatural one.
- 87. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New York: Collier Books, 1961), p. 88. Cf. also Edward A. White's penetrating study, Science and Religion in American Thought: The Impact of Naturalism (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1952), pp. 4-8, where White emphasizes the influence of James and Reinhold Niebuhr in the rediscovery of the true significance of the Christian faith against optimistic evolutionism.
  - 88. James, p. 140.
  - 89. Cf. ibid., p. 141.
  - 90. Gray (n. 2 above), p. vi.
- 91. Walter Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel (1917; reprint ed., New York: Abingdon Press, 1945), p. 156.
  - 92. Ibid., p. 220.
  - 93. Ibid., p. 181.
- 94. According to Clifton E. Olmstead, History of Religion in the United States (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 549.
- 95. Langdon Gilkey, Religion and the Scientific Future: Reflection on Myth, Science, and Theology (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 85.
- 96. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, vol. 1 (1941; reprint ed., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), p. 24.
  - 97. Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Truths in Myths," in Kennedy (n. 73 above), p. 93.
- 98. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (1929; reprint ed., New York: Macmillan Co., 1960), p. 524.
- 99. John B. Cobb, Jr., and David R. Griffin, Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976), pp.67-68.
  - 100. Ibid., p. 29.