

THE BURNING FUSE: THE UNACCEPTABLE FACE OF RELIGION

by J. W. Bowker

Abstract. For pragmatic reasons more attention should be devoted to the serious study of religion. Although religions inspire great achievements of human creativity, it is important to understand them because they also promote violence and warfare. One can understand the unacceptable face of religion when one sees why religions matter to those who belong to them; why they are bound to be conservative, especially in times of stress; and why, therefore, believers become very passionate about defending the boundaries of their particular religious systems. Such understanding provides a realistic basis for working toward the peaceful coexistence of conflicting religious systems.

On Monday, May 13, 1985, *The Guardian* newspaper of London devoted page three to overseas news. There were twelve stories on the page, and all but one were stories of violent behaviors or episodes: "Sri Lanka Killings 'Revenge,'" "Six Shot Dead in Bangladesh Protests Over Koran Suit," "Cry Rings Out to Kill Extremists," "Death Toll of India Terror Bomb Reaches 80," "Explosion in Teheran Kills 15," and so on—and on. Stories like these are so familiar that we scarcely notice them. What is not so familiar (or at least not so often noticed) is how frequently, in the most intransigent and apparently insoluble of the disputes that lead to such violence, there are deep religious involvements. Of the eleven stories of violence in *The Guardian* that day, all but one had clear religious contributions to them.

It was, I guess, for that reason that a correspondent wrote to me (after a BBC program on religions in the United Kingdom today)

J. W. Bowker is Dean, Trinity College, Cambridge University, Cambridge, England CB2 1TQ. This paper grows out of a series of lectures on religion's role in violence and war, presented at the Thirty-second Annual Conference ("Can Scientific Understanding of Religion Clarify the Route to World Peace?") of the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science, Star Island, New Hampshire, 27 July-3 August 1985. It is part of the first chapter in his book *Licensed Insanity*, to be published in 1987 by Darton, Longman, and Todd, London. Subsequent chapters deal with the relation between science and religion, and the rationality (or otherwise) of belief in God.

[*Zygon*, vol. 21, no. 4 (December 1986).]

© 1986 by the Joint Publication Board of *Zygon*. ISSN 0044-5614

describing religions as “licensed insanities.” For in the program on which he was commenting (now the first chapter in the book *Worlds of Faith*), I had listed some of the bitter conflicts or divisions which have strong religious components in them: “Bombs in Hyde Park and Ballykelly and many other parts of Northern Ireland, the destruction of Beirut, that whole conflict over Israel/Palestine and the Near East, the bitter divisions between black and white in the apartheid system of South Africa, Cyprus, India and Pakistan, Poland, the Philippines, Iran, Afganistan, the list goes on and on. Even while we were making the first programme, Sikhs were rioting in India, and in Northern Nigeria, 450 were killed in religious riots” (Bowker 1983, 9).

WHY STUDY RELIGION?

All that was in 1983. None of those problems has disappeared; a few have been added. Religions are extremely dangerous animals, and one might well put up on their boundaries the notice I saw once in a game reserve in Africa, “Advance and be bitten.” And yet, despite the obvious involvement of religious beliefs and ideology in so many of the dangerous and destructive problems in the world, it is virtually impossible to find any politician or economist (let alone people who make the operative decisions in the worlds of commerce or industry) who has any serious knowledge of what religions are or why. As I put it in an article on this theme, “One of the most obvious reasons why we seem to drift from one disastrous ineptitude to another is, ironically, that far too few politicians have read Religious Studies at a University. As a result, they literally *do not know* what they are talking about on almost any of the major international issues. They simply cannot” (Bowker 1982, 66).

The case, therefore, for reinforcing and strengthening the study of religion and religions is overwhelming. On pragmatic grounds alone, we need to understand the dynamics of religious systems; we need to understand far more clearly than we do why religions in general matter so much to those who belong to them, why religious believers can be so passionate in their commitments, and why also religious believers are deeply, not to say violently, disturbed when their traditional belief patterns and practices are threatened or disturbed. Contrary to what Karl Marx predicted (and contrary to what some Western commentators seem to suppose), religion is not withering away. It remains the context, or at least a part of the context, in which the majority of people alive on this planet today live their lives or from which they derive important inspiration and judgment for their lives.

And that takes us at once to the part of the story missing so far. So far I have accepted—and emphasized—the extremely dangerous potentials within the religious domain. Too much religious education ignores

or diminishes the unacceptable face of religion; however, since that unacceptable face is so obvious, in my view religious education would lead to far wiser insight if it began with (or at least included) Thomas Hardy's "full look at the worst."¹ But the plain fact remains that one reason why religions are so dangerous is because they are so important—important to virtually every aspect of human life. Religions are, and remain, the resource and the inspiration of almost all the greatest achievements of human creativity, whether in art, architecture, agriculture, music, poetry, drama, spiritual exploration, or even, in origin, the development of the natural sciences. This creative resourcefulness of religions remains as vital now as it has been in the past. In this very period, when we have been told that the sea of faith is going out, we have seen not only an immense numerical increase in some of the major religions but, even more to the point, we have seen very specific initiatives which have been derived, not from a general goodwill, but explicitly from Christian resources: such enterprises as the founding of the Little Brothers, the Hospice movement, L'Arche Communities, Christian Aid, Halfway Houses, and the like. In this respect, A. H. Clough in the nineteenth century, who knew well at first hand the nature of doubt and scepticism, was a great deal more accurate than those in the twentieth century who see only a one-way flow. He observed that if a tide goes out in some places, it must no doubt find a level somewhere else:

For while the tired waves, vainly breaking,
Seem here no painful inch to gain,
Far back, through creeks, and inlets making,
Comes silent, flooding in, the main.²

And since that *is* the verse of a poem, it is a point of the same kind to recognize that in this very same period of the last 100 years, we have been living through one of the greatest ages of Christian poetry that has yet occurred.

So religions are not unequivocally and exclusively bad news. The paradox to be grasped is that religions are highly dangerous *because they are so important* and because they create so much in, and of, human life.

WHY ARE RELIGIONS IMPORTANT?

Why are they so important? Not simply, one would suppose, in order to help us write more beautiful poetry or design more marvelous buildings. The really fundamental reason is that religions are a consequence of extremely ancient and long-running explorations by the human animal of its own nature and its possibilities, *and* of how best it can sustain the possibilities of its own continuing life. Religions are the

oldest (and therefore by evolutionary definition the most successful) “cultural packages” which have protected and enhanced the replication of genes and the nurture of children. That kind of observation, derived as it is from sociobiology, may seem suspect, since sociobiology is itself very controversial. But the basic observation is not in itself controversial: religions (whatever else they may be) are at least highly successful cultural creations, through which human beings have secured and enhanced the probability of gene replication and the successful nurture of children. Furthermore, they are, to pick up the vital observation of the American psychologist Donald Campbell, extremely well winnowed through time. They have been tested and sifted for effectiveness through time and in experience.

So religions are a consequence of explorations—explorations of what this strange architecture of atoms and molecules, which constitutes you or me or any other human being, really is capable of being or of becoming: What *are* the possibilities which are open to it? Also they represent social achievements of stability and protection of both genetic and cultural information. And from the point of view of our own participation in those achievements, it is important to remember how stable the genome is, so that achievements in the past are by no means inaccessible to us by way of understanding.

So whatever else we may want to say about religions, at the very least we have to note how vital they have been for human survival *and* for cultural and individual discoveries. This means that religions are just as much a consequence of human curiosity as are biology, physics, or the study of Greek antiquity. The difference from those other explorations is that religions are a consequence of explorations of an idiosyncratic, *sui generis* subject matter, explorations of what we are capable of allowing the available human energy to become at the furthest stretch of its possibility. It is of that inner exploration that Henry David Thoreau was writing at the end of his book *Walden*: “Is it the source of the Nile, or the Niger, or the Mississippi or a North West Passage around this continent, that we would find? Are these the problems which most concern mankind? Be rather the Mungo Park, the Lewis and Clarke and Frobisher of your own streams and oceans . . . Nay, be a Columbus to whole new continents and worlds within you, opening new channels, not of trade, but of thought.” Then Thoreau went on to warn us: “It is easier to sail many thousands of miles through cold and storm and cannibals in a government ship with 500 men and boys to assist one, than it is to explore the private sea, the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean of one’s own being alone” (Thoreau 1971, 321).

But in making that addition Thoreau, while he was certainly being honest to his time of solitude in Walden Wood, was completely missing

the reason why religions exist. The basic reason why religions exist is that we *never* have to make those explorations of our own nature and possibility alone. In fact we cannot do so, because we would have to invent and discover everything for ourselves. Life in each generation would have to begin *de novo*: each of us would have to invent the wheel and discover fire all over again. The point is obvious, but it is, all the same, important. The point is that information does not float around the universe at random: information to *be* information has to be coded, channeled, protected, and received. Between humans, it can then be shared and transmitted from one life, or from one generation, to another. And since information can also be stored, it is for all these reasons that John of Salisbury could report (in a quotation much appreciated by Isaac Newton): “Bernard of Chartres used to say that we, like dwarfs on the shoulders of giants, can see more and farther, not because we are keener and taller, but because of the greatness by which we are carried and exalted” (John of Salisbury 1848, 321).

However, that kind of “circus-acrobat construction” cannot happen randomly or by chance. Wherever human communities have made what they believe to be important or precious discoveries, they have devised (or they have allowed to come into being) the organized means of their protection and transmission, and thus they make sure that those discoveries are transmitted into other lives and other generations beyond their own. Equally, and this is just the other side of the coin, where some item of *gnosis* (of knowledge or information) is so important for survival or success (or at least insofar as it is believed to be so), then of course communities have often gone to the other extreme; they have organized the protection and transmission of information so well that the outsider cannot gain access to it. There are industrial secrets as well as military secrets, and often there are religious secrets.

So, whatever else religions may be, at the very least they are systems organized for the process, protection, and transmission of information. That is why there are mystery religions and missionary religions. Mystery religions are those which protect the transmission of vital saving knowledge so securely that only the initiates can gain access to it.³ Missionary religions are equally well organized, but in such a way that the transfer of information is an open offer. Either way round, introverted or extroverted, the essential point is that there will be no religions at all if there are not individuals within them who believe that the information which they have received and which is incorporated in their own lives (literally embodied in such a way that it informs and forms in themselves) is so important that it really must be preserved, protected, and transmitted. Consequently, religions are organized for the process and transmission of information—of Dharma in Hin-

duism, of *ariya-atthangika-magga* (the Noble Eightfold Path) in Buddhism, of the conditions of *berith* (covenant) in Judaism, or *sharia'* (the consequence of Qur'an and *hadith*) in Islam, and so on.

Religions are organized in immensely different ways for the transmission of information. Systems, including religious systems, can be very diverse. One of the few things they have in common is an emphasis on how important women have been in this process—a point strongly emphasized by those interviewed in *Worlds of Faith*. “Women,” says Mrs. Pancholi (to quote but one example), “are the transmitters of culture in Hindu tradition, and this role lies in the hands of women. I don't think a man has time or even the patience to do that” (Bowker 1983, 213). Therefore she was able to go on to argue that in Hindu perception, women are actually much more important than the men, who (poor dumb creatures) are not much good for anything except going out to work.

RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS AND THEIR BOUNDARIES

If, then, we are to understand why adherents to religions are often so passionate and violent, we need first to understand the extent to which religions are *systems*, and why. On religions as systems I have written at length elsewhere (see Bowker 1981), and it would be redundant to repeat the exercise. But briefly, systems are the organized ways in which otherwise disparate and unrelated parts are linked to some common purpose or enterprise. “Trade unions, political parties, professional football, Marks and Spencer's, the Royal Airforce, British Leyland, the United Nations, . . . have to be *systematically* ordered if continuity is to be assured (or at least attempted), and if decisions affecting the organization are to be made and implemented; and there are effective and ineffective ways of achieving this” (Bowker 1981, 167).

An important implication of this is that systems, including religious systems, require boundaries in order to maintain their identity and in order to assure the protection and transmission of information. Those boundaries may be metaphorical, for example, the “Body of Christ.” Or they may be literal; for example, until recently an orthodox brahmin was not supposed to travel outside the boundary of India, nor even, ideally, outside the boundary of his province. So if we ask the further question, *Why* are religions necessarily systems?, a key point lies in the importance of the information which religious systems are protecting and making available for appropriation into life. It is so important, extensive, and diverse that it *requires* elaborate systems to protect it. Information, particularly in the religious case, is very far from being simply words, whether written, spoken, or sung. Much more is involved than the transfer of verbal items. What are being transmitted

are such things as style, method, wisdom, insight, technique, and behavior; and a great deal of all that is transmitted in the religious case by entirely nonverbal means, by action, liturgy, silence, ritual, dance, decoration, and so on. But in all this, the fundamental and essential point is this: for those involved in the process, the religious information may be far more important than any other information for which we organize the systematic means of transmission. The information which religions are transmitting is frequently believed by those who are living it, and therefore transmitting it, to be a great deal more important in the long run (and often in the short run) than physics, biology, history, or any of those other systematized transmissions of information, which usually have a higher priority in university budgets.

The reason is obvious: religion has to do not just with the organization of life day by day, week by week, and year by year; it has to do also with what you or I, the human organization of energy, may immediately become in the transformation of life and its judgments, and with what we may ultimately also become in terms of salvation, *nirvana*, *moksha*, union with God, or whatever else may be held out as an ultimate goal or concern. It may be the case that the religions are entirely wrong, or even just partly wrong, about what they believe to be the ultimate case; but that does not affect the point. The point is that what are on offer in religious traditions are both the goals to which any humans may reasonably and hopefully aspire, and also the resources to help them to make the journey.

Not all these goals are ultimate (in the sense that they lie beyond death). By far the majority are immediate, within the boundary of this life. Although religions may now point to goals that lie beyond death (such things as salvation, paradise, *moksha*, *nirvana*), in *origin* all the major continuing religious traditions, both East and West, were based on a "this life," "this worldly" experience (particularly experience of what we in the West call God), *not* on a belief that there was going to be something worthwhile after death. It is the exact opposite of what Marx and Sigmund Freud supposed. In all the major, long-standing religions there was no belief originally that there would be a conscious continuity of life with God beyond death. This is probably most familiar in the case of the Jews. Almost the whole of Tanach (of what Christians refer to as the Old Testament) was written without any belief that there would be a worthwhile life with God after death. In other words, contrary to what Marx, Freud, and many others have said (that religions came into being in order to offer compensation in Heaven for all the ills and evils of this life), in fact the major continuing religious traditions originated without any belief that there will be any kind of worthwhile life beyond the grave.⁴

So, fundamentally, religions are a consequence of *this-life, this-worldly* discoveries, whatever further inferences may subsequently have been drawn. This means that quite apart from any belief in what may or may not happen after death, religions are the basic systemic means through which individuals and communities have organized and protected their own continuity and survival, and have identified the worth and value of being human. Religions are the basic and primordial cultural achievements through which gene replication is secured, enhanced, and protected. *But also* religions have been validated to their adherents and participants, not simply because they create *stable contents for breeding and nurture*, but because they have in any case identified (and continued to make available to others in later generations) particular achievements and opportunities in the exercise of this particular human energy. It is this quality of discovery and achievement in the religious case which means that, *no matter how important physics or history or any other subject in the curriculum may be* (and obviously they *are* important—which is why the human community has organized systematic ways of transmitting those traditions, in schools, colleges, and universities), they are nothing like as important potentially, for many people, as the information which is protected and transmitted in the religious systems. For these systems contain those traditional and long-established wisdoms, which led Campbell to observe that they are indeed “well winnowed.” Religions are a consequence of successive generations testing, correcting, confirming, extending, and changing the accumulating wisdoms of experience.

None of this is unfamiliar. In a different way this is exactly what the sciences are and how they proceed. They too are well-winnowed traditions, tested, corrected, confirmed, and extended through the process of time. They are well-winnowed traditions in which increasing reliability is achieved and in which the false, the ineffective, or the illusory is winnowed out. Of course the history of science is not as simple as that;⁵ but the general point remains clear: the sciences do correct and change themselves through the course of time, and they require systematic means in order to do so. But so too do religions: religions also are well-winnowed traditions, and they do as a matter of fact correct and change themselves.⁶ Further, they too have to be organized as systems for this process of appropriation from the past, embodiment in the present, and extension into the future (other lives and subsequent generations) to take place.

However, that means, as we have just seen, that they require boundaries; and it is here that the tensions begin: religions are so ancient and so well winnowed through time that they are, generally

speaking, extremely reluctant to change. The reluctance becomes even more acute when religions appeal to revelation; but even without revelation religions are predictably always going to be conservative, simply because people within them believe there are important things to conserve. The information they are processing is believed by many of those involved (and they are often the operators of the systems) to be so vital that they are bound to be reluctant to change, or even, frequently, to adapt. In their own perception, they must defend and preserve what has been transmitted to them, which has given true value and significance (or, to use religious language, salvation or enlightenment) to their lives.

So the more a religious system is threatened, whether by persecution or by the proximity of a rival system, or even by a drift into secular indifference, the more likely it is that at least some people in that system will begin to monitor and maintain the boundaries of the system with much more careful attention to the past and to detail. That is to say, they will attend to the fundamentals which have given rise to that tradition and which have been maintaining and sustaining it. Not surprisingly, therefore, at the present time we find so many variations on the theme of fundamentalism in all religions—an insistence on the fundamental conditions which are believed to guarantee the continuity and the achievement of what has been on offer so far in that system. It may sound very complicated, but it simply means that the theme of conservative fundamentalism will occur in all religions, not just in Iran, or the Vatican, or Pakistan, or the Sudan, or the southern states of America; and variations on this theme will occur because of what is required of systems to be effective *as* systems for the protection and the process of information.

It means also that the operators of religious systems (such people as popes, imams, rabbis, and pundits) are likely to remain boundary-minded, as indeed are many of those who belong to religious systems. There will be, at the least, a sensitivity concerning the protection and transmission of information (which, after all, has been by definition important to themselves) into other lives and other generations beyond their own. Under threat, more bluntly, there will be a determination to maintain the system and its boundaries. And where there are boundaries, even metaphorical boundaries, there will always be what we may well call “border incidents.” That is why it is easy to take a world map, draw on it the boundaries where religious systems or subsystems are adjacent to each other, and see not only that these boundaries identify existing trouble-spots but also where new incidents or episodes of conflict are likely to occur.

RELIGIONS, WARFARE, AND VIOLENCE

Is all this far too pessimistic? Certainly it is one-sided. Of course, on the other side, we have to keep in mind that brief allusion, made earlier, to the fact that religions are the resource of virtually all the greatest achievements of human creativity and exploration—quite apart from their paramount adaptive contribution to human evolution and survival. All that alone would be more than enough to justify their place in any worthwhile education. But we are looking at a more pragmatic and elementary point, that we *must* understand the dynamics of religious systems much more clearly than we do if we are to have any hope of unraveling those complex problems which bring so much misery and destruction to so many people. I am not in any way suggesting that religions alone *cause* those problems. Certainly not. There are constraints derived from geography, economics, history, and no doubt human malevolence and wickedness. But religions (i.e., constraints derived from religious ideation and the necessities inherent in the nature of systems) are undoubtedly powerful within the total network of constraints which control these destructive events into their happening.

Not least is that so because all religions will justify violence in certain circumstances (the nature of the circumstances being differently identified in different religions). This is true, even of religions like Hinduism, which have a reputation for being tolerant, or like Buddhism with its strong commitment to *ahimsa*, nonviolence. The point was put succinctly by a commentator on the recent outbreak of violence between the Sinhalese and the Tamils in Sri Lanka (the Sinhalese being mainly Buddhist, the Tamils mainly Hindu); asked what the chances of reconciliation are, he replied, "You will never achieve peace in Sri Lanka, until you throw away the Mahavamsa."

The point of that comment was that the Mahavamsa, the Great Chronicle, is the early epic history of Sri Lanka, recording among other things how the island was visited by the Buddha and became Buddhist. It includes also episodes in which Buddhist kings went to war with the blessing and support of Buddhist monks (the *sangha*), not least against the Damilas. Thus, when King Dutthagamani (ca. 101-77 B.C.E.) decided to expand his territory in Sri Lanka and attack the Damilas, he appealed to the *sangha* in these terms: "I will go on to the land on the further side of the river to bring glory to the doctrine [*dhamma*]. Give us, that we may treat them with honour, bhikkhus [monks] who shall go on with us, since the sight of bhikkhus is blessing and protection for us" (*Mahavamsa*, xxv.3). Having won his victory over all thirty-two of the Damila kings, Dutthagamani established a single kingdom in the whole island. But then he began to have second thoughts about the millions

he had killed in his wars. Immediately the *arahants* (those who have attained the goal of Buddhism and have true insight) sent eight of their number to reassure the king. They did so on two grounds: first, that he had actually only killed one and a half people, since the rest were in effect not truly human; and, second, that in any case the evaluation of deeds rests on the state of mind or attitude in which they are performed—and the king had specifically acted to bring glory to Buddhism. They said:

From this deed arises no hindrance in your way to heaven. Only one and a half human beings have been slain here by you, O lord of men. The one had come into the (three) refuges, the other had taken on himself the five precepts. Unbelievers and men of evil life were the rest, not more to be esteemed than beasts. But as for you, you will bring glory to the doctrine of the Buddha in manifold ways; therefore cast away care from your heart, O ruler of men! Thus exhorted by them the great king took comfort. . . . Should a man think on the hosts of human beings murdered for greed in countless myriads, and should he carefully keep in mind the evil (arising from that), and should he also very carefully keep in mind mortality as being the murderer of all, then will he, in this way, shortly win freedom from suffering and a happy condition (*Mahavamsa*, xxv.101-end).⁷

These points are made not in order to take sides in that dispute, still less to express antagonism against Buddhists or Hindus, but only to illustrate the fact that all religions, at some point and in different ways, will justify war or violence, even if only as the lesser of two evils. What we have in this instance is not a Thirty Years' War of Religion but a two thousand and thirty years' war of religion; and the extent to which some Sinhalese still see the matter as one of defending Sinhala Buddhist culture has been well documented in such works as *Sri Lanka: Racism and the Authoritarian State* (1984).⁸ Gandhi emphasized the priority of nonviolence in his interpretation of the Hindu tradition. But the Bhagavadgita, a deeply fundamental text for virtually all Hindus, tells Arjuna that he *must* fight and kill his kinsmen, because it is his *dharma* (his appropriate behavior) as a warrior to do so, and because also, in Hinduism, it is only possible to kill the superficial, outward appearance of something, never the abiding, enduring reality which underlies all appearance. And Gandhi was assassinated by two orthodox Hindus, who believed it was their *own dharma* to act against his misappropriation of tradition (though more immediately, of its finances).

This acceptance of warfare and violence in some circumstances (exemplified in the Western religions by the Holy War, the Just War, and *jihad*) means that religions are realistic about evil and about its intention and capacity to destroy. This realism even goes so far as to accept that the forces of chaos, evil, and destruction may prevail—not ultimately, but immediately; all religions live with apocalyptic scenarios

of an End to the prevailing order in chaos or violence or terror. So much is this so, that, largely thanks to religion, the very word *apocalypse*, which in Greek meant originally “the uncovering of the head” or “the making manifest of the unknown” (hence seeing into the future, both of good and evil), has come to have a negative sense. It is now virtually a synonym for “cataclysmic destruction,” as in the title of the film *Apocalypse Now*.

It follows that religions are not necessarily dismayed by the possible destruction of the world. They may indeed regard such cataclysmic events as, say, a local nuclear conflict as “signs of the end,” vindications of their own beliefs. Even more alarming (for those who do not share those apocalyptic beliefs), some believers may feel an obligation on themselves to promote the very circumstance itself. At the least, it is not aberrant for such people to look for signs that the cookie has begun to crumble. Buddhists believe that we are living in the *meppo*, Hindus that we are living in the *kali yuga* (both of them being views, within a cyclical understanding of time, that we are living near the end of the cycle when evil and destruction will prevail). Christian Adventists look for the Second Coming and ponder the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse. Lubavitch Hasidic Jews chant on the streets of New York, “We want the Messiah, and we want him now.”

These may be minority voices. But they illustrate an acceptance of warfare and violence, which reinforces the predictable inclination of many people in strong systems to defend the boundaries of those systems when they seem to be coming under threat. Of course there is much more to be said about religions than this. There are many countervailing voices and actions which point in different directions. On that same page of *The Guardian* which reported so many stories of violence with religious components in them, there was an advertisement in the bottom left-hand corner for the Society of Friends, which offered a free copy of a pamphlet *Introducing Quakers*. But it was, nevertheless, a minute proportion of the page.

If less has been said so far about the resources within the religious traditions which require an attempt at reconciliation and peace, it is because I have been trying, as directly and briefly as possible, to indicate why religions matter to those who belong to them, why religions are bound to be conservative (especially if they find themselves in a minority or under stress), why therefore religious believers do tend to become very passionate about the defense of tradition and their system. Consequently, it is absolutely essential and urgent for us to understand the nature and the dynamics of these systems—because they are not going to go away, they are not going to give way to each other, and they are not going to merge into a single world religion. There have

indeed been attempts to establish unifying world religions, but so far each of them has ended up as another religion (i.e., another separate system). Islam, for example, began as a claim that, since there can be only one God, there can only be one single *umma* (human community of faith), deriving its life from God and returning its life to God. Bahais emerged in the nineteenth century from the context of Islam, proclaiming the essential unity of all religions. Yet both became separate systems; and some Muslims in Iran now persecute Bahais with great ferocity.

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RELIGIONS

What, then, is to be done? What can we do to help or encourage these strong systems to find ways of coexisting with others, particularly where the overlap of boundaries has already led to "border incidents" or to outright war? One common procedure is to draw religions together in order to identify those beliefs and objectives which they have in common and in order to mobilize their support against a common enemy. "The question that arises, and may have to be debated," according to A. K. Brohi, an attorney and former cabinet minister in Pakistan, "is this: What is it that has overtaken those who subscribe to the three Abrahamic religions [Judaism, Christianity and Islam] that they cannot stand shoulder to shoulder to face the assault that the Anti-Christ is making upon the lives of a vast section of mankind? How is it that the followers of these three religions do not take a united stand against the forces of Atheism, materialism and historicism in terms of which *communist doctrine* is penetrating in a large way into the soul-life of the teeming millions of the world?" (Jack 1980, 6).

But the paradox of this approach (seeking the common ground between religions) is that it is too easy to achieve. In making the programs *Worlds of Faith*, I asked people to summarize what they believed to be the essential point and quality of their own religion. The answers, listed out of context, might apply to *any* of the religions—and out of context, it is not always easy to identify which of the religions is being summarized:

My main aim of this life is to lead a peaceful and helpful life, and to serve humanity in any way I can, and not to be a hindrance to anyone. That is the aim of my life, and I try my utmost to achieve this aim.

Peace and harmony and tolerance and compassion and generosity: I think these are the things; and I think these are very, very important—and honesty: honesty for yourself and for others, without any discrimination, without colour or creed. And compassion has to extend not only to human beings, but beyond all human beings to all creatures.

I wouldn't have said this a few years ago, but I think I'll say it now, that if you reduce the whole of it, as they say, to a few words, it's, Love thy neighbour as thyself. That incorporates and takes in the real ethic.

I would say that the real characteristics are accepting things, and giving, caring, loving, about everyone, not just about your own family: I think it must include everyone that you come in contact with, that you must care—always to care, that's the important thing.

Without my religion, my belief, my faith, I wouldn't be a human being at all: I would be just as useless as a weed in a garden. It's my belief that keeps me up. I walk in the street sometimes, and many people look at me and say a lot of things which they shouldn't say, but I forget all about it, because my religion says, Tolerance, patience, obedience. I take every other fellow as a human being. So my religion is important to me. It is because of my religion that I survive (Bowker 1983, 293).

So it is not difficult to get religious leaders to agree on large, general issues of goodwill and morality; and there may well be some preliminary virtue in helping religious people to see how much they *do* in fact agree on. But it carries us very little further in resolving practical issues unless we recognize how profoundly different in practice the religions may be in the ways in which they move toward a superficially common objective.

To take an example, most parents in any religion (and their religious leaders) would probably agree that they do not want their daughters, while still at school, to become pregnant or addicted to drugs. That is a perfectly sensible, general goal, and there would be no problem in getting a statement from all religions agreeing that this is desirable. Therefore we might conclude that all religions are really different routes (different roads) to the same goal. But in fact the roads by which religions move really are *different*; and it is in the detail that the religions become radically incompatible with each other and often with a secular society. If we take further the example of protecting one's daughters, in some religions this goes right down into the detail of department, clothes, behavior, who they may have as friends, when and to what time they can be out in the evening, whether they can be educated with boys, and whether they should initiate the quest for a marriage partner. For the parents concerned this is not a matter of persuasion and trust or of initiating their daughters into their own independence of choice and responsibility; it is, for the parents, a matter of obligation and of *their own* responsibility, because they are accountable within the terms of their own religious system for how the children entrusted to them are looked after. And the account will have to be rendered through, for example, *samsara* (the round of rebirth) or, in the case of Muslims, on the *yaum udDin* (the Day of Judgment): "Each one of us is a caretaker [*ra'iy*]," said Muhammad, "and is responsible for those under his care."

Religions may seem superficially to be similar, but in fact they are radically different; and the differences go to the *radix*, the root of

behavior. That is so because each religion carries with it its own implicit anthropology, that is, its own account of what human nature is. Thus, the mention of *samsara* in the previous paragraph is a reminder of the Hindu belief that human nature is constituted in such a way that the Self underlying my appearance (the essential, undying, enduring reality which underlies my and every other appearance) will be reborn repeatedly until I attain *moksha* or release; and “repeatedly” may mean as many as eighty-four million times. Buddhists agree that there will be long sequences of connected reappearance, but they do not believe that there is any abiding, substantial “self” being reborn; there are only the long sequences of continuing, caused and effected, reappearance. These are different anthropologies from each other, and both of them are different from the anthropologies of the Western religions.

Taking another type of example, kamikazi pilots, or Buddhist Vietcong guerillas, or Shiite Muslims driving lorries as bombs all believe that there are more important things in life than living. But they believe it for very different reasons even though, for all of them, the way in which they die has direct consequences for what they will be after death. They have different anthropologies.

Again (as another example), the status of women in (most) religions seems to many, looking in from the outside, to be humiliating and repressive—not least because the operators of religious systems are usually men. As Mary Daly writes:

Patriarchy is itself the prevailing religion of the entire planet, and its essential message is necrophilia. All of the so-called religions legitimating patriarchy are mere sects subsumed under its vast umbrella/canopy. They are essentially similar, despite the variations. All—from buddhism and hinduism to islam, judaism, christianity, to secular derivatives such as freudianism, jungianism, marxism, and maoism—are infrastructures of the edifice of patriarchy. All are erected as parts of the male’s shelter against anomie. And the symbolic message of all the sects of the religion which is patriarchy is this: Women are the dreaded anomie. Consequently, women are the objects of male terror, the projected personifications of “the Enemy,” the real objects under attack in all the wars of patriarchy (Daly 1979, 39).

The case may seem overstated—until one reflects, *inter multa alia*, on the extraordinary contortions of Christians resisting the ordination of women. Nevertheless, it is frequently women themselves who resist most emphatically the intrusion of outsiders (whose judgments are made from their own circumstantial anthropologies) disrupting a life-way which the women themselves want and desire. They are living with different anthropologies.⁹

It then happens that people carry from their different religious anthropologies very different attitudes to illness, authority, work, school, family, the outsider, those in need, and so on. Do those dif-

ferences make any difference? Clearly they do, if they create different identifications of value or of obligation. To take a very direct and simple illustration involving work: some years ago a documentary was shown on British television of a return visit to the so-called death railway, constructed by prisoners-of-war under the supervision of Japanese guards. Part of the line has remained open, and at the end of the line there is now a flourishing plantation, carved out of the jungle—a plantation which obviously could not have been brought into existence but for the railway. The interviewer asked the owner whether he had any uneasy feelings about his own prosperity having been built on so many deaths. He replied that of course he was sorry that it had happened but that life comes and goes; and anyway, he asked (turning on the interviewer), “Why do you put such a value on the individual appearance on this earth?”

In the Japanese case, there existed a distinctive sense of the close connection between the spirits of the dead and the soil of Japan and also between the living and the spirits of their ancestors; and to die well or obediently in war makes a return to Japan a great deal more certain than annual leave. This is so deep that even the arrival of Buddhist missionaries in Japan, who brought the Japanese promises of heaven and threats of hell-fire in domains far removed from Japan, failed to dislodge the indigenous Japanese belief. Kunio Yanagida has summarized this very well:

We do not know how old this belief in the ancestral spirit remaining on this land of ours to protect their posterity and make them prosper may be. But it is important to note that the cosmopolitan idea of Buddhism, which preached that the departed soul would leave this land to go to some faraway place which did not belong within any national boundary, was very strange to the Japanese people. Surrounded by nations who believed the other world to be far away and cut off from them, and in spite of long years of Buddhist influence, the Japanese alone retained their belief in the closeness and accessibility of the departed spirits of their ancestors (Tsurumi 1970, 167).

Those beliefs helped to create a powerful justification for actions and attitudes in war which to other belief-systems seemed incomprehensible, or worse.

When the International Military Tribunal was set up in 1946, it classified war crimes in three categories: crimes against peace, conventional war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity seemed self-evidently to be crimes of atrocity. Yet, the actual word *humanity*, as in “human rights,” begs the very question at issue: an atrocity in one anthropology is not necessarily so in another. Of the 1,068 Japanese prisoners who were executed (or who died in prison), it is clear that the majority remained committed to the view that their actions in the war were justified. Seven hundred and one of those who

died as war criminals left some kind of personal statement. The statements were collected and published under the title *Seiko no Isho*. Kazuko Tsurumi analyzed the statements and showed that 87.4 percent of those condemned refused to accept any kind of guilt, except that they had failed the Emperor and their fellow countrymen. This was indeed Hideki Tojo's own attitude: "As a man responsible for the waging of the war, I deeply regret that the war ended with our defeat. . . . I deeply regret what I have done and apologise to the Emperor and to my countrymen." Of those who refused to accept guilt, thirty percent specifically expressed a belief that their spirits would return to protect their families and their fatherland, and for that reason they were able to approach their own death undisturbed (Tsurumi 1970, 138-40). The purpose of quoting this example is not to make some value judgment for or against. It is to emphasize that differences between religions may—and frequently in practice do—make a difference in living and dying (Bowker 1973).

Some parts of what religions claim to be the case are logically incompatible with each other: the religions may all be wrong, but they cannot all be right—not in everything that they claim to be the case.

THE COEXISTENCE OF RELIGIONS

How can religions live or coexist with each other? To take a particular example, how can they coexist in the United Kingdom, which is now religiously plural in an obvious way, and in which already we know that some Roman Catholics and some Protestants *cannot* coexist peacefully (albeit in a very special circumstance in Northern Ireland)?

The immediate problem in this country is one of geography. The geography of religious space is inevitably important, given that systems have to be systems in order to function effectively for the protection and transmission of information. Systems as complex as religions require literal as well as metaphorical space. How do we handle the religious imperative for space in the United Kingdom, which is the size of a medium-size American state? It is roughly the size of Wyoming; and about one third of it, in the north of Scotland, is sparsely inhabited in any case. Religions coexist in India or in the United States, but there is considerably more space in those countries for distribution. But is such distribution desirable, given the consequences of cultural ghettos, the caste system, and the pressure for degrees of autonomy among, for example, Sikhs in the Punjab? Or is some kind of autonomy precisely the goal to be aimed for? What should be done in practice to give space for the continuity, development, and identity of these distinct cultural and religious traditions?

That last question immediately gives rise, for some people, to another set of questions: Should we do anything? Why should we make provision for religious pluralism? What is the basis for it? The most obvious answer lies in a regard for article eighteen of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."

But in practice, the foundation and basis for coexistence, toleration, and freedom of belief are extremely different in different cultures and traditions. In America, reflecting the European experience, church and state were deliberately separated from each other. In India a participant diversity can, within limits, be tolerated, because in the Indian anthropology (since we are going to be reborn eighty-four million times) sooner or later we may have to participate in all the religions. There are many different paths to the same goal. In this country, the Toleration Act of 1689 was a completely different enterprise. It was based on the premise of something like a national church: the Earl of Nottingham introduced not one, but two bills, the first for comprehension, offering generous terms on which dissenters might be admitted to the Church of England, and the second, the Toleration Act, to deal with the few who would not allow themselves to be so comprehended. It was only when King William appeared in the House of Lords to propose the abolition of the Test and Corporation Acts that fears overflowed and the Comprehension Bill was lost. The Toleration Act went through on its own, addressed to a different and much larger constituency. All that is very different from a Bill of Rights, and clearly it is a very odd basis for a secular toleration now. So, on what basis in this country *should* the toleration of conscience and belief rest? Should we extend toleration to religions which themselves are deliberately separatist and divisive or to religions which, if they were in control, would certainly not extend a comparable toleration in reverse? It is much easier to build a Mosque in Regents Park than to build a Cathedral in Medina. Obviously a Muslim would say that Regents Park is not as important to a Christian as Medina is to a Muslim, and that is true. But in general, is the extension of toleration reciprocal? Or, to apply the point differently, should all new religions and cults be equally tolerated? The Cotterell proposals in the European Parliament clearly felt that *some* religions should carry a warning on the package that they are dangerous to spiritual health. But *are* they? And who decides? And are the Moonies a charity, to keep the questions in the immediate and practical domain?

All these issues, which have been in the headlines in recent years, lead to a third set of questions or perhaps, more accurately, to a clear parting of the ways, where we will have to make a decision of principle and policy: granted that freedom of conscience and belief is still secure in this country, what should we actually do to implement it? The options here are very serious. It is decisively important, as we have seen, for religions to feel that the continuity of their own tradition is secure and that the transmission is protected. What should those outside a particular tradition do? Should we try to reinforce that stability, which arises from security, by encouraging and allowing separate identity (and here the issue of separate schools is inescapable)? Or should we try to guarantee the very principle of toleration itself by encouraging as much integration as possible, above all in the schools, by bringing people together into friendship and respect for each other? Given the long battles to achieve the liberties of this country, it is still (thankfully) highly likely that we will favor the second option, the route of integration. But that route, by encouraging assimilation, is precisely the one which is very threatening to some religious systems, because they believe they require distance and separation in order to secure the continuity of their own tradition. There was a brief example of this in the last election, in a television discussion in Birmingham with an invited audience. The then chairman of the Conservative party, Cecil Parkinson, tried to defend the famous or infamous Conservative poster, which displayed a black face and said of the Labour party, "They call you Black but we call you British." In the agitation of the discussion, Parkinson continued to take, in an increasingly bewildered way, what he believed to be the liberal and integrating line, until a young woman in the audience jumped up and shouted, "Can't you understand that we want to be black *and* British?"

But what does it *mean* to be both x and y, or a or b or c, and y? Should we expect and encourage the sacrifice of sheep, as happened recently in a London street, to inaugurate Ramadan? Or polygamy? Or separate state schools for each religion that can demonstrate a majority in the local population (since we already have schools for Jews and Christians, and even for Christians in different subsystems of the whole)? Of course the questions are extreme. But they are intended to emphasize that, for some of these strong systems, what is important is not so much a particular issue but the defense and preservation of a whole life-way, which has been inherited from the past and which must be maintained. This, too, was put strongly by a Muslim in a television debate, when a headmaster pointed out how, in his school (on the premise of toleration) the school assembly was converted into a form of the great Muslim festivals Id alFitr and Id alDua, when they occur. In almost angry

contempt the Muslim replied that that was futile in relation to the experience of being Muslim and growing up as a Muslim child.

WHAT CAN WE DO?

What, then, is to be done? to repeat the question. First, and most urgently, we need to understand much more clearly and accurately than we do what actually *is* required within each system for its maintenance and continuity (on the assumption, made earlier, that they are not going to disappear and that they are not going to be banned by legislation). What is required is a much more detailed and serious analysis of what the necessary conditions for continuity in each religious system really are. We need to know what really is, as well as what is perceived to be, indispensable and necessary for each religious system to continue and to transmit what it regards as its wisdom and practice into another generation.

Clearly, people in each religious system (and certainly operators of such systems) think they know what those conditions are: if they are asked in the abstract to specify the necessary conditions for their survival, then the answer will be an extremely long list. It will include virtually every mark of identity in the system; so the turban of the Sikhs will be added to the Five Ks as though it is a sixth (Bowker 1983, 34-37). Yet in fact, when religions do come under pressure, particularly of persecution (which has happened to virtually all religions in this century), then religions often find that they can travel extremely light and still continue and endure.¹⁰ What we need is a much clearer understanding of where the middle point is—between wanting everything and needing nothing—which will enable strong systems to coexist, an understanding, yet again, of what really are the necessary and indispensable conditions of continuity in each religious case. Each, because each will be different: religions with strongly defined constraints over behavior, such as Judaism or Islam, are likely to be a great deal more specific. But even within such a tradition, there will be different evaluations of how much or how little must be maintained and observed. In the terror of Europe, there were two main different responses within Judaism to the issue of keeping the commandments of Torah during the holocaust: if the Nazi attack was understood to be an attack on the Jewish religion, then *kiddush haShem*, the sanctification of God's name (a synonym for martyrdom), prevailed, which is in line with the Talmudic precept (B.San. 74a) that "one must incur martyrdom, rather than transgress even a minor precept"; but if the attack was on Jews as individuals and communities, then one might invoke *kiddush haHayyim*, the sanctification of life, a phrase attributed to Rabbi Isaac Nissenbaum, who nevertheless was killed in the Warsaw ghetto in 1942. On

that view, it is a duty to save one's own life and as many other lives as possible; and the *halakoth*, or precepts, of Torah can be interpreted as generously as necessity demands.

So this attempt to specify more clearly and precisely what really *are* the necessary survival conditions, as the participants perceive them, is by no means simple, because there will not be an agreement among the participants. But for that reason, it is all the more important to undertake this exercise, because otherwise we will never know how they can relate to a secular or neutral environment, let alone to each other. And in any of those particular disputes with which this essay began there cannot be any enduring solution unless the participants "negotiate down" to that middle point from the high specification of necessity with which they at present live. Such negotiated perception has then to be incorporated into the political and economic and geographical considerations which are equally at issue.

All that, however briefly expressed, has immensely high priority given the desperate urgency of some of the issues before us. But there are other obvious things to be done as well: one is to recognize the legitimacy of the conflict from the point of view of the participants involved (and that is *not* possible without a knowledge of the points of view of those involved, which itself is *not* possible without a knowledge of religions). Another is to avoid the language of conflict management and conflict reduction (as though we, paternalistically, from the outside, know how these naughty children ought to behave), while never ignoring the insights which those disciplines and reflections have thrown up. So, for example, there may be pragmatic wisdom in establishing neutral languages and conceptual models through which particular conflicts may be analyzed dispassionately. But equally, it is important to remain realistic: in any long-running conflict there will be those who have a strong interest in its continuing—from superpowers and arms manufacturers down to pathological individuals and individuals seeking revenge.

But on the assumption, as Mo Tzu used to put it, that the majority do wish to leave at peace, then certainly it is important to support and reinforce those movements and individuals within which or whom the internal logic of a particular system moving towards resolution, or towards the condemnation of inappropriate (according to its own criteria) violence or aggression, is articulated. It is not ineffectual idealism to encourage such movements as Religions for World Peace (though the fact that that organization is largely unknown, unavailing, and underfunded makes, once again, the point about ignorance concerning religions with which this essay began).

Equally, it is important that more people should be, more deliberately, "multiply religious" (i.e., should attempt, as Bede Griffiths put it,

the marriage between East and West.¹¹ That already happens by the accident of paperback publication; at a more serious and deliberately constructive level, the attempt to live from different resources is in itself a way of demonstrating the value of coexistence. And perhaps as important as any of the rest, we need to cultivate an *interreligious* sense of humor. In each religion believers are capable of humor about themselves and their religion. In any decent-sized bookshop you will find somewhere a book of Jewish humor—not so many books, admittedly, of Muslim humor or Sikh satire. But *all* these religions generate their own self-deprecating laughter, and in Zen Buddhism such laughter may be a “royal road” to religious wisdom and insight. But put the religions together, and get a Muslim to tell a joke which deprecates (i.e., appears to deprecate) a Jew, or get a Hindu to tell a joke which deprecates a Sikh, and the result will be to reproduce in miniature those larger conflicts which bid fair to destroy us all.

To be able to laugh with each other at ourselves would be an immense gain. But very painful: it was hard enough in adolescence. And a deep problem in interreligious engagement or dialogue is that religions are immensely unequal in their ability to accept judgment or criticism, let alone initiate it in their own case: the movie “The Life of Brian” was an irreverent parody of the life of Jesus; it caused upset for many but was ultimately healthy for many others, for the quite different way in which it made them see and understand their own appropriation of Christian faith and hope. Imagine what would happen if anything like it were attempted of the life of Muhammad; there was extreme protest in London when an attempt was made to show a highly reverential film of his life. Four years ago, an Indian film company was taken to court in Delhi because of a scene in the film “Aanchal” which showed a Hindu god smoking a cigarette, another god wearing glasses, and a third one stammering. A lower court ordered the film to be cut, although the high court in Delhi reinstated the film and allowed the scenes to remain in it.¹²

Of course people are sensitive about sacred things. The whole point of this paper has been to emphasize that religions matter, to those who believe, more than anything else, and that is precisely why we have to take them seriously. But in the end, religions in pluralistic societies, often under pressure, have become too overdefensive, too oversensitive for their own health and happiness and for their own security. We need to develop the interreligious sense of humor, that sense of humor which is so characteristic of the Jews and which has done so much to enable them to survive in more difficult circumstances than most. It is time, for the sake of the peace of so many of the troubled parts of this world, that we all grow up a bit, that we all grow up enough to allow the

voice of judgment and criticism and encouragement to be heard without becoming so defensive that the voice of correction (which all religions need sometimes to hear) is immediately suppressed.

But all or any of these actions require one thing: they require a far better knowledge of religions than most of us—and certainly most of those who make decisions—possess. This essay has attempted to indicate the pragmatic reasons why we need not to reduce but to extend and reinforce our self-education about religions. Of the many other reasons, which arise from the way in which religions are the resourceful context of so much good in human life, I have said nothing; but they would certainly reinforce the case.

Yet education about religions is exceptionally vulnerable: in the United Kingdom it has been a particular victim of the government cuts; and if the United Kingdom is of rather minor importance (and requires such education mainly because of the problems and the opportunities of a religiously plural society), then at least one would hope for a more determined attempt to acquire wisdom in the educational systems of the two major powers. But in the Soviet Union and its satellite empire religion is defined in relation to the revolution in such a way that it cannot be taken seriously; and in the United States, the separation of church and state means that only in certain very restricted ways can the role and function of religion be considered. Education is no panacea. As the saying has it, “when you’ve educated the devil, what you have at the end is a clever devil.” But education contributes to understanding and wisdom; if I have appendicitis, I would rather be treated by someone who has been medically educated than one who proceeds by intuition and bedside reading: it is no guarantee of a cure, but it is a contribution to its possibility. The same applies to arresting the diseases of human violence and warfare, and promoting peace.

NOTES

1. The full statement from Hardy’s poem “In Tenebris” is: “If way to the Better there be, it exacts a full look at the worst.”

2. “Say Not the Struggle Naught Availeth.”

3. Greek mystery religions are a familiar example, as, in the East, are Hindu and Buddhist tantric cults. A precise example of this point is the way in which early rabbinic Judaism designated its orally transmitted *mishnah* as its own *misteyrin*—because Christians could not get access to it as they could to publicly available Scripture (see Bowker 1974).

4. These points are argued and illustrated at length in my forthcoming book *Dying and Disorder: Secular and Religious Understandings of Death*.

5. Following Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, there has been an immense discussion of theory displacement and incommensurability, from which it is clear that there is no smooth process whereby what is of value in T(theory)¹ is accumulated in T² as T² subsumes T¹, while whatever is erroneous is discarded. For a brief summary, see Hacking (1983, 65-74).

6. Theory displacement is even more complicated in the case of religions, but scarcely any applied research in this field has been undertaken.

7. The five precepts are the basic obligations which a Buddhist promises to himself to undertake (see Bowker 1983, 28).

8. There is a wider survey of some of these issues in Ling (1979).

9. This is particularly evident in the interviews with women (Bowker 1983, 210-28).

10. This is again particularly clear in *Worlds of Faith*, where many more than half the people interviewed were refugees from persecution (Bowker 1983, e.g., 20-23).

11. *The Marriage of East and West* is the title of Griffiths's (1982) autobiographical account of his discovery of India and of its consequence for his Christian vocation.

12. An account of the trials appeared in *The Times*, June 1981, under the headline "Delhi Court Says Gods Can Smoke."

REFERENCES

- Bowker, J. W. 1973. "Can Differences Make a Difference? A Comment on Tillich's Proposals for Dialogue Between Religions." *Journal of Theological Studies* 24:158-88.
- . 1974. "Mystery and Parable: Mark 4:1-20." *Journal of Theological Studies* 25:300-17.
- . 1981. "Religions as Systems." In *Believing in the Church*, Report of the Doctrine Commission of the Church of England, 159-89. London: S.P.C.K.
- . 1982. "Only Connect. . ." *Christian* 7:59-66.
- . 1983. *Worlds of Faith: Religious Belief and Practice in Britain Today*. London: Ariel.
- Daly, M. 1979. *Gyn/Ecology: The Meta-ethics of Radical Feminism*. London: Women's Press.
- Griffiths, B. 1982. *The Marriage of East and West*. London: Collins.
- Hacking, I. 1983. *Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Jack, H. A., ed. 1980. *Religion in the Struggle for World Community*. New York: World Conference on Religion and Peace.
- John of Salisbury. 1848. *Opera Omnia*. Ed. J. A. Giles. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
- Ling, T. 1979. *Buddhism, Imperialism and War*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Sri Lanka: Racism and the Authoritarian State*. 1984. *Race and Class: A Journal for Black and Third World Liberation*, vol. 26, no. 1.
- Thoreau, H. D. 1971. *Walden*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press.
- Tsurumi, K. 1970. *Social Change and the Individual: Japan Before and After Defeat in World War II*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press.