"IMPERIALISTIC MISSIONARISM" AND THE KIBBUTZ PARADIGM FOR COEXISTENCE

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Abstract. Hegelian-Marxian doctrines of dialectic progress through war and conflict are traced to Christian theosophy of historical necessity and "imperialistic missionarism." Jewish fossilized existence is traced to its antiproselytizing "kibbutz" ideology of dialogic coexistence. Tolerance is possible either through an ideological balance of terror between equal opposing powers or through mutual volitionary space evacuating Cabalic style contraction. According to the Biblical definition of covenant, *brit*, a coexisting *shalom* (peace) is possible only through separating and rebinding which comprises the *shalem* (complete). Japanese Makuya Christianity is presented as an anti-imperialistic model for mutual contraction facilitating the coexisting *shalom-shalem* between equals who are *different* but not *indifferent* to each other.

While Karl Marx's popular slogan "religion is opium for the masses" is enthusiastically cited by most secularists including drug addicts, the devastating atrocities resulting from the application of the Marxian-Hegelian dialectic conception of progress through war and conflict are rarely examined objectively. In the present paper I shall argue that "imperialistic missionarism" is the religious extension or expression of Darwinian, Marxist-Hegelian, and Freudian dialecticism because the common goal of these systems is to substitute or replace a no more fitting ideology, class, or religion with one new fundamentalistic fitting entity.

PROGRESS THROUGH WAR AS HISTORICAL NECESSITY

In an international conference on psychoanalysis, literature and criticism which took place in June 1985, I demonstrated how psychoana-

lytic neonarrativism operates like a missionary system in which one person (analyst-missionary) manipulates another person (analysand-convert) to accept and internalize one fundamentalistic interpretation of the latter's biography so that he or she may understand the current neurosis as resulting *only* from his or her unshakable Oedipal-original-sin guilt.

I am indeed fully aware of the difference between the subtle method of proselytizing (or rather missionarizing and manipulating other people to accept one fundamentalistic truth) and the process of eliminating and replacing a no more fitting class, Oedipal father, religion, or ideology through war and conflict; however, I must still insist that, if both processes involve the dialectic imposition of a new class, identity, or ideology in place of the eliminated entity, we are dealing with an imperialistic-despotic system. So is opium really substantially different from tyrannic imperialism? More specifically, what is it in the Marxian-Hegelian dialectic notion of progress that, I say, breeds war and prevents peaceful coexistence? There is a famous joke claiming that all the big powers want peace . . . a piece of Africa, a piece of South America, a piece of the Persian Gulf, and so on. Popular jokes usually reflect a certain reality which becomes very convincing if, for example, one sees the big peace signs posted all over the Soviet Union. But I think that the idea of "imperialistic peace" may be traced all the way back to the cradle of the Christian era.

Robert Nisbet (1979) has demonstrated that Western ideas of progress and of social change strategies have been dominated and influenced for the past two and a half millennia by essentially only one organismic-biological metaphor, that of conflict-based development through the three phases of birth (genesis), blossom (maturity), and annihilation (decay). Thus, from Augustine's interpretation of the declining Roman empire to Hegelian-Marxian dialectic conceptions of progression, philosophers of history and evolution such as Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee, Charles Darwin, and Herbert Spencer have conceived the possibility of progress solely in historicistic-linear terms. In these terms progress occurs through *conflict* from one declining nation to a new culture because of the "organic" impossibility of national and cultural self-renewal.

Hegel's dialectic idea of progress added the dimension of self-negation and conflicting oppositions by which the maturity (thesis) of one nation entails its own self-destructive seeds (antithesis) which is to be followed by the *synthetic* elevation (*aufheben*) of the spirit to the next nation. Thus, in describing how the accumulative (linear) world-spirit progresses from one decaying nation to the other, Hegel (1920, 50) states: "the particular national spirit (*Volksgeist*) is merely an individual

in the course of world history *(Weltgeschichte)*. The life of one nation causes one fruit to ripen. . . . This fruit however, does not fall back on to its own lap. . . . The fruit will bear seeds once more, but seeds of another nation." According to the Hegelian philosophy of history, the organic impossibility of self-renewal and the consequential necessity of historical development hence justifies progress through *war* and *conflict*. For example, Hegel (1900, 541) asserts that "war was the indispensable preliminary to the security of Protestants," and Marx (1949, 48), who "remained truer to Hegel's belief in historical determinism than Hegel himself," claimed similarly that "the communists . . . openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions."

Indeed, in his vehement attack on Marxism, Martin Buber (1958) differentiated between apocalyptic and prophetic eschatology. While both kinds of eschatology refer to humanity's anticipation of an improved future, according to the apocalyptic belief, argues Buber, the future was already determined in the past and therefore people are, to use Karl Popper's (1960) phrase, "swept into it" as pawns or instruments for its realization. On the other hand, prophetic eschatology sees in each person an active, voluntary shaper of future redemption, the dimension of which no one can foresee. According to Buber, prophetic eschatology originated in ancient Israel whereas the apocalyptic one, which is traceable to ancient Persia, was perfected by Augustinian apocalyptic Christianity and Hegelian-Marxist philosophy of history; therefore, it legitimizes progress through war and conflict which is carried out by despotic tyrants (e.g., Marxists) who "only fulfill" the predetermined yet unavoidable decrees of historical necessity and evolution.

In Hegel's organic conception of progress the dialectic immanent in history only exemplifies the universal principle of opposition or self-negation pervading all reality since "interest is present only where there is opposition" (1900, 128). One might thus identify in Hegel's conception, the ideological roots of the notion that wars between a younger nation and an older one merely hasten the natural organic process of self-destruction by which the young and the fittest survive. Indeed, in using the analogy of the Phoenix which eternally prepares its funeral pyre upon which it consumes itself, Hegel (1900, 127) states that the outlived nation "certainly makes war upon itself—consumes its own existence" because "natural death appears to imply destruction through its own agency" (1900, 129). Moreover, if a nation seemingly survives, in spite of wars and the expected process of natural self-destruction, then conflict is still immanent and imminent because its existence should be conceived as *fossilized* unjustified persistence to use

Toynbee's famous terms or in Hegel's own view as "an existence without intellect or vitality, having no need of its institutions . . . a political nullity and tedium" (1900, 129).

What follows from the foregoing discussion is that, according to the biological organismic metaphor of social change and historical necessity, growth may only be conceived as a natural process proceeding through war and conflict, because progress of one organism is possible only if it is constructed out of its active participation in the inevitable self-destruction process of another decaying organism. Thus, if indeed Western thought has been dominated for the past twenty-five hundred years by the unchallenged conflict-based organismic metaphor of progress and social change, as Nisbet (1979) claimed, then the idea that the production and development of the "progressing fittest" is possible only through their active precipitating aid in the annihilation of the "regressing fossils" may in fact underlie and legitimize *patricidal* and even *genocidal* theories of psychological and social development. In this sense Augustine's progress via the insoluble conflict between the city of God and the city of man, which becomes a Marxian class struggle, is followed by Sigmund Freud's noncompromising father-son conflict. Thus, while the idea that some psychological theories are embedded in the patricidal conceptions that Oedipus, Jr. may develop only after killing Papa Laius is no novelty (see especially Sheleff 1981), the discovery of their origin in particular philosophies of history might bear far-reaching significance.

But how exactly are these psychohistoriosophical notions derived from or related to our subject matter—religion and world peace or, rather, the possibility of international religious and ideological coexistence? As an Israeli Jew, who is continuously forced to survive by *fighting* in order to be fitting or rather who has to *fit* in order to *fight*, I feel unfit to discuss the self-imposed problem of war and peace objectively.

CHOSENNESS AND THE FOSSILIZATION PROCESS

But here nonetheless one has to remember that Hegel's historiosophical dialecticism emerged as a response to the theological problem of chosenness. That is to say that Hegel's dialectic-imperialistic philosophy of history constitutes in essence a secular "scientific" formulation of the theology of *chosenness*. Thus, Hegel saw, in the emergence of Christianity out of the self-destructive "dechosenness" and denationalization of Judaism, a natural dialectic process of linear progression by which Christianity became, through the synthetic *(aufheben)* progressive movement of the free spirit, an elevated form of Judaism which outlived itself: "The Chosen Family and its possession of Ca-

naan, was taken from the Jewish people . . . it was left for the Romans to annul its individuality. The Temple of Zion is destroyed; the God-serving nation is scattered to the winds. . . . All that remains to be done, is that this fundamental idea should be expanded to an objective universal sense, and be taken as the concrete existence of man—as the completion of his nature" (Hegel 1900, 412). Indeed, consistent with his own idea about the progression of the spirit via the antithetic process of self-opposition, Hegel asserted that the expansion or elevation of Judaism is immanent in Christianity which elevated man to the level of God: "For spirit makes itself its own [polar] opposite . . . that antithetic form of spirit is the son of God. . . . Man himself therefore is comprehended in the idea of God . . . the unity of man with God is posited in the Christian Religion" (Hegel 1900, 414).

While Hegel in his conceptualization of the dialectic progress of the spirit from nation to nation is not *preaching* the practice of national genocide but only *teaching* the theory of how social fossils are doomed to disappear through the natural process of socio-self-destruction, nineteenth-century Hegelians such as Bruno Bauer (1843) have objected to emancipation for the Jews precisely because they have presumably outlived their mission in the dialectic progress of historical necessity, and twentieth-century historians such as Toynbee have openly objected to national revival of Judaism due to the danger immanent in the archaic resurrection of fossils: "Archaism . . . is most perilous of all when it is taken up by members of a community that is a fossil relic of a dead civilization, since the past to which the archaist have it in their power to cast back may be . . . sharply at variance with present realities." "Zionist Jews are a fragment of a fossil of alien origin" (Toynbee 1934, 8:301; 6:64).

For our current purpose, it seems less central (although not less important) to establish whether such dialectic conceptions of progress through conflict and opposition geared to complete the unavoidable self-destructive process of outlived nations have directly or indirectly contributed to such Nazi-like genocides of "fossils," as it is of interest to determine the extent to which the conflict-based notion of dialectic progress through patricide has permeated modern theories of "war and peace" or rather ideologies of coexistence on the macro and the micro levels of human relations.

Charity begins at home! While it is thus difficult and probably presumptuous to formulate grand theories outlining the possibility for dialogue and coexistence on the macro-universal level, let me begin with self-criticism. Let me demonstrate how dialectic missionarism permeated my own society, where originally the dialogic notion of egalitarian coexistence was to prevail. The case studies that I have in

mind are associated with the concept of *kibbutz*, which was on the one hand interpreted and put to good use according to its original dialogic definition but which was on the other hand abused due to its misinterpretation into dialectical terms of conflict-based progress.

THE KIBBUTZ AS AN INSTITUTION AND AS A PROCESS

While the kibbutz has become known in the world as a form of collective settlement, according to its Biblical origin the term means, literally, collecting or ingathering. Indeed, in Israel it has been used in association with both *kibbutz galuyot*, referring to the process by which the scattered exiles return or immigrate to Israel and with the collective farm known as the *kibbutz*. Concerning the use of the word *kibbutz* in reference to the less-known process of absorbing immigrants, it is remarkable that, while in the Bible and in the Talmud we find a clear use of the term *kibbutz* only in reference to the ingathering of exiles (for example, "I will even gather [*vekibatzti*] you from the people . . . and I will give you the Land of Israel" [Ezek. 11:17]), in modern sociological literature a gradual switchover to the more popular term *mizug galuyot* may be noticed.

The Hebrew term *mizug* refers literally to a process by which several elements melt or dissolve in order to be reblended into a *new* synthesized, fused entity. While the word *kibbutz* bears, what I would term, strong dialogical connotations since the process of ingathering refers merely to an "I and thou" coexistence of assembled individuals or collectivities and not to their necessary fusion, the concept of *mizug* is by definition dialectic as it demands the synthetic reblending of the exiles.

It is beyond the scope of the present paper to tackle problems concerning the study of integration and absorption of immigrants in Israel, or elsewhere; but, from our conceptual point of view, it is important to suggest that the term *mizug galuyot* appears as an apparent derivation from the American dialectic "melting pot" conception. Concomitant with the dialectic process of Christian missionarism it would seem natural for Protestant Americans to use the "melting pot" technique by which the immigrant's *race* is *erased*, his ethnic-cultural past is negated and dissolved in the great "melting pot" fire so that he may be "born again" as a new synthesized American. As Israel Zangwill described it poetically: "America is God's Crucible, the great melting pot . . . the real American has not yet arrived. . . . I tell you—he will be the fusion of all the races, the coming superman" (Zangwill 1909, 37).

To assess how the "American-dreamy" melting-pot formula, according to which everybody melts together in order to be "born again" as a new synthetic American superman, has succeeded, one has to read

Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan's *Beyond the Melting Pot* (1970) or to examine the massive failures of integrative desegregation projects (see Cloward and Piven 1974) in order to learn that, while the lower class *melts*, there is always a hidden upper class missionary who *molds*. Thus, missionarism may be defined as a process by which an antithetic B's identity is dissolved and recreated by and according to a synthesizer A's identity. Having been indoctrinated by the same Hegelian dialecticism coming out from the European school of enlightenment, the early Zionist conceptions of resettling Palestine were similarly based on the ideological notion that progress is possible only by negating and by erasing the Diaspora and the past. One has only to skim through publications of typical European Zionist writers as Y. C. Brenner who, in stating that "we the free Jews have nothing to do with Judaism" (quoted in Koyfman 1952, 159), represented the famous Zionist idea of progress through *shlilat hagalut* (the negation of the Diaspora). The natural translation of the original dialogic *kibbutz galuyot* concept into the dialectic notion of *mizug galuyot*, which was imported by the European-enlightened and American-influenced early settlers who comprised the absorbing establishment in the early fifties, may now be well understood, especially if one considers how they negated their own past "fiddling on alien roofs" to recreate the earthly farmer type at "home."

While indeed the book which published the lectures given at the sociological conference which assessed, in the late sixties, the integration of immigrants was entitled *Mizug Galuyot*, one may best grasp the extent of disappointment in the application of the dialectic *mizug* conception to the integration of immigrants in Shmuel Eisenstadt's (1969) introductory lecture to that conference. Eisenstadt, who as a leading sociological authority not only provided the major studies about "the Israeli ways" of absorbing immigrants but who probably also influenced Israel's policy and operation, differentiates in retrospect between several "absorption phases." The underlying assumption of the first absorption phase, according to Eisenstadt, was that in Israel "there is in existence a social center, perhaps quantatively small but qualitatively crystallized who is called upon to absorb those incoming immigrants into its midst and imprint upon them its established image" (1969, 6). This absorption phase, according to which the new immigrants were exptected to "melt" their "imported" ethnic identity in order to be "remolded" by the local crystallized and European homogeneous establishment (which in our terms would represent an exact duplication of the American dialectic "melting pot" notion), *failed* however, according to Eisenstadt, to integrate the new immigrants who simply *refused* to be *fused* by relinquishing their old identity.

Indeed, if one follows the process of absorbing immigrants into Israel especially from near-Eastern countries, he or she will learn that during the fifties and the sixties what predominated was the deeply entrenched notion that it is the established European "*old who mold*" so that the Eastern newcomers will do what they are being *told*. Thus, ethnic traditions were knocked and religious customs mocked; the idea was that new immigrants should abandon their old ways of living and dressing, and their manner of speech in order to be reblended into the new synthetic "Sabra" type. It was only after a bitter ethnic struggle, which included such uprisings as the Israeli "Black Panther" move-ment, that today we witness a more dialogic "kibbutz type" of political coexistence, which may be reflected in the fact that several ethnic parties have representatives in the Israeli *Knesset* (parliament). My emphasis on the "kibbutz type" of dialogical coexistence now requires clarification by discussing the concept of tolerance as a basis for the possibility of peaceful coexistence.

THE BALANCE OF TOLERANCE

Buber rejected both extreme individualism and extreme collectivism because in both cases a person "runs away": in the first case he or she runs away *from* the group into the egoistic world of irresponsibility and in the second case he or she runs away *into* the group and becomes immersed in a massive deindividualizing mob. Compared to other "massed mingled collectivities," the only commune which Buber (1958) termed a "nonfailure" is the kibbutz. The kibbutz, according to Buber, emerged as a response to the problem Jews faced when they came together to Palestine, not on the basis of any abstract principle or a fundamentalistic doctrine. The kibbutz is hence, according to Buber, not a domain where one surrenders his or her will for the group but it is the very testing ground for one's *response-ability* to oneself and others because, as a genuine community, it should always satisfy a situation, not an abstract dogma. In Buber's own words, it is "a living together-ness, constantly renewing itself" (1958, 135). Should we say then that the kibbutz qualifies as a dialogic model for peaceful coexistence due to its existential free definition of self-actualization? Is the kibbutz then a communal "do your own thing" system? The answer is negative: the kibbutz has a very firmly established way of life which largely impinges on and limits the individual's movements. So in what way do I see the kibbutz as a model for intergroup tolerance and peaceful coexistence? In order to argue that it is precisely the firmly entrenched ideology— which those members who founded or joined the kibbutz chose freely but which they are not imposing on others outside the kibbutz through any proselytizing techniques—that makes the kibbutz a model for

dialogic coexistence, we must examine now the possibility of real toler-
ance.

The concept of tolerance refers to the possible coexistence of dia-
metrically opposed positions, ideologies, or convictions which by defi-
nition must remain polar entities, for, if they were to be swallowed
and molded into a single new synthesis by a dialectic process, there
would be no opposing positions that could be mutually tolerant. In
other words, while the strong convictions of "true believers" essentially
preclude tolerance of dissidence from those convictions (e.g., political
or religious orthodoxies), only those with strong convictions can in fact
be considered tolerant in relation to equally strong but opposing be-
liefs.

I stress that only equally strong opposing positions facilitate true
tolerance, because one may assume, as Joshua Halberstam (1982) has
suggested, that the more I am convinced that the other's belief is
erroneous, weak, and nonthreatening to my conviction, the more "tol-
erant" I may be toward his position; but then it is highly questionable
whether we are still speaking about tolerance or what I would rather
term "social indifference." Let me illustrate. If a young boy neglects his
studies or drops his pocket money into the river and his father does not
interfere or reproach him for his behavior (but rather reimburses him
for the "lost" money), we would probably describe the father's behavior
not as tolerance but as indifference or even negligence. If, however, the
father is a Protestant nationalistic capitalist and his son grows up to
become a devout cosmopolitan communist but they live together
peacefully, we may speak about mutual tolerance—although by defini-
tion they cannot really tolerate each other's position because real com-
munism in the dialectic-synthetic sense of conflict described above
requires the destruction of exploitative free enterprise.

How then is tolerance possible? Halberstam has eloquently sug-
gested that contemporary "openness to divergent views stems less from
a mien of tolerance than from the endemic lack of convictions; having
transcended the 'age of belief' we are left without heresies as well"
(Halberstam 1982, 195). I would suggest, further, that the popular
notion of social tolerance so prevalent among so-called liberal, demo-
cratic circles may reflect social indifference or patronizing tendencies
rather than egalitarian tolerance. If the rich are "tolerant" toward the
poor or if rational intellectuals are "tolerant" toward the uneducated or
the poor, they not only demonstrate indifference to poverty and ignor-
ance, but actually by their "tolerant" behavior they widen the guilt-debt
social gap between the patronizing strong creditors and the weak
debtor clientele as long as equally strong opposing positions are not
structurally institutionalized in the social system. If, however, a multi-

ple ideal-actualization system provides the institutionalizing tools for the development of equally effective but divergent educational, religious, and other actualizing mechanisms, we may speak about mutual tolerance. Indeed, one should take notice of the fact that in Israel, the most communistic known social system, the kibbutz, coexists with other capitalistic enterprises while none is out to proselytize and swallow the other.

THE "IDEOLOGICAL BALANCE OF TERROR"

On the ideological level, this dialogic nonproselytizing perspective has in fact been for ages part and parcel of Judaism, which rejected proselytism throughout most of the long period it has been in existence. Thus, the first-century philosopher Philo did not shun Hellenic culture but maintained a genuine dialogue with its philosophies without feeling the need to convert to Hellenism. Similarly, Maimonides and other Medieval Jewish philosophers did not hesitate to incorporate into their philosophy Aristotelian ideas and Arabian philosophy with which they maintained an ongoing dialogue. But it was the Greek Hellenists, the Romans, the Crusaders, and the Muslims who declared war against the Jewish "refusniks" who would not convert and accept their respective new religions.

Thus, Christian crusading accompanied by manipulative missionarizing, which was considered for about a thousand years to be carried out mainly by monastic orders, did not vanish during the modern age of reason. Quite to the contrary, concomitant with Hegel's dialectic theosophy, it reached its peak during the nineteenth century. John Dillenberger and Claude Welch, who indicated that "the nineteenth century was the period of the greatest geographical expansion of Christianity," cite Kenneth Scott Latourett, the foremost American historian of Christian expansion, as having asserted that "never had any other set of ideas, religious or secular been propagated over so wide an area by so many professional agents. . . . For sheer magnitude it has been without parallel in human history." Dillenberger and Welch stress accordingly that "in this process, the Protestant churches, and especially the British and American churches, provided the chief impetus and the bulk of the resources" (Dillenberger & Welch 1954, 166). To be sure, Jewish antimissionary ideology of dialogic coexistence culminated in complete failure when one considers its "fossilized" existence through the philosophical spectacles of tolerance in which we previously indulged. That is to say, that if, paradoxically, real lasting tolerance may prevail only between two equally strong partners who either neutralize each other through a "balance of terror" or by a "social contract" established through a mutual voluntary con-

traction and relinquishing of sovereignty, then Jewish fossilized and precarious existence in the last two millennia, which was certainly not based on any power balance, could obviously not be effective as a macro model for dialogic tolerance between nations.

Let me make this point as specific and direct as possible. While on the national local level Israel has been repeatedly criticized by the East and the West for its so-called imperialistic wars, which are difficult to prove as necessary for its fossilized survival especially when it won, on the historical international and interfaith level Judaism has been rarely given credit for its long nonproselystic tradition. True, until the end of the fourth century A.D. Jews and Christians were equally and competitively engaged in proselytizing the heathens as Max Weber (1967) and others have shown. One could thus suggest that the famous Jewish antimissionary ideology evolved only as an apologetic response to the Christian imperialistic victory in the battle over souls, which made it dangerous for Jews to engage in proselytism. Nevertheless, the popularity of Judaism as the first monotheistic religion during the early days of the Roman empire, the conversion cases of whole kingdoms such as the Chedayev Kingdom (approx. second century A.D.), the Hasmonean's imperialist success in converting thousands of pagans to Judaism, the famous story about the Khazar Kingdom converting to Judaism in the twelfth century, and especially the recent growing *teshuva* (repentance) movement which, by using all the modern methods of proselytism, succeeded in redirecting a multitude of Jews back to their religious roots, all give us reason to believe that Judaism could have become once more a bigger power—had it not committed itself to a strict antimissionary ideology to which it has adhered faithfully for the past sixteen hundred years. Indeed, while the missionary movement "Jews for Jesus" is spreading, there is no countermovement calling for the return of Jesus to the Jews. Thus, does "to be" mean *proselytize* lest you will "not be" because you will be *fossilized?*

Should we conclude then that the possibility of coexistence or world peace requires an "ideological balance of terror"? Should we say that only "big powers" stand the chance of future survival? Should we say that what we call peace is in essence only a Hobbesian balance of power? I think that, on the one hand, the gloomy evidence which may be adduced from Iraq and Iran, Ireland, and Lebanon and Israel testifies that it is usually the firm-fundamentalistic theological definition of life which triggers the tragic noncompromising wars.

On the other hand, however, in a very strange unique way of paradoxical reasoning we may learn something about the possibility of tolerance from none other than the Muslim fundamentalists' attitude towards the Western, United States and the Eastern, Soviet Union. Let

me explicate this ironic proposition. In a paper presented in a recent colloquium on religious radicalism and politics, Daniel Pipes (1985) argued that while both the democratic West and the communist East constitute a threat to Muslim fundamentalism, "Marxism appears to them the lesser evil." The reason for this peculiar situation, contends Pipes, is that, since both Islam and Marxism essentially comprise fundamentalistic systems, they are less threatening to each other, or, if you wish, they constitute an "ideological balance of terror." "Both fundamentalistic Islam and Marxism make claims to a whole truth, both entail all-embracing systems, both have founding scriptures giving guidance on a variety of matters, private and public, great and small. Their specific regulations differ very much, of course, but details matter less than the fact that each of them aspires to regulate all life" (Pipes 1985, 12).

Pipes goes on to show that the irony which resulted from these relations is reflected in that "despite Russian rule over fifty million Muslims in central Asia, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet control over Yemen, and the evidence of Soviet interest in controlling Iran and the Persian Gulf, Muslim fundamentalists see the U.S. power as the greater threat" (Pipes 1985, 15).

Why does the West then appear as more threatening to the Muslim world? I propose that, paradoxically, democratic liberalism and manipulative missionarism constitute contradictory double messages, which evidently may enhance hostility even more than fundamentalism per se. As Pipes indicates, "Christian missionaries are seen as directing a frontal assault on Islam, and they come only from the West" (Pipes 1985, 10). To be sure, God forbid, it is not that the present thesis advocates fundamentalism, and it is not that the Soviets do not engage in coercive-tyrannic manipulating and missionarizing imperialism. Rather, it appears that what we can learn from the ironic case of the Arab-Russian love affair is that the contradictory double message of "democratic-missionarising" seems to hinder even the possibility of a cold coexistence. If my assessment of the macro "ideological balance of terror" is unfortunately halfway correct, then what realistic chances are there for educating our youth for future dialogic tolerance? In other words, how can we teach tolerance which excludes tolerance of intolerance and which respects *differences* but which is not synonymous with *indifference*?

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT VIA MUTUAL CONTRACTION

If charity begins indeed at home, that is on the micro level, and if Weber was right in assuming that behind every psychology there is a theology, then we must begin our new peace work at home. That is to

say that if, in order to understand America's "this world" secular activism or India's "other world" norm regulating passivism, one must go back to their respective religious systems, then we may study the faltering faults of macro "pathopolitics" but begin from scratch to teach religious tolerance on the micro level.

I have argued frequently (see Rotenberg 1983) that, according to the Hasidic-Cabalistic theodicy of contraction, God's volitionary self-contraction to evacuate space for the human world serves as an *Immitatio Dei* model for the human world. Thus progress is possible not via egoistic construction of the "I" but through mutual "I-thou" contraction. Hence, the voluntary contracted God as a model parent figure allows us human beings to become partners with God in creating and recreating the world so that we may use our *chutzpa power* to influence Heaven in order to transcend the past and reach further than our divine parent. According to this contraction model, there is not one materialistic ideal for self actualization; rather it is the mutual contraction between the equally religious ideals of scholar, merchant, and the Hasidic ecstatic prayer which creates the egalitarian social contract.

The social contract between mutually contracting partners becomes more effective not through the synthetic swallowing of one another but when the "I" who remains "I" and the "thou" who remains a firm "thou" maintain a coexisting dialogue between them. This mutual contraction was in fact Thomas Hobbes's conception of social contract when he stated that "this [contract] is more than consent or concord; it is a real unity of them all . . . made by covenant of everyman, with every man in such a manner, as if every man should say to every man: I . . . give up my right of governing myself . . . on this condition, that thou give up thy right" (Hobbes 1969, 176). While Hobbes's social contraction *evolves* from a balance of terror between human *wolves*, it is pertinent to point out here that in fact the three terms—contract and contraction, *hesed* (benevolence) and Hasidism, as well as *shalom* (peace) and *shalem* (complete)—are historically and conceptually interconnected.

Daniel Elazar, an international expert on covenantal and federal relations, points out that the idea of contract or covenant, which is derived from the Hebrew Biblical term *brit*, "involves two actions'; cutting and binding i.e., the separating of something into parts and its reunification in such a way that the parts remain separate in their identities" (Elazar 1981, 21). Thus the ancient Near Eastern ritual *lichrot brit* (cut a covenant) involved the symbolic division of a sacrificial animal so that the parties may pass between the divided parts which are then symbolically reunited through rebinding. The covenantal contract which follows the ritual does not constitute a synthetic fusion of the parties but a dynamic federation in which it is precisely the clear-firm

identity of each party that bestows upon them the strength to contract mutually in order to draw the contract of mutual respect. Nonetheless, it is the nature of any contractual or other relationship that it may have lasting durability only if the covenants' terms are *not* interpreted fundamentalistically, that is, strictly according to the written word so that each party is out to get the other in order to exploit him.

Thus, the Bible developed *hesed*, a going beyond the written letter, in order to reinforce mutuality (George Homan's notion of surplus sentiments) via an open approach to interpret the contract according to the midrashic-pluralistic tradition which maintains that the Torah has seventy faces or multiple interpretation possibilities. Thus, the contrast between midrashic-hesed and fundamentalism marks the difference between *Chumeinism* and *humanism*.[1] Indeed, Elazar indicates that "the whole concept of *Hasidism* in Jewish life, both in Biblical period and subsequently, is an outgrowth of this dynamic approach to covenantal relationships," which requires treating the other by going beyond the written letter (Elazar 1981, 21).

The third term *shalom* means peace! But etymologically it stands for completeness: *shalem* is a coming together which creates a *brit shalom*, a wholeness of the contracted parties which is then stronger than the separated parts which comprise it. This *shalom-shalem* may be understood in the Hasidic sense that there is nothing more complete than a broken heart. Strength and progress are possible only when hearts are not hermetically sealed by strong iron locks but only when they break open to absorb the world of otherness.

I have sketched a very idealistic picture of how the contracted open parts of the human heart may in theory constitute the contract of *shalom* in terms of peace and completeness—*shalem*. I cannot conclude my presentation without giving a concrete illustration. Elazar maintains that the Swiss canton system is a good illustrative case study of covenantal relationships. To end our discourse about the possibility of macro peace with a micro "broken heart" case study takes me away, however, from the Western Swiss case where neutrality prevails to an Eastern Japanese case predominated by emotionality.

CONTRACTUAL CONTRACTION IN JAPANESE MAKUYA

The illustrative and probably instructive case that I have in mind takes me also away from my own troubled and polarized country to the Japanese Makuya people with whom I lived for over a month in the fall of 1983. The Makuya are a nonchurch affiliated, original gospel Christian sect, which maintains what I would term a dialogic relationship with Jews, other Christians, Zen Buddhists, and Shintoists. I say "dialogic relations" because one must remember that Christianity was

reintroduced in Japan in the mid-nineteenth century after it was banned there for 250 years because the Japanese rejected dialectic Christian missionarism which they saw "as an expression of western paternalistic imperialism" (see Caldarola 1979, 2).

This is not the place and time to describe in anthropological details the experiences from my visit with the Makuya movement, which counts at the most only up to 100,000 members. In closing, let us however discuss briefly those features which, according to my experience, justify entitling the Makuya movement a model case for dialogic coexistence.

The very selection of the word *Makuya*, which is the Japanese equivalence of the Biblical Hebrew words *ohel* (tent) or *mishkan* (tabernacle), seems to contain the implicit dynamic goals of the movement. Thus Ikuro Teshima, founder of the movement, declared the importance of following the idea inherent in the tabernacle which symbolizes flexibility and movement, because "in ancient times the sons of Israel wandered in the wilderness of Sinai. . . . The Makuya movement is not a permanent building but a movable tent, folding and unfolding freely: it signifies the noninstitutional character of G-d's *ecclesia*" (Teshima 1982, 21). Indeed, Makuya's nondoctrinary nature, which thus concurs with Buber's definition of the kibbutz, seemed to feature its physical setting and organization and its dialogic openness for what can be termed "ritualistic exchange."

Accordingly, Teshima proclaims that "the movement is not by any means an organized body, much less a denomination. It is an expression of brotherly love, transcending denominational differences" (Teshima 1982, 48). This proclamation became one of the "fundamental" antifundamentalistic dialogic components characterizing the movement. To be sure, it is not that anarchic freedom of choice governs the Makuya's physical organization of life. Quite to the contrary, mating and work or study assignments especially for the young are, for example, largely determined by leaders, so that on the intermember level one might say that dialogic individualism or what I termed (Rotenberg 1978) "reciprocal individualism," is less prominent. However, following our conceptualization of genuine tolerance which by definition requires firm ideological convictions, it is the nondogmatic organizational operation which may vary according to changing needs, which justifies labeling the Makuya "kibbutz" style as a model community operating via volitionary contraction.

Makuya style interaction thus evolves around a physical center, which constitutes the pulsing heart of the community to which "members have a common relation" (Buber 1958, 135). Yet, members are free to live in their own apartments and most adults work wherever they

choose. Most importantly, the organization of activities might change according to new incoming ideas and technological knowledge. If thus one day a decision might be reached to concentrate zealous efforts on producing a Hebrew-Japanese dictionary, at some other time an experiential group trip to the seashore or the building of a new center in the mountains might be organized with similar enthusiasm. Organizational flexibility in regard to physical settings and experiences obviously borders on what I termed "ritual exchange," which, according to my experiences, epitomizes the possibility of a coexisting dialogue.

Since it was my main purpose to explore the possibility of an interfaith coexisting dialogue by using a phenomenological-experiential participant-observer technique, I focused efforts on practice-based teaching of Hasidic singing and dancing according to my Cabalic social contraction theory and on learning Makuya style interaction and ecstatic practices. What I learned was not only that Makuya rituals constitute a conglomeration of Christian, Shinto, Buddhist, and Jewish customs. Rather, my phenomenological experience taught me that, while the main tool for dialogic openness to learn and teach rituals was what could be termed the Makuya "love bomb" attack, this "I-thou" interchange reflected no dialectic "imperialistic-missionary" trend. In a nutshell, I may thus say that if I ever experienced a feeling of togetherness based on genuine mutual contraction (in which I felt good and firm about my Jewishness, in which they, I believe, felt good about being Makuya, and in which both sides felt eager to learn about the other but none of us felt any desire to impose one's beliefs on the other), it was there in the bosom of the Makuya commune in Tokyo.

It is probably not accidental that the late Teshima, who founded the movement in the early forties and led it until his death in the early seventies, rejected vehemently what he called Western "missionary" or "religious imperialism," which, to his mind, is "perhaps reflecting the European nature" which is "inclined to reject other religions and impose itself on others" (Teshima 1981, 44). Paradoxically, then, Eastern polytheism appears more tolerant than Western monotheism. It is not only that the contracting deassertiveness of the "broken-open heart," which comes natural to the Japanese, makes them good listening students, it is also the openness to accept other interpretations of life without giving up their own which makes them unique.

In summarizing this brief experiential account, the general implications emanating from my description might be somewhat as follows. While Makuya members are affected by the predominant Zen Buddhist socialization pattern which fosters in Japan a certain degree of egoless social withdrawal, the influence of the Japanese counteracting high learning ability through mutual, self-contraction seems to have

paved the way for openness and tolerance towards those components which enhance inner existence and external coexistence. Hence, Makuya-Hasidic style joy-practices may contribute to a dialogic inner coexistence between Zen Buddhist withdrawal and technological learning ambitions and to an external coexistence between Christianity, Buddhism, and Judaism.

Returning to our main discourse about Western imperialistic missionarism and the possibility for dialogic coexistence, my conclusions may sound somewhat gloomy. However, if Western dialecticism has indeed programmed both capitalist and Marxist minds to play war games, then we might have to try Eastern style "mind transplantation." And if indeed big brother Hegel has brainwashed us to believe that progress is possible only through war and conflict, then the time has come to begin our new piecemeal peace-work all over again. In other words, the fact that Eastern religious nations coexist for so many hundreds of years might teach us that the Hegelian assumption that *construction* is possible only after *destruction* is simply false.

"My heart is in the East and I am in the end of the West" said the medieval poet Rabbi Yehuda Halevi. Perhaps then the medieval poet's secret formula for "*Shalom* means peace!" may emerge from the Eastern contracted "broken heart," which may be more complete than the egoistic "I am" predominating the pieced-sliced West. We shall have thus to begin the thousand-steps march toward the marco world peace by taking the first micro step of relearning to respect how we are *different from* each other without being *indifferent to* each other.

NOTE

1. Referring to Iran's fundamentalist revolution led by Chumeiny, this *Chumeinism* is a popular expression for fanaticism.

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Notice

The International Erich Fromm Society has been founded in Tübingen, where the posthumous works of the psychoanalyst and social psychologist Erich Fromm (who died in 1980) are located in the Erich Fromm Archives. The registered charitable organization serves the purpose of maintaining, researching, developing further, and transmitting the knowledge and ideas of Erich Fromm. The Society organizes scholarly programs and projects on a national and international basis.

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