PRINCIPLES OF BUDDHISM

by Leslie S. Kawamura

Abstract. This paper presents Buddhism as a path theory in which the adherent practices mindfulness in order to see the world as-it-is. The world as presented in a human situation is an interdependently originating process to which one can bring meaning but in which meaning is not inherent. The conceptualizing process by which one concretizes reality is the foundation on which human frustrations and dis-ease arise. However, it is by this conceptualizing process that one establishes a cosmological view of the universe. The soteriological consideration in Buddhism is to realize that reality created by the mind is like an illusion, a concretization of an interdependently originating process into a substantive reality. Through this realization one can remove the delusion created by mind and see reality as-it-is.

Keywords: Buddhism; cosmology; mindfulness; problems of existence; reality; soteriology.

What has developed throughout history under the rubric of Buddhism reflects many diverse, multifarious, and at times even contradictory systems. Consequently, the term *Buddhism* does not refer to one homogeneous system, and therefore it is necessary to define how the term is used within a particular context.

In this paper the term *Buddhism* refers to a perceptual process of "seeing" (*darśana*), a seeing in which concepts do not impede one's perception of reality as-it-is. Consequently, it will not refer to particular schools of thought that fostered its development over 2,500 years. When tenets of a particular schools are used to support a thesis, that school will be referred to by name. The word *principles* refers to

Leslie S. Kawamura is professor of Buddhism, Department of Religious Studies, Faculty of Humanities, the University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4. This paper derives from one presented at the Thirty-Fifth Annual Conference ("Cosmology and the Meaning of Human Existence: Options from Contemporary Physics and Eastern Religions") of the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science, Star Island, New Hampshire, 30 July–6 August 1988.

[*Zygon*, vol. 25, no. 1 (March 1990).]
 ISSN 0591-2385

activities constituting that perceptual process. Therefore, this paper addresses the "activities constituting the act of seeing."

Buddhism was established as a unique and separate religious system when Siddhārtha, the prince of the Śākya clan, son of King Suddhodhana and Queen Māyā, sat under the Bo tree to resolve his human situation of suffering. Prince Siddhārtha (one who attains [*siddha*] his aim [*artha*]) was named by his father the king in the hope that he would follow in his footsteps and become the leader of the Śākya kingdom. This was of special concern to the father, because when, as the *Lalitavistara* relates, the prince was born, Asita, a fortune-teller proclaimed: "If he dwells in a house, he will become a king, a universal monarch. . . . But if he goes forth from a house to a houseless life, he will become a Tathāgata, . . . a fully enlightened Buddha" (Thomas [1927] 1960, 40). On the basis of this proclamation, the king took great pains to safeguard his son from life's afflictions. He built a summer residence to protect the prince from the blazing heat of the sun, a winter abode to shelter him from the bitterness of cold, a spring habitat to enjoy the opening of fresh buds, and still another dwelling to delight in the splendor and brilliance of autumn. The king also ensured that the paths leading to these places were always cleared of all human suffering.

What can be anticipated from the statements above is that the soteriological aspect of Buddhism, unlike other religious traditions, lies not in a historical Siddhārtha as an enlightened being but in an individual's capacity to realize reality as-it-is through an awareness of seeing it before the formulation of any concepts (*yāvadbhāvikatā*) and seeing it as relativity in its field characteristic (*yathāvadbhāvikatā*). Consequently, the examination of how one perceives oneself and the surrounding world is of more immediate significance in Buddhism than the investigation of cosmological principles that attempt to account for the universe. The reason for this is given in Sutta 63 of the *Majjhima-Nikāya*. Speculation concerning metaphysical and ontological questions is considered to be a theory that "is a jungle, a wilderness, a puppet show, a writhing, and a fetter and is coupled with misery, ruin, despair, and agony, and does not tend to aversion, absence of passion, cessation, quiescence, knowledge, supreme wisdom, and Nirvana" (Warren [1896] 1953, 124). If questions concerning the ontological status of God or the authenticity or historicity of a religious founder are central to one's soteriological concerns, investigation into such matters would be "as if . . . a man had been wounded by an arrow thickly smeared with poison, and his friends and companions, his relatives and kinsfolk, were to procure

for him a physician or surgeon; and the sick man were to say, 'I will not have this arrow taken out until I have learnt whether the man who wounded me belonged to the warrior caste, or to the Brahman caste, or to the agricultural caste, or to the menial caste'" (Warren 1953, 120).

Consequently, realization of the immediacy of experience becomes a focal point of the Buddhist concept of cosmology. Central to such a realization is (1) the problem of existence itself, (2) the quest into life's meaning, (3) the need to see reality as-it-is, (4) the practice of mindfulness, (5) the understanding that mistaken notions comprise the basis of dis-ease, (6) the realization that reality is illusionlike, and (7) the comprehension of the three perspectives of reality. By discussing each of these, this paper will attempt to show that cosmology results from soteriology—that is, the method (or path) by which one sees reality as-it-is brings meaning to the world that unfolds before one; a teleological world from which one must derive meaning does not exist.

THE PROBLEMS OF EXISTENCE

In spite of King Suddhodhana's attempt to keep the child prince protected from life's woes, Siddhārtha managed to leave the palace grounds. One day he sat on the edge of a field, watching a farmer cultivate his field, when he saw a bird swallow a worm in a single gulp after the worm was expelled from its comfortable earthy abode by the plow. This incident so distressed the prince that, from that day forward, he became totally preoccupied with the question of how and why life is doomed to be filled with *duḥkha* (dis-ease and suffering).

Life's path led Siddhārtha to further experiences that deepened his concern about human suffering. Four events, known as the *Four Gates*, experienced by Siddhārtha when he was twenty-nine years old, led him to seek teachers to help resolve the problem. The first of the four events took place when he left the palace grounds accompanied by his charioteer, Channa. On this excursion he came across an old man, battered by and feeble with age. Siddhārtha asked the charioteer, "What is this man?" Channa, contrary to the order given by the king, explained that "this dreadful sight was a man suffering from the miseries of old age, the condition to which all humans are inevitably fatefully drawn" (Herman 1983, 14). Moved by this incident, Siddhārtha retired to the palace to brood over what he had seen.

On the second occasion he encountered a sick man, lying by the road, and inquired into the causes of his suffering. Channa responded, as on the previous day, that it was the fate and nature of man to endure the pains of sickness, as well as to grow old and feeble.

When Siddhārtha left from the third gate, he encountered a dead man being carried to a funeral pyre. Again he asked for an explanation and Channa responded by saying that this was a corpse, a body of a man whose life had ended—a reality reached by everyone sooner or later.

On the fourth occasion Siddhārtha met a man, dressed in a yellow robe, who was old yet appeared peaceful and tranquil. The man's face seemed to glow with joy and peace. Siddhārtha again requested an explanation of this event. Channa explained that this man was a religious wanderer, a solitary monk, who begged for his food and who had conquered the pain and suffering of old age, sickness, and death. Deeply impressed by this experience, Siddhārtha returned to the palace.

At this time Yashodhara, his wife, gave birth to his son. Having contemplated and then determined to live a life of solitude as a religious wanderer, Siddhārtha felt chained by the responsibilities that now confronted him. When asked by the attendants what the child's name should be, he muttered *Rāhula* (fetter) in utter disgust.

Kindled by experiences gained when he left the palace through the four gates, shaken by the birth of his son, and disgusted with the pleasures and sensuality of his father's palace, Siddhārtha resolved to renounce his princely life and to seek true happiness and joy that life in the palace could not give him. Thus, shortly after the birth of his son, Siddhārtha left the protected shelter of his father's palace.

SIDDHĀRTHA'S QUEST

The world into which Siddhārtha entered when he left the security and pleasures of the palace was dominated by proto-Hindu traditions, in which the words of the written texts were studied and discussed. Investigators were scrutinizing the spoken words (*śabda*) as if the words could unravel the mystery of life. It was also a world that was seen to be ordered by the law of karma. The *Bṛhadarānyaka Upanishad* states: "Now as a person is like this or that, accordingly as one acts and accordingly as one behaves, so will one be:—a person of good acts will become good, a person of bad acts bad. One becomes pure by pure deeds, bad by bad deeds."[1]

This law of karma was conjoined with the rounds of birth and

death (*saṃsāra*). The *Chāndogya Upanishad* (about 750 BCE) states: "Those whose conduct here has been good, will quickly attain some good birth, the birth of a *brāhmaṇa*, a *kṣatriya*, or a *vaiśya*. But those whose conduct has been evil will quickly attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog or a pig or a *caṇḍāla* (outcaste)" (Müller [1879] 1962, part 1, 82).

Siddhārtha wandered about, from one teacher to another, but two of them—Aḷāra Kālāma[2] and Uddaka Rāmaputta—were most influential in teaching him the way of meditative absorption. Siddhārtha quickly learned what they had to offer, but their methods did not respond to his quest for peace and happiness. However, from them he learned that *no* teacher could instruct him in the way to peace and tranquility. He was on his own. He must go alone or not at all.

To achieve his long-sought goal, Siddhārtha continued his practice of the most severe austerities until he almost died. A young maiden, who happened to pass by, saw the frail Siddhārtha and gave him rice gruel. Then, having regained his strength, he renounced the ascetic path of the mortification of the body, because he realized that without health, one could do nothing. Rejected by his five ascetic companions because he refused to live by their self-mortifying practices, Siddhārtha journeyed alone to Gayā. There, under a Bo tree, he seated himself and resolved not to move until he had achieved the *nirvāṇa* he sought. In accomplishing what had to be done, he realized that old age, sickness, and death were naturally the manifested dependently originating (*pratītya-samutpāda*) reality as-it-is (*yathā-bhūtam*).[3] There was nothing more to achieve and nothing more to add.

Siddhārtha sat blissfully for forty-nine days, enjoying the peacefulness of emancipation. Contemplating whether he should or should not share the enlightenment experience with others, he sat in absolute silence (*tūṣṇīm-bhāva*). The Brahman God, Sahampati, came to Siddhārtha and pleaded that he teach all of mankind what he had learned. Whether this incident is true or was a later interpolation (to show the superiority of Siddhārtha) does not concern us. What is important is that Siddhārtha ventured out to seek his former ascetic companions, who had moved to the Deer Park in Sārnāth. As Siddhārtha approached, they tried to avoid him, because he had renounced their self-motifying practices. However, when Siddhārtha came closer, they could not but marvel over his peaceful countenance and serene composure. They greeted him by his name, but Siddhārtha said, "Do not call me Siddhārtha, for I am now the *tathāgata*." By this statement, Siddhārtha was referring to the "one

who comes just as one is" (*tathā-gata*) and the "one who goes just as one is (*tathā-āgata*)."[4]

Seeing Reality As-It-Is

As pointed out above, it was "seeing things as they really are"—i.e., seeing reality as-it-is (*yathā-bhūta*)—that made Siddhārtha an awakened one, i.e., a buddha. Therefore the term *tathāgata* refers to "just what one is" within the activity of "seeing what is as-it-is." This means that enlightenment (*bodhi*) does not depend upon a historical Siddhārtha to be authentic, but verification of an enlightened state lies in the very process of experiencing reality as-it-is. However, in spite of the fact that people perceive nothing more than reality as-it-is, what distinguishes a *tathāgata* from an ordinary person is that a *tathāgata* neither judges, evaluates, nor concretizes either the perceptual process or the object of perception as this or that particular existence. In other words, whereas the *tathāgata* sees what is as-it-is, and *no-thing* more, the ordinary person sees that very same reality as-it-is as "a this" or "a that" particular substantive thing, possessing positive or negative qualities. Thus, when Siddhārtha told his ascetic friends not to call him by his name, he discouraged them from judging, evaluating, or concretizing him as this or that particular person possessing this or that innate quality.

Having greeted his five ascetic friends in that manner, Siddhārtha began to impart the contents of his enlightenment experience to them. He told them that they should avoid the two extreme beliefs in existence and nonexistence and that they should adhere to the middle path. He then characterized human existence as frustrating and one of dis-ease (*duḥkha*), nonsubstantive (*anātman*), and transitory (*anitya*). He explained that dis-ease results from the desire to keep constant what is transient and bound to change. He then revealed that by overcoming desire and attachments, frustrations can be overcome. By means of the eightfold path, which is none other than plunging headlong into action by giving up one's clinging to ideas and concepts as realities of experiences, Siddhārtha showed how the capacity to see reality as-it-is can be actualized.

Although such a formulation, known as the Four Noble Truths,[5] is explained as a path by which the unenlightened can become enlightened, the path cannot be seen by one who has not truly experienced dis-ease in its depth. In other words, although it is by means of a Buddhist path that one overcomes human suffering, the overcoming of suffering cannot be actualized unless one's practice (*bhāvanā*) of mindfulness in meditative absorption (*dhyāna*) is inspired by a deep feeling of dis-ease.

PRACTICE OF MINDFULNESS

"The necessity for 'mindfulness' is frequently emphasized in the Pali Suttas . . . [and] 'mindfulness' rests on the 'Four Bases' of mindfulness" (Ling 1981, 71). The practice of meditative absorption, which is fundamental to the cultivation of seeing reality as-it-is, is perfected by the practice of mindfulness: The *Mahāsati-paṭṭhāna-sutta* states:

> The only way, bhikkhus, to purify living beings and to transcend sorrow and lamentation, to extinguish suffering and dejection, to acquire the right mode of life and to reach the realization of nibbana, is that of the Four Applications of Mindfulness.
>
> Now what are these four? In our community, bhikkhus, one continually so observes the body, *qua* body, that one remains energetic, conscious and mindful, having disciplined both the desire and the dejection which are common in the world. Similarly one continually so observes the sensations, *qua* sensations, that one remains energetic, conscious and mindful, having disciplined both the desire and the dejection which are common in the world. And one continually so observes thoughts, *qua* thoughts, and states of mind, *qua* states of mind, that one remains energetic, conscious and mindful, having disciplined both the desire and the dejection which are common in the world (Ling 1981, 72).

One maintains mindfulness of the body to observe "its actions, its movements, its breath, its thirty-two parts, its skeleton, its corpse; mindfulness of feelings [to observe] the physical sensations or the emotional feelings; mindfulness of thought [to observe the] thinking processes, [and to know] . . . that thinking process is going on, . . . that the mind is working, . . . that there is a thought; and mindfulness of mind objects [which is the] knowing whether the thought is wholesome or unwholesome" (Khema 1987, 174).

Wholesome or unwholesome thought is measured, traditionally, against knowing whether the five hindrances (*nivaraṇa*),[6] for example, have arisen or not. The "five hindrances" refers to five emotional states—overexuberance and remorse, vindictiveness, gloominess and drowsiness, attachment, and indecision—that are known as enemies (*māra*) that disrupt the attainment of meditative absorption and mindfulness, because they tempt one to submit to desires and pleasures. Once these enemies take over, the cultivation of the wholesome states of happiness and tranquility becomes very difficult (Guenther and Kawamura 1975, 105–6).

How do these five hindrances torture us and bind us to *saṃsāra*, the prison of life? Basically, they prevent us from seeing what is as-it-is. When the mind gets overly excited about its object or becomes remorseful over what has taken place, or when the mind becomes

angry with others, or when it turns inward on account of gloominess, or when drowsiness takes over and the perceptual organs become dull, or when the mind clings tenaciously to things that merely seem to, but not really, please, or when doubt arises, then the mind is incapable of seeing reality clearly for what it is. Thus by cultivating mindfulness, which counteracts the five hindrances, the three defining characteristics of reality (viz., that all is dis-ease and frustrating [*duḥkha*], that all is transitory [*anitya*], and that all is nonsubstantive [*anātman*]) can be experienced just-as-they-are.

Mistaken Notions as Basis of Dis-ease

Transitoriness and nonsubstantiveness give rise to dis-ease, because one desires to maintain one's youth, life, pleasures, happiness, joy, reassurance, hope, and to gain what one desires, even though old age, sickness, and death lurk in the background. Whether it be gain or loss, pleasures or pain, kind or abusive words, or praise or blame—in short, no matter which worldly concern gives life its pleasures, joys, reassurances, hope, or purpose—that concern is transitory and bound to be disappointing. Thus they are not anything upon which one can depend. Although these emotional qualities color one's life, for the enlightened one they are nothing but fleeting moments of the mind process that have nothing substantive about them. They are unreal fantasies—like the son of a barren woman or the horn on a rabbit—and lose their power to dominate one when they are understood and accepted for what they are—i.e., as nothing but notions or ideas. Only a fool would seriously investigate the attraction that a son of a barren woman may have or the damage that a horn of a rabbit may produce. However obvious it may be that a son of a barren woman and the horn of a rabbit cannot bring about an effect, when an unenlightened mind is obscured by the five hindrances, it is conquered by them and becomes very attached, deluded, and angry.

Attachment, delusion, and anger are referred to as the three kinds of poisons, because when they are operative, nothing positive results.[7] Dis-ease (*duḥkha*) arises from attachment and attachment originates from delusion. Consequently, it becomes clear that in order to avoid dis-ease and tension in life, delusion must be overcome.

Illusionlike Reality

Overcoming delusion is not easy, because it is very difficult to accept one's existence as transitory and without a substantive basis—

especially when one is deluded by the notion that there is something underlying one's existence, social status, personality, and so on. Accordingly, one continues to think, speak, and act in the belief that some permanent nature underlies existence, even though all is transitory (*anitya*) and nonsubstantive (*anātman*). For example, when the three periods of time—past, present, and future—are considered, people usually accept them as substantive units. That is, people think, speak, and act as if what has already transpired continues to exist in the present, or as if what is taking place now will last, or as if what has not yet occurred can influence one's present thoughts. Although, conventionally speaking, the future is the present transformed into the past, neither the past, the present, nor the future is an absolute unit of time, possessing an essence of its own. Each derives its meaning only in the relationship to the other, because it is only transiency, i.e., the fact of momentariness and passing away, that can give time its reality. Consequently, we know that it is not, in any absolute sense, 10:40 A.M. Wednesday right now—that, in fact, any of the conventionally designated, possible times of the 24 hours will do, depending on our perspective. Further, even though any time will do, when a conventionally designated time is selected, we know that time is relative to the reality of transiency. Yet we—and even WWV (the radio station of the National Bureau of Standards at Fort Collins, Colorado)—think, speak, and act as if the universe were endowed with "standard times." In fact, it is WWV and the like that maintain and nourish our belief in the reality of a "correct" time, which is nothing more than the mistaken belief that such a "thing" as a "correct" time can exist.

Bertrand Russell expressed a similar concern with regard to propositions, the vehicle by which we convey our mistaken beliefs. He says, "[W]hen rightly analyzed, propositions verbally about 'a so and so' are found to contain no constituents represented by this phrase. And that is why such propositions can be significant even when there is no such thing as 'a so and so' " (Russell 1952, 99). This means that just because we can formulate a proposition, it does not necessarily follow that what is expressed by a proposition is reality as-it-is. But we believe that propositions can relate reality as-it-is, because we do not realize that language as a medium is a convention, a convenient way of communicating ideas, but one that has no ability to determine reality as-it-is. Words name, but do not make reality. In other words, whatever presence there is, is as-it-is. This means that whatever exists lacks a nature that makes it what it is and is therefore nameless. The mistaken notion of the substantiveness of whatever is named is based upon consciousness of not realizing

that reality is "interdependently arising" (*pratītya-samutpāda*) and "illusionlike."

According to the Yogācāra Buddhist tradition, reality is "illusionlike" (*māyopama*), but not "an illusion" (*māyā*), because if reality were an illusion, it would be unreal. Although the statement that reality is illusionlike, sounds on the one hand paradoxical, it is not unreasonable because the simultaneity of existence and nonexistence must be accepted in order to speak about reality as illusionlike.

In the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, an important Yogācāra text, Asaṅga discusses at length our mental constructions by which we see what is truly like an illusion—i.e., the essenceless transiency—as if it were this or that substantive reality. Asaṅga relates that a magician, out of pieces of wood, creates an illusionlike elephant which is perceived by the audience as a real elephant. That illusionlike elephant, though perceived by the audience, does not exist in reality, because such an elephant is nothing more than a mental construction. Yet the audience, upon perceiving the magic creation, acts as if a real elephant were present (Lévi [1907] 1983, 59–62).

The author, Asaṅga, is careful to refer to the elephant as "illusionlike" (*māyopama*), and not as "an illusion" (*māyā*), because if the magically created elephant (the nonexistent) were in fact an elephant (the existent), it could trample the audience (and the audience should be worried about what it perceives) and because if the elephant were an illusion, then it could have no efficacy. A magically created (i.e., a mentally constructed) elephant is nonexistent insofar as it does not have a nominatum;[8] however, in spite of that, a mental construct takes on existential characteristics. The pieces of wood that appear like an elephant (which is nonexistent) is perceived by the audience as if it were a real elephant (existent). This means that the audience does not perceive the magically created elephant as illusionlike. In other words, the audience took the mentally created elephant (i.e., the illusionlike elephant that is nonexistent) to be real (i.e., the nonexistent to be existent) instead of seeing the mental construct (the nonexistent elephant) as being illusionlike (a nonexistent elephant).

In the same manner, our understanding of reality is said to be illusionlike insofar as it is mentally constructed. When the audience is no longer deceived and sees that the magically created elephant is none other than the pieces of wood, there will be no basis for fearing the nonexistent elephant. Mental constructs exist as illusionlike realities, because what is constructed in one's mind takes on a certain form even though the form so constructed is not substantively real. It

is for this very reason that reality, which is illusionlike, has the attributes of both existence and nonexistence simultaneously.

THREE PERSPECTIVES OF REALITY

How are we to understand that reality has the attributes of both existence and nonexistence simultaneously? The three-nature theory established by Yogācāra is a very sophisticated explication of the meanings of existence, nonexistence, and the existence of nonexistence. The three natures refer to three perspectives by which reality is interpreted. First, reality can be seen as simply the fact of "interdependently arising," and seen from this perspective reality is referred to as the *other-dependent* (*paratantra*). Second, when reality is seen from the perspective of a "mental construction," it is referred to as the *imagined* (*parikalpita*). Finally, when seen as-it-is, reality is referred to as the *consummated* (*pariniṣpanna*). This last means that one sees the interdependently arising (i.e., the other-dependent) as interdependently arising (i.e., the consummated) without the imposition of mental construction (i.e., the imagined). When the interdependently arising is seen as-it-is, then transiency or flux (i.e., the interdependently arising) will not be turned into a concrete existence. When transiency is accepted just-as-it-is, frustration or dis-ease will not arise.

During the candlelight services at the conference where this paper was presented, people were asked to reflect on a flame. I invite you to reflect on a flame too. What is the flame? Is it some kind of substantive existence possessing the essence of "flame-ness" that makes it what it is? If so, from whence did "flame-ness" come and where does it go when the flame is extinguished? Is it that "flame-ness" alights on the candle wick, lingers, and thrusts itself away again, perhaps to the realm of flames? Or is it illusionlike—that is, is "the observed" like an illusion that makes its presence felt in some form but is truly without essence?

The attempt to respond to these questions is a process of mentally constructing the "interdependently arising" into a concrete substantive reality that has this or that unique characteristic. Therefore, when the mind is confronted by such questions, instead of directing itself to the absurdity of the questions, it turns to the dichotomy of "the observed" and "the observer" created by the mental process as if it were a reality that had its own essence. Once the mind succeeds in dividing reality into components, it alienates itself from the world and thus finds itself in loneliness, where the frustrations and dis-ease of life are generated.

SOTERIOLOGY AND COSMOLOGY

This paper began with the idea that the soteriological aspect of Buddhism, unlike other religious traditions, lies not in a historical Siddhārtha as an enlightened being—that is, in Siddhārtha's divinity—but in an individual's capacity to realize reality as-it-is through an awareness of seeing it before the formulation of any concepts (*yāvadbhāvikatā*) and an awareness of seeing it as relativity (*yathāvadbhāvikatā*). In order to see reality just-as-it-is, one had to understand how the mind transformed the interdependently originating process into a substantively real. The three-nature theory of Yogācāra gave the cosmological basis for the Buddhist soteriology in that the world as the given is an interdependently originating process on which the illusionlike substantiveness is imputed. In this aspect, the Buddhist experiences deep frustration and dis-ease. When the illusionlike substantiveness is seen in its field characteristic as illusionlike and when the interdependently originating process is seen as the basis for the illusionlike reality, then reality is seen as-it-is. In this aspect, the Buddhist is freed from the frustrations and dis-ease caused by the delusion of seeing nonexistence as existent and existence as nonexistent. Consequently, the examination of perception is a more pressing concern in Buddhism than cosmological principles to account for the universe.

NOTES

1. *Bṛhadaraṇyaka Upanishad*, IV. 4.5 (Müller [1879]i1962, part 2, 176). Note 1 (which pertains to this section) reads: "The *iti* after *adomaya* is not clear to me, but it is quite clear that a new sentence begins with *tadyadetat*." The terms *man* and *he*, used by Müller, have for the most part been replaced by *person* and *one* in the present paper.

2. With regard to how Siddhārtha reacted to the teachings of Āḷāra Kālāma, the *Majjhima Nikāya* (i. 240) states:

> Thus it was, Āḷāra [Kālāma] my teacher set me his pupil as equal to himself, and honored me with eminent honor. Then I thought, "this doctrine extending to the Attainment of the state of Nothingness does not conduce to aversion, absence of passion, cessation, tranquility, higher knowledge, Nirvāṇa." So without tending to this doctrine I abandoned it in disgust (Thomas [1927]i1960, 63).

3. This is described by A. L. Herman (1983, 55) as follows:

> During the great night that followed he experienced the four states of meditational trance. In the first watch (evening) of that memorable night he experienced his own previous existences. In the second watch (mid-night) he experienced the death and rebirth of all living beings. In the third watch (late night) he destroyed the impurities in his own nature, *kāma* (sensual desire), *bhava* (desire for existence), *dṛṣṭi* (false views), and *avidya* (ignorance), and he experienced the four noble truths and *pratītyasamutpāda* (the principle of dependent origination). Finally with the coming of dawn, Gautama saw into the fundamental nature of all things, he saw things as they

really are (*yathā-bhūtam*). It was then that he became completely awakened. Thus, in the year 528 BCE, Gautama Siddhārtha Śākyamuni became the Arhat, 'the worthy one,' the Tathāgata, 'the thus become,' and the Buddha, 'the awakened one.'

4. The translation of *tathāgata* into English (thus come or thus gone) must not be understood as a description of the manner in which Siddhārtha came and went. The term *tathāgata*, used in this context, is one in which the terms *thus come* and *thus gone* portray the momentariness of existence. In other words, the term *tathāgata* describes the locus, making up what we understand to be the present moment, constituting our existence, which also happens to be the very moment in which life in its totality takes place.

5. What has been described above is related in the texts as the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Noble Path. However, I would like to point out that the English translation of the Sanskrit terms *catvāry ārya = satyāni* (the Four Noble Truths) is somewhat perplexing, because one must wonder how a reality that is filled with suffering and frustration could be "noble." No doubt the word *ārya* can be translated into English as "noble," but it should not be understood as an adjective of the word *satya*, which, according to dictionaries, has, besides the meaning "truth," such others as "reality," "existence," and so on. Would it not be more appropriate, therefore, to understand the relationship between the words *āryāni* and *satyāni* as yielding the meaning "reality of a noble one"—that is, "reality as perceived by an enlightened being"? In other words, the reality that is experienced as frustrating and full of suffering is perceived directly as the result of one's thought, speech, and action. But it must be emphasized that it is only an enlightened being who can directly perceive the reality of frustration as originating from one's own thought, speech, and action, because by virtue of being enlightened, one has given up attachments to the erroneous view that value and meaning can be derived from reality. Thus, to be enlightened means that one gives up belief in the absoluteness of value and meaning, because one realizes that value and meaning are relative to a situation and gain absolute status only insofar as one is unable to perceive the transitoriness of reality as-it-is.

6. Ayya Khema points out that, aside from knowing whether the five hindrances have arisen, mindfulness of the mind objects is explained as "knowing whether . . . any of the seven factors of enlightenment, any of the path factors of the noble eightfold path or any of the six sense contacts have arisen" (Khema 1987, 174).

7. For example, the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* VI. 3 and VI. 5 (Guenther and Kawamura 1975, 67) states:

> When one is mentally feverish with hate
> The mind cannot experience peace.
> In not being able to gain either happiness or joy
> One will lose sleep and become very unsteady.
> By anger friends are made weary, and even if one
> Attracts them by gifts, they cannot be made to stay.
> In short, anger does not offer one
> The slightest chance to be happy.

8. The term *nominatum* is one that Frege used in his semantic analysis of language to indicate that a word has a referent. It is used in contrast to *sense* (Carnap 1956, 118–33).

REFERENCES

Carnap, Rudolph. 1956. *Meaning and Necessity*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

Guenther, Herbert V., Leslie S. Kawamura. 1975. *Mind in Buddhist Psychology*. Emeryville, CA: Dharma.

Herman, A. L. 1983. *Introduction to Buddhist Thought*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Khema, Ayya. 1987. *Being Nobody, Going Nowhere—Meditations on the Buddhist Path*. London: Wisdom Publications.

Lévi, Sylvain. [1907] 1983. *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra—Exposé de la Doctrine du Grand Véhicle*. Vols. 1 and 2. Reprint. Kyoto: Rinsen.

Ling, Trevor, ed. 1981. *The Buddha's Philosophy of Man*. London: Everyman's Library.

Müller, Max F. [1879] 1962. *The Upaniṣads*. 2 parts. New York: Dover.

Russell, Bertrand. 1952. "Descriptions." In *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language*, by Leonard Linsky, 95–108. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Thomas, Edward J. [1927] 1960. *The Life of Buddha as Legend and History*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Warren, Henry Clarke. [1896] 1953. *Buddhism in Translation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.