

BEYOND SCIENTISM

by Wallace A. Russell

It would be a simple matter to open a discussion on the theme of "Science and Religion in a New World View" with a critique of the incompatibilities of traditional religious doctrines with the methods and findings of empirical science. Indeed, it would be exhilarating to review the old battles between science and old-style religion—those battles which were so gallantly fought and from which the liberal, pro-science wing emerged with such a satisfying sense of victory. Then it was a clear question of *competing* world views, with an ancient Christian metaphysics pitted against the new world view of science. The conflicts were clear and often empirical in nature. How old was the earth? Was the earth once destroyed by a flood? Did the sun ever stand still? Was man created by God, or did he evolve from a pre-existing primate? Was there a virgin birth and a genuine physical resurrection? Surely, it was a case of a nascent scientific world view versus a pre-scientific theology in a society where the implicit prejudices were all on the side of the old view and all the good evidence was on the side of the science-influenced view.

However much we may regret it, the time has passed for such nostalgic activity. The issues today are of another order, and they are too urgent to wait while we indulge in remembrance of things past. Those issues of science versus religion are obsolete. This has been brought about by a basic change in the functioning world view of our culture as a whole.

INFILTRATION OF THE SCIENTIFIC WORLD VIEW

The meaning of the phrase "world view" is apparently so general as to defy definition. No less an authority than Webster's second edition evades the issue by stating only that it is a translation of the German

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word *Weltanschauung*. But using this evasion as a clue, I found that my German-English dictionary was somewhat more forthright. It was willing to settle for "conception of the world" and "philosophy of life" as meanings for *Weltanschauung* and, presumably, for "world view," also. These terms are at least familiar to us and give us a preliminary feel for what is being referred to, even though it cannot be claimed that they add much precision to a discussion.

Now, a world view, as I see it, is not something which a person may lightheartedly accept or reject on the basis of a single "bull session" or even a formal lecture, no matter how enlightening it may be. In fact, it may not be something we *select* at all. Our functioning world view runs much deeper than that. It is a kind of general orientation within which we operate and which is the cumulative, perhaps even automatic, product of our experiences with the world. In other words, we may have a world view and not even know it! Indeed, I would hold that our functioning world views are made up in large part of strictly unconscious elements imposed by cultural forces which are so pervasive that they are no more noted than the air we breathe.

This is not to say that conscious efforts to formulate our world views are impossible or undesirable. Indeed, the more explicit our attitudes become—that is, the more validly they can be expressed in words—the more efficiently they can be related to effective action.

The point I want to stress about world views first of all, however, is that they are made up of *more* than just verbalizable statements concerning our philosophy of life. A world view may function very well in the complete absence of any explicit formulation in words. An archeologist might reconstruct the world view of members of an ancient civilization by inference from remaining artifacts, and he might be correct even if we found that a living member of that culture would have been quite unable to express or be aware of the framework of assumptions—the world view—which guided his actions.

But there is also a conscious aspect to the world views of most of us. And so it is possible to consider the degree of congruence between a person's "built-in," unconscious world view and his conscious, intellectual attempts to express that world view in words. These latter attempts may be the personal efforts of an individual to express his philosophy of life in his own words, or they may be dogmatic social statements designed to express the views of a group, such as the creeds of orthodox religious institutions.

There have been periods in history when the congruence or harmony between the functional, implicit world view of a society and its formal,

overt verbal formulation was high. I suspect that this was the case in western Europe in the thirteenth century when St. Thomas Aquinas produced his profound synthesis of early Christian and Aristotelian thought, reconciling for his time the claims of both faith and reason. Perhaps that was a period when for many persons there was a complete harmony between their implicit world view and their publicly expressed world view, which was, of course, official Roman Catholic Christianity.

More often than not, unfortunately, the congruence between functional and expressed world views has been far from perfect. As societies change, functional world views change in subtle and perhaps unrecognized ways while the consciously acknowledged world view remains static. This may leave both the individual and society as a whole in a state of conflict between conscious and unconscious, between apparent reality and doctrine, between what a person "knows in his bones" and what he says he believes.

For over four hundred years the Western world has been in such a state of conflict. Cultural changes have occurred so rapidly and our functional world views have changed so much that it is not surprising that our efforts to harmonize our experienced world with our expressed beliefs about it have largely been unsuccessful. The ground has simply been shifting too fast. Certainly, the synthesis of St. Thomas no longer resonates with every level of our being, nor do any of the formulas developed for another age. Inevitably, we seek new ways to reduce the discord within us. In the words of the theme of this conference we seek expression for "A New World View."

If what I have just said about world views is reasonable, then efforts to enunciate a world view could do worse than to begin with the recognition that our society already possesses certain unconscious elements of a world view. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, for us to know intuitively what that implicit world view is like. But it is possible to make some guesses about it, just as the archeologist might make guesses about the world view of an ancient and alien culture.

One probable guess about our society is that our implicit, functional world view has been profoundly influenced by the scientific developments of our day. However we may feel about it, the scientific progress of the last few centuries is bound to have had its effects upon us and to have produced, functionally, a science-influenced world view. I believe that this is the case and that any formulations which ignore this state of affairs are doomed to fall on deaf ears in our time.

Now let me be clear about what I mean by a science-influenced world

view. I do not mean that all of us think like scientists or that a science-influenced world view is necessarily any more "scientific"—however you may use the term—than any other world view. Rather, I mean only that the cultural residue of the scientific revolution has left its imprint on all of us so that the way we view the world, the way we conceptualize reality, the way we think things must be, are different—radically different—from the corresponding preconceptions of other generations. Time, space, matter, causality, life, death—any fundamental conception—all have different meanings to us as a result of developments in science.

If we recognize the functional existence of a basic, science-influenced world view in our society, a number of matters can be seen in a new light and some old problems can be viewed in a new way.

For one thing, the whole issue of religion vis-à-vis science takes on a new look. The problem is no longer one of new science versus old religion. The influence of science is established; it is ingrained in us. There is no longer a need for defending science but, rather, a question of finding a place for religion. Our theme is science *and* religion, not science *versus* religion, and the middle word is the critical one. This is why, in my opinion, it would be simply irrelevant for us to spend our time in one more foray into the old arguments for a scientific world view as against a now non-functional theological position.

RESPONSES OF ORTHODOX AND LIBERAL RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Many recent developments in orthodox religion begin to make sense if they are viewed as efforts to achieve accommodation with the functional existence of an implicit yet dominant, science-influenced world view in contemporary society.

The movement to "demythologize" the Christian message appears as an effort to make that religion more acceptable to a culture whose ingrained thinking about the material world does not allow a place for capricious violation of natural laws.

When an official of the Church of England can write in the vein of the book *Honest To God*¹ and a man like Bishop Pike can avow an agnostic position, the direction of religious thought toward accommodation with a science-influenced world view becomes obvious.

Even the hysterical cry that "God is dead," meaningless as it may seem to a humanist, appears to confirm the general trend, at least in reflecting dissatisfaction with orthodoxy.

It is tempting to imagine that organized religion, in seeking this accommodation with modernity, may be turning toward positions which

ZYGON

have characterized those of the liberal churches. Certainly some claim to discern a latent cryptohumanism in much recent theological discussion.

O. H. Mowrer is an eminent contemporary psychologist whose experience with organized religion provides further confirmation of the yielding of the church to the scientific orientation. Disillusioned with Freudian psychoanalysis, and seeking some basis for personal reorientation, he turned to the Presbyterian church. Here, in his own words, is what he found: "as I became somewhat better informed about the state of Christendom in general, I made a fantastic discovery: nobody was 'home.' Everyone was over where I had just come from, getting themselves psychoanalysed or non-directively-counseled . . . the fact was that many clergymen and seminary professors, not to mention the rank and file of church members, now 'accepted Freud' in a way that was very reminiscent of the way people used to be admonished to 'accept Christ.'"²

Where does all this leave the liberal church? At first glance it would seem that we had won the day. We have defended science against an outworn view of the world. The influence of science has been incorporated into the very warp and woof of our society. Orthodox religion is in an upheaval in its struggle to accommodate itself to this fact and may be groping toward positions which have often been characteristic of our own group.

One might imagine that liberal religions would now take the lead in propounding a total world view which would provide a synthesis of thought and feeling as profound and harmonious for our time as that of St. Thomas was for his. It seems to me that there is precious little evidence that this is so.

The thinking in the liberal churches I know seems to be that of those who are somehow baffled by their own success and infinitely uncertain about where to go from here.

One reaction, in the true tradition of the rebellious spirit of liberal religion, has been to turn against the very scientific orientation it formerly defended with such force and brilliance. This stance has been that of a reaction to the dangers of a truly powerful science. Its advocates fear not only the possible physical destructiveness of the new sources of energy but the threats to individuality in an automated society and the potential sacrifice of the experiential realities of living to the methodological objectivity of science. They reject science because of these dangers and advocate a return to a subjectivity which takes the form of a vague, and perhaps solipsistic, existentialism.

Another view found in the liberal church is one which accepts involvement in the material and social world. This much is characteristic of the empirical emphasis of science. But this position characteristically does not prize highly the role of conscious elements in a world view. Its followers are content to act on the basis of their intuitive impulses. They become impatient at attempts at reasoning, which they fear might inhibit real-world contacts. They rush blindly into social action, feeling that action is a substitute for personal integration.

But perhaps most interesting and widespread of all is a position which I shall call "intellectual scientism." This is the view that the acceptance of the philosophy and methods of science is alone sufficient to provide a basis for religion, morals, and the totality of a world view. It is particularly widespread in the traditionally hard-nosed Midwestern cradle of the humanist faction of the Unitarian Universalist group. We fall victim to it whenever we denounce the views of others as "unscientific"—implying that our own are free of this fault. It derives from our respect for science, but results in making a fetish of it. In extolling the power of science, we fail to recognize its limitations and assume it to be all-sufficient.

It is my contention that none of these views is adequate to the task of providing the synthesis that we seek between our functional and expressed world views. The subjective anti-science position conflicts with all the pro-science attitudes inherent in our culture; the blind social-action view simply fails to confront the problem; and intellectual scientism, as I shall maintain, not only avoids the central religious issue of our day but is demonstrably incorrect.

RELIGION BEYOND SCIENTISM

One gets the impression that, while orthodoxy in our time cannot survive *without* accommodation to a science-influenced world view, liberal religion is doing not a bit better trying to survive on the bare bones of those influences. Something more is needed in both camps. Let us leave orthodoxy with its problems and turn candidly to the problems we face in framing a world view which goes, as I feel it must, beyond scientism.

I recall, not so long ago, listening to one of our most renowned philosophers of science review once more, and at the request of my own Unitarian Society, the lineup of arguments of the scientific outlook against theology. He was, as always, brilliant, and his reasoning, coercive. Having once more killed the dragon of viciously transempirical belief, he devoted the last five minutes of his discussion to the position which he advocated, that of scientific humanism, suggesting tentatively

ZYGON

that its moral basis might be drawn from the "ethical communalities of the world's great religions." There he stopped. A friend of mine commented, "How I wish that someday I could hear a sermon which would *begin* at the point he left off."

That was a clear statement of our current need to get beyond scientism, to grapple with the problems of morality and religious commitment as a priority issue and not as a promissory note following a restatement of our recognition of the cogency of a well-formulated philosophy of science. Surely the latter provides the basis for a picture of reality, but religion requires more than this. Religion involves standards which govern the active and emotional relations between a man and the rest of nature. And standards lie just a step beyond scientism.

This is not an easy step to take, and, for one who will not go beyond the procedural dictates of science, an impossible one. I personally hold that there is no such thing as a scientific humanism, in the strict sense which implies that the religious position of humanism can be arrived at by the same process of scientific reasoning as, say, the law of falling bodies. My conclusion follows from the consideration that strictly scientific laws must take the form of "if . . . then . . ." statements. That is, they specify regularities obtaining between certain initial conditions (the "if . . ." phrase) and certain consequent conditions (the "then . . ." phrase). This is a truism among scientists and underlies most discussions of what is called the "neutrality" of science, for there is no purely logical way in which an "if . . . then . . ." statement can become an "ought" statement—that is, one containing a moral imperative or setting a standard of right and wrong, good and bad, desirable and undesirable.

The validity of this argument I cannot deny. Hours of discussion with those who have sought for a moral imperative in natural law have failed to change my view on this point. At the same time, I have never been able to accept this argument as stating the whole truth about religious or moral imperatives any more than I have been content with the claim that it represents the whole story about the alleged neutrality of science.

Obviously, if we are to get any further we must at least face the full implications of our argument. We must abandon false and wishful thinking to the effect that, in spite of all, we will one day find a way to a "scientific" humanism. Even more, we must stop any pretense that if religious commitments are not logically derivable from scientific laws, then somehow they don't exist in any sense, or are unworthy of serious

consideration. They must be recognized as an essential aspect of an effective world view.

Of the many meanings of the word "belief," one has the sense of faith or commitment to something, as in the statement: "I believe in democratic principles." It is this meaning that we need to explore, and exploit, if we are to get beyond an empty scientism in our religion. And to my mind, this frontier is the critical issue we have to face.

To be sure, the protective cover of scientism may be lost when we do this, and we risk being branded as "unscientific." But let us hope that all that is non-scientific may not be equally sinful. Perhaps we will find that there are some non-scientific considerations which are quite untainted and which may add that vital something to our total world views. We may even have to resort to a little metaphysics. But we shall be cautious and, as the much admired Herbert Feigl said as he tried to convince his ultra-positivistic friends of the reality of the external world, "If *this* be metaphysics, make the *least* of it."³

I have one suggestion for getting beyond scientism without doing irreparable violence to the basic science-influenced elements in our world view. It is a modest suggestion, easily punctured, but I find it personally satisfying, and I have the hope, at least, that it will pitch our discussion of "Science and Religion: A New World View" at a level where there is at least the possibility of a constructive contribution. It involves at its base only a modest shift of emphasis in our thinking about science and religion.

Over the years we have devoted much effort to the search for chimerical "scientific moral imperatives" in the *formal or logical structure of science*. We now know this cannot be a fruitful search. But this does not mean that science is therefore irrelevant to religion. Even though science cannot give us any sort of "commandment," it may provide us with critical information and with a valuable framework within which to conduct a religious quest.

My suggestion is simply that we should examine the *content* of science, rather than its *formal structure*, in the effort to extract its religious import. This is a large task. It cannot be neat. It cannot be certain. But it can be relevant, and it may point to forms of commitment that grow out of the soil of a science-influenced world view, that are nourished by it and compatible with it, even if they are not themselves scientific in the sense that they are necessary consequences of scientific reasoning.

What I am suggesting is that we may get beyond scientism without abandoning science by turning our attention to *what* science tells us

ZYGON

about ourselves and the world and by considering our religion seriously in the light of the empirically determined nature of man and the universe.

This is not a very dramatic suggestion, but it may carry us farther than we at first suspect. Let me touch on one fairly obvious point and then consider another which may be far less so.

COMMITMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF SCIENTIFIC WORLD VIEWS

If I am correct in claiming that our implicit world view is science-influenced, then at least when we turn to the content of science we are inclined to believe—*really* believe—the broad outlines of what is claimed. We do not doubt the efficacy of atomic power; we may be amazed, but we do not doubt, that a man can orbit the world in a few minutes; no one seriously questions the evidence that large portions of the earth were actually covered with glaciers during what geologists have called the Pleistocene Epoch or the “ice ages.”

We are too sophisticated, of course, to accept every new hypothesis of the scientists. We know that in principle no scientific law warrants our absolute confidence. The conception of the world offered by science is always “open” and subject to revision. To us, the revisability of science only adds to our confidence in its ultimate correctness. Its admission of many unsolved problems emphasizes its integrity, and, in spite of these difficulties, people in our time know—emotionally at any rate—that the broad outlines of the scientific world picture are the ones they would bet on against existing alternatives.

But I wonder if we have made the most, in an emotional way, of the well-established description of the world which science offers? Have we appreciated the breathtaking magnitude of present-day theories of the origin of the universe? For how many of us is the awe-inspiring story of the history of the earth one that we have made part of ourselves? Our science-influenced world view inclines us to “believe” it, yes, but how many of us have any effective grasp of even the time scale involved? The age of the earth has been set at around five billion years, but five billion years is for most of us a number so gigantic that we have simply turned away from the task of coming to grips with it. We know, and believe, that the crust of the earth has passed through fantastic crises of mountain-building, continent-shifting, and climatic change. But how many of us are familiar with even the main outline of the actual course of events? We know and believe that these matters have provided the very stage upon which life has evolved—and yet how many of us really

include them in the framework of our thinking? How many see ourselves as related in any significant way to them?

The failure to incorporate fully the products of scientific effort applies even more if we focus upon the very relevant matter of the evolution of man. For most of us the history of man begins *dynamically* somewhere around five thousand years ago. Yet we are prepared to accept the scientific fact that this represents less than one half of 1 per cent of the actual period in which human culture has existed. Shouldn't our working concept of humanity have this kind of effective scope?

Only a hundred years ago the idea that man evolved as part of the animal world was considered somehow demeaning and base. Now it has for those who contemplate it an epic grandeur which reduces the ancient fables of man's origins to emotional insignificance. Our change of world view has not only made us ready to believe it, it has also made it possible to receive profound inspiration from it—if we will only allow ourselves to do so. As Robert Oppenheimer has said in another context, "Myth has its charms; but the truth is far more beautiful."

Surely, allowing ourselves to respond emotionally to the world picture of science is a step beyond scientism. We are not logically compelled to do so. But in fact most of us, oriented as we are, cannot help being moved when we are confronted with it. We experience a feeling of awe, I would say religious awe, when we view with a sense of real conviction the glory of nature evolving and man's setting in it, as it has been revealed by science.

But there is still deeper import to be found in the accepting contemplation of the world picture provided by science. Again it is one that takes us beyond scientism. Indeed, it is one which leads to what may be called the great religious option—and yet it is one which still does no real violence to our science-influenced world view.

I can only briefly indicate its nature, but I hope that I can say enough to stimulate discussion of it, for to me it is the most crucial point for a world view honestly including both science and religion.

From the standpoint of a science-influenced world view, what place can we give to man? Certainly psychologists and anthropologists see man as an *object in nature*. Man is a part of nature, a part of the totality of things; an evolving, active organism related to other organisms and existing, like other organisms, in a complex set of ecological conditions.

At first glance this may appear rather cold-heartedly "objective." It is as though we were somehow standing apart and treating ourselves, as it were, in the third person. We could as well be discussing the giant

ZYGON

sloth. Viewing man as an object in nature seems to overlook the "inside" aspect, the subjective side of our individual experiencing of life. Many who stress this possible feature of a scientific view of man have used it to oppose the whole orientation of science.

In fact, however, scientific objectivity in studying the empirical nature of man does not deny the subjectivity of the individual. Quite the contrary. The capacity of each individual to feel, to learn, to think, to contemplate his position in the world—in brief, to become a center of subjective experience—must be included in any scientific account of man. Some have even defined psychology as the branch of science which studies the subjectivity of an object.

The science-influenced view does, of course, suggest that subjective experience takes place in nature, that is, in a real world. Our implicit world view includes, then, what Feigl has called "critical realism," a point of view which is, strictly speaking, beyond scientism but which can be defended on the grounds of parsimony and which surely involves making the least of metaphysics. In contrast to a pure, existential subjectivism, anyway, it gets away from the ancient, arid, and unresolvable dilemma of the objective existence of the real world.

So we see man, then, as an object in nature, but as an object which subjectively looks out at a real world. Each of us is seen as a center of experience, limited in what we can know by our capacities for knowing, asking the questions that we must ask, choosing among the alternatives we are capable of seeing, adopting the values which appear most satisfactory.

Now among the options confronting us as experiencing individuals is that of determining our stance in relation to other men and to the rest of nature. Here lies what I refer to as the great religious option. No scientific law can dictate what this relationship *ought* to be. And yet no world view can be complete without some manifestation of it. Man is in nature; he must act in nature; what standards shall guide his relations to it?

What are the alternatives? They appear to lie importantly in the domain of what psychologists have called *identification*. With what or whom in nature should we identify our interests? We are aware of ourselves as experiencing individuals. Presumably, we could stop there and identify with only those activities which directly serve the local interests of the self. I would suggest, however, that it is the mark of a religious identification to go beyond this and to identify with those actions and events which serve the interests of a larger segment of nature than the self. For some this larger segment of nature may ex-

tend only to family or to party or to country, but it may come to include all mankind or humanness itself, and all that promotes it in nature.

The option of identification may for some persons be so easily resolved as to appear never to have been made. As with other aspects of a world view, it may be implicit and unconscious. For others the choice may be intensely conscious, and it may involve the most painful conflict. That conflict, in turn, may be resolved either slowly or with dramatic rapidity. Indeed, this option is perhaps the psychological substance of what has been called conversion in religious circles—and all that William James has written on that subject seems to apply. Let me say only that to speak of this option does not imply an “unscientific” act of free will, but only a very respectable form of determinism, in this case, determination by the self.

The religious option at its core, however, resolves itself into the question of “me” or “more than me.” Shall the experiencing self recognize only its own limited interests, or shall it join a larger concern? Scientism cannot tell what we *should* do. But, again, contemplation of the content of the picture of reality provided by science can help, and it makes a strong appeal to the “more than me” alternative. A person who accepts the world picture of science cannot very well see the self as an isolated unit; rather, it is imbedded in nature, sharing a vast development with myriad other selves. Evolution is a story of species development, not of the momentary success of selfish individuals. And the same is true if we examine cultural history. It is not the alienated self that provides the grandeur of cultural change but the linkage of the contributions of many selves.

The restricted identification of a person with purely selfish concern seems in the light of the facts of scientific reality to be both unimaginably narrow and ultimately self-defeating, for it involves an impossible combat with the rest of nature. No view could so well guarantee long-run failure, through death if nothing else, or appear so false to the actual nature of the cosmic events in which the self must be seen as participating. A man is a splinter of humanity, with the option of recognizing or denying his human heritage. Which will he choose?

The eminent historian of science, George Sarton, from his years of scientific scholarship, saw with remarkable clarity both the rich rewards and the inevitable victory of the broader identification against the meaner one. In his inspiring little book *The History of Science and the New Humanism*, he shows how our lives are made abundant through identification with the human cause. He says, “What little

ZYGON

we know, what little power we possess, we owe to the accumulated endeavors of our ancestors.”⁴ This we appreciate and pass on, hopefully augmented by our own efforts, to those who follow us. But in a larger sense, if we “look at things from the point of view of the whole, and not the fragment, . . . there is no past, there is no future, simply the everlasting present.”⁵ “The whole of humanity, past, present, and future, is but one man.”⁶ Why is the victory of this gratifying humanism assured? Sarton says this:

When one reads such a book as Gibbon’s *Decline and Fall*, one cannot help shuddering half the time, and wondering how on earth did the “good people,” the forward-looking ones, the “dreamers” ever triumph over the unprincipled barbarians, the ruffians, gangsters and murderers—who in every level of society, from top to bottom, were weakening the Empire and undermining like termites the whole fabric of civilization. How could the monks who were then almost the only reliable guardians of western culture . . . overcome all the forces of evil . . . ? And yet they did. . . . In the long run, the good man, though critically handicapped by his own moderation, had triumphed over the bad one.⁷

How could gentle people survive long enough to transmit their gentleness and increase it—however slowly—in the face of a brutal world? . . . I believe an explanation can be given. . . . The miracle occurs because there is a continuity of effort among [defenseless good men] while [the bandits] are always and necessarily at cross-purposes.⁸

. . . Whenever a parcel of truth is found by any scientist, he finds it not for himself, not even for his own people, or the people of a single nation or faith but for the whole world.

The gentle but continuous efforts of good men are like the proverbial drops of water falling unobtrusively but uninterruptedly upon the same place and cutting mountains. They must necessarily defeat the erratic efforts of selfish men, however strong the latter and however weak themselves. The higher aspirations of man are sufficiently pertinacious and convergent to accomplish miracles and it is only because of its continuity and purpose that humanity has at all succeeded in achieving a modicum of civilization.⁹

These words are not science, but they are inspired by science. They are compatible with science, but they go beyond it, pointing to a form of religious commitment which can free us from suicidal self-concern and allow us to appreciate our proud human inheritance, to enjoy our present lives, and to anticipate the unlimited future of the humanity with which we have identified ourselves.

POSTSCRIPT

I would add only one more word. I have reviewed these thoughts with my scientific colleagues, and they have said, “It’s a permissible

view, but why do you need to join a club? Hasn't the organized church always been a baleful influence on society? Can't you follow this line all by yourself without seeking social support in a church?" I suppose I could. But I am reminded of the ease with which words can be substitutions for action. Even if I found the words which could bring harmony between the implicit and explicit poles of my total world view, there would be danger of remaining wrapped in the warmth of my own abstractions. It's easy enough to talk about identification with humanity, but if the scientific view suggests anything, it suggests that words should somehow be tied to observables. I don't want to be like Linus of the "Peanuts" cartoon, who says, "I love mankind. It's people I can't stand."

Perhaps this club, if we must call it that, has a role in providing social reality to what, in terms of observables, is an identification, not with an abstraction, but with people. Only in such *real human association* can I find the final integrity for a world view which holds that beyond scientism lies humanism.

NOTES

1. John A. T. Robinson, *Honest to God* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963).
2. O. Hobart Mowrer, "Abnormal Reactions or Actions? (An Autobiographical Answer)," in Jack A. Vernon (ed.), *Introduction to Psychology: A Self-Selection Textbook* (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Co., 1966), p. 34.
3. Herbert Feigl, "The Power of Positivistic Thinking: An Essay on the Quandaries of Transcendence" (presidential address delivered at the meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, Columbus, Ohio, May 3, 1963).
4. George Sarton, *The History of Science and the New Humanism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937), p. xix.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, p. xviii.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 165-66.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 167-68.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 169.