

## Reviews

*Religion: An Anthropological View.* By ANTHONY C. WALLACE. New York: Random House, 1966. xv+300 pages. \$5.95.

This is an impressive attempt to bring the entire history of all human religious experience, past, present, and future, under one rubric. Professor Wallace defines religion as "neither a path of truth nor a thicket of superstition, but simply a kind of human behavior . . . which can be classified as belief and ritual concerned with supernatural beings, powers, and forces" (p. 5). He notes that "one religion, as an entity, is distinct from another when its pantheon, its ritual, its ethical commitments, and its mythology are sufficiently different for its adherents to consider that the adherents of other religions are, in a general sense, 'unorthodox' or 'pagans' or 'nonbelievers'" (p. 3). Using this criterion of "a religion," Wallace estimates "that mankind has produced on the order of 100,000 different religions" (p. 3). (This attitude, incidentally, actually characterizes none of the living non-Christianized peoples whom I have ever studied. But this is not a book about people; it is a book which attempts to systematize one way of understanding a vast amount of cognitive behavior, religious and non-religious.)

Although the book is intended to be a text, the author is highly selective throughout, taking no responsibility for acknowledging the work of those whom he apparently does not wish either to praise or criticize. Also, Wallace makes little effort to place those he quotes within a context which would be intelligible to the student who does not know a great deal about their work—and also about many people whose work he does not mention. It is essentially a book for the specialist sophisticated in the study of religion and in the study of other related forms of human behavior, particularly cognitive style, analysis of myth, and analysis of political cults and rituals.

After a preliminary survey of the treatment of religion by some of the early anthropological theorists (Tylor, Frazer, Lang, Lévy-Bruhl) as "evolutionary theories," he discusses the theory of "degeneration from primitive revelation," the theory of "religion as a projection of, and therapy for, emotional problems" (Freud, Rank, Reik, Jung), and functionalist theories of "religion and sociocultural systems" (Durkheim, Weber, Talcott Parsons); makes passing reference to the studies of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter); and then introduces his own most conspicuous contribution to theories of religions—"religion as a revitalization process." He sketches briefly the cult of the prophet Handsome Lake among the Iroquois (1799) and the reconstructed earlier revitalization movement among the Iroquois of about 1450, led by Hiawatha and Dekanawidah. In revitalization movements,

the essential theme of the religious event is the dialectic of disorganization and organization. . . . On the one hand, men universally observe the increase of entropy (disorganization) in familiar systems: metals rust and corrode, woods and fabrics rot, people sicken and die, personalities disintegrate, social groups splinter and disband. On the other hand, men universally experience the contrary process of organization: much energy is spent preventing rust, corrosion, decay, rot, sickness, death, and dissolution, and indeed, at least locally, there may be an absolute gain of organization, a real growth of revitalization. This dialectic, the "struggle" (to use an easy metaphor) between entropy and organization, is what religion is all about. The most diverse creeds unite in the attempt to solve the Sphinx-riddle of the relationship between life and death, between organization and disorganization; the ideas of the soul, of gods, of world cycles, of Nirvana, of spiritual salvation and rebirth, of progress—all are formal solutions to this problem, which is indeed felt intimately by all men.

But religion does not offer just any solution: characteristically, it offers a solution that assures the believer that life and organization will win, that death and disorganization will lose, in their struggle to become the characteristic condition of self and cosmos. And religion further attempts to elucidate and describe the organization of self and cosmos. Religion, then, may be said to be a process of maximizing the quantity of organization in the matrix of perceived human experience. Religion maximizes it, perhaps, beyond what rational use of the data of this experience would justify, but in so doing it satisfies a primary drive. We must, I think, postulate an organization "instinct"—an "instinct" to increase the organization of cognition and perception. Religion and science, from this point of view, would seem to be direct expressions of this organizational "instinct" [pp. 38-39].

Wallace concludes with a discussion of the extent to which Darwin was influenced by the belief in progress and asserts the superiority of a structural as opposed to a functional approach, to which latter he devotes the next two chapters.

Chapter ii deals with "The Anatomy of Religion: The Fundamental Pattern, the Four Major Types, and the Thirteen Regional Traditions," an inclusive, rather loose classificatory scheme, based on the recorded phenomena of religious behavior. "It is the premise of every religion—and this premise is religion's defining characteristic—that souls, supernatural beings, and supernatural forces exist" (p. 52).

"The Minimal Categories of Religious Behavior" are listed as: Prayer: Addressing the Supernatural; Music: Dancing, Singing, and Playing Instruments; Physiological Exercise: The Physical Manipulation of Psychological State; Exhortation: Addressing Another Human Being; Reciting the Code: Mythology, Morality, and Other Aspects of the Belief System; Simulation: Imitating Things; *Mana*: Touching Things; Taboo: Not Touching Things; Feasts: Eating and Drinking; Sacrifice: Immolation, Offerings, and Fees; Congregation: Processions, Meetings, and Convocations; Inspiration; Symbolism: Manufacture and Use of Symbolic Objects (pp. 53-66). These Wallace treats as "minimal elements," which suggests an order of abstraction later referred to as "the elementary particles of ritual" (p. 83), a more rigorous concept than the very looseness and inclusiveness of his list would imply.

He then introduces a discussion of ritual, comparing an analytical example from Iroquois ritual—and the Iroquois ethnographical material is the only culture used throughout the entire book, always evocatively without any

basic description of the whole culture—with a rather casual bit from “my home town.” Subsequently, “Cult Institutions” are defined as “a set of rituals all having the same general goal, all explicitly rationalized by a set of similar or related beliefs, and all supported by the same social group” (p. 75), from which Wallace proceeds to a discussion of “The Religion of a Society: A Conglomeration of Cult Institutions” (p. 78).

In his “American example” (p. 78) he distinguishes between “Denominational Cult (excluding Jewish),” “Political Cult” (e.g., Washington’s Birthday, St. Patrick’s Day), “Superstitious Cult” (e.g., Valentine’s Day), and “Children’s Cult” (e.g., the Easter Rabbit) (p. 79). The denominational cult has a curious omission between Ascension Day and Advent—Pentecost—a not insignificant omission in the light of the author’s predilection for rationalizing as the most significant attribute of ritual. In a later section of the book on ritual as found among other organisms, he describes evolutionary process as follows: “What has presumably happened is that, in the course of human cultural development, much ritual has *become* religious as it has been rationalized and explained in language by reference to beliefs about supernatural beings. And, further, ritual has to a considerable degree remained the fulcrum by which the communicational energy of these more elaborate linguistic formulations is applied to the work of psychophysiological state transformation, and social coordination, in man. In other words, from the evolutionary vantage point, religion can be defined as the use of language to increase the effectiveness of ritual” (p. 224).

After ritual he discusses “the second major component of cosmology, *myth*, [which] generally identifies, describes, and explains the origin, interests, and powers of the supernatural entities of the pantheon, and gives an account of their relation to man which justifies and rationalizes the rituals that are performed in their name” (p. 81).

Wallace then states “The Fundamental Pattern” (p. 83) as: first, “*the supernatural premise*”; second, “*the elementary particles of ritual*” (the thirteen categories given above); and, third, “the threading of events of these ritual categories into sequences called *ritual* and the rationalization of ritual by *belief*. Fourth, ceremonies are organized into complexes which we have labeled *cult institutions*. Finally, we come to *the religion* of a society, which is describable only as a conglomeration of *ritual* (both calendrical and critical [concerned with life crises]) and *belief system*, including *pantheon*, *myth*, and *values*, whose components are logically well integrated only at the level of cult institutions” (p. 83). “The Varieties of Cult Institutions” (p. 84) are here discussed: individualistic, shamanic, communal, and ecclesiastical. In later discussions these become an evolutionary sequence, with the individualistic as a hypothesized earliest stage and the ecclesiastical divided between Olympian and monotheistic.

“The Four Main Types of Religion” (p. 88) are then illustrated by the Eskimo for the shamanic, the Trobriander for the communal, the Dahomean for the Olympian, and the Indian for monotheism. This is followed by “An Outline of Religious Culture Areas of the World” as of 1600; “since this time, the distribution of religious types has been grossly altered by colonization and by political and economic change” (p. 96). (The extraordinary Euro-

American ethnocentrism of this statement is matched by the later treatment of the Upper Paleolithic in Europe as the first stage in "civilization.")

Under shamanic, the outline lists *circumpolar shamanism* and *Negrito shamanism* (p. 97).

Among the communal cults,

. . . *American Indian* societies, apart from North American shamanic areas and from the central high-culture region, characteristically maintained communal cult institutions in which seasonal ceremonies were performed in connection with agricultural, hunting, and fishing activities [and frequently] scheduled life-cycle rites . . . and secret or restricted membership cults.

. . . *African* societies, outside of the central African kingdom areas and Muslim North Africa, maintained communal cults emphasizing severe puberty rituals for young men and girls, secret societies, and calendrical subsistence cults, particularly in the eastern and southern cattle areas.

. . . *Australian*, presumably Tasmanian, and Melanesian communal cults emphasized subsistence rituals, performed by members of localized totemic groups, and puberty rituals. The major emphasis lay on magical performance by human inheritors (or reincarnations) of great mythological ancestors rather than on intervention by active deities.

. . . *Oceanic* (including Micronesian and Polynesian) communal cults stressed fetishes (statuary residences of gods), taboo systems, age-grading, and subsistence [pp. 97-99].

Students of each of these areas will have something to say about the cavalier nature of these characterizations.

The section on Olympian is divided into three parts:

. . . *American Indian* high cultures [were characterized by] huge temples, priesthoods, and spectacular public ceremonials on a regular calendar. . . .

. . . *Central African* Negro tribal kingdoms, with their elaborate bureaucracies and incipient urbanism, supported major Olympian cults, as in Ashanti, Dahomey, and Uganda.

. . . *East Asian* societies on the edges of China and India (that is, such kingdoms as were found in Burma, Indonesia, Korea, and Japan) traditionally possessed pre-vailling official cult institutions that would seem to have been of the Olympian rather than the monotheistic type, despite the partial penetration of Islam and Buddhism [p. 100].

Finally, subsumed under monotheistic are *Hindu-Buddhist*, *Judeo-Christian*, *Islamic*, and *Chinese* (pp. 100-101).

The foregoing classification is used to indicate that Wallace takes into account historical and ethnographic materials and is not only concerned with highly formal analysis. Its cursory character, lack of comparability of criteria, and uninformed treatment of the historical religions of the world are congruent with Wallace's overriding preoccupation with the Handsome Lake cult, in which only Iroquois and Christian traditions have to be considered. Students of primitive cultures are invariably irritated when students of higher religious traditions lump together the great diversity of primitive religious experience. This reaction must be more than matched by the irritation of students of the historic religions when they encounter the summary and reductionist treatment accorded them in a synthesis of this sort.

Chapter iii discusses "The Goals of Religion: Ritual, Myth, and the Transformations of State." "The primary phenomenon of religion is ritual. Ritual

is religion in action; it is the cutting edge of the tool. . . . The primacy of ritual is instrumental: just as the blade of the knife has instrumental priority over the handle, and the barrel of a gun over the stock, so does ritual have instrumental priority over myth. It is ritual which accomplishes what religion sets out to do" (p. 102). In this chapter, Wallace introduces "a new and more analytical definition of religion. . . . We can say that *religion is a set of rituals, rationalized by myth, which mobilizes supernatural powers for the purpose of achieving or preventing transformations of state in man and nature*" (p. 107).

He distinguishes various kinds of ritual as: "Ritual as Technology," subdivided into "Divination," "Hunting and Agricultural Rites of Intensification" (drawing on the work of Chapple and Coon), and "Protective Rituals" designed "to improve technological control of any fractious part of physical nature" (p. 112). In "Ritual as Therapy and Anti-therapy," Wallace rather farfetchedly conceives of witchcraft as anti-therapy and fails to distinguish between witchcraft as an aspect of persons and the personality, and the rites and practices of black magic. "Therapy" follows Clements' "six main primitive theories of disease: natural causes, imitative and contagious magic, disease-object intrusion, soul loss, spirit intrusion, and breach of taboo" (p. 116). (Wallace's passion for order is well exemplified here in his willingness to accept six theories, one of which is composite.) To these diseases there correspond types of treatment: herbs, ointments, bone-setting, and the like; reverse magic; massage and sucking; bringing or enticing the wandering soul back to its body; exorcism; and confession (p. 116). The third category under "Ritual as Therapy and Anti-therapy" is "The Shaman," who is "an individual practitioner who performs ritual for a fee on behalf of individuals or groups" (p. 126).

A third category co-ordinated with technology and therapy is "Religion as Ideology." " 'Ideological' rituals are . . . intended to control, in a conservative way, the behavior, the mood, the sentiments and values of groups for the sake of the community as a whole [and] may be said to have as their aim social control in a cybernetic sense; they intend to instruct, to direct, and to program individuals as they enter upon new tasks, and to correct the 'wobbling' of the system of society which would result if individuals strayed too far from the roles they have assumed" (pp. 126-27).

He then discusses "Rites of Passage" for the "two types of mobility . . . role change and geographical movement" (p. 127). The first type includes the phases of separation-transition-incorporation and a "statement, or reminder, of how to play the expected role, and then a directive to commence its performance; first, 'This is what to do,' and second, 'Now do it'" (p. 130). Then come social rites of intensification such as the observance of the Sabbath, the Mass, the daily muezzin call. "It is as if the cult institution recognized an entropic tendency for faith to slide away and the necessity to correct this constant randomization of motives by repetitive reminders" (p. 131). But, "although most rituals no doubt have this function, not all have religious intensification as their explicit goal" (p. 131). In addition to this useful distinction between goals and functions, which Wallace maintains throughout, he adds here: "Society does not consciously become an object to itself until there exists a class,

or professional specialty, responsible for the care of selected aspects of that society's welfare and maintaining a bureaucracy sufficiently large and sufficiently free of routine subsistence demands to perform the necessary rituals regularly and frequently" (pp. 131-32). He associates this class with early stages of urbanization.

Under the heading of "Taboos and Other Arbitrary Ceremonial Obligations in Social Interaction," he places the mother-in-law taboo and the taboos against incest and sexual contact with menstruating women. This is a curiously concrete set of choices; it is strange that Wallace omits taboos against the murder of a member of the in-group. Here also rituals of respect which maintain Goffman's "dialogue of identity" are mentioned. Finally, under the heading "Rituals of Rebellion" he notes calendrical catharsis and ends this section with a restatement: "Its goal is to make people want to do what they have to do" (p. 138). (The "it" here is ambiguous, and the distinction between goal and aim is not clearly maintained.)

Under "Ritual as Salvation," discussed as a form of identity renewal, Wallace writes: "Although there are many avenues to identity renewal, they all involve some kind of identification with an admired model of the human personality, and differentiation from a despised model" (p. 140). (Both Erikson and George H. Mead are absent from the Bibliography and discussion.) He then distinguishes religious identity renewal as "identification . . . with, or . . . differentiation . . . from, a supernatural being," and three common types or rituals of salvation: "Possession: The Socially Sanctioned Alternation of Identities," "Becoming a Shaman: The Substitution of One Identity for Another," and "The Mystic Experience," which ends with a discussion of psychedelic drugs. "Expiation: Penance and Good Works" is contrasted with salvation as appealing "to those whose identities are reasonably intact but who in some specific aspect of identity may experience severe shame or guilt, and suffer in consequence chronic anxiety and the accompanying physiological stress" (p. 156).

This chapter closes with a discussion of "Ritual as Revitalization," and we approach Wallace's central and abiding interests, ritual and revitalization, linked into one. He postulates that the general course of such movements follows a remarkably uniform program. So acutely has Wallace analyzed this sequence that, when I talked to him on my return from Manus in 1954, he was able to prophesy the next stage in the Noise, the special form of cargo cult that was part of the Paliu Movement, described by T. Schwartz as the Second Ghost Cult, which had not yet occurred. (Cf. Theodore Schwartz, *The Paliu Movement in the Admiralty Islands, 1946-1954* [New York: Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, 1962].) Wallace discusses a community within which a revitalization movement occurs, beginning with "The Steady State," "a period of moving equilibrium [within which] disorganization and stress remain within limits tolerable to most individuals" (p. 158).

This is followed by "The Period of Increased Individual Stress," in which "the sociocultural system is being 'pushed' progressively out of equilibrium by various forces, such as climatic and biotic change, epidemic disease, war and conquest, social subordination, or acculturation. . . . Increasingly large numbers of individuals are placed under what is to them intolerable stress by

the failure of the system to accommodate their needs. . . . But the situation is still generally defined as one of fluctuation within the steady state" (p. 159).

Then comes "The Period of Cultural Distortion":

Some members of the society attempt, piecemeal and ineffectively, to restore personal equilibrium by adopting socially dysfunctional expedients. Alcoholism, venality in public officials, the "black market," breaches of sexual and kinship mores, hoarding, gambling for gain, "scapegoating" by attacking other groups or a central bureaucracy, and similar alienated behaviors which, in the preceding period, were still defined as individual deviances, in effect become institutionalized efforts to circumvent the evil effects of "the system" or "the Establishment." . . . Because of the malcoordination of cultural changes during this period, such changes are rarely able to reduce the impact of the forces that have pushed the society out of equilibrium and, in fact, are likely to lead to a continuous decline in organization [p. 159].

This is followed by "The Period of Revitalization," which "depends upon the successful completion of the following functions:

*Formulation of a code.* An individual or group of individuals constructs a new, utopian image of sociocultural organization. This model is a blueprint of an ideal society or *goal culture*. Contrasted with the goal culture is the *existing culture*, which is presented as inadequate or evil in certain respects. Connecting the existing culture and the goal culture is a *transfer culture*—a system of operations which, if faithfully carried out, will transform the existing culture into the goal culture" (p. 160).

The code is not infrequently formulated by one individual in an hallucinatory vision. "Ritual is a principal element of the transfer culture" (p. 160). Then follows "*Communication*. The formulators of the code preach the code to other people in an evangelistic spirit. . . . The code is offered as the means of spiritual salvation for the individual and of cultural salvation for the society" (p. 160). Next is "*Organization*." The disciples take on executive functions. "The tricorned relationship between the formulators, the disciples, and the mass followers is given an authoritarian structure—even without the formalities of older or bureaucratic organizations—by the charismatic quality of the formulator's image" (p. 161). Then comes "*Adaptation*" (p. 161). The attempt to deal with discrepancies results in a hardening of the code, hostility, and increase in militancy, with hostility to "traitors" within the group "and toward outsiders, who are 'enemies'" (p. 162).

Then, in a successful revitalization movement, comes "*Cultural transformation*" itself, a movement which "must be able to obtain internal social conformity without destructive coercion and must have a successful economic system" (p. 162). Finally "*Routinization*" sets in and diminishes in intensity "as its functional necessity becomes, with increasing obviousness, outmoded" (p. 162). "With the routinization of the movement, a new steady state may be said to exist" (p. 163). (Here we find one of the confusions between what is and what Wallace has chosen to call it, a confusion which increases toward the end of the book.)

The succeeding sections of this chapter are some of the least satisfactory in the book and include a "Typology of Revitalization Movements": cargo cults of Melanesia, *terre sans mal* movements of the South American tropical forest, Mahdist movements of Islamic areas, millennialist movements of Christian areas, messianic movements of Judaic areas, and nativistic movements of

North American Indians and Separatist churches. After presenting his typology, Wallace abandons it as impossibly complex and goes on to discuss a "typology of a different kind. . . . A religious revitalization movement has two aims: to provide immediate personal salvation to the presently afflicted and to reorganize the culture in such a manner that a better way of life is brought into being to take the place of the old" (p. 164). To wit, he had previously distinguished three attributes with respect to the first goal—*possession, mysticism, and good works*—and four attitudes of the movement toward the community's own culture as well as toward the culture of other communities—*revivalistic, utopian, assimilative, and expropriative*.

Chapter iv, "The Functions of Religion: Relations among Cause, Intention, and Effect," is the least satisfying portion of the book, partly because of its heavy reliance on work based upon the Human Relations Area Files. After discussing the various kinds of functions—biological, instrumental, psychodynamic, and sociological—which the sum total of religious cult institutions may perform in any society, and the differences between the kind of flux characteristics of modern industrialized and industrializing peasant societies in contrast to more stable primitive societies with which the HRAF deals, he then discusses the functions of different kinds of rituals. "Technological Rituals," although intrinsically useless, function to promote decisiveness in the face of ignorance, neurosis, or group disagreement. So "the hypothesis would seem to be highly plausible that the practice of divinatory rituals has the effects of: reducing the duration of individual indecision; accomplishing a more rapid consensus within a group, with minimal offense to the members; and inspiring the persons who must execute the decision with sufficient confidence to permit them to mobilize their full skills and energies, unimpeded by anxiety, fear, or doubts about having made the best choice among the alternatives available" (p. 173). Similarly, regarding "The Function of Rites of Intensification in Mobilizing Human Effort," "the improvement of confidence in the likelihood of success may very well be an important ingredient in achieving that very success" (p. 175).

In the food quest, for example, "not only should technological ritual function to increase the efficiency of individuals in the performance of their mechanical tasks; it should also serve temporarily to resolve, in a symbolic way, such conflicts in human relationships as may interfere with the effectiveness of the cooperative team effort to get and distribute food" (p. 177).

In evaluating the "Functions of Therapeutic and Anti-therapeutic Rituals" (witchcraft and medicine), there is less confidence "that the function is different from the goal" (p. 177). In the course of cross-cultural studies, Swanson and Whiting "hypothesized that witchcraft would be most important in those societies in which secular authorities were unable to levy sanctions on, and thereby control, human behavior" (p. 181). These studies, by the usual cross-cultural method of attempting to find variables suitable for testing the hypothesis, confirmed it, and also showed that the strength of the tendency "to believe that their opponents will turn to witchcraft" (p. 184) is a function of the frequency and intensity of the conflicts. Whiting and Child, from attempts to study religion as a projection of childhood, found that the "importance of witchcraft explanations of illness is associated with variation in socialization anxiety in each of the five areas of child training . . . , although most marked-



ly, and with statistical significance, only in relation to oral, sexual, and aggression training" (p. 185). They found, moreover, "first, . . . that theory of disease is also positively related to the program of childhood training in the oral, aggression, and dependency spheres; second, that there is no clear relationship between socialization and either strength of belief in other, non-witchcraft, supernatural explanations of illness, or the nature of the ritual medicine (if any) believed to be appropriate for therapy. These would seem to be functions of other conditions than early socialization and its resultant personality configurations" (p. 187).

In the classic work *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Weber "showed forcefully that an independent change in religious belief was intimately connected with a dependent change in economic and political institutions" (p. 188). On the other hand, Wallace notes, "Most of the subsequent work on relationships between maintenance and belief systems (except for that on revitalization movements . . .) has, however, in the contrast to Weber, tended to emphasize the dependence of religion on economics and politics rather than the reverse" (pp. 188-89).

He then praises Swanson's *The Birth of the Gods* for the relationships drawn between such beliefs as monotheism, reincarnation, and immanence of soul in body. This study, based on fifty societies from forty-seven culture areas, seems a tautological restatement of such matters as the relationship between the number of high gods and the presence of social classes. Wallace finds from these studies "a very consistent functional pattern. The nature of the gods and the relationship of the gods to man are clearly related to the economic, kinship, and political structure of the society; they are related to the child-training practices; and they are related to the modal personality" (pp. 195-96). He distinguishes also mirroring, complementarity, and projective processes at work. He postulates that

those transformations of personal identity that have to do with the abandonment of a generalized infantile dependence on the parents and the assumption of a responsible autonomous adult role are the area of socialization within which the nature of religion is most precisely fitted to the needs of the society. An explanation of this relationship may be suggested. It would appear that the general function of a belief in gods of a particular character is to provide a screen upon which to project those images of people and those styles of behavior, surviving from infancy and childhood, that would be most inconvenient if brought into the arena of real-life, day-to-day behavior. Thus, lingering feelings of infantile helplessness and longings for an all-indulgent mother would be an awkward intrusion into the daily round of hunting, warfare, and political negotiation; but they may with relative safety be expressed in a dependent, trusting relationship to a god, since here they entail little consequence in human relations, are sanctioned by the society, and may be admitted to consciousness without shame or guilt. Similarly, it would be inconvenient if malevolent, aggressive, and hateful images of adults and of all persons with power or authority were admitted to consciousness and the hostility felt toward these images directed toward neighbors, public officials, and kinsmen in daily life. These feelings, and strivings for their expression, can be more comfortably directed toward a supernatural realm. In most general form then, we can say that the supernatural beings in whom the members of a society believe will have precisely those personality (not social-structural) characteristics that people cannot afford, and do not dare, to attribute as adults to their fellow men. The function of the beliefs, and of the rituals that the beliefs rationalize, will be to reduce the likelihood of these motives erupting into conscious-

ness in relation to real people, causing guilt and shame, and into action in social contexts, causing disruption of efficient, cooperative effort.

The general cultural cause of both the complementary and projective processes, in distinction to the mirroring process, must evidently be some inconsistency in the culture. If a function of religion is to make people want to do what they have to do, then there must be something in most societies that would make people, without religion, want to do things other than what they have to do. Two sorts of cultural inconsistencies have been suggested that could, in the absence of religion, lead to this effect: first, any sort of internal cultural contradiction in values, or in the roles that adults must play, resulting either from the vicissitudes of incomplete cultural change or intracultural differences in custom or status, as between men and women or ethnic groups or classes and castes; second, any sort of discontinuity in the behavior that is expected of people at different ages [pp. 196-97].

Other students, Lévi-Strauss, Ruth Benedict, Spiro, and Hallowell, "all suggest that the role of religion is to take up the slack . . . between infantile or childhood patterns of behavior and adult expectation" (p. 198). "But it is ritual, and not myth, which does the actual work of conflict resolution, and perhaps the most dramatic examples of both the ritual resolution of discontinuities and of contradictions are provided by the widespread customs of puberty rituals and other rites of passage" (p. 199).

Wallace now turns his attention to "The Functions of Rites of Passage" and "Rituals of Rebellion." After analyzing the function, he emphasizes that "over a time span of centuries rather than a couple of years, some of the actual functional consequences of a ritual custom may be very different from, and far less positive than, either the intentions of its practitioners or the impression of an ethnographer whose perspective is limited both geographically and temporally. This negative aspect of the function of ritual would seem to be especially likely to emerge in connection with rituals of catharsis that assuage but do not remove the frustrations and grievances which presumably led to their original acceptance" (p. 206). (This point has been dramatically illustrated in Balinese history. Described by ethnographers thirty years ago, ritual dramas which satisfactorily expressed the terrible sibling rivalry and frustration evoked in young children were associated with a very peaceful society with few acts of violence. Recently, there took place one of the worst massacres in modern times.)

Although rituals of salvation apply to some cases and not to others, Wallace notes that "shamanism molds (even if it does not prevent or cure) nervous disorders into socially acceptable syndromes" (p. 207) and may be "as much exploitative as therapeutic [in using] psychopathological processes, [which may] produce, indirectly through the distorted socialization of children by 'saved' persons, the very illnesses they 'cure.' . . . The 'saved' person—be he shaman, mystic, or enthusiastic convert—has still another service to perform. . . . These persons are surrounded by a kind of ambivalent glamor; they are both valuable and dangerous" (p. 208). This shaman's role as both savior and scapegoat is now being taken over by the scientist, "infinitely beneficent and infinitely corrupt" (p. 209).

We come again now to the subject closest to Wallace's interest, revitalization movements, with the functions of cultural innovation comparable to the appearance of a new compound when the temperature of elements in solu-

tion is raised and a "catalyst" is introduced. Thus, "cultural materials which have hitherto appeared to the members of a society as dissonant are analyzed and combined into a new structure" (p. 211). (In contradiction to Wallace's assumption that in the battle between religion and science, science always wins, many of the rapprochements between science and theology in the last quarter-century fit the above formula.) "In the interplay of destructive and conservative forces in revitalization movements, one is observing a thermodynamic (or information) [*sic*] process comparable to other natural processes commonly studied by natural scientists" (p. 211).

In "The Resolution of Group Identity Dilemmas," illustrated again by Handsome Lake, Wallace discusses the frequency of triangular situations: "The group in question sees itself as surrounded by two other threatening or competing groups, with one of which, whom it admires in some respects, it would like to identify and with which it would also like to form a political alliance against the third, the 'enemy'" (p. 213). He explains the position of Communist China—unable to obtain help from her natural ally, the Soviet Union, and unable to form an alliance with the United States, which would mean an unacceptable identity—as justifying the prediction of "an imminent revitalization movement" (p. 213). Wallace thereby seems to ignore the earlier vicissitudes of the self-definition of the Communist nations.

But social reorganization is the largest function of revitalization movements that "reduce the stress level prevalent in a system by increasing its internal organization" (p. 215).

Wallace now introduces two short essays concerning the origin of religion, one on comparative animal behavior, the other on the characteristics of ritual of cross-species, both in their social (allo-communicative) functions and their solitary (auto-communicative) functions. He is particularly struck by the incorporation in animal rituals of childish patterns of behavior, and comments: "One is reminded of the common negative commentary on human religious behavior by the anticlerical philosopher: that religion simply reduces the devout to an infantile dependence upon the divine parent" (p. 222). (One might usefully raise the question with the ethologists of whether it is fruitful to consider the instinctive repertoire in this way.) He presents material on Paleolithic religions—Neanderthal (Lower Paleolithic), with evidence from graves and bear rituals, and Upper Paleolithic, with evidence from "*human burials, animal burials, hunting ceremonies, and human fertility ceremonies*" (p. 231)—and concludes that "the goal of science and the goal of ritual and myth are the same: to create the image of a simple and orderly world" (p. 239).

With the discussion of "The Ritual Learning Process," we come to the heart of Wallace's other major interest, the nature of ritual itself. "The ritual learning process, whether its effects be measured in years, as in the case of puberty rituals, or in hours or minutes, as in the case of certain technological rituals, seems to involve a special five-stage process, which invokes not so much the law of effect (as in conditioning and instrumental learning) nor the law of repetition (as in imprinting) but what might be called the law of dissociation" (p. 239). In this roundabout fashion he introduces his own formulation: "This is the principle that any given set of cognitive and affective elements can be restructured more rapidly and more extensively the more of the perceptual

cues from the environment associated with miscellaneous previous learning of other matters are excluded from conscious awareness, and the more of those new cues which are immediately relevant to the elements to be reorganized are presented" (pp. 239-40). The stages of the ritual process are as follows: *pre-learning*, at least some of the several elements of the new synthesis must be present; *separation* (from others), accomplished by one of several methods: deprivation of sensory contact, desemanticating drugs, imposition of extreme physical stress, presentation of monotonous and repetitive stimuli; *suggestion*, once the dissociative state of separation (sometimes called "trance") has been achieved; *execution*, in which the ritual subject acts in accordance with his new state; *maintenance*, which involves the renewal of the ritual or the provision of tangible cues (pp. 240-42). Wallace reiterates that, although the ritual process relies on some quasi-pathological mechanism, "it is nonetheless closely dependent upon culture" (p. 242).

In "The Relation of Belief to Ritual," Wallace reasserts, this time as a dogmatic statement concerning belief, that neither theology per se nor mythology and folklore "can be adequately understood apart from ritual" (p. 243). He takes issue with the entire group of theorists (Lévi-Strauss, Propp, Leach, and Dundes) who have attempted to explain mythology as "a form of primitive philosophy which rationalizes, not ritual, but the sociocultural system as a whole" (p. 244). He regards the theories of structuralists, however, as fruitful insofar as the theorists are willing "to divide a text into a sequence of events, each component event of which can be classified under a small number of -etic or -emic headings" (p. 244).

He then produces a brilliant analysis of the Cadmus-Oedipus-Antigone trilogy, in which each goes through a sequence of separation, mystical experience, and reaggregation, and from this analysis proceeds to make a classification of myths, those that "*mirror the ritual sequences*" (the Mass, the Last Supper with the twelve disciples), those that are "the *perfect negative of the ritual*" (the Oedipus Trilogy and the Last Supper with Judas) and the "*partial negatives*, produced by an identity operator which contains both positive and negative terms" (such as the Great World Rim Dweller) (p. 248).

Fourth, some myths are "*true permutations*, produced by a nonidentity matrix operator with a negative element. . . . In these, the proper order of ritual events is juggled, and the final term is negative" (the Trickster myth of the Winnebago) (p. 249). The functions of myths in relation to ritual are thus patent. "They assert that the goal of ritual is achieved only if the proper rituals are performed in the proper order and that disaster (the negative of the goal) will occur if order is reversed or if improper elements (the negatives of the preceding terms) are introduced" (p. 249).

As he approaches the question of "The Evolution of Religion, Stages in the Evolution and Goals of Religion," Wallace criticizes the comparative approach as too global but praises more limited functional-structural-historical studies and suggests that the constancy of religious forms is due not so much to the universality of certain archetypal "ideas" or "themes" as to the very ambiguity of their meaning. Then, after reiterating the four stages adumbrated earlier—individualist, shamanistic, communal, and monotheistic—he suggests that "there have occurred certain broad changes in the attention

paid to the goals of religion": from (1) "the importance of technological ritual" to (2) "increasing conscious concern with formulating religious belief as a system of metaphysical thought" (p. 256) to (3) the idea that with bureaucratic growth there comes an increasing concern "with resolving problems of human morality" to (4) a feeling that "as population expands, and as social density rises, the problems of individual and social welfare become more challenging to religion" (p. 257).

With technological development, religions first deny the new technology, then try to control it, and, finally, abandon it to secular institutions and concentrate on the moral implications, for example, birth control. With increasing retreat from successful technology, religions become more concerned with psychological and social problems which can be divided into two categories: those perennial and universal human problems or processes either immune or untouched by technological change and those which "are, at least in part, the result of the very technological changes that have diverted religious attention: population increase, urbanization, industrialization, technological unemployment, war, conquest, social inequalities, and the like. . . . Religion . . . by reason of its interest in over-all levels of organization in the individual and in society, is frequently in a position to diagnose and treat not only old but also new disorders" (pp. 259-60).

But there is increasing competition for religion from science and government. (It may be noted that this is a less sophisticated analysis than that made by Frank Tannenbaum in his discussion of the balance of power between the family, the church, the state, and industry.) Here, in religion's competition with science, "science *always* wins. This, indeed, can be stated as a cultural law" (p. 261). Government competes when it gladly uses the processes of myth and ritual also to induce "the same kinds of transformations of state as religion traditionally has done" (p. 264).

And now Wallace comes to the point where his definition of religion, as involving supernaturalism, forces him to say that "The Future of Religion" so defined is extinction. This is inevitable and certain. But the question of "the functional consequences, desirable and undesirable, of such an event as the elimination of supernaturalism from the human cultural repertoire, are very much worth considering" (p. 265). He recognizes that the development of the attitudes traditionally directed toward God or toward political figures or groups or institutions is even less desirable. In this he is thinking of the highly intense ambivalences of love and hate, the masochistic longings and other emotional debris of religious systems that in religion are displaced from human objects to supernatural ones. He sees several ways of forestalling this undesirable state: by establishing an ideal society in which children are properly reared—a futile hope—or by desupernaturalizing the existing theistic religions and bringing about a metaphysical merging of science and religion. This requires

a nontheistic theology [*sic*] the properties [of which] must be: (1) that it postulate no supernatural being or force; (2) that it not contradict scientific knowledge in any particular . . . ; (3) that the entities that are the elements of its pantheon [*sic*] be such that they can be . . . cathected; (4) that these entities not be any recognizable human person, group, or institution; (5) that the belief system . . . be an effective

rationale for particular rituals, including secular rituals, which are designed to induce socially and culturally desirable transformations of state; and (6) that this belief system also rationalize an appropriate ecclesiastical organization [p. 267].

Admitting that his own imagination is not equal to this formidable task, and referring in passing to Julian Huxley's *Religion without Revelation*, he goes on to say that a new faith may be needed, which "should concentrate its attention on the nature of the optimal solution of these social problems, and on the associated ethical principles. . . . Such a faith should be truly international in reference, a catholic faith in the generic sense, raising a standard to which the righteous of all nations can repair, attending to issues that are of universal concern while eschewing partisan involvement with the particular tactical choices that divide mankind" (p. 269).

We then have the prescription of a new revitalization movement with an "elite group, requiring that new members undergo a strenuous and transforming rite of passage, excluding insofar as possible the pure opportunist, the compulsive joiner, the lazy and cowardly, and seeking only the true believer who will commit his life to the cause" (pp. 269-70). The fact that the phrase "true believer" is used without italics or reference to Eric Hoffer's book brings one up with a start. Wallace has gone full circle and returned to demand true believers in a non-existent God.

I have quoted so extensively in order to convey the full flavor and precise phrasing of the argument. The book is a brilliant tour de force, certainly the most brilliant and ambitious treatment of religion in this generation. But one is left with a curious sense of complete emptiness. It is about religion, yet one leaves it with a feeling that somehow religion itself has escaped, that Wallace is really interested in ritual—which religion shares with other aspects of life—and in revitalization movements—which need not be religious; that he is dealing with religion simply because, history being what it is, the two matters he is really interested in have been mixed up with religion in the past, but need not be in the future. So many things are lacking: the word "faith" hardly occurs until the very end, and the word "love" never occurs at all.

The role of the great religions in transcending national and cultural borders disappears under the heading of the capacity of religions to "spread geographically and to survive chronologically." There are categories, classifications, laws, sequences, human beings only as those members of the animal kingdom given to rationalizing ritual. One of the particular contributions of anthropology, the study of living peoples in the full complexity of their lives, is missing; there are no people anywhere. Perhaps this is due to the biographical circumstance that Wallace owes his very impressive insights and understandings to the intensive study of written records of a man who died at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Handsome Lake, the Iroquois prophet. Handsome Lake has stood for him as the heart of religion, the revitalization process; and Handsome Lake is dead.

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