

CAN A DARWINIAN BE A CHRISTIAN? ETHICAL ISSUES

by Michael Ruse

Abstract. A brief historical overview shows the main Christian claims about morality and proper conduct, looking at questions about both prescriptions (“normative ethics”) and foundations (“metaethics”). Jesus did not leave a fully articulated ethical system, and hence it fell to his followers to tease out such a system from his sayings and actions. Particularly important for Catholic thinking has been the natural law theory of St. Thomas Aquinas. Particularly important for Protestant thinking have been the directives of the Gospel stories, although different branches of Protestantism emphasize different parts of Christ’s teachings. Foundationally important for all Christians is God’s will or desire, and it is necessary to show that this does not commit the believer to potentially capricious divine directives.

Keywords: Thomas Aquinas; Christian ethics; divine command theory; metaethics; natural law.

Alvin Plantinga’s attack on Darwinian naturalism destructs through its own failings. But I do understand why he feels so strongly. He is defending his deeply held religious beliefs against what he clearly sees as another, rival, secular religion. And surely the comments we have seen from Edward O. Wilson alone should alert us to the fact that Plantinga’s worries are not without foundation. Anyone who talks of replacing one “myth” with another has gone beyond the bounds of the purest science. Not that Wilson is the first evolutionist to try to make a metaphysics, a secular religion, from his science. He stands in a tradition that goes back to Charles Darwin and earlier. Indeed, one might say that this is evolution’s oldest tradition. The very first evolutionists, men like Erasmus Darwin in England and

Michael Ruse is Professor of Philosophy and Zoology at the University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1, Canada. This essay is a version of chapter 9 of *Can a Darwinian Be a Christian? The Relationship between Science and Religion* (Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming).

[*Zygon*, vol. 35, no. 2 (June 2000).]

© 2000 by the Joint Publication Board of *Zygon*. ISSN 0591-2385

Jean Baptiste de Lamarck in France, were open in their hope that evolution could substitute in some way for conventional religious beliefs.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, Thomas Henry Huxley, Ernst Haeckel, and (above all) Herbert Spencer set out to make of evolution a Christianity substitute: a new world picture that could challenge and replace the old religions, one far better suited to the new industrial, urban, capitalist age than were the systems of the past (Ruse 1996). Although Darwinism today is much more than an ideology, more than a new religion of humanism or naturalism or whatever, the tradition of so regarding it has persisted down through this century, many years after the publication of the *Origin*. Julian Huxley, grandson of Thomas Henry, was one of the most ardent enthusiasts in this respect, as is attested by his popular book *Religion without Revelation* (1927).

Religions usually incorporate some kind of moral code or tradition—rules for proper conduct—and Christianity is a paradigm in this respect. Likewise for evolution-as-religion. It too is a font of moral prescription: most famously, so-called social Darwinism. Many people consider this to be an old, discredited nineteenth-century movement, but thanks particularly to Wilson, the past twenty years have seen more activity on the biological front than perhaps at any previous time. My aim here is to compare and contrast ethical thought and behavior in the two domains: Christianity and Darwinism. First I sketch the points of Christian ethics. Then I look both at traditional evolutionary ethicizing and at recent work in this field, seeing the points of agreement and possible conflict between Christian thought and evolutionary (especially Darwinian) thought.

As I begin, let me remind you of, or perhaps introduce you to, a distinction that is customarily and conveniently made in philosophical circles. This is the distinction between “normative ethics” (also known as substantive ethics) and “metaethics” (Taylor 1978). The former area of inquiry looks at the rules of proper conduct. “What should I do?” The latter area of inquiry looks at foundations for proper conduct. “Why should I do that which I should do?” Thus, normatively, Immanuel Kant (1959) asked that we follow what he termed the categorical imperative. In one formulation: Treat persons as ends rather than as means. Do not just use folk for your own purposes or benefit; regard them as worthwhile entities in their own right. Never make an example of someone simply for the sake of others. At the foundational level, Kant argued that (normative) morality is necessary and has its justification in the fact that no society of rational beings could function without it. It is not that there is some outside force or power to which one can and should appeal. It is rather that a lack of normative morality would lead to civil chaos or what Kant termed a (social) “contradiction.”

I am not commending Kant particularly, just using him as an example. We must keep in mind, in discussing both Christianity and Darwinism,

that any adequate analysis of ethics must offer answers at both the normative level and the metaethical level.

THE GOSPELS

Christianity rises out of the Jewish religion and was deeply influenced in its earliest years by Greek philosophy (Wogaman 1993). Both of these elements, the revelatory and the reasoned, can be found in Christian ethics. The Jews, of course, had their codes of proper behavior. Some prescriptions were what we today would regard as customs, perhaps having tribal sanction or sanitary force rather than strictly ethical. One thinks, for instance, of the demand that males be circumcised and of the various dietary rules and restrictions. Some prescriptions were more directly ethical: the Ten Commandments are the prime example. However, the God of the Jews did not always order his people to act in ways that we today would find morally admirable. Indeed, toward alien peoples this God could show a ferocity that would make the average contemporary ethnic cleanser look positively harmless. But particularly as we approach the time of Christ, we sense a more enlightened and universalistic ethic. The love commandment, "Love your neighbor as yourself," makes its appearance (Wallwork 1982; Betz 1985). Not that Judaism then or now was simply a pale proto-version of Christian thought. For the Jew, lifelong celibacy has always been something to be excused or explained away rather than cherished for its own sake. For an embattled and threatened people, having a family is a positive obligation.

Jesus took Judaism, adapted it, and (Christians would say) transcended it. "Think not that I have come to abolish the law and the prophets; I have come not to destroy them but to fulfill them" (Matthew 5:17). He was raised within the Jewish law, and it was the background to his thinking; but he could be casual or even callously indifferent towards its observance. He was little bound by Sabbath restrictions, for instance, and (although obviously one must take care in interpreting isolated comments) could be chillingly unsympathetic to the family ties and obligations of himself or his followers. Much more positively, Jesus wanted to go well beyond the limited reciprocation one finds characteristic of Jewish law—an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth—and (particularly as expressed in the Sermon on the Mount) wanted to extend moral behavior out beyond the hitherto marked outer bounds. One should not simply be restrained in the face of violence and unfair treatment; one should return hate with love. One should not simply give alms to the needy (the widows and orphans); one should give and give and give, until one has no more to give. One should not simply keep one's hands off the wives of others; one should not even lust after them in one's heart. One should not simply help those in one's own group; one should (as is shown by the parable of the Good Samaritan)

extend one's aid to all people. One should not simply worship God; one should give up everything and follow him. Question: "Good Teacher, what must I do to inherit eternal life?" (Mark 10:17). Answer: "Go, sell what you have, and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me" (Mark 10:21).

This is radical stuff indeed and, as scholars point out, must be framed in the context in which Jesus thought and lived and spoke (Ramsey 1950). His was an apocalyptic age, one that expected the Messiah and the coming judgment of God, and Jesus himself preached in this context. His human nature (as opposed to his divine nature) limited his understanding of God's plans, for clearly Jesus himself expected the end to come soon—within his own lifetime or at least that of his followers. Realization of his limited perspective may finally have come to him on the cross, but his commands were directed toward hearers whom Jesus expected would soon be facing the end of time. For this reason, we do not find Jesus offering either a system directly equivalent to the Jewish law or a philosophical system as one finds in the writings of the great Greek philosophers. It is true that there are some dicta of practical importance—about divorce, for instance, and his evading the trap of sedition by advising his followers to render unto Caesar those things that are Caesar's. Generally speaking, however, in the preaching of Jesus we do not find an articulated moral system for ongoing societies—not even for those of yesterday, let alone for the technology-fueled mega-groups within which we live today.

DEVELOPING CHRISTIAN ETHICS

It fell to Jesus' followers to develop and build an ethical system for societies that are going to persist and that are facing ongoing points of moral conflict, within and without. Saint Paul was the first to plunge right into this task, stressing the love commandment and offering counsel to the new and growing Christian communities within the Roman Empire. Yet although his writing has inspired moral reformers for two millennia—"There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus" (Galatians 3:28)—at another level he was deeply conservative. Slavery as a social custom is accepted; the subordinate status of women is stressed; the immorality of homosexual activities is reaffirmed (unlike Leviticus, Paul includes lesbians explicitly in his prohibition); and we start to see the chilling attitude toward heterosexuality that marks out Christianity from other great religions (see especially 1 Corinthians 7): better to marry than to burn, but better not to have any sexual activity at all. Even touching women is proscribed. Of course, one should put all of this in context. Christian restraint was a welcome move in an era when sexual laxity was the norm. But a pattern was set.

The church fathers, Augustine in particular, made major strides in taking the sayings and lives of Jesus and the apostles and making of them a morality for functioning societies. Augustine stressed the new commandment of love prescribed by Jesus and promulgated by Paul, but practically he saw the need for rules—he thought the Ten Commandments to be binding on Christians—and reaffirmed the significance of societal laws promoting harmony and social justice. Distinguishing between the earthly city found in this world and the heavenly city toward which we strive and which will be our reward, he emphasized that the former “seeks an earthly peace, and the end it proposes, in the well-ordered concord of civic obedience and rule, is the combination of men’s wills to attain the things which are helpful to this life.” In this, there is no conflict with the latter, for “though it has already received the promise of redemption, and the gift of the Spirit as the earnest of it, it makes no scruple to obey the laws of the earthly city, whereby the things necessary for the maintenance of this mortal life are administered; and thus, as this life is common to both cities, so there is a harmony between them in regard to what belongs to it” (Augustine [413–426] 1972, 326–7, XIX, 17).

Particularly influential have been Augustine’s thoughts on war and the conditions under which the Christian might take up arms (in a “just war”). Conflict must be carried on only in the face of an unjust aggressor, under legitimate authority, and under restraint. One cannot simply defend oneself. “I do not approve of killing another man in order to avoid being killed oneself unless one happens to be a soldier or public official and thus acting not on [one’s] own behalf but for the sake of others, or for the city in which [one] lives” (Augustine 1983, 475). And mercy must be shown to the vanquished. “Just as we use force on a man as long as he resists and rebels, so, too, we should show him mercy once he has been vanquished or captured, especially when there is no fear of a further disturbance of the peace.”

This thinking remains influential. But it fell to Thomas Aquinas to articulate and defend the position that was to become definitive for Catholic thought, a position deeply indebted to the newly discovered Aristotle and which, being based on observation and reason, could go beyond simple biblical teaching to provide norms for situations quite beyond the ken of Jesus or his immediate followers. Absolutely crucial is Thomas’s thinking on the subject of law, distinguishing “eternal law” from “natural law,” and these two from “human law.” The first, eternal law, refers to God’s intentions for the world and the constraints under which he has put it. “Therefore the ruling idea of things which exists in God as the effective sovereign of them all has the nature of law. Then since God’s mind does not conceive in time, but has an eternal concept, . . . it follows that this law should be called eternal” (Aquinas 1966, 19–21; *Summa Theologiae* 1a2ae, 91, 1). The second, natural law, is the way in which rational beings (we ourselves)

participate in eternal law. It is the working out of eternal law in the context of the human frame and mind. “They join in and make their own the Eternal Reason through which they have their natural aptitudes for their due activity and purpose. Now this sharing of the Eternal Law by intelligent creatures is what we call ‘natural law’” (1966, 23; *Summa Theologiae*, 1a2ae, 91, 2). Finally, the third, human law, is what we have and devise, in the light of our need to obey the natural law, which is in turn the eternal law.

Just as from indemonstrable principles that are instinctively recognized the theoretic reason draws the conclusions of the various sciences not imparted by nature but discovered by reasoned effort, so also from natural law precepts as from common and indemonstrable principles the human reason comes down to making more specific arrangements. Now these particular arrangements human reason arrives at are called ‘human laws’ provided they fulfill the essential condition of law already stated. (1966, 27; *Summa Theologiae* 1a2ae, 91, 3)

Natural law is the key mediating notion in Thomas’s ethics. Things, including animals and human beings, have certain natural tendencies—ends or goals (“final causes” in the Aristotelian system which structures the discussion)—and their nature displays and reveals these ends. For animals and human beings the ends are preservation, life, and (for humans) rational thought and activity. Natural law reflects eternal law and may be encoded in and enforced by human law, but it is itself something discoverable independently through reason and observation: looking at organisms, including human beings, seeing the ends that they and their parts serve, and judging accordingly. By example, take homosexual activity. We know that this is immoral because the Bible tells us so (eternal law), and it is something proscribed by human laws. But natural law shows us why it is really wrong, for penises and vaginas were clearly made for heterosexual copulation with the resulting pregnancy and childbirth. To use one’s organs in some other way is unnatural—ultimately, of course, an insult to God, who is creator of all things and whose creation is entirely good.

THE PROTESTANTS

In line with their theology, the reformers took a position more directly based on biblical sources. Justification by grace was their theological foundation, something which might be thought to lead to moral complacency. Remember that it is the Pelagian heresy to think that one can buy one’s way into the kingdom of heaven through good works, and so one might expect Protestants to believe that all moral effort is worthless. But this is far from true. “Faith by itself, if it has no works, is dead” (James 2:17). One’s acts may be worthless compared to one’s sins, but the God-touched person acts morally precisely because of this rather than out of a sterile sense of duty, hoping thereby to win praise. Luther compared the Christian to a young lover.

When a man and a woman love and are pleased with each other, and thoroughly believe in their love, who teaches them how they are to behave, what they are to do, leave undone, say, not say, think? Confidence alone teaches them all this and more. They make no difference in works: they do the great, the long, the much, as gladly as the small, the short, the little, and that too with joyful, peaceful, confident hearts. (Luther 1915, 1, 191)

Not that Luther wanted to preach a reformation in society corresponding to his reformation in religion. He warned against revolution and rebellion, taking a particularly dim view of those who rose up against the authorities. The people in power were to him analogous to parents, and in line with the commandment he would have us obey and honor them. "Through civil rulers as through our parents, God gives us food, house and home, protection and security. Therefore since they bear this name and title with all honor as their chief glory, it is our duty to honor and magnify them as the most precious treasure and jewel on earth" (Luther 1959, 29–30). Conversely, those who rebel against authority are wrong and deserving of punishment. "What we seek and deserve, then, is paid back to us in retaliation. . . . Why, do you think, is the world now so full of unfaithfulness, shame, misery, and murder? It is because everyone wishes to be his own master, be free from all authority, care nothing for anyone, and do whatever he pleases" (p. 30).

Calvin likewise stressed the importance of obedience to the authorities and of following the rules of the state. After all, he had been trained as a lawyer! But for him the chief emphasis was on the sovereignty of God: all happens through and because of him. For this reason, rulers act by his authority, and we find Calvin more ready than most to embrace a democratically elected leadership and to justify rebellion against a false ruler.

And how absurd it would be that in satisfying men you should incur the displeasure of him for whose sake you obey men themselves! The Lord, therefore, is the King of Kings, who, when he has opened his sacred mouth, must alone be heard, before all and above all men; next to him we are subject to those men who are in authority over us, but only in him. If they command anything against him, let it go unesteemed. . . . And that our courage may not grow faint, Paul pricks us with another goad: That we have been redeemed by Christ at so great a price as our redemption cost him, so that we should not enslave ourselves to the wicked desires of men—much less be subject to their impiety. (Calvin 1960, 1520–21, IV, 20, 32).

Not that Calvin had time for those rulers or states that eschewed violence out of a false reading of scripture. "For it makes no difference whether it be a king or the lowest of the common folk who invades a foreign country in which he has no right, and harries it as an enemy. All such must, equally, be considered as robbers and punished accordingly" (Calvin 1960, 1499, IV, 20, 11). This justifies both a police force within the state and a standing army for defense against attack.

In making this argument about the need for an army and the justified use of force, Calvin was writing against the more radical branches of the

Reformation: the Anabaptists. They would have nothing to do with violence and insisted on a literal reading of Christ's commandments, trying often to live communally without private property, according to what they saw as Jesus' direct prescriptions. The Quakers, for instance, were ardent pacifists, and although they did not withdraw physically and live apart as did others, like the Mennonites, they eschewed the baubles of the world like fine clothes and honors and titles. "It is not lawful to give to men such flattering titles as Your Holiness, Your Majesty, Your Eminency, Your Excellency, Your Grace, Your Lordship, Your Honour, Etc., nor use those flattering words, commonly called COMPLIMENTS" (Barclay 1908, quoted in Beach and Niebuhr 1955, 320).

Even to this day, there is a literalism to the Quaker reading of the Sermon on the Mount that contrasts strongly with their far more relaxed and moderate attitude toward other passages in the Bible, including the early chapters of Genesis. Not that they concerned themselves only with what (today) seem like trivialities and cultural ephemera, such as whether to address one's superiors as "you" rather than "thee" and "thou," and whether to take one's hat off in the presence of the king. Quakers took very seriously the claim by Jesus, reinforced by Paul, that human beings are all equal in the sight of God. For them, each person is blessed by the presence of God within the breast, the "inner light." This belief led to their being early involved in and always at the forefront of the movement to abolish slavery, a tradition that has continued to this day. (For a modern-day reformed reading of the Gospels, see Murphy 1997.)

One could go on listing further figures and refinements on the views just expounded. There is the calm rationalism of the eighteenth-century Anglicans and the emotionalism of the evangelical movement led by John Wesley, something that reached out beyond the middle classes to the poor and dispossessed, urging them to improve themselves for the greater glory of God. "Having, first, gained all you can, and, secondly, saved all you can, then 'give all you can'" (Wesley n.d., 706). There are the social movements of the nineteenth century, particularly toward its end, when concerned Christians became increasingly concerned with industrialism, recognizing the costs in lives and morality to human dignity. Analogously, there are movements in the twentieth century, for example liberation theology, particularly powerful in Catholic circles in South America, which uses insights of Marxism to put the church on the side of the poor against the rich and powerful.

ANYTHING GOES?

By this stage the cynic may be concluding that, far from there being such a thing as Christian ethics, there are as many positions as there are writers on the subject. Simply nothing has been barred to those acting in the name of their Lord, and frequently quite contradictory courses of action have been

urged as the true Christian way forward. Christians have defended property, Christians have decried property. Christians have defended making war, Christians have been pacifists. Christians have been slaveholders, Christians have been abolitionists. Christians have condemned homosexual behavior and birth control and abortion, Christians have (especially recently) cherished homosexual behavior and promoted birth control and defended abortion. From the viewpoint of normative ethics, there is no conclusion to be drawn about Christian thinking and behavior.

At one level, this is surely true. "If you see that there is a lack of hangmen, constables, judges, lords or princes, and you find that you are qualified, you should offer your services and seek the position, that the essential governmental authority may not be despised and become enfeebled or perish" (Luther 1962, 95). If Martin Luther can say this, then just about anything seems to be open. Yet of course, at another level, this is not true. However one decides and acts, one ought to be infused with Christian love: not just toward one's family and friends, but toward one's enemies also. If one convinces oneself, for instance, that the Christian way involves physical force—and, to take the paradigm case, many Christians found that very little convincing was needed in the face of Adolf Hitler—then, much as one may hate the acts, the intention must always be one of love toward even the vilest of human beings. And this must govern one's own acts. Torturing Hitler might have been very satisfying. It would not have been Christian.

More positively, however far one may think the love commandment extends (more on this later), as a Christian one has an obligation to help the poor and the sick and the homeless, the widow and the orphan and the prisoner and the dying and destitute. Mother Teresa's Christianity and her activities in Calcutta were not coincidentally linked. Moreover, even though one may perhaps disagree with some of her views—the impermissibility of birth control and abortion, for instance—one can understand the Christian nature of her emphasis on personal restraint, particularly in sexual matters. Christians go (and have gone) all of the way from rigid denial of all sexual activities except for limited sexual acts within marriage (itself judged less than the most desirable state), to very tolerant acceptance of virtually all of the ways in which humans seek erotic satisfaction. There is nevertheless a presumption in favor of self-discipline (Ruse 1988). To pretend otherwise is to ignore the Christian heritage.

FOUNDATIONS

What now about the question of foundations? What is Christian metaethics? Most obviously and most centrally, the Christian puts his or her faith in God as revealed to us through Jesus Christ—in his love and care for us—and finds the justification for substantive ethics in God's will. We should do that which God wants. And why should we do that which God

wants? Well, ultimately because that is what God wants us to do: end of argument! Ours is not to reason why. This tradition goes back to Jewish thought. God tells Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac, a son born only after much trial. There is simply no question in Abraham's mind that this is what he must do. God has spoken and issued the order, and that is an end to matters. The same is true for the Christian. In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus does not reason with his audience, trying to persuade them to his opinion. Rather, he lays on the line the expectations of the Christian. These are the things you must do, because these are the things that God wants. And the same holds for the Christian today. The way of the cross is a demand that God puts on those who would be followers.

In a sense, this all sounds like a deal or a bribe. You do what I ask, and I will offer you goodies in return: a land flowing with milk and honey, perhaps, or relief from your sins, or eternal life. Certainly, this is rather the way that Abraham's covenant with Yahweh comes across. You keep your side of the bargain, and I will keep mine. The mark of those keeping the covenant is not presented as anything other than something the Lord has decided on as a sign. "This is my covenant, which you shall keep between me and you, and your descendants after you: Every male among you shall be circumcised" (Genesis 17:10). If the Lord had decided on a facial tattoo, like those worn by some African tribes, that would have done as well and have had as much justification.

However, there has to be more than this for the Jews, and certainly for the Christians. Plato, in the *Euthyphro*, four hundred years before Jesus, put his finger on crude versions of the divine command theory. Is that which is good, good simply because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good? Could God simply command arbitrary rules on everything? Could God, for instance, simply make rape an ethically acceptable practice? Ethically mandatory, indeed? Surely not! In which case, it would seem that God commands things because they are good, which seems to make the good independent of God's will or intention. From a metaethical perspective, his will is irrelevant, although obviously he backs up morality with the divine carrot and stick.

Of course, things are not quite this simple, either way (Quinn 1978). God is creator of everything, so ultimately morality has to rest in God's will and creative power. Yet while God is omnipotent, we have seen that this does not imply that he can do the impossible. Moreover, God is in his nature infinitely good. He *could* do or wish ill, but it is not of his nature to do this. Unlike us, God is not tainted with original sin. Hence, on the one hand, God is constrained by practical necessity. To borrow the point that Kant made—Kant was the child of deeply pietistic (Anabaptist) parents, and it was hardly a surprise that he made it—God could not make a functioning and happy society if everyone could lie and cheat and break promises with impunity. This is simply not possible, and God has never claimed

the ability to do the impossible. On the other hand, God could only want what is best for us and could only make and endorse the rules which serve us best. If God could make a society that functions like the society under the Nazis—some people do well, but others suffer terribly—he would never do so. He might be free to do so, but he would not. I am free to go with an axe in the night and murder my children, but I would no more do so than God would do something similar.

For the Christian there is a necessity to morality—a universality—which is endorsed, demanded, by God, which is not capricious or arbitrary. God wants what is right, God wills what is right, God demands what is right, and through grace forgives us when we fall short. But God does not simply make it all up as he goes along. Morality is part of the nature of things. The Catholic doctrine of natural law brings this out most fully—God having made male and female, certain sexual acts are by necessity natural and proper—but it is a general conclusion held by all Christians. If you are going to argue that something is morally acceptable, then you must show that it is natural. Consider, for example, debates about birth control and population restraint. Back when most human beings died before themselves reproducing, because of childhood illnesses and the like, having as many children as possible was entirely natural. Today, those who argue for birth control base their case on the existence of modern medical practices and so forth that preserve people until adulthood and thus indirectly contribute to a horrendous population explosion. It is argued therefore that it is no longer natural—and hence no longer mandated for the Christian—to have as many children as possible. Indeed, one must practice restraint or protection or some such thing.

Likewise, but from the opposite pole, those who oppose birth control argue that this practice is not natural: “Since . . . the conjugal act is destined primarily by nature for the begetting of children, those who in exercising it deliberately frustrate its natural power and purpose sin against nature and commit a deed which is shameful and intrinsically vicious” (Pius XI 1933, 25). But note how the Catholic Church today will allow the rhythm method of control, which is judged to be natural. Note also how, in the West, most Catholics ignore the church’s teaching on the subject of contraception. They think that their church is out of step with what is now right and proper and natural. Apart from anything else, people today recognize that sexual intercourse in human beings promotes pair bonds—women are continuously receptive and do not wait to come into heat—and these bonds are important for the care of human infants, offspring who have such a slow and demanding process of development. Contraception can therefore be defended on strictly Thomistic grounds.

Leave now the details and examples. We have before us a sketch of the Christian position on morality.

REFERENCES

- Aquinas, Thomas. 1966. *Summa Theologiae: 28, Law and Political Theory (1a2ae. 90–97)*. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.
- . 1970. *Summa Theologiae: 11, Man (1a. 75–83)*. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.
- Augustine. [413–426] 1972. *Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans*. Trans. H. Bettenson. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- . 1983. “Commentary on the First Letter of John.” In *The Early Fathers on War and Military Service*, ed L. J. Swift. Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier.
- Barclay, R. 1908. *An Apology for the True Christian Divinity*. Philadelphia: Friends Book Store.
- Beach, W., and H. R. Niebuhr, eds. 1955. *Christian Ethics: Sources of the Living Tradition*. New York: Ronald Press.
- Betz, D. 1985. *Essays on the Sermon on the Mount*. Philadelphia: Fortress.
- Calvin, J. 1960. *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. J. T. McNeill. Philadelphia: Westminster.
- Huxley, J. S. 1927. *Religion without Revelation*. London: Ernest Benn.
- Kant, Immanuel. 1959. *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Trans. L. W. Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill.
- Luther, Martin. 1915. *Works*. Philadelphia: Holman.
- . 1959. *The Large Catechism*. Trans. R. H. Fischer. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg.
- . 1962. “Temporal authority: to what extent it should be obeyed.” In *Works* 45, ed. H. T. Lehman, 75–129. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg.
- Murphy, Nancy. 1997. *Reconciling Theology and Science: A Radical Reformation Perspective*. Kitchener, Ont.: Pandora Press.
- Pius XI. 1933. *On Christian Marriage*. London: Sheed and Ward.
- Quinn, P. L. 1978. *Divine Commands and Moral Requirements*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Ramsey, P. 1950. *Basic Christian Ethics*. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
- Ruse, Michael. 1988. *Homosexuality: A Philosophical Inquiry*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- . 1996. *Monad to Man: The Concept of Progress in Evolutionary Biology*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press.
- Taylor, P. W., ed. 1978. *Problems of Moral Philosophy*. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth.
- Wallwork, E. 1982. “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: the Freudian critique.” *Journal of Religious Ethics* 10:264–319.
- Wesley, J. n.d. “The use of money.” In *Sermons on Several Occasions*. London: Methodist Publishing House.
- Wogaman, J. P. 1993. *Christian Ethics: A Historical Introduction*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox.