

Symposium on Organ Transplants: Religion, Science, and Global Ethics

INTRODUCTION: ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION— A CHALLENGE FOR GLOBAL ETHICS

by *Barbara A. Strassberg*

Abstract. A social scientific interpretation of the development of global ethics is offered. Both spontaneous and intended mechanisms of the construction of such an ethics within the broader processes of globalization are analyzed, and possible theoretical foundations are suggested. The scientific and technological achievements that gave rise to the medical procedure of organ transplantation generated new questions and challenges that theologians, scholars of religion, natural scientists, and social scientists are now trying to resolve.

Keywords: accountability; essentialism; globalization; hybridization; multi-ethicality; pluralism; social movement.

The essays in this section¹ focus on the general question of global ethics and on specific issues that stem from the development of the global organ trade, as a result of two macro processes: (1) economic globalization, as a social and cultural practice, generating a number of questions primarily from the area of economic and business ethics, and (2) organ transplantation, as a transnational scientific and medical practice, generating questions from the area of biological and medical ethics.

Both economic globalization and the practice of organ transplantation develop within and across the traditional boundaries of languages, values, norms, and religious beliefs and practices. They develop within and across cultures. Organ transplantation became very quickly interlocked with the

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global economy because there is a much higher demand than supply of organs in the world, and existing economic inequalities create favorable conditions for the development of a transnational trade in organs.

It is fascinating to listen to the voices of representatives of various scientific disciplines and religious traditions struggling with ethical questions that stem from that unique merger. The authors in this section can be considered “practitioners” of globalization, and their views reflect their awareness of challenges faced by those who would want to see some type of global ethics develop, especially in the context of transnational medical issues such as organ transplantation or health-care issues such as the pandemic of HIV/AIDS. Listening to their voices, we realize that the global phenomena unfold in local contexts and the local events have global consequences. The global and local dimensions are not oppositional but complementary. Reading these articles, we become acutely aware of the fact that it is not easy to find answers to questions the authors ask or invite the readers to ask.

Before I introduce the authors and their essays in greater detail, let me offer a sociological interpretation of the issues surrounding the development of global ethics in the context of the practice of organ transplantation.

GLOBAL ETHICS AND ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION— REFLECTIONS OF A SOCIOLOGIST

In this essay I argue that:

1. Processes of globalization are both spontaneous and intentional.
2. These are not linear processes going only in one direction but rather a multitude of processes entangling the world in a web of connections and relationships.
3. They are accompanied by processes of fragmentation that are complementary to globalization.
4. Processes of globalization have both positive and negative consequences for humanity.
5. Among those processes of globalization, we are now observing processes of emergence of a global civil society and of cultural hybridization that leads to the development of a global culture, which includes global ethics.
6. It seems more justified to talk about global ethics than universal; such ethics is a result of moral hybridization and is not homogenous.
7. Human beings have a potential for being multi-ethical and move freely from one ethical context to another.
8. Both religions and sciences have a role to play in the development of global ethics, providing information that people need to make choices

with a higher level of awareness of the consequences of their actions for all involved.

9. The development of global ethics might be stimulated or even accelerated by means of a social movement led by those who have courage to care about the empowerment of all people, regardless of their condition of being, and who are ready for action.
10. Such a movement might find foundations in a theory of accountability that might help us move from intervention to prevention. This theory emphasizes responsibility, self-regulatory mechanisms of control, respect for moral diversity, and protection of the agential potential of all human beings.

Universal, Global, and In Between. There is an abundance of literature on global ethics. For example, *Zygon* published a number of articles that addressed issues of global ethics in June of 1999. In order not to repeat what others have already said so eloquently elsewhere, let me introduce the interpretation, which will be helpful for the discussion of ethics and organ transplantation presented here.

Let's start with the concept of *globalization*. Zygmunt Bauman (1998) develops a rather unique interpretation of globalization, viewing it as human struggle for independence from space and for freedom of mobility. As a result, distance becomes a social product, and it depends on speed—as reflected in saying, I live an hour away from here. *Globals* are people who are relatively free from territorial constraints, obligations, and the duty to contribute to the daily life of communities. They exercise exterritorial power and contribute to hybridization of cultures. Many of them learn to love the otherness among them. They move in space because they want to. To a large extent they also operate within the cyberspace, that is, space devoid of any spatial dimensions (Bauman 1998, 17). On the other hand, *locals* are locally bound, and they bear the consequences of globals' mobility. Among them are people who display the neo-tribal fundamentalist tendencies and contribute to the re-essentialization of cultures. Many of them, defined by globals as undesirables, end up trapped in the ultimate and most radical form of spatial confinement that is developing all over the world today: a prison, a refugee camp, a labor camp, or a concentration camp. If locals do move in space at all, it is because they have to—in order to pursue education or employment or escape persecution—or as a result of many other push-and-pull factors. Many of them still do not have any access to cyberspace.

The new polarization of the world population in a way breaks down the divisions between the First, Second, and Third World countries; globals and locals operate in every community in the world. Multinational corporations become temporarily localized at any point of the planet, and once they move on to a different place, the locals remain stuck and suffer the

consequences. The old divisions, however, are still meaningful, and we can assume that they will remain meaningful in the years to come. But the new divisions stimulate a new dynamics of social change that needs to be taken into account if we want to better understand globalization.

Does this mean that we are witnessing one more example of Western cultural imperialism, that when we say globalization we actually mean Westernization or even Americanization? My answer is No, and I would submit two arguments in support of my answer.

First, following Bauman's interpretation of globalization, we should no longer view the changes occurring in the world today as the East meeting the West or the West imposing itself upon the East. The new polarization into globals and locals occurs everywhere—in the East, West, North, and South. Even though there are many more globals in the First World countries (now also called the North) than in the Third World countries (also called the South), these are the "local" globals who, regardless of where they are, make most of the decisions shaping the lives of the "local" locals. The processes of globalization unfold everywhere in the world, displaying their complexity, contingency, chaotic order, interconnections, and interdependencies. Multidimensional hybridization takes place, both as a spontaneous process and as a result of intentional efforts undertaken both by globals and by locals.

If we use the transnational practice of organ transplantation as an example, we immediately see the heuristic value of Bauman's interpretation of globalization. The globals move around the world wherever organs might be available, and, because they can afford the price of transportation, medical procedures, and fees for organs, they can buy life while others suffer or die. The locals, on the other hand, wherever they are, are the main suppliers of organs, with all the consequences of that status.

The second reason why globalization should not be interpreted as one more form of Western imperialism is the readiness we observe in the world to adopt and assimilate certain ideas because they are locally considered important for the betterment of life. To support this observation I use the example of human rights. The concept of human rights is Western in its origin, but by its very definition it is universalist in aspiration and global in its scope of operation (Beetham 1998, 58–71). Today it is linked to many other Western concepts, such as individualism, justice, self-determination, and democracy. Human rights became a foundational concept for numerous interventionist actions undertaken all over the world on behalf of the disempowered by various organizations, including the Organs Watch.² This concept started to play a very pragmatic role leading toward action, especially when the United Nations issued the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. As a result of the spontaneous processes of economic, technological, and cultural globalization, on one hand, and intentional actions undertaken by numerous nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs), on the other, human rights and other Western concepts spread all over the world. They got injected into many cultures and were adopted by many with no coercion from external powers. In many cases, these Western concepts simply activated similar local concepts that had remained dormant in non-Western cultures because of the over-exploitation of those cultures during the times of European colonialism.

Today only one-third of the world's population is governed by autocratic regimes. "Human rights has gone global by going local, imbedding itself in the soil of cultures and worldviews independent of the west, in order to sustain ordinary people's struggle against unjust states and oppressive social practices" (Ignatieff 2001, 7). Obviously, when you read daily reports of the Human Rights Watch from all over the world, you see that the violations of human rights occur everywhere, including in the countries that signed the Declaration. This shows that the processes of assimilating the concepts of human rights, individualism, and justice in local cultures are not as simple as they might seem and do not automatically lead to their implementation, even in the Western countries where they originated. Constructing any component of the developing global culture takes much more than a declaration signed by several self-selected moral equals.

In spite of all the obstacles, however, we observe that more and more people locally adopt these concepts and assimilate them, trying to empower themselves in order to become agents shaping their own individual lives. If the adoption of the concepts of human rights, individualism, global justice, the English language, and international law would lead to the spread among a larger portion of humanity of a higher standard of living, a healthier and more fulfilling life, happiness according to their own definition, justice, and peace, we should not be overly concerned about where those elements of the developing global culture have originated. We do not worry today at all about the origin of the components of our American culture, and we all know that when we take a closer look, we discover that hardly any of them originated on American soil.

Globalization and Hybridization of Ethics. To explain how the macro mechanism of globalization works, I start by drawing a parallel between ethics and language, following to some extent a model developed in evolutionary psychology by Steven Pinker (1995). Both language and ethics are components of culture, and they both serve the purpose of establishing, maintaining, or discontinuing human interactions. They both rely heavily on symbolic expressions and are closely wrapped in local meanings. Language is universal, and I believe ethics is universal among human societies, but only in the sense of an individual innate biological potential that needs to be activated, developed, and shaped in the processes of socialization and education within a specific cultural context. In other words, what is universal about language and ethics comes from nature, from the physical

world, without our intentional intervention. Our universal potentials for language and ethics make us all capable of developing these two systems of communication, but only if we are raised among other humans and go through an intensive process of interacting and learning.

On the other hand, what might be labeled as global is a result of our planned, intentional, and well-defined actions. When certain structures or processes become global, not everybody is a part of them in the same way, and those involved experience different consequences. Is it then justified to talk about a global language and a global ethics? My answer to this question is Yes.

In many countries outside of the United States people learn and speak several languages, and among those languages is English. I would argue that as a result of the processes of globalization of economy, transportation, communication, and information, we witness a relatively fast development of a global culture that operates in English, which becomes a global language. Neither multilingualism nor the development of a global language presents a threat to the survival of native local languages or to the cohesion of groups, communities, nations, or families. English blends its already hybrid forms with the local languages and cultures and only acquires more and more forms that are simultaneously different and the same.

How and why does this occur? The first and oldest factor is the colonization by Great Britain of many countries of the world. Some societies were only exposed to English, others developed systems of education conducted in English, and still others were coerced to acquire English as the official language. On the one hand, we have the unintended, spontaneous linguistic hybridization that results from both unintended and intended and voluntary (also by means of market seduction) adoption of various elements of Western technological innovations that happen to have English names. Those elements come wrapped in a culture of operating them that so far is best addressed and expressed in English. Today English is the dominant language in business, computing, law, science, and politics (Held 1998, 18). On the other hand, English is transformed into a global language because of intentional efforts made by people around the world to learn it and teach it to their children. They believe that being able to communicate in English will widen the range of and give access to opportunities and choices that would otherwise remain beyond their and their children's reach. English is believed to be an instrument and resource for acquiring intellectual and cultural capital that might offer a better life.

Thus, people participate in the construction of a global language that is one but not exactly the same all over the world. There are many Englishes spoken, even within the context of the same culture. In the culture of the United States, for instance, there are linguistic differences between people from the South and from the North, between parents and their children, lawyers and construction workers. Together with the inhabitants of Aus-

tralia, Great Britain, Canada, and many other countries of the world, we believe that we all speak one language, English.

All human languages have the same fundamental structure; they are all composed of vowels and consonants, and in all of them sounds are put together according to similar rules—there are nouns and verbs and phonemes and morphemes, specific intonation for questions, and paralinguistic expressions of anger, fear, excitement, and joy. It is difficult to notice all these similarities when one listens to people speaking to each other in a language one does not know. In definite human interactions, suddenly words are untranslatable, ideas do not make sense, and an intonation might seem offensive. Detached from their own cultural setting, the languages become devoid of their pragmatic power to shape human interactions. However, when one begins to learn another language, those fundamental similarities become apparent. It is often easier to learn other languages when one is young and a larger scope of the universal potential for language is still available, and when one can immerse oneself in a culture that operates in the language being learned. And, once a second language is learned, learning additional languages becomes less difficult.

How does this relate to ethics? We can assume that there is a universal potential for ethics, comparable to our potential for language. All of us growing up learn our native ethics, but we are also capable of learning the values and norms of other people and developing multi-ethicalism, which is only going to widen the scope of our ethical competence. This multi-ethicalism, in part, is going to be the result of a spontaneous hybridization of ethics caused by contact, diffusion, mimicking, and assimilating new technologies that put us in new social interactions that need to be somehow regulated. But hybridization might also be achieved by means of intentional actions. We might want to know values and norms of our close or more distant neighbors (especially when we already speak their languages), and we also might want to learn and teach our children an ethic that we believe will assure them life in a more peaceful and just world. If we believe that the spontaneous processes of globalization that we experience are irreversible, that economic globalization has to be accompanied by globalization of culture, then we can find arguments in support of the possibility of the development of a global ethic. Let us remember that in the past, the processes of transition from horticulture to agriculture, from agriculture to industrialism, and from industrialism to post-industrialism were also accompanied by quite dramatic changes of cultures, which in spite of the usual lag always managed to catch up with the new demands, challenges, and peoples' new needs, dreams, and aspirations.

Ethics is a system of norms and guidelines directing, shaping, and interpreting human behavior, and when we take a closer look at these norms and guidelines they appear more similar than different. They are limited in scope by our universal potential for ethics, and they also are the result of

spontaneous hybridization resulting from the processes of cultural diffusion. That diffusion has been enhanced in the past by colonization and today by dislocation, transnational migrations, and globalization of technology, transportation, and communication. As a result, most ethical norms and guidelines are “the same” all over the world—from those that regulate the most intimate interactions to those that shape international relations. But, as with languages, in situations of individual human encounters norms and guidelines suddenly become untranslatable and difficult to learn, and the similarities somehow disappear. The unique meanings that they acquire in any given context make them appear completely foreign. However, if we are exposed to a diversity of ethical contexts when we are young, we somehow manage to activate a larger portion of our universal potential for ethics, we are more inclined to see similarities rather than differences, and we become *multi-ethical*. On top of that, we might assimilate the global ethics not as a vernacular of cultural prescriptions but as a global language of moral empowerment. Its role would be not to define the content of a particular culture but to try to enfranchise all human agents so that they can freely shape that content.

And here, my parallel between language and ethics in a way ends, because in talking about norms, rules, and guidelines of conduct we have to mention sanctions and authorities, a local or global institutional fabric that would make sure that norms are followed, sanctions enforced, and conflicting interests negotiated in a peaceful and just way.

Social Norms, Sanctions, and Institutions. The question of the right and the duty to intervene in situations where the norms of a global ethic are violated would also have to be addressed. Saying that, I know I am opening a Pandora’s box. I do not intend to address these issues here, because that would take me beyond the scope of this introduction. I do want to mention, however, that the development of a powerful regional body such as the European Union is quite remarkable. “In the accelerating process of globalization of economic, political, cultural and scientific relations, the European Union is largely seen as a successful model of the institutionalization of supranationality” (Preuß 1998, 138).

Just over fifty years ago Europe was at the point of self-destruction. Since that moment Europe has created new mechanisms of collaboration and of human rights enforcement, and new political institutions in order not only to hold member states to account across a broad range of issues, but to pool aspects of their sovereignty. . . . Our world is a world of *overlapping communities of fate*, where the fate of one country and that of another are more entwined than ever before. (Held 1998, 24, 26)

Very interesting existing models of regional and global governance and control have already been evaluated and possible future models constructed. Also, necessary reforms of the United Nations have been proposed (Archibugi, Held, and Kohler 1998).

The processes leading to the development of a global ethics are already unfolding in front of our eyes. This ethics is hybridal, heterogeneous, situational, and complex. It is hybridal because it is a blend of elements that originated in many human communities, and it is heterogeneous because it is composed of elements that resisted the processes of hybridization and maintained their autonomy. It is situational because it demands from people involved in any social interaction, local, global, or in between, that they be responsible for what they bring to that situation as individuals, their biological structure and their own limitations, memories, and personal histories. This ethic also requires that people be responsible to other participants by making choices that reflect a taking into account of all others involved. It is complex, because it has to both address the new models of intra- and intersocietal relations, new political arrangements able to govern the plurality, autonomy, and richness of differences and, at the same time, express humanity's shared responsibility for the fate of each individual, the species, and the planet (Melucci 2000, 65–69).

In every ethical system some norms are transformed into laws. Usually these are norms viewed by a given society as the most crucial for its survival. A similar process is already occurring on a global scale. A number of societies have already agreed that survival of humanity requires formulation of international laws and establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal. "The tribunal has already done much to break the cycle of impunity in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Each arrest of a suspect and each conviction by a tribunal help to substantiate the reality of a universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity" (Ignatieff 2001, 12).

The development of a global ethic might follow the pattern of the development of English as a global language and of international laws. If certain key values and norms, regardless of their origin, are intentionally chosen and adopted locally by many peoples of the world, they will blend with local contexts acquiring diverse forms of expression, and all together will constitute a global ethic. Stemming from our universal ethical potential, accompanying our "native" local ethics, the global ethic might function as one among many and as one composed of many.

Global Ethics and Moral Pluralism. There is no contradiction in interpreting a global ethic as a reflection of cultural and moral pluralism. Contrary to the view of pluralism, common in the past, as a relatively static collection of cultural systems defined in essentialist terms, the new, alternative, dynamic model emphasizes "the constantly changing and contested nature of the constructed boundaries of the national 'imagined community' and of the narratives which constitute its collective cultural discourses" (Yuval-Davis 2000, 201), and it includes the emerging counter-narratives from the local margins and from hybridal globals who have lived in more than one culture. This model challenges the old concept of multiculturalism (Yuval-Davis 2000, 197), which assumed homogeneity of

cultures, ignored power relations and conflicts, accepted elite representation of collectivities, emphasized differences over similarities, and viewed members of communities as culturally homogenous and equally committed to their unique cultures. The new, global ethics has to fit the context of the developing global society, where the equation of culture and community is dissolved. Culture and community become a matter of negotiation and debate within the context of “the social processes that underlie the forging of multi-ethnic ‘communities of action’ out of reified ‘communities’ of ‘culture’ (Baumann 2000, 209–10). This dynamic model of pluralism reflects the social reality of communities within communities, cultures across communities, and multiple communities within cultures. The same is true for ethics as a component of those cultures. Ethics can no longer be viewed as static systems of well-defined “ought to’s” functioning as if parallel to each other within the context of communities defined in essentialist terms. They need to be reinterpreted within the dynamic model of cultural pluralism, which leaves room for disagreements and even outright conflicts. These disagreements, however, as with other paradoxes in social life, need to be managed in a way that does not have to lead to a solution of conflicting situations by exclusion or termination of the opponent.

As stated before, the development of English as a global language is possible today also because so many people in the world want to learn it. Before we have a global ethic, there has to be a *want to learn it* among larger human populations and a consent to enforce its norms. We can create an international court of law, but it does not seem feasible to create a global body that would supervise whether or not people follow those multiple and changing rules that constitute a global ethic. We might propose moving in the direction of developing on both individual and community levels some self-regulatory mechanisms, such as self-sanctioning and self-condemnation (Bandura 1998, 161–76).

The issue of control brings us to the last component of culture that is intertwined with languages and ethics into a “net,” namely, religion. This “net” might either entangle us like a fish, pulling us out of the context that is our life-supporting system and causing us to suffocate to death, or it can be spread and waiting to save us when we suddenly lose our grip on one of the trapezes on which we are swinging through life. And that is not all. These three—language, ethics, and religion—are also intertwined with all other systems that together make our social and cultural setting.

A Global Social Movement on Behalf of Global Ethics. If we want to see changes in any one of these systems, we need to be ready for changes in all other systems as well. The driving force of global transformations today are global social movements (Giddens 1990, 158–73). In the past, such movements operated on local levels and acquired the form, for instance, of a labor movement or a nationalist movement. People fought for better

work conditions or for free speech, democracy, and political participation. The new movements operate on a global level, and, whether this is the peace movement, the ecological movement, or the feminist movement, they all show humanity's growing concern about its own speciation survival. The new global movements do not replace the old ones but rather supplement them in the way that a global ethic might in the future supplement local ethics. The work is already in progress; the increasing life expectancy, declining birth rates, and acceptance of NGOs and their work are current examples of a slow but successful movement toward a higher level of empowerment of locals all over the world and of transformation of many of them into agents who make decisions about their own individual lives and the lives of their communities. I believe that the time has come for the development of a social movement (and we have ready-made blueprints of those that have been successful) led by representatives of religions and sciences toward a global ethic.

Such a movement could rely on many foundational arguments (Gutmann 2001, vii–xxvii). A global ethic that welcomes an overlapping consensus will be compatible with the dynamic model of moral pluralism. It will show respect for the many cultural and philosophical traditions that converge in support of a similar set of values and norms. This convergence does not have to be perfect, since it is never perfect even *within* a single cultural or philosophical tradition. To be global and compatible with moral pluralism, global ethics does not have to be compatible with every belief system.

Translated into a social movement, activism on behalf of a global ethic means taking sides, mobilizing constituencies powerful enough for the movement to succeed. In other words, effective activism toward global ethics is bound to be partial and political. But I support the view that "There is nothing wrong with particularism in itself. Everyone's universalism ultimately anchors itself in a particular commitment to a specially important group of people whose cause is close to one's heart and conviction" (Ignatieff 2001, 9). We already have examples of such exterritorial moral activism. The campaign to abolish the slave trade and slavery, the campaign on behalf of Soviet Jewry, and the international struggle against apartheid are some of many examples of successful global activism.

Theories of Accountability and of Hybridity. Among plural foundations for a global ethic, we could include a *theory of accountability*. Accountability means making decisions about what is right and what is wrong or what is good and what is bad for us and our fellow humans, not unilaterally but by taking into consideration others' definitions of right and wrong, bad and good. This requires a level of ethical literacy that would stem from the knowledge and at least some level of understanding of cultures, religions, and ethical systems different from our own. Individual and collective actors would justify their actions "by the balance of foreseeable

consequences for all parties affected (as compared with the consequences of alternatives), and justify single actions on the same basis in cases where no such practice yet applies” (Attfield 1999, 34). They would take responsibility for shaping the future by paying attention to all foreseeable consequences of their actions, both the positive and the negative ones, both the intended and the unintended, which all matter for human and nonhuman elements of nature in the present and in the future. Similarly to the theory of consequentialism, the theory of accountability would not assume that a worldwide moral community exists. Such a community is simply not fully possible and not necessary, because the theory of accountability would emphasize respect for cultural diversity, “except where agents are intolerant of toleration and diversity” (Attfield 1999, 38). The new ethics of accountability would be global because it would not be restricted by space or time and it would “supply reasons for action or restraint for all agents, in whatever community they may be situated” (1999, 41). I believe that, entangled in the web of interactions of the globalizing world while living our everyday, localized lives—thanks to our growing ethical literacy and competence—we are slowly and gradually becoming better equipped for that new form of accountability.

We have numerous examples showing that the world is ready for dealing with individual accountability.

The finally unsuccessful effort since 1998 to detain and extradite General Augusto Pinochet, the former Chilean dictator, to face criminal charges in Spain, the war-crimes indictment of Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic a year later by the Hague War Crimes Tribunal, the pressure to similarly indict Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, the move to create a tribunal to review the crimes of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia during the mid-1970s, and the campaign to establish a permanent international criminal court—all these actions flow from a wider effort to institutionalize criminal liability of leaders on a global level. The guiding idea is to fashion a framework of individual accountability that is uniformly applicable to all political and military leaders, whether in countries large or small, whether in governments that won a war or lost one. (Falk 2000, 4)

These are examples only of *ex post facto* interventions. We might also want to start exploring our options for preventive, constructive initiatives, to promote accountability not only of political or military leaders but also of all human beings, and thus enhance and optimize opportunities and resources toward communal self-determination and individual freedom.

Global ethics embedded in the theory of accountability would reflect a paradigm shift from essentialist interpretations toward the growing awareness and acceptance of the processes of hybridization. “Hybridity has served as the organising principle for international cultural initiatives, and entered the programmes of local social movements” (Papastergiadis 2000, 257–58). In the past, it served as a metaphor for the perceived negative consequences of racial encounters that were viewed as damaging the “fixity and purity of origin” (p. 257). Today, we can agree that

The positive feature of hybridity is that it invariably acknowledged that identity is constructed through a negotiation of difference, and that the presence of fissures, gaps and contradictions is not necessarily a sign of failure. In its most radical form, the concept also stresses that identity is not a combination, accumulation, fusion or synthesis of various components, but an energy field of different forces. . . . Its “unity” is not found in the sum of its parts, but emerges from the process of opening what Homi Bhabha has called a third space within which other elements encounter and transform each other. (Papastergiadis 2000, 258)

Hybridization is intrinsic to all forms of radical transformation and renewal when transformation is viewed in “a ‘generative way’; as ideas, world-views and material forces interact with each other, they undergo a process of being internally reworked until the old ones are displaced” (Stuart Hall, quoted in Papastergiadis 2000, 274).

The theory of hybridity also marks a shift from emphasizing full recognition of the humanness of the other in the presence of the self (e.g., “love your neighbor”) to emphasizing both the self and the other in the presence of each other and of many others, who might be consequentially impacted by the actions of the self or the other, or both. This new model, which I would call a social action model, challenges the old model of a dialogue (Michel Serres, cited in Papastergiadis 2000, 271–72). Those who promote a dialogue too often encourage a conversation between partners who are *not opposed*, who are on the same side, tied together by mutual interests, ideas, concerns, passions, and beliefs. They hold the dialogue as if in alliance, supposing the existence of a third party who is excluded from that conversation, is hardly ever invited to the table, and sometimes is even viewed as a common enemy. “The most profound dialectical problem is not the Other who is only a variety—or a variation—of the same, it is the problem of the third man” (Serres 1982, 66–67). In the case of ethics of organ transplantation, the new social action model would require inclusion in the conversation of both organ donors and recipients, and, above all, of the “third party,” composed of lawyers arranging organ transplantations and surgeons and other medical-care providers performing them, and it would require making a transition from conversation to action. The theories of accountability and hybridity combined with the theory of social movements encourage us to make a stronger effort to ensure that no one is left out, that the discourse is inclusive. This effort might lead to empirical improvement of the conditions of life of a larger segment of human population.

Moreover, global ethics grounded in the theory of accountability might lead to the drafting of “a Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities as an indispensable companion to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. . . . The notion of protecting the individual is a great advance over its absolutist antecedents, but it needs to be balanced by the acknowledgment that the individual is embedded within a community” (Falk 2000, 88). Such a declaration might also consider inclusion of duties of each

generation toward past and future generations, duties toward victims of past abuses, and duties related to a vision of a just and peaceful future. "The world does not need a wholesale merging of different cultures and civilizations; rather, it simply needs to foster a new level of respect and reconciliation between and among its ever changing and ever diverse people and nations" (Falk 2000, 93).

The articles on organ transplantation in this section illustrate the issues addressed in this introduction. They show very clearly that a global ethic for today has to merge the ought-to rules functioning across all cultures and societies, which historically have been supported by religious beliefs, with rules explicitly addressing the multiple, intended and unintended, direct and indirect, consequences of human behavior for the more or less immediate social context, which historically have been embedded in sciences. Various scientific disciplines provide us with information necessary to become morally literate and, thus, morally competent human beings. To make true choices and to be fully accountable for actions, people need to expand their intellectual horizons and build the foundations of their social literacy, cultural literacy (including religious literacy), ecoliteracy, and cosmoliteracy. Spontaneously, a merger of rules grounded in religions and rules grounded in sciences occurs daily all over the world and all the time—at any moment when human beings are making choices and decisions about their conduct. Very often, however, these decisions are not grounded in all the information that is available for a given empirical life situation.

The issue of moral literacy and competence leads us to the politics of narration, which often is characterized by a culture of secrecy (Feldman 1991, 11). Secrecy limits the range of known and foreseeable unintended consequences of behavior, and, because it is often intended, it can be interpreted as an extremely harmful form of violation of the human right to know. "The price of silence is paid in the hard currency of human suffering" (Bauman 1998, 5). The existing macro and micro narratives give foundations for social and individual practices, provide the justification and legitimization for conduct, and define access to and distribution of necessary resources. Such resources, among other elements, comprise at least some basic knowledge and understanding of sciences, on the one hand, and religious and moral literacy, on the other. The control of such resources often is in the hands of people who can manipulate information in a way that brings profit to the globals at the expense of the locals. New narratives have to be told by scientists and religious thinkers, more often and among larger audiences, to emphasize their growing awareness and concern about the well-being of humanity, both of locals in their particular social contexts and of globals involved in transnational, transcultural, and transsocietal operations.

NEW NARRATIVES FROM SCIENCE AND RELIGION

The essays that follow bring to us new voices that address the issues of global ethics and organ transplantation from the perspective of religion and science. The authors are practitioners, and each of them represents a unique hybrid expertise. These scholars take the science-and-religion dialogue from the level of an abstract academic discourse to where it acquires its full meaning by being engaged in the process of making ultimate decisions about human life and death. The essays clearly show the extent to which people involved in the global organ trade and organ transplantation practice make choices that often lack sufficient information pertaining both to the scientific ramifications of this procedure and to possible interpretations of specific religious traditions. Too often, people's decisions are not grounded in a level of scientific and religious literacy that is sufficient for their choices to be free and for their accountability to stem from internalized behavior controls. The authors do not shy away from making remarks about the role religious ethics might or should play in the development of the medical practice related to organ transplantation when they think it is appropriate.

Let me introduce the hybrid academic and multicultural experiential backgrounds of the authors of the first four essays. Lawrence Cohen holds a Ph.D. in medical science, as well as in social and cultural anthropology, and works in the field of medical and psychiatric anthropology. He studied comparative religions (Hindu and Jewish thought) and medicine (geriatrics and psychiatry) at Harvard and spent many years working in India and Malaysia. Nancy Scheper-Hughes has a Ph.D. in anthropology and a B.A. in social sciences, and her interests are in medicine, psychiatry, genocide, globalization, popular culture, political consciousness, and anthropological ethics. She has worked on issues of medical anthropological ethics related to organ transplantation as well as to motherhood and childbearing in Brazil, Ireland, South Africa, Cuba, and Israel. Her coauthor, Francis L. Delmonico, is also a medical doctor who completed his internship and residency in surgery and served clinical and research fellowships in surgery and transplantation. He is a professor of surgery. Gayle Woloschak holds a Ph.D. in medical science and works as professor of medical sciences (microbiology) and biological sciences. Stuart Youngner is an M.D. who did his internship in pediatrics and residency in psychiatry; currently he specializes in medical ethics.

The two last essays in the section add voices from religion. They are written by theologians interested in the issues of global ethics from the perspective of the religious traditions that they represent. Both authors are scholars and practitioners of their religious traditions, and both are very active in the interreligious dialogue, which they approach from somewhat different positions. Ghulam-Haider Aasi, an Islamic scholar, holds a Ph.D. in history of religions as well as degrees in Arabic language and literature,

Islamic studies, and political sciences. He is actively involved in interreligious dialogue, primarily focusing on the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and in world peace activities. Jewish scholar Stephen Jacobs is a doctor of divinity, a doctor of Hebrew letters, and an ordained rabbi. For many years Jacobs has linked his academic career with everyday pastoral work, which has helped him acquire a unique insight into the significance of religious ethics for moral decision-making processes among members of his congregation. Aasi focuses on the interpretation of religious ethics of Islam for the purpose of the practice of organ transplantation. His essay supplies a transition from the discussion of ethics of organ transplantation provided by the scientists to the theological conversation about globalization and ethics as interpreted by Jacobs in his article.

Both by training and by experience, all of the authors bring to the science-and-religion conversation new voices from the down-to-earth level of everyday individual lives. Their contributions reveal the dramatic significance of this conversation when it occurs in real life, within specific social ramifications, within unique political, economic, cultural, and religious contexts.

Let me now briefly sketch the preliminary map of social issues, cultural settings, and ethical arguments that are submitted for a wider discussion by these authors.

Organ Transplantation and Ethics. Medical anthropologists Scheper-Hughes and Cohen focus on the issues related to the world trade of human organs and on ethical considerations that surround this dimension of the world economic market. Scheper-Hughes argues elsewhere in her writings (1995) for politically committed, morally engaged, and ethically grounded social sciences. She says, "Those of us who make our living observing and recording the misery of the world have a particular obligation to reflect critically on the impact of the harsh images of human suffering that we foist upon the public" (1995, 416). Scheper-Hughes and Cohen founded the Organs Watch, an organization that aims at intervention in cases of abuse and exploitation that occur in relation to the world trafficking in human organs.

Cohen studied religion and medicine at Harvard before he received his doctorate in medical anthropology, so he is able to approach the issues of an ethics of organ transplantation from a variety of angles. In the article he reports some of his findings collected in India, where he conducted broad research based on extensive interviews with several hundred physicians, administrators, bureaucrats, police officers, journalists, lawyers, patients, donors, and sellers. Cohen focuses on the construction of publicity for organ transplantation, rumors, scandals, and narratives of his interviewees. Among his many concerns, he mentions that most people in India are selling their kidneys not in order to invest in a better future but to pay old debts. Frequently, they are back in debt within several years. Cohen for-

mulates a hypothesis that kidney zones emerge through interactions between surgical entrepreneurs, persons facing extraordinary debt, and medical brokers. Once a kidney zone is established, the search for new sellers intensifies, and the exploitation of the poor continues. The Indian example is only one among many that can be found on the Organs Watch Web site.

The article coauthored by Delmonico and Scheper-Hughes in a way supplements Cohen's, because it addresses the issue of payment for human organs. The authors maintain that the language of organ sharing and transplantation has been extremely idealistic, strongly ethical, and (in an unrecognized, subliminal sense) also very Christian. However, in a way that disturbs ethicists, an economic underclass of organ donors has developed throughout the world to serve the wealthy. Medical and social considerations include risks and complications to live organ donors that are kept secret from potential donors and risks to recipients resulting from donors' medical histories kept secret from potential recipients. The authors argue that the division of the world into organ buyers and organ sellers, which reflects the new polarization resulting from globalization, is a medical, social, and moral tragedy.

Woloschak addresses the issue of organ transplantation from the perspective of a biologist. She emphasizes the importance of organ donation for saving human lives and discusses modern advances in the field of transplantation, such as artificial organs, transplants from nonhuman species, and cloning. She states that most world religions find organ donation for the purpose of transplantation acceptable but that the new approaches require careful bioethical considerations, particularly emphasizing humans as a unity of body and spirit. She addresses the issue of human responsibility to ourselves, to each other, and to our world.

Youngner takes the discussion into the realm of ethical and psychosocial considerations generated by the blurring of boundaries between life and death, self and other, healing and harming, and killing and letting die. He writes about controlled death, as he calls it, when some must die for others to live. Both death and life in this case are made possible only by the development of science and technology. He talks about the balance between life and death and about ethical challenges of what in some circumstances can be called the construction of life out of death. All of these issues are of extreme ethical significance in the light of the increasing reliance on living donors and the growing awareness among psychiatrists counseling both donors and recipients of the psychological and emotional side effects of organ transplantation for both parties and even for the medical care providers.

Globalization and Ethics. The next essays move our discussion from the area of the practice of organ transplantation as an example of the entanglements, difficulties, opportunities, and promises it offers to humanity, in the direction of the challenges it presents to religious scholars and

ethicists. Aasi debates the issue of compounded accountability on the Day of Judgment. He offers the Islamic legal and ethical views on organ donation and transplantation. In Islam, one of the core beliefs is a belief in the life of the hereafter. At the end of time and all that exists, all human beings will be resurrected (in their bodies and souls) and will face the Day of Judgment. Even their body parts or organs will stand witness against them. In Islamic law, every action or thing is categorized either as legitimate or prohibited. These essential Islamic beliefs lead to a question, "If the same organ is a part of two different humans in this life, to whom will the organ belong on the Day of Judgment? Will the accounts be compounded?"

Finally, Jacobs turns our attention to religious texts, to selected passages of both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament. He believes that the foundational Jewish and Christian scriptural texts can no longer be read, understood, and either interpreted or reinterpreted the way they were prior to the Holocaust. He is involved as a scholar in genocide studies and is wholeheartedly devoted to the pursuit of peace and justice. Carrying the burden of past genocidal victimization of his family members during the Holocaust and of a large portion of the "imagined community" of European Jews with whom he identifies, he joins the efforts undertaken by other scholars and religious leaders who aim at the development of ethical foundations for a better world. He proposes a new model for the construction of a global ethic that is called "a post-Shoah interfaith dialogical universal ethic." Even though his example is limited to the Jewish-Christian dialogue, he believes that such an interfaith dialogical universal ethic is possible but has to be grounded in relations between all human beings, regardless of particularistic identities.

CONCLUSION: ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION

I would like to submit some questions to move forward the discussion about globalization and ethics.

Are we actually talking about a global ethic or about ethics of globalization? Are these two aspects of the same process of our growing ethical and moral concern or two issues that need to be discussed separately?

Can we envision localizing the developing global ethics by interlocking it with the existing codes of professional ethics designed for professionals working in both sciences and religions?

To what extent is it helpful to focus on one global issue at a time, such as organ transplantation or the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which in the global human society need new ethical regulations?

In what ways can the international professional associations join hands with the Parliament of the World's Religions and get involved in the development of a new global social movement that would help build the foundations for a global ethic?

How can we transform ourselves, to use Scheper-Hughes's language, from being only observers and recorders of the misery of the world into politically committed, morally engaged, and ethically motivated agents of change toward a more peaceful and just world?

With time, these questions, like many others, will find answers.

NOTES

1. The essays in this collection are in part an outcome of two Annual Lecture Series in Religion and Science that took place at Aurora University, Aurora, Illinois, in Spring of 2001 and 2002. The series was initiated in 1997, and for several years, as a component of courses in religion and science, it was supported by a grant from the Templeton Foundation. Next, it was sponsored by Aurora University, the Aurora University Center for Faith and Action, and most recently, by an individual sponsor.
2. For information on the Organs Watch, see <http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/biotech/organswatch>.

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