

## *In the Periodicals*

Both the mastery of nature and the intrinsic value of science are advocated by Brand Blanshard in "Current Issues in Education" (*Monist* [January 1968], pp. 11-27). He writes:

Only through science and its technology can nature be mastered, and only through the mastery of nature can the good life be made possible for mankind generally. . . . Science is an intrinsic value as well as an instrumental one. The desire to know is an authentic and central drive of human nature, and though Dewey thought the philosophers had made too much of its distinctness and intensity, it is clearly there and its fulfilment is one of man's greater goods. Its aim, as I conceive it, is not to accumulate details, but to penetrate through to the network of law that renders the details intelligible, in brief, to understand the world. The aim in understanding is quite distinct from the aim in application. "Scientific discoveries," says Russell, "have been made for their own sake and not for their utilization, and a race of men without a disinterested love of knowledge would never have achieved our present scientific technique." . . . The student who can enter into the inheritance opened to him by modern science, whether he can add to it, or not, has enriched his mind invaluablely [pp. 16-17].

Questions of racial discrimination are of great significance today, and Marcus S. Goldstein believes that the science of anthropology can make an important contribution. In "Anthropological Research, Action, and Education in Modern Nations: With Special Reference to the U.S.A." (*Current Anthropology* [October 1968], pp. 247-54), he states:

On the national level, probably no group has been immune to infection at one time or another with prejudice and discrimination, perhaps leading to outright persecution because of differences in religion, caste, race, social or economic status, or a combination of these or like factors. . . . Thus an avowed purpose of the proposed program of teaching the lessons of anthropology on a national, mass scale would be to modify habits of thought and behavior with regard to ethnic and racial stereotypes, to cultivate a climate of understanding and respect between diverse groups in the nation. To the extent that the program is successful in attaining this goal, it would plainly be a great force for unity, stability, and amity within the nation [pp. 253-54].

Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy has often been heralded by hasty religious enthusiasts as the chief agent of reconciliation between science and religion in that it destroyed the position of nineteenth-century deterministic materialism. The issues are not as simple as commonly assumed, as is indicated by R. B. Lindsay in "Physics—To What Extent Is It Deterministic?" (*American Scientist* [Summer 1968], pp. 93-111), in which the author clearly points out that "the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which makes indeterminism fundamental in all of quantum physics" (p. 107), did not satisfy Einstein, de Broglie, and Schrödinger. And David Bohm in 1952 suggested the existence of a medium with "hidden variables which would interact with ordinary atomic particles so as to account for the

probabilistic results of quantum mechanics, though the hidden variables mechanism itself might conceivably be deterministic in nature" (p. 108). R. B. Lindsay summarizes the arguments on both sides: "We can only conclude by expressing the feeling that the problem of the future of determinism versus indeterminism in physics is still an open one, albeit one with fascinating implications" (p. 110).

Erich Goode, in "Class Styles of Religious Sociation" (*British Journal of Sociology* [March 1968], pp. 1-16), discusses the primary focus of the sociology of religion as "the interplay between the sacred and the secular" (p. 1) and attempts to answer the question: "Does secular society merely 'inform' religion, as has been maintained recently, or does the process work in the opposite direction?" (p. 1). His conclusion is not too optimistic with respect to organized religion: "Religion can, and does, reaffirm commitment to existing norms. It reflects the social structure. Secularization need not imply anomie, decreasing normative commitment" (p. 14).

Richard F. Larson, in "The Clergyman's Role in the Therapeutic Process: Disagreements between Clergymen and Psychiatrists" (*Psychiatry* [August 1968], pp. 250-63), based "on the responses from 1868 clergymen and 54 psychiatrists" (p. 262), discusses "the notion that a consensus does not exist between clergymen and psychiatrists regarding the professional role performance of a member of the clergy in handling emotionally disturbed persons" (p. 250). He concludes: "The diversity of problems brought to a clergyman, however, clearly makes it mandatory that he have a fair amount of knowledge regarding modern psychiatry" (p. 262).

Pope Pius' encyclical *Humane vitae*, issued on July 28, produced a variety of reactions among Catholics and Protestants, mostly negative. An editorial in *The Christian Century* (August 14, 1968, pp. 1007-9), "The Pope's Missed Opportunities," stated bluntly that the encyclical "fails to deal positively with fundamental problems of the world—poverty and overpopulation—and thus contributes to the source of the fundamental psychic problem of the world—conflict and war" (p. 1007). J. John Palen, in "Catholicism, Contraception and Conscience" (*Christian Century* [September 11, 1968], pp. 1132-34), gives information on the Catholic reaction to the encyclical throughout the world and acknowledges that "whatever the eventual consensus of theologians may be, the uncompromising nature of the encyclical is producing a serious crisis of conscience for the better educated and more reflective members of the Roman Catholic Church" (p. 1132). On the Catholic side of the controversy may be mentioned "An Editorial Statement on 'Human Life'" (*America* [August 17, 1968], pp. 94-95), which makes the important point that the encyclical is not the last word on the subject: "In the final analysis dogmas are few and far between. Even in the case of dogmas our knowledge is subject to growth. In the area of the Church's teaching on the natural law, we are still more inescapably tied to a system of development. Whatever else is clear about *Human Life*, it is certain that Paul VI did not intend it as the last word on life and love. For anyone else to claim the last word would be the essence of theological—or journalistic—folly" (p. 94). In the same issue of *America*, Robert J. O'Connell reports on a panel discussion held at Fordham University on July 30 in "A Discussion of 'Human Life'" (pp. 96-98). The report is a fair presentation of the discussion which this writer heard personally, except that the remarks of Father

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Norris Clarke, editor of the *International Philosophical Quarterly*, were more critical than reported in O'Connell's article. Also pertinent is Ladislav M. Orsy, "Questions about 'Human Life'" (*America* [August 17, 1968], pp. 98-99).

The discussion and searching of minds continue, as is attested by John C. Haughey in "Conscience and the Bishops" (*America*, [October 12, 1968], pp. 322-24), who reveals the attitudes of the Australian, American, Dutch, Italian, English, German, and Belgian bishops. The attitude of the Belgian hierarchy is to the effect that "there can be no call for 'unconditional and absolute adherence' to the teaching of the encyclical as if it had the weight of a dogmatic definition. Furthermore, if someone shows himself informed, of sound judgment and versed in all aspects of the question, then there is a possibility of his arriving at other moral conclusions than those reached by the Holy Father" (p. 324).

Norman Pittenger, one of the leading Anglican theologians of process theology, strikes a reassuring note in "Does Belief in God Make Sense?" (*Christian Century* [September 25, 1968], pp. 1196-98) when he states: "The world does show a pattern; and as scientists increasingly affirm (I cite Sir Alister Hardy in his recent Gifford lectures, *Divine Flame* and *The Living Stream*, Dr. W. H. Thorpe in his Riddell lectures, *Science, Man and Morals*, Professor Ian Barbour's magisterial *Issues of Religion and Science*), the pattern is one of ceaselessly renewed and even more integrated occasions for the expression of good" (p. 1197). As to those who say "God is dead," Pittenger replies: "Well, some 'gods' are dead—because they never existed in the first place" (p. 1196).

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