

VIOLENCE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

by John P. Spiegel

In our search for appropriate ways to define the main features of a historical epoch we often use the big, broadside label. Thus, the eighteenth century is called the "Age of Reason," the early nineteenth century the "Age of Romanticism," and the late nineteenth century the "Age of Materialism." Continuing this imagery into the twentieth century, we can, with some plausibility, characterize more recent times in terms of thirty-year periods. The period from 1900 to 1930 could be called, for the United States at any rate, the "Age of Optimism," reflecting such self-confident national slogans as "manifest destiny" and "make the world safe for democracy." It was a time in which, despite the temporary inconvenience of war, depression, or race riots, change always seemed to be for the best. In contrast, the period from 1930 to 1960 has been called the "Age of Anxiety." Owing to the Great Depression, the rise of fascism, World War II, the collapse of the colonial powers, and the uneasy tension between the Communist and non-Communist worlds, national self-confidence was replaced with increasing self-doubt. Social change seemed now to be sometimes out of control, and frequently for the worse. Although traces of hope remained attached to such worldwide efforts of reconstruction as the United Nations, the newly emerging nations, and aid to underdeveloped countries, the national mood was one of uncertainty and personal anxiety.

Since 1960, however, the increased turbulence, both within and between nations, has introduced a new note into national life—anger, recrimination, and aggressive behavior between individuals and groups. A corresponding change in national self-awareness gives rise to the notion that we are at this moment living in the "Age of Violence." Certainly, such a designation is suggested by the expressed concerns in the public media, in political oratory, and in the minds of citizens troubled by campus riots, civil disorder, and the fear of violence in the streets.

Although we may be reasonable, from the viewpoint of national im-

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agery, in calling the period we are passing through an Age of Violence, the title may not necessarily be accurate or helpful. In fact, it raises many questions. What is meant by the word "violence"? What moral or ethical assumptions are embedded in such a characterization? What social and psychological processes can account for an increase in personal and collective aggression, if indeed such an increase can actually be demonstrated?

In this paper I shall attempt some partial and temporary answers to these questions.

A DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONCEPT OF VIOLENCE

During the so-called Age of Anxiety, a good deal of psychosomatic and psychiatric research was based on the concept of "stress," an internally experienced correlate of anxiety. Similarly, in the sociological and anthropological literature considerable emphasis was placed on processes of integration and equilibrium within social systems. Social change and the pathologies of social systems, if considered at all, were treated as instances of social "strain" to be overcome by a process of internal re-adjustment.

But in the current, somewhat more heated climate of research, both psychological and social research have shifted, in some degree, to more externally defined problems of behavior. Where individual behavior is concerned, there is an increased focus on drug use and abuse, on hippies and youthful activists or rebels, and on the relation of the person to his family, organizational, or community environment. At the social level, interest has shifted to a greater examination of social problems and the need for social change. Concurrently, we are acutely aware that we not only lack knowledge for determining desirable directions of such change, but also the techniques for bringing it about.

Although the shift from internal to external problems and from adjustment to reality to changing that reality should not be overemphasized, this transformation does highlight the need for new definitions and concepts. Just as, during the thirties and forties, it was necessary to define "stress" and "anxiety" as accurately as possible, now it is of the greatest importance to define what we mean by the terms "aggression" and "violence."

All definitions tend to sound dry and academic. Nevertheless, significant consequences flow from them. Although "violence" may be defined narrowly or broadly, we have chosen a narrow one which goes as follows: Violence lies at the extreme end of a spectrum of aggressive be-

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havior. It is characterized by acts of physical force aimed at the severe injury or destruction of persons, objects, or organizations. A second defining feature is concerned with timing and tempo, usually expressed as "explosiveness." Violent behavior, in other words, is aggression released fully and abruptly, usually in a state of high energy arousal.

The definition rules out many behaviors often included when the word occurs in ordinary speech or in the popular press. For example, it excludes sin and evil in general as well as such particular forms of evil as injustice, exploitation, deprivation, defamation, and starvation. It excludes brutalizing social arrangements not characterized by the use of physical force.

Many people, particularly social activists, are unhappy with such a limited definition. For example, they prefer to describe our society as violent because it is responsible for so much social injustice. From the point of view of research, however, it seems preferable to restrict the behavior to be studied and to ask that other forms of undesirable social behavior, such as injustice and exploitation, be considered separately.

A more serious problem arising from the narrow definition concerns destructive force used in lower-keyed or nonexplosive ways, for example, torture, poisoning, and exile. Such acts could be conceived as lying within the spectrum of aggressive behavior just short of violence. A graphic or linear concept of this sort, however, becomes quite arbitrary in the absence of a definition of aggression, and we know how difficult it has been, in the past, to define the word "aggression."

Despite the difficulties, the need for a workable concept of aggression geared to the concept of violence is so great that it seems important to formulate a definition for this purpose. Accordingly, the following formula is proposed: "Aggression is behavior involving the use of force or its symbolic equivalent to effect an outcome in line with the intentions or goals of the aggressor acting against the intentions or goals of an adversary. It usually, but not always, occurs in an agonistic situation characterized by a conflict of interests."

This definition is, by design, quite broad. It leaves open the character, intensity, and aim of the force used to secure compliance from an opponent. Under these general terms, aggression can vary along a continuum from acts of simple assertion requiring a minimal use of force, at one pole, to violence, as defined above, at the other. It also leaves open the techniques—such as a formal challenge, a surprise attack, or a conspiracy—used to set up adversary relations. Finally, it leaves open the timing of the behavior with respect to securing compliance or non-compliance. For example, the show of real or symbolic force used to

secure compliance in advance of a struggle we call threat-behavior just as we call force used after the loss of a contest, revenge.

Two significant consequences proceed from this formulation. First, a great deal of aggressive behavior is nonviolent in character. Even in the purely physical realm, such acts as pushing, holding, blocking, restraining, constraining, confining, and depriving, though aggressive, are nonviolent. Considering the heated debates over who has done what to whom in the streets of our cities and on our college campuses, it is of the greatest importance to distinguish between violence, on the one hand, and aggression, no matter how disruptive, on the other hand.

The second consequence consists of an avoidance of the question of whether aggression is to be regarded as instinctual or learned behavior. It must represent a combination of both elements. Vexing images—man as the killer-ape, struggling to control his innate violence, or man as the noble savage taught to be violent by an aggressive civilization—become irrelevant. Aggression as the use of force to overcome obstacles is innate behavior that man shares with most living species. Violence as the maximum arousal of aggression for destructive purposes, including the killing of members of one's own species, is, by the same token, an innate behavior potentially capable of being aroused in all men. But the internal, biological conditions necessary for arousal are ordinarily under the control of external, environmental contingencies. If this view is correct, then what is sorely needed is research directed at investigating the feedback relations between the mechanisms of biological arousal, particularly in childhood, and the environmental controls, both instigating and inhibiting, over aggressive behavior.

ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AS ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL OVER HUMAN BEHAVIOR

I should now like to turn our attention to the second part of such circular, feedback mechanisms: the question of environmental instigators and inhibitors. Clearly, the first level of environmental control over the behavior of man is based on morality and ethics. Ethical standards govern what is regarded as acceptable or unacceptable behavior, both for the individual and the group. Our question, then, must read as follows: Is there an ethics of violence, known and subscribed to by most members of our society or—perhaps more cogently—by members of the world societies?

Despite an abundance of ethical statements from a variety of religious and philosophical contexts, there exists no systematic analysis of ethical principles in this area. What does exist, apparently, is a vast confusion—

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a state of contradiction bordering on chaos—which has been more or less internalized by most members of our society. Three ethical, or quasi-ethical positions can be discerned within the confusion. The first can be called positive and negative “absolutism.” This consists of persons who say either that violence is never justified, the negative position, or that violence in the pursuit of political goals is always justified, the positive position. A moral posture of negative absolutism is quite familiar to Americans under the label of “pacifism.” It is also the position of Quakers and some other religious sects: violence between nations, groups, or individuals is *never*, under any circumstances, justified.

A positive ethics of violence is not so directly known to Americans, but it has been well articulated by the French social philosopher, Georges Sorel, in his book, *Reflections on Violence*. Sorel postulated that violence is a social good. Those who are fit to govern are those who understand and know how to use violence. The ability to employ violence intelligently is what separates the elite of any historical epoch from the dull, passive, decadent, and corrupt bourgeoisie. Hitler, with his boast, “We *are* savages; we’re proud of being savages!” was an intellectual offspring of Sorel, as was Mussolini with his advocacy of national “audacity,” along with the Italian poet and political adventurer, Gabriele D’Annunzio, both of whom emphasized the creative, releasing functions of violence, daring, and militant pugnacity.

In contrast to such absolutist positions, most Americans tend to endorse a relative one. According to relative principles, violence is generally condemned but can be justified under certain conditions—for example, in the service of “self-defense.” Violence on behalf of an indisputably just cause, for example, a “war of national liberation,” is another possible basis of exemption. The guiding principle is flexibility; permission to use violence depends upon conditions, although there is often a notable lack of consensus about just what conditions can be used to excuse the use of violence.

The paralyzing effects of confusion and contradiction are nowhere more conspicuous than in the confrontation of absolutist and relativist ethical principles. From the point of view of the relativist, the absolute position is exceedingly dangerous. How would any individual or group ever overcome injustice, escape exploitation, or overcome oppression if violence were not permitted? As far as a positive ethical position is concerned, to the relativist this posture seems to promote perpetual destruction and killing as pugnacious aggressors flex their muscles and deploy their weaponry against each other, utterly without moral controls, in a state of constant vendetta.

But, to the absolutist, the relativist position seems equally dangerous; like a rubber band, it can be indefinitely stretched and extended to justify continuous escalations of violence. Today we have to fight in a just cause in Vietnam—tomorrow in China, the day after that the whole Communist world? If we exonerate ghetto rioters on the basis of “white racism” in Watts, won’t the violence break out in Dayton, in Newark, in Detroit?

To such blind alleys and fallouts of communication at the overtly moral level, we must add a new component of environmental control: the recently articulated “therapeutic” positions. Here again we encounter an unyielding contradiction between positive and negative positions. The negative therapeutic position holds that an individual or a society displays violence because of illness. The violent society is a “sick” society; the violent person is disturbed. Thus professional help, either on the part of psychiatrists or social therapists, is required. The positive therapeutic position, on the other hand, holds that violence itself is therapeutic, a position clearly articulated by the black psychiatrist, Frantz Fanon, in *The Wretched of the Earth*. An oppressed people, or an inferiorized person, according to this view, will usually identify with the aggressor and, as an inevitable result, display depression, apathy, and alienation. If, however, identification of the aggressor is substituted for identification *with* the aggressor, then the victim will fight the oppressor and overcome both his depression and his social inferiority.

This contradiction of guiding principles again generates seemingly insoluble problems. From the viewpoint of the positive therapeutic principle, the negative position is both degrading and unrealistic. What is to become of our national heroes if violence is a sign of illness? Was George Washington “sick” because he led the violent action which freed our nation from the English Crown? Were the colonies “sick” because they fought the British at Lexington and Concord?

To those who subscribe to the negative therapeutic position, however, the positive position seems a prescription for paranoia. How is a sense of reality to be established if any frustration or grievance or feeling of inferiority is to be ascribed to some real or fictitious oppressor? Doesn’t this position sanction a wild spree of impulse gratification? Of the fight of all against all?

There appears to be no way of reconciling these moral contradictions. Ethical principles, it would seem, can be found to justify almost any line of conduct. Perhaps this means that morality and its embodiment in law is a primitive—or at least a prescientific—form of social control.

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If so, then we obviously must search for more rational or objective principles of environmental control. But is research—specifically, in this case, behavioral research—actually prepared to assume such a responsibility?

CONDITIONS FOR THE BREAKOUT OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

We may be able to shed light on this question by examining the conditions under which collective violence breaks out, confining our attention to civil disorders rather than full-scale war or revolution. Since the Stamp Act Riot in 1765, the country has undergone seven cycles of civil disorder. Each cycle has been characterized by a number of similar instances of violent uprisings occurring in various parts of the nation. Shays's Rebellion in 1786, a revolt of poor farmers in the western frontier of Massachusetts, exemplifies the first cycle. The farmers were resentful of the unjust tax laws passed by the Massachusetts legislature. Led by Daniel Shays, they seized the law courts and prevented the legal apparatus from functioning. Then, as now, the wealthy members of the legislature had not realized how angry the disenfranchised farmers were. The legislators were surprised and frightened. But, as we say nowadays, the power structure got the message and passed fairer tax laws. Similar uprisings were to occur in other parts of the Eastern Seaboard, usually with a successful outcome.

The second cycle consisted of attacks by Protestants against Irish-Catholics during the 1840s and 1850s. Led by the Native American party, the Protestant establishment vilified Irish-Americans as papists—unpatriotic foreigners. Catholic churches and schools were burned. In Philadelphia, the City of Brotherly Love, in July of 1844, twenty-four persons were killed and more than a hundred wounded during an anti-Catholic riot. In Charlestown, Massachusetts, a convent was burned to the ground.

The Civil War Draft Riots of 1863 constituted the third cycle of disorders. Angered by the exemption clause of the Conscription Act, which permitted the wealthy to escape the draft by the payment of \$300, poor people rose up in wrath directed at the Republican party and the police who were called upon to keep order. Although motivations were mixed and there were vicious attacks upon black people, who were held responsible for the war, the principal cause of the disorders was an intense feeling of injustice.

The fourth cycle, the West Coast anti-Chinese riots, began in the 1870s. Among California's poor, white population, racism combined with fear of economic threat to identify "the Chinese Menace" as a social

problem requiring violent solution. During the riot in Los Angeles in October of 1871 twenty-three Chinese were killed. Similar riots occurred in 1877 in San Francisco, in 1881 in Denver, and in 1885 in Rock Springs, Wyoming.

The fifth riot cycle, the long series of disorders arising from the movement for organized labor, began in the 1870s, reached a peak of intensity in the 1890s, and disappeared only after passage of the National Labor Relations legislation in the 1940s. Thirty-five people were killed and hundreds wounded in the Carnegie Steel plant strike at Homestead, Pennsylvania, in July of 1892. During the Pullman strike in June and July of 1894, sixteen-thousand federal troops were called out to control the disorders which, starting in Illinois, spread out over the country from Indiana to California.

The sixth cycle, the anti-Negro riots before, during, and after World War I, were perhaps the bloodiest and cruelest of the series. In East Saint Louis and Chicago, and elsewhere, while policemen stood by and National Guardsmen joined in the attack, whites viciously assailed Negroes, clubbing, shooting, and hanging any black person they could catch. As in the West Coast anti-Chinese disturbances, racism combined with economic fears, and whites tried to drive black men, women, and children out of the neighborhood, out of the city, out of their way.

Since 1964 we have been engaged in the seventh cycle of disorders, involving black people seeking control of their ghetto communities, and young people seeking more control over their own lives in their college communities. Although there has been less violence in this seventh cycle, fewer deaths and fewer injuries, the same themes of injustice, protest, and backlash which made themselves felt in the previous cycles are apparent in the current sequence. Has the substance of this protest varied over the years, or has the underlying problem remained the same, despite its different manifestations? If we are to be concerned with the conditions governing the outbreak of collective disorder, this is an extremely important question.

The evidence would seem to suggest that all the riot cycles have been correlated with a chronic social conflict, a basic flaw in the social structure of the United States. In a previous communication,¹ I described this strain as the incompatibility between our democratic ideals and our authoritarian practices. The rights of man, the equality among peoples, and the principle of representative government, the main items in the democratic ideology, have from the time of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 been pitted against an all-encompassing but largely masked authoritarianism modeled after the European social sys-

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tems that the American Revolution was presumed to have overthrown. This concealed hierarchical structure of power has been maintained in two ways: (1) by the principle of exclusion of social groups from the decision-making process; and (2) by the operation of pyramidal, bureaucratic structures with power centered at the top of the pyramid.

At the time of its formation, the American system of government was limited by six principles of inclusion and exclusion. Let us call this the WAMPAM structure of the social system. In order to have access to power one had to be:

1. White, excluding all who were red, yellow, or black;
2. Anglo-Saxon or of some closely related national background, excluding the Irish, the southern and central Europeans, and those from the Middle and Far East;
3. Middle-class or better, excluding the working class and the poor;
4. Protestant in religion, excluding all Catholics, Moslems, and Jews;
5. an Adult, excluding all children and youths from the decision-making process; and
6. a member of the Male sex, excluding all females of whatever color, religion, or national background.

This was the political and social structure of our republic. Whether a system so elitist in form and function could be called a democracy is doubtful. From the beginning, these six structural principles were under attack from both sides—by the “reconstructivists” who wanted to broaden them, and by the “nativists” who thought they were already too broad. All the riot cycles, including the present one, can be correlated with attempts by one or another excluded group to penetrate the elitist barrier in order to be admitted to the seats of power. In Shays’s Rebellion, the poor began their struggle, one that has not yet been wholly successful. The anti-Catholic riots were meant to discourage the Irish from their bid for power, feeble as it was during the 1840s. In the Civil War Draft Riots the poor and the Irish joined forces to limit the power of the wealthier Protestant establishment over the conscription issue. And so it went for the orientals in California, for labor organizations all over the industrial north, and for black people in both the north and the south. A relatively weak reconstructivist effort to enter the system was almost invariably met by a powerful and violent nativist effort to keep them out. With the single exception of the Draft Riots, a more complicated case in any event, reconstructivists have directed their violence mainly against property, such as buildings, equipment, and machinery. Nativists, on the other hand, have tended to

direct their violence against persons, quite often in the form of frenzied and bloody massacres. Nativists have consistently held that the reconstructivists "provoked" the violence, usually through nonviolent demonstrations and protests, which were conveniently found to be illegal or simply annoying.

Although particular reconstructivist efforts have been successful, they have not succeeded in changing the system. Irish and Italians, Jews and Catholics have been admitted into the power structures in ever greater numbers. Still, the reconstructivists of one season become the nativists of the next. Irish-Catholics, Jews, and members of labor unions, forgetting the bitter struggles of their past, now resent the efforts of the poor, the blacks, and the youth to enter the system and make their claim for power. The familiar objections of the past are leveled at each new group knocking loudly at the elitist barrier with their ever-present "demands." They are seen as upstarts, as unintelligent, unmotivated, lazy, untrainable, unmannerly, uncouth, and, above all, undeserving. The stamp of inferiority is pressed upon them, softened, to be sure, by humanitarian kindness, Christian forbearance, or therapeutic understanding. But to the excluded, a patronizing charity is little better, and may well be worse, than a last-ditch rejection.

This description may have been slightly overstated. Not all reconstructivists have turned nativistic after entering the system. There have always been some who, after having climbed the upper rungs of the social ladder, stretched down their hands to help those at the bottom of the heap, sometimes at considerable risk to their own positions. But such rescue operations, even when successful, have not changed the vertically stratified structure of the social system. They seem mainly to add new rungs at the bottom of the ladder.

When considering the conversion of reconstructivists into nativists in a previous publication,² I asked why such a transformation should take place. What psychological mechanisms, other than identification with the aggressor, could account for such a seemingly radical change? Before their penetration into the system, reconstructivists of whatever historical epoch have usually been interested in adding their own cultural forms—their art, their speech patterns, their national heroes, and holidays—to the native American stock of culture patterns. Such efforts have always been strongly resisted by the nativists. To them, a broadening of this sort has meant a weakening, an introduction of un-American clannishness, at the least, corrupting of the moral fiber of the country and, at the most, threatening a "take-over" of the entire nation. Thus, in the 1840s, rumors were propagated by the Native American

party that the Catholic church, including the pope, was planning to take over the country. In the 1890s, and again in the early 1920s, radical labor leaders—*anarchists, syndicalists, socialists, or Communists*—were represented as planning the take-over. Today, radical youth and extremist student leaders are reported to be planning the destruction of the country in order to seize power. Let us grant that in the minds of a few revolutionaries these have been serious goals. Still, revolutionary or drastic change has never been a serious threat in our country. Therefore, we must ask: how is it that, having had firsthand experience with the unrealistic nature of nativist fears, newly arrived reconstructivists can so quickly internalize these apocalyptic fantasies and direct them at the newest ranks of dissatisfied outcasts?

After much discussion and thought about this question, I have concluded that it has probably been wrongly posed. Rather than assuming that a change takes place, would we not be more correct to assume no change at all? On this view, reconstructivists have all along only wanted "a piece of the action," as it is phrased today. They have wished to penetrate the system but not to change it. In the process, to be sure, they have wanted to bring parts of their culture along, while dropping or attenuating other parts. But, in the main, they have wanted to become as Americanized as possible as quickly as possible, to be given the chance of "making it" within the system as they have found it. This would imply an easy acceptance, once entry was gained, of both the democratic ideological disguise and the authoritarian realities of the social system. If this is true, their protest all along was directed, not at the elitist system *per se*, but at their own exclusion from it.

If the foregoing analysis is correct, then our initial question concerning the conditions governing the outbreak of collective violence becomes extremely poignant. Large-scale civil disorder, it now appears, will erupt whenever a group in an excluded category makes its historically appropriate bid for entry into the elitist system. There are, of course, particular determining conditions governing the local outbreaks of rioting. These have been dealt with in the Kerner Commission Report and in previous publications from the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence. But, in general, the environmental contingencies associated with the violence arise from the clash between a determined reconstructivist campaign and an equally determined nativist resistance. Since the resulting cycles of disorder produce no change in the underlying social conflict, their recurrence is inevitable. Given our open immigration policy, to omit, for the moment, the almost intractable problem of color, new ethnic and national groups will continue to obtain

a foothold in this country, to undergo exclusion and inferiorization, and, eventually, to initiate a new cycle of disorder. There would seem to be no solution.

Recently, however, as if in response to such a pessimistic conclusion, various groups have pointed with increasing urgency to the need for dealing with the underlying social conflict. It is being suggested that what is usually talked about as social change, even rapid social change, is in fact an example of "Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose." For the most part, suggestions for real rather than delusory change are concerned with the need for remodeling the social and political structures which support the elitist system. While such a restructuring is of the greatest importance, current blueprints being offered for this purpose suffer from a certain vagueness combined with angry denunciations of the status quo. The New Left and militant student groups appear more certain about what is wrong than how to make things better.

ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT OF VALUES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

It seems quite possible that the predominantly negative tone and the absence of positive models of change may be due to the neglect of the impact of cultural values on the very structures which need changing. The work of sociologists and cultural anthropologists has produced fairly convincing evidence that cultural value orientations and social institutions have reciprocal effects upon each other. Studies on family structure and function, which I have carried out with Florence Kluckhohn, using her theory of variations in value orientations, have demonstrated the importance of these interrelationships to family conflicts. It seems fruitful, therefore, to submit the chronic conflict between democratic and authoritarian values in our society to a more refined value analysis based on the Kluckhohn theoretical approach.

Of the five value-orientation categories included in the Kluckhohn schema, only one, the *relational* orientation will be used, in the interests of saving time. Although the *relational* category is probably of key significance, I must stress that a full discussion of the current social conflict would require reference to all five categories.

The *relational* value category deals with the issues I have discussed under the labels of democratic and authoritarian values but in a more complex fashion. It is concerned with the manner in which group decisions are arrived at and with the ordering of interpersonal relations within the group. Three possible arrangements for group decision making are specified by the theory: the individual, the collateral, and the lineal. Individualism is an arrangement in which each member of the

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group has the right—indeed, the obligation—to state his opinion and the decision is made by a vote of the majority. In the collateral arrangement, effort is directed at reaching group consensus by a decision with which most group members can feel comfortable. In the lineal arrangement, decisions are made by the leader, then handed down through the chain of authority.

The interpersonal aspects of the three arrangements are in harmony with the decision-making process. In lineal structures, each member must know his place in a system of leaders and followers featuring dominance and submission. Strict dependence on the hierarchy of authority is strongly emphasized. In collateral arrangements, group harmony is stressed. Group members are mainly at the same level of importance; but the goals of the group are more important than individual needs or preferences. Individualism accents the importance of each member, of his own goals and needs, of his ability to make decisions by himself and to stand on his own two feet.

The Kluckhohn theory assumes that every culture or subculture ranks the three arrangements in an order of preference in accordance with its institutions. The ranking pattern which is dominantly preferred in the United States is first the individual, second collateral, and third lineal. This pattern has been ascertained in several ways but primarily through the use of questionnaire schedules. It is clearly a value pattern which is easily articulated—a set of preferences closest to conscious awareness. The importance of the individual conforms to the ideal image Americans have of themselves. For certain purposes, however, they will shift to the second-order collateral position—for example, in the case of team sports and in a crisis, when individualism must be subordinated to group goals. The least-preferred lineal position receives short shrift. While he might be necessary in certain situations, most Americans resent a boss who acts too bossy; and their sympathies tend to lie with those who have to take rather than give orders.

Although there are many subcultural groups which vary from this pattern of relational values, there is no doubt about its stability for the nation as a whole when respondents are asked to make verbal choices between alternatives. How then are we to reconcile this pattern, especially its antiauthoritarian implications, with the authoritarian practices and the hierarchy of power which we noted earlier?

The first answer which suggests itself is that this value pattern conforms to the official, democratic ideology of the nation. It corresponds to the well-advertised American way of life, a view that has been drilled into us from early childhood. Since it is so strongly held among our

ego ideals, we tend to screen out selectively, to repress, or to dismiss most evidences to the contrary in our national affairs or everyday experience. As a result, we are forced to falsify our own experiences and thus to maintain the hypocrisy which the young, who are not yet committed to inauthenticity, so easily spot in adult behavior. Furthermore, this official pattern of values receives just enough valid support in middle-class styles of life, particularly within the family, so that it is not wholly lacking in substance. Thus we can afford, it seems, though at considerable psychological cost, to shut our eyes to the entrenched lineality that characterizes our political institutions, our universities and hospitals, our business and commercial establishments, and our conduct of foreign affairs.

But there is a more subtle and more unconscious fashion in which the discrepancy between ideology and reality is obscured. Individualism was first installed as a national value during the Revolutionary War in order to rationalize the declaration of independence from the Crown. "All men are created equal," said Thomas Jefferson, and "are endowed with certain inalienable rights." Among those rights were life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. To justify the obtaining of liberty, individualism had to be elevated into the highest position, while lineality, which would have required loyalty to the king, had to be reduced. Collaterality, the value principle that united the colonies in common effort, was hardly mentioned in Jefferson's eloquent prose. The struggle was between tyranny—that is, lineality—and liberty—that is, individualism.

The value goals of the Founding Fathers were valid for their time. But the formula of freedom versus tyranny in the absence of a strong collateral value orientation too easily becomes a mask for the perpetuation of tyranny. Almost every would-be dictator, from Hitler and Mussolini to Father Coughlin and Huey Long, has used the language of freedom to obtain power. Freedom from something—from the conqueror, from the sense of inferiority, from want, from lawlessness—becomes the slogan to rationalize the seizing of power for the purpose of subjugating someone else. Identification with the oppressor perpetuates the authoritarianism of the fighter for freedom. The lineal principle, the unconscious or concealed endorsement of authoritarianism, persists behind the mask of individualism. The institutions established in the name of freedom embody, for the most part, the hierarchical structuring of authority. Thus it seems fair to say that the *operative* pattern of relational preferences consists of, first, the individual; second, the lineal; and third, collateral. This is, of course, in conflict with

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the officially acknowledged, or *ideal* ranking pattern: individualism first, collateral second, and lineal third. It is the inconsistency between the ideal and operative pattern that generates the strain in the system.

It has been said that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. Vigilance against tyranny, of course. But this saying misses the mark. It seems more likely that any price-mark attached to liberty would have to be labeled "collaterality." Angry demands for the rights of an individual, or a group, would not be necessary if social structures were arranged horizontally rather than vertically—if all were in the same boat, on the same level. In the presence of pyramidal power structures, neither vigilance nor protest can do much to preserve freedom. The most that can be accomplished is the effecting of "deals" and "trade-offs" between the power structures—the formation of temporary coalitions which gain a measure of freedom for participating groups. This is the "wheeling and dealing" which runs straight through our political and commercial life. The saying, "You can't fight City Hall," may or may not be true—truer in Chicago, for example, than in New York—but it illustrates the impenetrability of the pyramidal power structure.

The remedy, at the level of cultural value orientations, would seem, then, to consist of a rearrangement of the operative value priorities. Collateral values will have to be given preference over lineality, in action, in the actual performance of our institutions, so that the operative pattern conforms to the ideal pattern. This requirement is hardly a new thought. The United Nations, the One World movement, the slogans "Participating Democracy" and "Community Control"—to say nothing of time-honored appeals to the brotherhood of man—all represent structural rearrangements based on the collateral principle. However, there may be something to be gained by spelling out the needed direction of change in value terms. At the least, this approach can provide a test for determining whether a proposed change really meets the need. Beyond this, it may provide a steady image for the mobilization of the energy required to effect change.

I raised the question earlier of whether research can provide us with the information needed to determine directions of social change. If the above analysis is correct, then we can give a positive answer to the question. I also questioned whether behavioral research could have something to say about the techniques of change—especially on the score of nonviolent as opposed to violent techniques. This still seems to me more problematical. Any determined effort to remodel our social structures in the promoting of collaterality over lineality will meet strong resistance. It will be called "Collectivism" among many other

epithets. Those who propose it will be perceived by many, particularly the nativists, as un-American. Still, collateral structures may contain the resistance by their inclusion of their opponents in the collateral group. This possibility must be put aside for more study. For the moment, it is sufficient if we have been able to throw some light on the environmental conditions which give rise to outbreaks of collective violence. How to change those conditions must remain a problem for the future.

NOTES

1. John P. Spiegel, "Psychosocial Factors in Riots—Old and New," *American Journal of Psychiatry* 125 (1968): 281-85.
2. *Ibid.*