RELIGION AND THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS: COMMON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION

by June K. Singer

Whether psychologists choose to orient their research toward investigating phenomena arising from observable sources or from hidden ones, the reality of unconscious motivation as a psychological factor and a frequent determinant of behavior is generally accepted. Since the unconscious *is unconscious,* all remarks which are made concerning it are necessarily the results of inferences and interpretations made from empirical observations. We can never observe the unconscious directly, not even in dreams, for all we remember of dreams is what has crossed a hypothetical threshold between the unconscious and consciousness. The sure knowledge we have that there is more to the dream than is remembered is a personally felt experience of the unconscious. While a dream fragment cannot be proved to be part of a whole, few people would deny it. In my own experience as an analyst, I have observed how patients often bring a dream into their session almost apologetically, saying that only a bit is remembered, but, as they begin to speak about it, they become aware of more than they had thought they had recalled. Their reaction to this is a mixture of relief at recapturing what they felt they had possessed but had lost, and pleasure in being able to achieve a feeling of harmony between what they knew directly and immediately, and what they later were able to perceive and to report.

Yet many who call themselves scientists are hesitant to explore the elements which exist but cannot be perceived directly, and which cannot be quantified. They are uneasy with holistic conceptions and restrict themselves to what they feel they can, potentially at least, predict and control. They do not dare, with William Blake

> To see a World in a Grain of Sand
> And Heaven in a Wild Flower
> Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
> And Eternity in an hour.[1]

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They retreat from considerations of religion, leaving the ultimate questions to others, saying, "such things are beyond my field of competence." The experimental psychologist as a rule likes to feel that the research tools he has devised are adequate to the task he has set for himself or, more likely, to the task that has been assigned him. He believes that intuitions and feelings are something less than acceptable instruments for objective investigation, although he may grudgingly admit that they may have their place in intiating conceptualizations of problems and suggesting avenues of approach. The willingness of Swiss psychiatrist C. G. Jung to accept such inner or subjective criteria as valid tools for research has been the basis for some of his germinal ideas; it has also been the basis for much of the criticism that has been directed against him by contemporary psychologists.

Of all the concepts advanced by Jung, probably the one which has most discouraged behavioral scientists from further investigation of his theoretical formulations has been that of the "collective unconscious." This layer of murky awareness of truths which have yet to be discovered goes beyond any unconscious contents belonging to the individual and deriving from his past experience. It is a deeper layer of the unconscious, shared in and participated in by all mankind.

Intuition Implies the Concept of an "Unconscious"

When a theoretical physicist came to me for psychological treatment recently, I asked him to tell me a little about the work in which he was currently involved, inasmuch as I was painfully aware of my naïveté in his field. He patiently explained to me about his investigations of "elementary particles" which are observed by studying photographs which have been made of traces of the collisions of these particles within a container filled with liquid hydrogen. These collisions are the basis of all events in the universe, he said. He described how the effects of the collisions are plotted on frequency curves by the experimental researchers, providing thereby the data upon which theoretical physicists then do their work of generating explanatory hypotheses. I asked him whether the data received from the experimental scientists were the only raw material from which the hypotheses were generated, or if the theoreticians experienced intuitions which also contributed to the hypotheses. He agreed that intuition was an essential part of the search for knowledge—that is, that there are two kinds of data, that which comes from the world outside and that which origi-

nates within the individual. Another way of saying it is that there are two ways of knowing, the direct knowing which is a priori and becomes conscious without any intermediary, and the conclusion which comes later, nearly as a proof of what was already known, or as a proof that what was intuited was true enough but had been insufficiently tested or incompletely understood.

I asked him if this did not border on the philosophy of physics. He replied that the philosophy of physics is in the unconscious of the physicist. The unconscious, he said, is the soul of physics; while the physicist works on one hand with his intellect in examining external data, he is on the other hand working with his soul, comparing the results of experiments with "data" which seem to originate within himself. I then asked him the question which had been forming in my thought throughout the long discussion which I am abbreviating here, as I was realizing more and more that the elementary particles with which he had been dealing were in the nature of "ultimate things." The question was this: "I have noticed that physicists are willing to speak of the soul these days in all seriousness and without embarrassment, while among psychologists only the humanists speak of the soul and then with some reluctance, and the theologians hardly speak of the soul at all any more—how would you explain this?"

"Because it is the physicists who are working directly with God," he replied.

This physicist is representative, I believe, of those scientists who stand today at an opposite pole from the liberal Christian theologian who has come under the influence of the philosophical formulations of Husserl, Heidegger, and other existentialists. In their rejection of the nonmaterial aspects of reality, the existentialist theologians accept without question the basic theory of knowledge advanced by Aristotle and refined through Descartes—the theory that man knows experience only through the senses. This leads to the monistic position that there is no reality other than consciously received experience. The basic dualistic theory of knowledge of Plato, Jesus, and the church fathers is rejected without even the slightest consideration.

Kelsey, in an article in *Christian Century*,[2] remarks that it is noteworthy how few members of the scientific community are touched by existentialism. The reflective scientist knows that both knowledge *and* the knower are real and that one's knowledge of both increases in depth with new data. The philosophy of science which is formulating the scientific methods of today into a system of thought is producing some mature thinking which is quite at variance with that of existen-

tialism. Kelsey asserts that today's scientists are much closer to the thinking of C. G. Jung than are many theologians.

In his psychological studies, Jung laid a sound base for an understanding of religious experience. He saw it as an archetypal experience, that is, as a form of experience common to all men and in all ages, although the expressions of it may have the greatest variation in content. Thus the religious experience has its roots in the collective unconscious and is nurtured by the totality of man's collective experience, as well as being shaped and impressed by the custom and tradition into which it emerges.

The Nature of the Collective Unconscious

The collective unconscious, as Jung conceived it, does not derive from personal experience but precedes the individual in time. It is not ontogenetically acquired, but is the basis of all learning. It is not individual, but universal, carrying the traces of the entire evolution of the species. Thus the collective unconscious is in principle identical in all men and constitutes a common substratum of a suprapersonal nature which is present in all men.[3] Jung's thesis is as follows:

> In addition to our immediate consciousness, which is of a thoroughly personal nature and which we believe to be the only empirical psyche (even if we tack on the personal unconscious as an appendix), there exists a second psychic system of a collective, universal, and impersonal nature which is identical in all individuals. This collective unconscious does not develop individually, but is inherited. It consists of pre-existent *forms*, the archetypes, which can only become conscious secondarily and which give definite form to certain psychic contents.[4]

Form and contents.—The failure to distinguish between these two is probably the source of most of the confusion about the archetypes of the collective unconscious. When Jung writes about "forms" being inherited, he is not referring to specific modes of behavior, or to images which may be perceived, or even to mythologies. Modes of worship, religious images, and myths all have individual and social characteristics; they vary with different cultural settings and even among individuals in those settings. These variations are the product of environmental influences interacting with the elemental genetic structure of the psyche.

How the concept of the collective unconscious is misunderstood by important contemporary anthropologists is illustrated in a discussion in "The Logic of Totemic Classifications,"[5] where Lévi-Strauss described the way a very simple structure such as the concept of opposites recurs over and over again among different primitive groups, and in-

deed among all peoples. He compares the color symbolism among the Luvale of Rhodesia and some Australian tribes of the northeast of the state of South Australia. In the Australian tribes, he reports, the members of the matrilineal moiety of the deceased paint themselves with red ochre and approach the body, while the members of the other moiety paint themselves with white clay and remain at a distance from it. The Luvale use red and white soil also, but they use white in connection with offerings to ancestral spirits and red clay is substituted on the occasion of puberty rites because red is for them the color of life and fertility.[6] White represents the "unstressed" situation in both cases, while red—the chromatic pole of opposition—is associated with death in one case and with life in the other. From observations such as this, Lévi-Strauss concludes:

> It seems to be possible to dispose of theories making use of the concepts of "archetypes" or a "collective unconscious." It is only forms and not contents which can be common. If there are common contents the reason must be sought either in the objective properties of particular nature or artificial entities or in diffusion and borrowing, in either case, that is, outside the mind.[7]

Lévi-Strauss does the theory of Jung a disservice by confusing the archetype, which is pure form, with its content which appears as specific examples of tradition, myth, and behavior. The following passage from Jung would have made this point clear:

> Again and again I encounter the mistaken notion that an archetype is determined in regard to its content, in other words that it is a kind of unconscious idea (if such an expression be admissible). It is necessary to point out once more that archetypes are not determined as regards their content, but only as regards their form and then only to a very limited degree. A primordial image is determined as to its content only when it has become conscious and is therefore filled out with the material of conscious experience. . . . The archetype in itself is empty and purely formal, nothing but a *facultas praeformandi*, a possibility of representation which is given *a priori*. The representations themselves are not inherited, only the forms, and in that respect they correspond in every way to the instincts, which are also determined in form only. The existence of the instincts can no more be proved than the existence of the archetypes, so long as they do not manifest themselves concretely.[8]

Lévi-Strauss, whether he acknowledges the fact or not, distinguishes at least two specific elements of the psyche, or as he calls it, the universal *"esprit humaine"*—two elements which in Jungian terms would be called "archetypal." These are *mind* and *language*.[9] Lévi-Strauss describes the qualities of mind and language as not only universal (all men have the intellectual capacity to make and use symbols, and all languages exhibit universal features) but unconscious as well (men do

not *know* the universal rules of language, but any particular language nevertheless constitutes a concrete universal). It is not Jung now, but the American anthropologist Scholte[10] who tells us that "the assumption that structures of the human mind are unconscious and generic, universal and invariable, is of critical importance." He notes that this assumption allows Lévi-Strauss to interpret conscious and variable human events and particular historical cultural institutions as conscious expressions of a more fundamental unconscious reality. Lévi-Strauss then concludes from this that, if we recall the attributes of the human mind itself, these unconscious structures are not merely the same for all men and for all materials to which their function is applied, but they are also few in number. Hence the world of "mind" and "language" is infinitely diverse with respect to its content, but always limited in its laws.

The reality of an inherent psychological structure containing forms, such as "mind" and "language," capable of producing specific ideas and images, should be no more difficult to accept than the reality of a neurological structure called a brain which is capable of producing instances of behavior. Both are products of evolution and are no more contradictory as attributes of man than are head and hands. It is, indeed, the *psychological* structure which makes it possible for the data received by the neurological system to be interpreted.

It should be made clear that when we speak of the "psyche" or of "psychological structures" or even of "soul," there is no implication that we are creating a dualistic system in which mind and matter are opposed to one another. It is rather my intent, in this article, to posit the psyche as an organism which is endowed with the capacity for self-awareness, for communicating the nature of this self-awareness, and for behaving in accordance with consequences which can be expected on the basis of this self-awareness.

The psyche, in Jung's formulation, incorporates three factors: (1) *consciousness,* which includes the ego—or man as he knows himself, plus whatever else is within his awareness at a given time; (2) *the personal unconscious,* which is not ordinarily in awareness, but is nevertheless somehow related to an individual's experience; and (3) *the collective unconscious,* which, with its archetypal forms was conceived by Jung to be the base upon which all cultures are built. In itself it is a distinctive feature of *Homo sapiens.* It is unique in man, just as certain features are peculiarly characteristic of other biological species.

Long before modern zoologists investigated experimentally the ap-

parently innate or imprinted characteristics of specific animals, the poet intuitively recognized their presence and asked:

> With what sense is it that the chicken shuns the
> rav'nous hawk?
> With what sense does the tame pigeon measure out
> the expanse?
> With what sense does the bee form cells? have not
> the mouse & frog
> Eyes and ears and sense of touch? yet are their
> habitations
> And their pursuits as different as their forms and
> as their joys.
> Ask the wild ass why he refuses burdens, and the
> meek camel
> Why he loves man: is it because of eye, ear, mouth,
> or skin,
> Or breathing nostrils? No, for these the wolf and
> tyger have.
> Ask the blind worm the secrets of the grave, and
> why her spires
> Love to curl round the bones of death; and ask the
> rav'nous snake
> Where she gets poison, & the winged eagle why he
> loves the sun;
> And then tell me the thoughts of man, that have
> been hid of old.[11]

Such "innate" senses, each common to its own species, have been recently documented by research on the phylogenetic adaptations of various animals. A number of popular motion pictures have shown the phenomenon of the laying and hatching of eggs of the sea turtle. The female comes out of the water, and finds a point on the beach safely above the tide lines. There she digs a hole and deposits hundreds of eggs, covers the nest, and returns to the sea. Eighteen days later a small army of tiny turtles comes flipping through the sand and unerringly makes for the waves as fast as possible before the gulls overhead can dip low enough to pick the little ones off. Campbell,[12] in describing this scene, observes that no more vivid representation could be desired of the spontaneity of the quest for the not-yet-seen. There is no opportunity here for trial and error, nor is there a question of fear. The tiny turtles know that they must hurry, and they know how to do it. Evidently they know where they are going, too, and that when they get there they must swim; and they know how to do that immediately as they reach the water.

THE BIOLOGICAL RATIONALE FOR "INNATE KNOWLEDGE"

Students of animal behavior have coined the term "innate releasing mechanism" (IRM) to designate the inherited structure in the nervous system that enables an animal to respond in a predetermined way to a circumstance never experienced before. Chicks with their eggshells still adhering to their tails dart for cover when a hawk flies overhead, but not when the bird is a gull, duck, heron, or pigeon. Furthermore, if the wooden model of a hawk is drawn over their coop on a wire they react as though it were alive—unless it be drawn backward, when there is no response.[13]

Tinbergen,[14] who has given particular attention to the problem of animal learning, has shown that, not only do differing species have different dispositions to learn, but that such innate dispositions come to maturity only in certain critical periods of the animal's growth. He writes about the Eskimo dogs of east Greenland, living in packs of five to ten individuals. The members of a pack defend their group territory against all other dogs. All dogs of an Eskimo settlement have an exact knowledge of the limits of their territories and where attacks from other packs may be feared. Immature dogs, however, do not defend the territory. They often roam through the whole settlement, sometimes trespassing into other territories from which they are promptly chased away. In spite of frequent attacks during which they may be severely hurt, they do not learn their territorial boundaries, and in this respect they seem amazingly stupid to the observer. When the young dogs are growing sexually mature, however, they begin to learn the extent of the other territories and within a week their trespassing forays are over. In two male dogs the first copulation, the first defense of territory, and the first avoidance of strange territory, all occurred within one week.

Ginsburg raises the question whether applications from these animal studies to the behavior of humans are justified. He points out that while direct comparisons cannot be made, the analogies are obvious. Our own nervous systems, although overlaid with layers of new developments that are uniquely human, incorporate many of the primitive systems of our vertebrate-mammalian ancestry as well. One hypothesis is that major evolutionary breakthroughs depend upon a great deal of genetic variability in the systems affected. This is necessary so that selection can act on such variability and, teleologically speaking, select the best "model." We have already mentioned "releasers" (IRM) involved in the behavior of lower vertebrates. Evolution, according to

this notion, has resulted in the production of special structures and movements capable of eliciting appropriate responses resulting in a chain of adaptive behaviors. Releasers can be analyzed and compared, and there is even a phylogeny of releasers.

Ginsburg goes on to say that the adaptive value of such mechanisms is evident. It permits appropriate individuals to recognize each other as mates. It permits parents to signal to young. It permits other "socially integrating" messages to be transmitted. Even highly abstract models of structures and movements have been found to be serving as releasers retaining the meaning of the originals in terms of their ability to induce appropriate behavior in a responding organism. "What is interesting is that a phylogeny of such releasers amounts to a phylogeny of symbolic behavior and indicates an innate capacity of vertebrates to derive meaning from abstract symbols."[15]

Innate Knowledge in Humans is "Archetypal"

Jung suggests that if lower vertebrates are possessed of phylogenetically determined repertoires of symbolic behaviors, it is possible similarly to assume capacities for specific forms of symbolic behavior on the level of psychological functioning in humans. In his view, it is a great mistake to suppose that the psychological structure of a newborn child is a *tabula rasa,* in the sense that there is absolutely nothing inherent in it. He asserts that, insofar as the child is born with a differentiated brain genetically determined and therefore individualized, sensory stimuli from outside are met not with just *any* responses, but with *specific* ones; this necessarily results in a particular, individual choice and pattern of apperception. These aptitudes can be shown to be inherited instincts and preformed patterns, the latter being the a priori and formal conditions of apperception based on instinct. They are what Jung calls the "archetypes." Their presence gives the world of the child and of the dreamer its anthropomorphic stamp. "It is not, therefore, a question of inherited *ideas,* but of inherited *possibilities* of ideas."[16] Nor are these possibilities of ideas individual acquisitions but they are, in the main, common to all, as can be seen from their universal occurrence.

Historical Basis for the "Archetype"

Jung states that "archetype" is an explanatory paraphrase of the Platonic "idea" of which all existent things are imitations. For his purposes, the term is apposite and helpful because it tells us that so far as the collective unconscious contents are concerned we are dealing

with archaic or primordial types, that is, with universal images which have existed since prehistoric times.[17] In the products of fantasy the primordial images are made visible, and it is here that the concept of the archetype finds its specific application, says Jung. He credits Plato with being the first to have pointed this out.[18]

The concept of the archetype, then, refers to the existence of definite forms in the psyche which seem to be present always and everywhere. Mythological research identifies them as "motifs," and in the field of comparative religion Hubert and Mauss name them "categories of the imagination."[19] The anthropologist Adolf Bastian, as early as 1869, called them "elementary" or "primordial" thoughts.[20] Jung writes that from these references it should be clear that his idea of "the archetype—literally a pre-existent form—does not stand alone but is something that is recognized and named in other fields of knowledge."[21] In geometry they are "theorems," in literature "themes," and in chemistry "elements," etc.

Jung sees instincts as very close analogues to the archetypes; so close, in fact, that "there is good reason for supposing that the archetypes are the unconscious images of the instincts themselves, or patterns of instinctual behavior. Thus the hypothesis of the collective unconscious is no more daring to assume than that of the instincts."[22] Since Jung wrote these words in the essay "The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious" in 1934, the concept of "instincts" has gone out of fashion in psychological circles, to be replaced successively by "drives," "needs," and, more recently, "motivational determinants." In all cases these factors seem to precede any response associated with learning. If we can establish that our imagination, perceptions, and thinking may be influenced to some degree by inborn and formal elements which are universally present, it will follow that the concept of the collective unconscious is neither a speculative nor a philosophical matter, but an empirical one. But this is not such an easy task. How difficult it is to ascertain that the products of the unconscious, such as dreams for example, could not just as well have been derived from the residue of daily experience, or that religious yearnings, prayer, devotion, and a sense of awe are no more than socially induced modes of behavior, or that novel ideas which seem to be completely spontaneous with the subject may not be altogether the result of acquisitions through language or education. Even though the depth psychologist may find enough individual instances showing the autochthonous revival of mythological motifs in religious liturgy, dreams, and patterns of everyday behavior to put the matter beyond any reasonable doubt, other

psychologists remain who reject the concept of the innate being recognizable among the decisive factors in behavior. Why do so many psychologists exclude this possibility?

Lorenz,[23] while holding to the conviction that behavior contains two types of elements more or less distinguishable (the "learned" behavior and behavior which is not learned), hesitates to refer to the latter as "innate." His reason is that learned behavior is ontogenetically adaptive, that is, it is subject to change during the lifetime of the individual as a result of interaction between environmental forces and the intrinsic nature of the individual. The species, however, he regards as being phylogenetically adaptive, that is, entire species over the long course of evolution have become modified in the process of adaptation to environmental factors. What appears to be innate in the infant of today is different from what it was hundreds of millennia ago before the phylogenetic adaptations took place. Thus it is possible to counter the assertion that the concept of "innate" elements of behavior would not allow for adaptive changes of the species over the ages. For purposes of studying contemporary psychology, however, it is admissible to speak of innate elements underlying the behavior of individual human beings, in the sense that such elements have been phylogenetically adapted.

With this qualification in mind, it will be interesting to consider the attitude of this versatile Viennese physician-zoologist whose research in comparative psychology and ethology is well known. Lorenz opposes the view currently subscribed to by most behavioral scientists that animal and human behavior is predominantly reactive to stimuli external to the organism and that, even if it contains any innate elements at all, it can be altered to an unlimited extent by learning. He asserts that this view comes from a radical misunderstanding of certain democratic principles: "It is utterly at variance with these principles to admit that human beings are not born equal and that not all have equal chances of becoming ideal citizens."[24] Moreover, he writes that for many decades the reaction—the "reflex"—represented the only element of behavior studied by serious psychologists, while all "spontaneity" of animal behavior was left to the "vitalists," the mystically inclined observers of nature. Lorenz reminds us that the central nervous system does not need to wait for stimuli before it can respond like an electric bell with a push-button, but it can itself produce stimuli which give a natural, physiological explanation for the "spontaneous" behavior of animals and humans. This idea has found recognition only in the last decades, through the work of Adrian, Paul Weiss,

Kenneth Roeder, and above all Erich von Holst. That heated and emotional debates took place before the endogenous production of stimuli within the central nervous system became generally recognized by the science of physiology, plainly shows the strength of the ideological prejudices involved.[25]

Three theoretical attitudes toward the concept of the "innate" are examined by Lorenz;[26] in the process he turns up some evidence of serious logical and biological fallacies. He takes the position that most American psychologists (whom for brevity's sake and with some admitted incorrectness he subsumes under the concept of "behaviorists") maintain that the "dichotomy" of behavior into innate and learned elements is "not analytically valid." The statement is based on two arguments. The first asserts that the dichotomy is not a real one, since until now the only definition of the "innate" has been "that which is not learned," and vice versa. Hebb writes, "The identity of factors only identified by exclusion must be strongly doubted," and, "I strongly urge that there are not two kinds of factors determining animal behavior and that the term 'instinct' is completely misleading, as it implies a nervous process or mechanism which is independent of environmental factors and different from those nervous processes into which learning enters."[27]

The second argument, advanced by Lehrmann, contends that even if we cannot entirely rule out the existence of behavior elements independent of learning, the concept of innate behavior is without heuristic value because it will never be practically possible to exclude the contingency of learning in the early ontogenetic processes in the egg or *in utero,* which are inaccessible to observation.[28]

Tinbergen, as we have seen, along with a number of other modern ethologists, takes an attitude clearly distinct from that of the behaviorists, although somewhat similar superficially. Although they have dropped the term "innate" for the terminological reasons already mentioned, they are ready to accept the existence of two entirely different mechanisms affecting the adaptation of behavior—the process of phylogeny which evolves behavior (as well as any other structural and functional organization), and the processes of adaptive modification of behavior during the individual's life. In spite of their agreement on principle with this "dichotomy," these scientists take the attitude that practically all behavior, down to its smallest units, owes its adaptedness to *both* of the above adaptive processes. Thus, in their view, the types of behavior formerly described as "innate" and "learned" represent only two extremes on a continuum where all possible mixtures and blending of the two sources of adaptation can be found.[29]

As a consequence of this attitude, any instance of behavior, however minute, is automatically regarded on principle as being influenced by both factors in achieving adaptation. Therefore it would necessarily be considered hopeless and devoid of sense to attempt to separate phylogenetically and individually adapted characters and properties of behavior, either conceptually or in the course of practical experiments.

The third attitude is that of Lorenz, an attitude which he himself admits is the "most controversial." It rests on the assumption that instinctive and learned behavior "come in chunks" which can be clearly separated from each other as implied by *Instinkt-Dressur-Verschränkung* (intercalation of fixed pattern and learning). On the basis of this assumption, he suggests that the trend in the evolution of behavior in the direction of greater plasticity and increasing influence of learning and insight has to be regarded at least as much a consequence of reduction and disintegration of "innate fixed patterns" as of higher development of those functions of experience which, in the individual's life, affect adaptive modifications of behavior.[30]

It would appear that the term "innate fixed patterns" as described by Lorenz in his analysis of factors contributing to behavior is but the latest addition to the long history of what Jung called "archetypes" and which concept he traced as far back as the Platonic "idea." While Lorenz and other comparative psychologists sought their evidence for these fixed patterns (or archetypal forms) in observing the instincts as revealed through the habitual behaviors of various animal species, including *Homo sapiens,* Jung came upon the problem from another point of view. As a psychiatrist, he had access to the clinical material produced by patients, and not only to typical behavioral patterns but also to typical patterns of thought in individuals. In his practice of psychiatry, with his special interest in analytical psychology, he was able to develop techniques which would bring him into a closer contact with the motivating factors of the personality than a mere superficial observation of behavior was able to provide. As we have seen when we discussed the very inception of Jung's interest in and preoccupation with phenomena emerging from the unconscious, the source of Jung's knowledge of the unconscious was, indeed, the unconscious itself.

The Collective Unconscious as a Common Ground of Science and Religion

It seems to me that Lorenz's hypothesis of *Instinkt-Dressur-Verschränkung* approximates Jung's formulation of the way in which archetypes and their resulting images coexist with the products of experiential learning. As "innate fixed patterns," they give rise to psychological

needs which cannot fully be explained by man's physiology or the demands of his environment. I refer specifically to man's thrust toward spirituality. This important and universal factor, present in every stage of man's history, led Jung away from the theories of Freud, which appeared to him to be too mechanistic. Jung saw man's yearning for some explanation of forces beyond himself (which seemed to have a mysterious order of their own) as an element as innate and basic to his nature as hunger or sex. It is an archetypal need, which manifests itself in the religions of the world. These religions are constructed as an answer to man's search for what he calls "ultimate values." What seems to be needed is a sense of meaning, purposefulness, orientation in terms of some suprapersonal power. There is a desire for security, hope, and vision. These age-old needs arise from the deepest layers of the unconscious psyche.

What these needs have in common is that they all refer to the central value. Meaning is seen in terms of a system of ordering about this center. Purposefulness is behavior directed toward a goal which is central. Orientation is toward a source of abiding strength. Security, hope, and vision all imply that man needs to envisage some constant or central value to which his ego can relate.

Jung has called the central value the Self. He delineates the Self as possessing both immanent and transcendent aspects. As the midpoint of the human personality, uniting consciousness with the unconscious, the Self is supraordinate to the ego (the ego being the center of consciousness only). The Self, as inner guide, serves as reference point for the ego as it comes to terms with its conscious needs, whether these needs originate within the organism or are experienced as environmental demands. The transcendent aspect of the Self has to do with the collective unconscious. On this level the Self is understood as the ordering and guiding power in the cosmos. As such it is mysterious and unfathomable; it cannot be fully grasped by the mind of man, any more than can the collective unconscious.

The archetype of the Self has been the basis of an uncountable number of mythological and religious motifs. As the dwarf, dactyl, or kabiri figures of myth, as Tom Thumb, it is called "bigger than big, smaller than small." Thus the Self appears as the image of man, but it is not man. It has been called the "treasure hard to attain," the "pearl of great price," the "panacea," "the divine child." Jung writes that the archetype of the Self, the supreme value, has been projected throughout history onto the noblest and most awesome of the gods.

The Self is that archetypal factor which produces in man an ability to fashion a deity with more or less anthropomorphic attributes, and

invested with the capacity to fulfill needs which man experiences as "spiritual." Always in the past there have been god-concepts which have comforted man and made him feel safe. These concepts exist whether or not the existence of God is an objective reality. God as objective reality cannot be proved satisfactorily for all men and for all time, but the need for a god-concept and the search for a god-concept is a psychological fact, empirically derived. It is an a priori factor in man's psychological structure, that is, an archetype.

New ideas and new technological developments proceed at a pace which far outdistances man's ability to reconcile them with his archetypal value structures. Consequently, man finds himself involved in the operation of a new technique before its theoretical basis can be tested against either his ethical criteria or his psychological needs. Man's wish for meaning, security, fulfillment, hope, vision, and orientation is not balanced by the faith that these will indeed be realized. In his mad dash toward the materialistic goals of our time, man has destroyed the symmetry between his intrinsic nature and his striving after personal growth.

For these reasons we hear all about us the cry that man feels lost, frightened, impotent, out of control, isolated, directionless. He has lost his connection with the center. For as long as man held fast to his religious myths he could render objective his inner need. He could project it outside himself, and fulfill it through a way of life which was congruent with it. As the old myths are dispelled, the faith is lost—but the archetypal need remains. Thus during the time of the Enlightenment when orthodoxy gave way, Deists found meaning in a God who set into motion a world which then proceeded on its own momentum in an orderly way. Man could trust that. Later, when relations between classes of mankind became impossibly disordered, new social orders were founded, like that of Marxism, with its supposedly foolproof economic planning. The promised utopias did not come to pass, supposedly because of human weaknesses. Man then began to invent machines which were to circumvent human weaknesses. Computers figure faster and remember better than man, and they operate automatic pilots on airplanes that are more dependable than human pilots. Once again a new myth—that of hard science, devoid of human sentiment and feeling, purged of nonrational thought—is now God. His liturgy consists in submitting every event to measurement of one kind or another in order to ascertain whether or not it exists.

Even as the myth of science is elevated to the highest position of respect, there is a countermovement in process among those who have already begun to doubt. "There's a New-Time Religion on Campus,"

writes Andrew M. Greeley as he describes a number of manifestations of the "neo-sacred movement" now observable around the country. These include the study of Asian philosophy, meditation, yoga, Zen, the *I Ching* (a book presenting an ancient Chinese divination device), interest in extrasensory perception, mysticism, magic, and semimonastic cults of people who subsist on vegetarian diets, take vows not to cut their hair, and spend long hours in contemplation. Underlying all this, it seems, are the psychedelic drugs. The interesting thing is that the people who are involved may be a minority group on campus, but they include some of the most intelligent and creative students in the best colleges and universities. Greeley says that the first reason young people give for the return of the sacred is the failure of science. One graduate student is reported as saying: "Let's face it, science is dead. While the newspapers and magazines were giving all the attention to the death of God, science was really the one that was dying."[31]

The death of God had occurred first—for "God" has long been a symbol for an ineffable, unknowable mystery which manifests itself in ways to inspire man with a search for truth, by whatever name he may call it. When the symbol called "God" was reified and circumscribed by a theology which replaced mystery with exegesis and awe with authority, it began to lose the numinous quality which gave it life. When God became man, the shepherds were struck with wonder, but over the centuries the miracle has lost its shock value. When a symbol can no longer express the living experience of the numinosum, it ceases to be alive and meaningful. Jung has written:

> The symbol is alive only in so far as it is pregnant with meaning. But, if its meaning is born out of it, *i.e.*, if that expression should be found which formulates the sought, expected, or divined thing still better than the hitherto accepted symbol, then the symbol is *dead, i.e.*, it possesses only a historical significance.[32]

The numinous power of the symbol, withdrawn by man from his God-concept, was transferred to science. Science became the producer of the miracles, science became the source of healing, man's hope for survival on earth, if not in heaven.

But again in the final third of the twentieth century, man becomes disenchanted. As people had once lost their faith in the living God as represented to them in the traditional church, many are now losing faith in science, having observed how science is often applied in business and industry, and in the production of pollution and war. Although the old symbols of salvation are no longer meaningful to many, there still exists in man that archetypal need to experience the "sacred." A vacuum has been created and into it have rushed the panaceas—drugs

which are said to produce an expansion of consciousness and a host of other efforts to find education with ecstasy, sensory awareness, instant intimacy, and the willingness to trust the stranger.

All of this points to the revolt which is abroad today and which underlies all the other revolutions. It is "the revolt of the diminished man,"[33] reduced to a statistic, manipulated by the indifferent machinery of the efficiency expert and the computer bank, subjected to inhumanity in his cities and in his wars, absolved of responsibility for the conduct of his nation.

The need for a new approach is made clear enough. The world can no longer choose between the traditional Christian form, which creates a split between spirit and matter and elevates spirit, and science which elevates the material. It cannot artificially subordinate the one to the other. It is just as patently false to say that all I can be sure is real is what exists in my own consciousness, as to say that I do not require a concept of consciousness because reality can be described adequately in terms of weights and measures or operations.

We need a new approach to religion which does not occupy itself with trivialities. Religion will not serve us if it continues to concern itself primarily with partisan causes, citing a Higher Authority for whatever axe it has to grind. Religion must return to a concern with ultimate things, and new symbols must be found to express them. The clergyman and the scientist alike will need to address themselves, not only to those aspects of the world which man has hopes of bringing under his control, but also to the *mysterium tremendum* which fascinates him but will forever exceed his grasp. These people have the responsibility to see that man is guided to view himself in relation to the infinite stretches of the cosmos and to recognize that there will always be something beyond his reach. And they must help man to see himself in relation to the elementary particles which are so inconceivably small as to be indivisible.

Man's innate knowledge that he can increase his own capacity for understanding was characterized by Jung as an archetypal phenomenon. Thus the search for meaning, inasmuch as it is shared by all men in all ages, was designated by him as an archetype of the collective unconscious.

NOTES

1. William Blake, "Auguries of Innocence," in *The Complete Writings of William Blake*, ed. Geoffrey Keynes (London: Nonesuch Press; New York: Random House, 1957), p. 431.

2. Morton T. Kelsey, "Is the World View of Jesus Outmoded?" *Christian Century,* January 22, 1969, p. 112–15.
3. C. G. Jung, "Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious," in *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1963), p. 4.
4. Jung, "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious," ibid., p. 42.
5. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 35 ff.
6. C. M. N. White, "Elements in Luvale Beliefs and Rituals," *Rhodes Livingston Papers* 32 (1961): 32.
7. Lévi-Strauss, pp. 64–65.
8. Jung, "Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious," in *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious,* pp. 79–80.
9. According to Lévi-Strauss, language differentiates empirical reality into constituent units; these units are organized into systems of reciprocal relations, and these systems enunciate rules to govern their possible combinations.
10. Bob Scholte, "Epistemic Paradigms: Some Problems in Cross Cultural Research on Social Anthropological History and Theory," *American Anthropologist* 68 (1966): 1193–94.
11. William Blake, "Visions of the Daughters of Albion," in *Complete Writings,* p. 191.
12. Joseph Campbell, *The Masks of God: Primitive Mythology* (New York: Viking Press, 1959), p. 30.
13. Ibid., pp. 30–31.
14. N. Tinbergen, *The Study of Instinct* (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 7–8.
15. Benson E. Ginsburg, "Genetics and Personality," in *Concepts of Personality,* ed. Joseph M. Wepman and Ralph W. Heine (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1963), pp. 74–75.
16. Jung, "Concerning the Archetypes, with Special Reference to the Anima Concept," in *Archetypes,* pp. 66–67.
17. Jung, "Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious," ibid., pp. 4–5.
18. Jung, "Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype," ibid., pp. 78–79.
19. R. Hubert and M. Mauss, "Equisse d'une theorie generale de la magie," *L'Annee sociologique* 7 (1904): 1–146.
20. A. Bastian, *Das Beständige in den Menschenrassen und die Spielweite ihrer Veränderlichkeit* (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1869), p. 88.
21. Jung, "On the Concept of the Archetype," in *Archetypes,* p. 43.
22. Jung, "Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious," ibid., pp. 3–41.
23. Konrad Lorenz, *Evolution and Modification of Behavior* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 101–9.
24. Konrad Lorenz, *On Aggression* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963), p. 51.
25. Ibid.
26. Lorenz, *Evolution and Modification of Behavior,* pp. 3 ff.
27. D. O. Hebb, "Heredity and Environment in Mammalian Behavior," *British Journal of Animal Behavior* 1 (1949): 43–47.
28. D. S. Lehrmann, "A Critique of Konrad Lorenz' Theory of Instinctive Behavior," *Quarterly Review of Biology* 28 (1953): 337–63.
29. Ibid.
30. Lorenz, *Evolution and Modification of Behavior,* p. 5.
31. Andrew M. Greeley, *New York Times Magazine,* June 1, 1969, pp. 15–28.
32. Jung, *Psychological Types* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), p. 602.
33. Archibald MacLeish, "The Revolt of the Diminished Man," *Saturday Review,* June 7, 1969, pp. 16–19, 61.