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THE RELOCATION OF THE GOD-QUESTION

by Philip Hefner

The question of whether God exists and what he is like is a perplexing one for Christian theology. Theologians would like to assert that everyone, whether he knows it or not, is asking the God-question when it is perfectly clear that most men and women in our day are not asking it at all—at least not in a form that is recognizable in terms of the categories we feel most comfortable with. Perhaps the most arcane and least read philosophy and theology is the work of those tackling the God-question head on, asking precisely what the word "God" means, what it refers to, what the linguistic characteristics of God-talk are. As illuminating as this sort of reflection may be at times, it lacks the urgency and meaningfulness that would seem to be a prerequisite for really significant thinking about God. There is something a bit incongruous about the claim that the God-question is the question that burns in the soul of everyman if philosophical and theological reflection about God is esoteric, confined to a few who are in the know, and even tedious to larger groups of men.

TILLICH'S FORMULATION OF THE GOD-QUESTION

Perhaps this sense of the incongruity of much philosophical and theological talk about God accounts for the fact that the most important theologians have not hit the God-question head on as a question all by itself but have rather attempted to show that the question about God underlies the other serious questions that men are concerned about. Paul Tillich was one of the most important recent practitioners of this art

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of posing the God-question. Fundamental to his method was the category of "ultimate concern." Part of Tillich's genius was his ability to interpret and articulate in generally intelligible form the "ultimate concern" that underlay the cultural and personal questioning of man. He was able to lay bare an ultimate concern at the heart of cultural expressions or personal reflections in such a way as to give profound sense to life. Thus, for example, he could apply his own distinctive type of analysis to Picasso's "Guernica" to point to the underlying concern for the abysmal evil and destruction of life that come to expression in the painting. Or, he could apply his tools of reflection to the vast materials of modern psychoanalytic theory, to lift up concerns for the limitless depths of the human psyche or the profundity of guilt or the ceaseless surge toward psychical health and wholeness that must overcome the deadly forces of ambiguity. Or, finally, Tillich could apply his method of analysis to historical epochs—generalizing, for example, that the ancient period of Hellenistic culture was obsessed with the question of how to overcome mortality, even as the Middle Ages were obsessed with the question of guilt and the modern era with the question of alienation and emptiness.

Every question of ultimate concern that Tillich came upon became for him the God-question. His method of correlation brought him to the conclusion that the form of man's questioning after God, as well as the form of God's presence for man, took the shape that was suggested by the questions that grow out of man's ultimate concern. His celebrated maxim, "Culture is the form of religion, religion is the substance of culture," exemplifies his approach to the God-question. Tillich made the decision that the most significant ultimate question that man asks is how his life, under the conditions of existence, can break through the ambiguities, restraints, and distortions of time and space in order to fulfill itself according to the potential that is inherent in human life. As a consequence of this decision, each of the three volumes of his *Systematic Theology* deals with a fundamental aspect of this quest for the fulfillment of existential potentials—in terms that relate to God, Christ, and Spirit. But the important thing to note is that the God-question (which includes the Christ-question and the Spirit-question), for Tillich, lies at the heart of the crucial questions that man asks *as man,* quite apart from overt religious belief or awareness of the God of theologians and philosophers.

There are several objections taken to the kind of methodology of asking the God-question that Tillich represents. For one thing, it does not necessarily speak about God on the basis of the regularly and publicly sanctioned sources of God-knowledge. Tillich and those who

shared his spirit found every product of human culture—individual or societal—a source for God-knowledge. Tillich's amazing appeal outside the church and the theological fraternity is explained, in part, by his ability to interpret art to artists, psychology to psychologists, history to historians, in a way that spoke to them—and all the while he was expounding the God-questions latent within their own work. He could do this with good conscience because he firmly believed that God had raised them as God-fearers and as prophets in an age when the ecclesiastical custodians of the more conventional religious texts had all too often lost their charisma.

This use of cultural sources confused many of Tillich's contemporaries because they saw in it a weakening of the integrity of God's revelation and the traditional modes of talking about God. Tillich was always close to the biblical sources, but he expounded the knowledge of God more often from nonbiblical materials. Since the *shape* of these sources and the shape of the human questioning that lay behind them were so influential for the understanding of God's presence among men, there were always those critics who argued that Tillich had in fact permitted anthropological concerns to dictate the form of his God-talk. He seemed to be unable simply to proclaim the presence of the Christian God, but rather he was always obliged to find some nontraditional entrée (as one critic put it) which would enable him to reach, finally, the question of God.

A third criticism of Tillich insisted that he was too quick to find God located behind every human questioning and every human dilemma. Tillich really collapsed human culture and the integrity of the human spirit, this group argued, by insisting that every serious human question is a God-question. His method resulted in an imposition of Christian dogma and Christian doctrines of man—interpreted in Tillich's own particular metaphysical terms—upon a world of men who had struggled through to find their own meanings and who had earned the right to declare their own autonomy and independence from a religious and theological establishment who would be only too happy to see them collapse. This group of critics saw in Tillich a great deception—on the surface a theologian who took the secular culture very seriously, but beneath that surface a kind of theological totalitarian who insisted that, after all, it was the theologian who alone understood the deepest meanings of human efforts, and who insisted upon metaphysicizing them in his own terms.

Tillich's critics present us with an interesting paradox—on the one hand, a man who refused to limit himself to the traditional sources because they were not filled with the burning zeal of the God-questioner

—they did not take seriously enough the deep-down questions that men were asking all around; on the other hand, a man who, in his very seriousness to look to the questions of his fellow human beings wherever those questions arose, would insist that whatever those questions might look like, they *were* God-questions.

Tillich's paradoxical position, however, is the position that the theologian must take today—as, I would argue, many have always taken it. On the one hand, Tillich could not rest content with a religious community and a religious literature that evaded the God-question more frequently than it faced it. Furthermore, it was generally Tillich's *theological* critics who insisted that he imposed religion on culture. The artists, psychologists, physicians, and others to whom he talked were more fascinated by his expositions of their work and often agreed with what he saw in them. Nor did Tillich impose his religion cheaply upon his nontheological sources. Rather, he learned from those sources and let them speak to him so that there was always a reciprocity between what he brought to those cultural products in which he saw the God-question and what they gave to him. As for his metaphysics, it is separable from his method of posing the God-question.

Today, in the generation after Tillich, the generation of theologians that is trying to come to terms with a new set of questions and conditions has generally followed his method of approaching the God-question. We can mention three theological trends that bear this out. The so-called futurist school of theology focuses upon man's inveterate tendency to *hope* and the ensuing questions that arise concerning the future. It is not a misreading of these theologians to suggest that they lift up as man's ultimate or most pressing concern the pressure of those moments in which man engages in action that aims at accomplishing goals that will improve life or satisfy the human will. A teacher plans courses, interacts with students. Citizens plan highways, build schools, engage in welfare programs, declare war. To what end? What do they *hope* for in such actions? What do they hope to accomplish? How can they justify such hope? They must have some kind of confidence in the future. Men must be hoping, future-expecting creatures. And from the matrix of this basic human situation, the theologians of futurity draw the God-question. For such theologians, God-talk refers to the power which makes hoping so vital and omnipresent in the human condition. God-talk refers to the power of the future that seems to draw man on, like a magnet, like a siren song, from today into every new tomorrow. This posing of the God-question attends particularly to the revolutionary tendencies of our times, those that have emerged from Marxist thought and Third World aspirations.

Another school of theology, heavily influenced by existentialist philosophy, especially that of Martin Heidegger, has located the center of human existence in the situation in which man knows himself to be challenged or addressed by a word from his fellowman. The human being, as these theologians interpret him, exists in the response he makes to the claim others make upon him and in the counter-address that he puts to his fellowmen. Every "Thou" to whom I respond or fail to respond constitutes the challenge which makes me a man, and my life is what it is by virtue of the response or counterclaim I fashion. For these theologians, God-talk refers to the interpersonal, intersubjective situation in which men meet and draw out one another's humanity and personhood. When a man struggles to hear clearly what his fellowman is saying to him, he is struggling with God. When he asks what sort of response or counterclaim he should make, he is asking about God and touching the God-question.

A third example of current theological thinking about the God-question is illuminated by a recent book by Schubert Ogden, *The Reality of God.*[1] Ogden has long been associated with a philosophical conceptuality that utilizes process philosophy, particularly the metaphysics of Charles Hartshorne. His major treatment of the doctrine of God in this book, however, reveals an interesting dilemma, namely, that no matter how clearly his metaphysical equipment enables him to describe an understanding of God, Ogden feels the need to justify why it is important to describe God at all. In other words, Ogden came equipped with an impressive answer to the question of God, but he needed to demonstrate that the *question* about God is a meaningful and relevant question, and that it is a question which corresponds to his *answer.* His major essay on God provides this demonstration by suggesting that every man draws near to the concern for God when he engages in meaningful action because such action presupposes, whether consciously or not, a confidence in the reliability of the process of life which is hardly justified unless God or his equivalent is real. Having provided this entrée into the God-question, Ogden proceeds to unfold his elaborate metaphysical description of God. God becomes real when man makes the decision to engage in meaningful action because that action implies the further decision that life is worth living and that it it will not betray the man who immerses himself in its processes.

Each of the three theological modes that I have just discussed makes a decision as to where man's ultimate or most pressing concern lies, and then it proceeds to locate the realm of God-talk accordingly. Action based on hope in the future, interaction with fellow human beings, confidence in the life process—these are the three designations of man's

ultimate concern, and the God-question emerges out of each of these centers of ultimacy. Each of these schools of theological thought renders a decision as to what man's central questions are, and it brings the God-question into congruence with those generally human questions.

Questions on the Trustworthiness of Evolutionary Processes

There is no question but that the areas which each of these three schools of theological thought lifts up for examination as the crucial area of human questioning are serious and significant. There may be disagreement as to whether one or more of these questions is as serious or central as the others, or whether, once they have isolated a properly central question, these schools of thought have dealt with it properly. I believe that we are presently witnessing the emergence of another set of fundamental questions that lie deep in the hearts and minds of many—perhaps all—contemporary men. And these questions form the arena in which men ask after God today. The emergence of these questions may constitute a slight shift in the site of the God-question, or it may throw a new light on the questions that other theologians have focused upon.

The questions to which I refer pertain to the trustworthiness of the processes of evolution upon which man depends, including the evolution of both the inorganic world and life forms as well as the processes of human life itself. The question of the trustworthiness of the processes of evolution resolves itself into the question of whether man can give himself to the world processes which bear him along in the confidence that they will not destroy him. The very fact that man should self-consciously question the evolutionary process that bears him is testimony to man's distinctiveness in the world as the creature who not only exists but also possesses awareness of himself existing. Even so, the question of whether the processes of the world and life in that world are ultimately reliable presents a new face to man in the present age.

There are two dimensions to the question of the trustworthiness of the evolutionary process, of which *the first is the plain question of whether man as a species will survive.* This question is widespread in many quarters today, but it has been given particularly clear form by the biologist George Wald and the political scientist Victor Ferkiss. Wald, a Nobel laureate in biology at Harvard, gave a celebrated extemporaneous speech at M.I.T. in March 1969 in which he summed up a line of thinking that drew immediate response from thousands of students and faculty members across the country. He said: "I think I know what is bothering the students. I think that what we are up against is a generation that is by no means sure that it has a future." Wald made

these comments in concluding a discussion of the threat of global war, with specific reference to the dangers that are suggested by U.S. involvement in Vietnam and by the international armaments race. Ferkiss, in his recent book, *Technological Man*,[2] undertakes a comprehensive analysis of American society in order to throw light on the question of whether we are in fact approaching the future which we have conceived and which we desire, namely, a society that is viable under the conditions of our advanced technology. He argues that it is one thing for man to conceive of a future and to set his sights on it but quite another for that future to be actualized. His study concludes with the judgment that the adequately functioning technological society that we have imagined to be in the making is in fact *not* emerging and further that if we do not evolve soon into the society that can handle our already existing technological capabilities, our survival is imperiled.

The question of man's survival leads to the question of his relationship to both the physical and the social or cultural world which comprises his environment. To the latter belong the questions of war and peace, the fashioning of governmental and other social instruments appropriate to the advanced stages of technology, the formation of viable interracial communities, the reshaping of cultural forms, styles of sexual activity, marriage styles, and the like which will enable the species to adapt to the dramatic changes that are taking place. To the former belong the questions of overpopulation, hunger, and pollution of the physical environment.

The question of survival is directly related to the widespread attention that the *future* is receiving today, and it raises important considerations for the futurist school of theology. That school is properly concerned with the assumptions which the phenomena of hope and futurity hold for the Christian doctrine of God and his work in history, and that school also brings Christian reflection into a salutary relationship to the forces of revolution and change that pervade the international community. But the futurist school of theology begs one important question, the question raised by Ferkiss—whether the future which so many men hope for under so many different guises is actually coming about. As Ferkiss himself puts it, man is an inveterate fantasy builder, and he fantasizes about nothing so easily as the future and his own hopes for the future. An increasing number of men, including some Marxist dreamers of the future, are asking whether our hopes for the future are fantasies, unreal fabrications that may be shipwrecked on the fact that the survival of the species is in doubt.

A second dimension of the question of the trustworthiness of the evolutionary process touches on the question *whether there is ulti-*

mately a resonance between man and his world or a dissonance—whether man is fundamentally at home in his world or out of phase with it. The classic contemporary statement of this dimension of the question has been stated by Albert Camus. In his use of the prototypical figure of Sisyphus, Camus described the man who could find no meaning in his activity, pushing the stone to the top of the mountain only to let it roll down again into the valley, and who furthermore reflected upon this fact so as to be perfectly aware of this meaninglessness. There is no resonance between his efforts and the structures of the world in which those efforts take place; therefore he hopes for no "success" or "accomplishment." He faces a situation of pervasive and fundamental absurdity:

I said that the world is absurd, but I was too hasty. This world in itself is not reasonable, that is all that can be said. But what is absurd is the confrontation of this irrational and the wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the human heart. The absurd depends as much on man as on the world. For the moment it is all that links them together. . . . The absurd is born of this confrontation between the human need [for happiness and for reason] and the unreasonable silence of the world.[3]

Camus, like his figure Dr. Rieux in the novel *The Plague,* chose to live courageously and energetically to build up his fellowman, but he expected neither meaningfulness nor success in his efforts because he was caught up in an absurd relationship to the world, fighting in a "war without armistices."

The antipode to Camus is his contemporary and countryman Teilhard de Chardin, who believed that man had evolved within the matrix of the world's development and was thus thoroughly at home in it. There is, as he writes in the essay "Action and Activation," no gulf between man's activity and the world's response but, on the contrary, "there would be a contradiction, and ontological imbalance, in the world if our capacity to desire and to act were found to be greater . . . than the possibilities offered to us by our cosmic environment."[4] Quite opposed to Camus's Sisyphus, Teilhard writes: "By an organic and metaphysical necessity, the world cannot fall short, in coherence or in value, of the ultimate demands of our reason and our hearts. Or, to put it positively, what our reason and our hearts essentially and positively demand, if they are to be satisfied, that the world possesses."[5]

The question of Camus versus Teilhard, dissonance between man and his world versus resonance, emerges immediately in our questioning about man's survival because it is precisely the threat of dissonance, the fact that there is not a positive correlation or "fit" between man's activities and the world's response to them, that suggests the possibility

of man's destruction. Man's actions to date have brought forth significantly noxious reactions from his physical and social environment. The deathly reactions of water, land, and atmosphere to pollution are reactions of dissonance, discontinuity between what man desires and does and what the world will tolerate. Similarly, the social environment threatens to collapse under the weight of men's violent, destructive actions. That man *knows* better, *knows how* to act in a way that can bring resonating responses from his world, is not enough because this better knowledge is not persuasive enough, to date, to affect humankind's action as a whole.

Here the arguments advanced by Ogden seem to beg the question that man plainly does not sense the kind of reliability and trustworthiness of the evolutionary processes that Ogden imposes upon all human action. If a man engages in meaningful activity in the way that Ogden suggests, then he may be implicitly presupposing a conception of God. But, as Camus illustrates, man engages in his activity not always out of a sense of meaningfulness but rather out of a desperate or depressed sense of absurdity or dissonance between him and his world. Or, even if he does hope for more, for success, meaning, and God, he cannot do so in the lucidity and confidence that Ogden speaks of. As far as many men are concerned, what Ogden assumes is precisely the question.

Implications of the Relocation of the God-Question

Men everywhere *are* asking the questions of survival and of man's "fit" within his world—the question of whether the life process in which man is set is trustworthy, deserving of the confidence that man naturally places in it, or whether it is destructive of man and, in this sense, hostile to him. Within the arena of these questions, I would suggest, the God-question appears most pertinent to our day. This relocation of the God-question brings with it a number of implications. Here I am most concerned to spell out the implications for theology and theologians, rather than for men generally.

In the first place, we must recognize that the question concerning the trustworthiness of the evolutionary processes *is* the question concerning God. We must resist the temptation to say that it *leads to* or implies the God-question, just as we must avoid the assumption that if only men were more lucid, they would understand that the question of life's untrustworthiness is the God-question, or that if a man decides that life *is* trustworthy, he then must acknowledge that he is living with an *implicit* affirmation of God. All of these are forms of theological paternalism or totalitarianism that have as their end the demonstration that all men really do play the same games that Christian theologians

play and the attempt to show that theologians' traditional language is thereby applicable to all of these games. These temptations afflict all theologians, and each of the four schools of thought I have discussed above tends at times to pull the rug out from under the general human questions that it focuses upon by asserting that the generally human is "really" a form of theology.

The theologian is tempted, in other words, even when he is sophisticated enough to know better, to suggest that the God-question is itself an eternal substance, whereas the forms of this question (à la Tillich, Ebeling, Pannenberg, Moltmann, or Ogden) are accidents pertaining to it. Even theologians who are eager to present "new" conceptions of God (like Ogden's, for example) spend too much time trying to prove that men are really asking the "same old question." The result is that the honest human questioner ends up slightly bewildered, with the impression that he has just been spiritually raped by the theologian, mumbling, "*That* isn't what *I* thought I was asking!" No amount of logic or rhetoric, for example, will convince the man who is concerned with meaningful action that he is "really" wrestling with Ogden's "neoclassical" conception of God or the revolutionary that he is asking about Moltmann's or Pannenberg's category of divine futurity. When man is asking the questions that center on his own chances for survival as a species and as an individual and the trustworthiness of the world processes that bear him along through life, his question need not be transmuted into something else in order for it to qualify as a God-question. It is already, as the Germans would say, *ohne weiteres* the God-question, with nothing else added to or subtracted from it. This, I take it, is what we have learned from the "God-is-dead" and the "secular" schools of theology. It is legitimate to push the questioner and his questioning further and deeper, but not simply in order to show that he is asking what theologians have been asking all along.

The obverse side of this suggestion that theologians must relinquish their self-styled totalitarianism and paternalism when approaching human questions is that theologians have much to learn from the generally human questions that man asks. That is why the substance/accidents or genus/species scheme does not properly apply to the God-questions. We shall elaborate on this below, but it is enough to say here that theologians (with a few notable exceptions) have in fact *not* been asking the question of human survival, of the trustworthiness of life-processes, and the like. Therefore, they do not know what God-talk is latent in these questions. They must follow this set of questions to its farther reaches, within the categories appropriate to it (which may not be their favored, presupposed categories), in order to learn anew

what the God-question is and what the word "God" means. Their traditions may tell them what the word *has meant,* but not necessarily what it *means now* or will mean in the future.

In other words, the reality and the nature of God will be unfolded in the course of our probing the nature of the world processes in which we live and move, and as we seek to understand man's relationship to those processes, their trustworthiness for or hostility to human life, and the question of man's survival within the milieu which those processes have engendered. This is so because such probing moves through the array of empirical data to the most fundamental considerations of man's nature and destiny, as well as to the reflection upon the ultimate nature of the ambience of the world reality in which we find ourselves. The theologian will, of course, bring his heritage of Christian tradition (and the perception that has been shaped by that tradition) with him to the probing of these questions, and he will interpret what he finds with reference to that tradition. But he will also have to become familiar with and sensitive to the structures of reality and thought that are distinctive to these questions—and which may appear strange to his inherited categories. In coming to terms with these new structures, he will gain genuinely new knowledge of God and of the significance of Jesus Christ. The process of bringing these new structures into relationship with the Christian tradition—a process of reciprocal amplification, critique, and synthesis—will be an exciting and risky theological adventure.

The second implication of the relocation of the God-question to which I have referred here pertains to the risk and uncertainty of belief in God. Not only is the question of the reliability of the world processes one, if not the most, pressing question that man asks today, but it is also the one question which is fully open, the question to which the answer is genuinely in doubt. Although the Christian religious and spiritual tradition (as contrasted with the theological tradition) clearly speaks of the risk of belief in God and the genuine leap of faith which the believer must make, theologians have at times expended considerable effort to minimize this risk. One of the striking characteristics of both Ogden's work and the work of the futurist school is their consistent minimizing of the risk factor. Almost simplistically, Ogden argues that the very fact that men engage in goal-oriented action does imply a concept of God, while Moltmann and Pannenberg appear to argue that the very reality of hope and a concept of futurity does imply a God of promise and future. But of course no such implications are in fact present because it is a matter of genuine uncertainty whether the future will really happen, or whether goal-oriented action does in fact possess

an actual goal. It is not clear to us that man will cope adequately with the demands of his environment—either the physical or the social environment. Only the optimist would suggest that man will certainly come to terms with the demands which his ecological interrelatedness to his world make upon him—to end pollution and reverse its effects, to develop political and social structures that are commensurate with the realities of the global village in which we live, or to develop cities that are habitable for men. This risk and uncertainty are not fabricated by the theologian to make his apologetic task easier; rather, they are real, commonly acknowledged risks, which the Christian and the theologian share with all men. The questions pertaining to man's survival are, in other words, "real" questions to which all men, including theologians, must seek answers that are as yet not fully discernible. Thus the theologian cannot, because he himself is the questioner, enter this realm with "answers" to questions that nobody else is asking.

In this situation of risk, the theologian must recognize that he is treading on questions whose answers could indeed demonstrate the nonexistence of God and the error of his belief. If man in fact destroys himself by the violation of his physical and social environment, if he fails to survive, it will mean that he has fallen victim to the processes of natural selection, and that there is ultimately dissonance rather than resonance between him and his world. In such a case, it will become clear in an instant either that there is no God or that the Christian tradition has not pictured him satisfactorily. There are those who will say that God's power and sovereignty are vindicated even in the destruction of the world, or that to relate God's reality to man's survival is to impose criteria of utilitarianism upon God. There is not space here to deal with these considerations, but it should be clear that the position upon which this essay is based considers that the destruction of the human species, by any means whatsoever, even by self-destruction through violation of natural laws, represents a fundamental dissonance between man and his world that contradicts what the Jewish-Christian tradition has said about God's work of creation and redemption and about his faithfulness to his creation. The conclusion that I wish to draw here, however, is that the relocation of the God-question on the site of the questions that pertain to the trustworthiness of the evolutionary processes and man's survival once again moves the God-question into the realm of risk and uncertainty toward which the Christian tradition has perennially pointed.

Finally, the relocation of the God-question, if I am correct in discerning its thrust, places a new set of demands upon the theologian in that it moves him toward a set of data and criteria that he has not gener-

ally taken into consideration. I mean that the new set of God-questions moves him toward the data and criteria that are relevant to the questions of man's survival and the reliability of the world processes. It moves the theologian inevitably toward "empirical theology," in the sense that it sets before him the imperative to deal with the data from the sciences—natural, physical, and social—and the humanities that throw light on the question of survival. It is difficult, for example, to see how theologians can any longer be ignorant of, let alone indifferent toward, the data of history, sociology, psychology, biology, astronomy, and other fields that pertain to the processes of the world, natural selection, the demands of personal interaction and society, and the arts because it is in these areas that we see precisely what the nature and demands of the world processes are, as well as the evidence as to whether in fact these processes are trustworthy. These data are immensely rich, beyond the grasp of any single man, and open to contradictory interpretations, but that does not relieve the theologian of the responsibility to be both a well-informed student of these disciplines and also an active participant in the interpretation of their findings. Indeed, his Christian identity and theological training qualify him as a serious participant in the life processes and the interpretation of these processes, just as his humanity qualifies him as a serious questioner after God within the wider movement that questions the ultimate direction of those same processes. In the past, especially in the recent neoorthodox past, theology has not only been indifferent to the data of the "hard" and "soft" sciences; it has even intentionally demeaned those data. To relate God to "mental health" or "natural selection" was often considered crass. But if I am correct in discerning the current relocation of the God-question in human affairs, the day is already upon us when such a theology—whether merely ignorant or consciously indifferent—can only be rejected as obscurantist and frivolous.

NOTES

1. Schubert Ogden, *The Reality of God* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).
2. Victor Ferkiss, *Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality* (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1969).
3. Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1955), p. 4.
4. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *Science and Christ* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 174.
5. Ibid., p. 175. See also Philip Hefner, *The Promise of Teilhard* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1970), chaps. 3 and 4.