

THE DEHUMANIZATION AND REHUMANIZATION OF SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

by Solomon H. Katz

I shall discuss three themes: rapid technological change and its associated effects upon man in the twentieth century, the probability of national and even international revitalization movements, and, finally, the need for a new science of man. I shall attempt to link these themes, thereby synthesizing some new perspectives on the dilemma of dehumanization as well as possibly delineating some new pathways toward rehumanization. But first a note on the relation of Purpose and Humanization.

PURPOSE AND HUMANIZING

In a recent paper on the nature of human purpose,¹ I developed a scheme for explaining its significance. At least three kinds of purpose can be set up as useful constructs in dealing with man. The first is general purpose, which is a property of any system organized to receive and react to environmental change. General purpose can be ascribed to a machine, as Rosenblueth and Wiener have suggested (taking into partial consideration, of course, the criticism of Taylor),² and to any evolutionary system. A second form of purpose is man's marked propensity, based on the evolved capacities of the human central nervous system, to abstract and explain environmental stimuli. Man has developed both the need and ability to organize and explain the unknowns of his environment. This capacity of man's central nervous system evolved with his speech and tool-making abilities and, in a sense, is removed from his primary emotional processes.³ Man's continuous attempts to organize and explain the circumstances and events of his and his group's life cycle provide the basis of human purpose. Each social group has individuals whose roles involve expla-

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nation and interpretation (philosophers, priests, storytellers, shamans, political leaders, scientists, etc.) and who serve to develop and disseminate the purpose of the group.⁴ When human purpose is reduced to the particular group, it takes on specific characteristics of the group's history and ecology. At this level is the third form of human purpose, which I designate as Purpose. Purpose is the explanation and coherent organization of the events of the human life cycle, from conception to death and beyond, of a particular group in time and space. In general, the process of explaining unknowns, events, and circumstances is frequently relegated to the religious institutions of a society. Purpose in a society adds a measure of stability to the group by providing an important degree of security for its members. In a sense, Purpose supplies the essential reference point upon which a perspective of the human life cycle is drawn.⁵ Thus it underlies and is critical for the individual and the related group's value system present in all societies.

The process of dehumanization with which we are concerned can be conceived of in terms of human purpose. Due to the ongoing phenomenon of rapid technological and social change, the traditional Purpose of our society is being rapidly undermined. The rapid changes in modern times have rendered our more slowly changing traditional value systems somewhat obsolete. In this process the individual is losing his Purpose and associated identity, with the resulting feelings of dehumanization.

THE MEANING OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

The germane question is not whether technology is good or bad for man, but rather whether the rates of technological and interrelated social change are relevant to the problems of dehumanization. In order to analyze processes and rates and make them relevant to the issue of changing Purpose, values, and views of humanity, I will attempt to use a time perspective which incorporates some major events in the history of human technology.

One of the major biocultural evolutionary facts of man's natural history has been his continued association with tools. As long as there have been hominids, there have been tools. Man has always used objects to assist him in manipulating and adapting to his environment. Tools, and therefore technology, are essential ingredients of man and have been an integral part of man's evolution. There is no question that tool use is associated in part with some of the most evolved aspects of man's cerebral cortex, including his capacities for speech, abstraction, and conceptualization, which all help to form essential components of what makes man human.

During most of his evolutionary history, the technology of man was

that of hunting and gathering. Ten thousand years ago, a short period on an evolutionary time scale, man first developed agriculture. This became a revolutionary means of feeding himself. At least three separate agricultural revolutions occurred, one in the Middle East with the cultivation of cereal grains, another in the Far East with rice, and a third in Meso-America with maize. Each revolution led to separate great civilizations. There is no question that, from the evolutionary point of view, *Homo sapiens* entered a new phase of evolution when these agricultural revolutions occurred. The population size of the species began to soar ever upward. There were major reorganizations of the sociocultural systems to adapt them to this more sedentary way of life. There were further differentiations of labor, development of cooperative enterprises, more effective communication systems and social bureaucracies, changes in religious practices, and the development of effective tools for an agricultural technology. Obvious advantages at nutritional levels allowed these complex events to occur. The individual in an agricultural economy gradually traded his autonomy for his own adaptive success and that of his group as a whole. Social interdependencies had to be achieved and maintained in order for the new system to operate.

These adaptations were accompanied by a variety of new pressures on the behavior of the individual and by new value systems to accommodate these changes at the level of the various sociocultural systems. For instance, it was common for new values to deal primarily with the primacy of land and sedentary ways of life. Those values, explanations, and purposes still predominate today. In many respects they form the basis of our views on humanization and dehumanization. It has been frequently stated, for example, that the United States constitution was organized entirely on the value system derived from an agrarian economy. The central role that agricultural values play in the major religions is obvious. Yet we no longer live in a predominantly agrarian world.

THE MECHANICAL-INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Man welded his newly developing scientific method with technology, and the product was a machine-age technology. The increase in mechanical efficiency allowed for a rapid growth in population. Machines were now producing very easily and quickly what took considerable energy and time for individuals to make. While new orders of efficiency were achieved with machines, their operation and maintenance required new sources of energy and raw materials. Whereas cultivated farmlands were one of the main modifications of the agricultural revolution, mines, assembly plants, and smoke be-

came the symbol of the industrial revolution. As in the case of the agricultural revolution, the industrial revolution called for a whole series of biological and sociocultural adjustments. Value systems, purpose, and humanity now had to be adapted to these new constraints. Once again this was and is being attempted.

However, during the twentieth century new levels of technology, especially in the area of public health and sanitation systems, and new agricultural techniques and economic means of distribution pushed the world population growth into exponential proportions. Population size and growth, now more than ever before, emerged from its status as a dependent variable (an index of the adaptive success of the species) to a new position as perhaps the single most influential variable in the human ecosystem. As well as this phenomenal change in population size, equally amazing changes in technology and science have occurred. Currently, these changes are interacting with man's ecosystem at such rates that the system may be unable to respond in a viable way. At a biological level many species are being eliminated, and new kinds of diseases of pollution and stress are becoming prevalent in man. At social-psychological levels there have been rapid increases in the adaptive use of various drugs to alter states of consciousness and awareness of an apparent host of environmental and social factors. Culturally, there is evidence of the loss of traditional values and the decay of many social institutions. Environmentally, there is overexploitation of natural resources with the pollution of air, rivers, and seas as the outcome of high utilization of energy and raw materials.

While the United States and other industrial nations such as Japan are acutely aware of these problems, elsewhere the so-called underdeveloped nations suffer similar problems as they try to escalate their already established exponential rates of change in order somehow to catch up with the economic levels of the rest of the "developed" world. While the manifestations of the problem of change in these "underdeveloped" areas are different from those in the United States, the basic issue of too rapid a rate of change in social and other areas is the same. Somehow the quality of life is decreasing throughout the world, and individual dignity suffers with it. The whole ecosystem of modern man appears to be increasingly unstable, and unfortunately we do not seem to have the means of stabilizing it.

As the rate of technological and population change increases, there is increasing pressure on the individuals of the sociocultural system to alter their explanations of the world. Under these conditions Purpose must be redefined. With the redefinition of Purpose there are alterations in the value systems of the individual and society. As the indi-

vidual and society become more dependent on technology, and as the rate of change of the value systems accelerates, there are increasing feelings of dehumanization. When change becomes an end in itself and is valued without question or qualification about its negative consequences, as it is in our society, resulting feelings of dehumanization can be even more severe.

These trends are accompanied by such wide changes in the value system over such short periods of time that it is no small wonder generation gaps exist among members of the same family. Social traditions also lose their meaning from one generation to the next, and forms of social and moral anarchy begin to develop. Everyone realizes that vast social problems exist, but no one seems to know a solution. In reality, no single solution probably could work within such a social framework, since the problems involve so many divergent and conflicting value systems.

THE LOSS OF PURPOSE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF REVITALIZATION

While these events and feelings about the loss of traditional values and the dehumanization of man are being experienced by individuals, there are other more cumulative responses at the level of the entire sociocultural system. Anthony F. C. Wallace has developed a model of cultural change concerning the revitalization movement⁶ which helps to predict the possible outcomes when these kinds of problems become prevalent.

A revitalization movement is defined as "any conscious organized effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture."⁷ In general, Wallace has suggested that revitalization movements have a three-stage cycle consisting of a steady state, a period of cultural distortion, and a period of revitalization. The latter stage is characterized by the formulation of a code, and by phases of communication, organization, adaptation, cultural transformation, and routinization, respectively. In this paper I would like to cite his original model and include in a parenthetical fashion descriptive comments about recent national events in order to suggest the rather amazing and perhaps ominous parallels that exist between the model and our current status. Of course, it is important to mention even at the outset that Wallace has developed the model largely from religious revitalization movements of a single small society and not from the political ideological movements of a megalopolis. Thus, while we must be somewhat cautious about making too broad generalizations, the recent work of Gerlach suggests it is reasonable to consider the broader secular and nonsecular ideologies of our society to be sets of

organic beliefs, myths, and realities that closely parallel the various styles of religious movements. In this sense Maoism as well as Marxist and Leninist doctrines seems to fit the criteria.

Wallace states that the first stage is a "Steady State,"

... a period of moving equilibrium. Culture change occurs ... but is ... relatively slow. ... Disorganization and stress remain within limits tolerable to most individuals ... but some incidence of individual ill health and deviance is accepted in principle as a price society must pay for stability.⁸

He defines the "Period of Increased Individual Stress" as follows:

The sociocultural system is being "pushed" progressively out of equilibrium by various forces, such as climatic and biotic change, epidemic disease, war and conquest, social subordination, or acculturation. ... increasingly large numbers of individuals are placed under what is to them intolerable stress by the failure of the system to accommodate their needs. Anomie and disillusionment become widespread as the culture is perceived to be disorganized and inadequate; crime, illness, and individualistic asocial responses increase sharply in frequency. But the situation is still generally defined as one of fluctuation within the steady state.⁹

The next stage is the "Period of Cultural Distortion":

Some members of the society attempt, piecemeal and ineffectively, to restore personal equilibrium by adopting socially dysfunctional expedients. Alcoholism (and drug abuse), venality in public officials,¹⁰ the "black market," breaches of sexual and kinship mores, hoarding, gambling for gain, "scapegoating" by attacking other groups or a central bureaucracy, and similar alienated behaviors which, in the preceding period, were still defined as individual deviances, in effect become institutionalized efforts to circumvent the evil effects of "the system" or "the Establishment." Interest groups, losing confidence in the advantages of maintaining mutually acceptable interrelationships, may resort to violence in order to coerce others into unilaterally advantageous behavior. Because of the mal-coordination of cultural changes during this period, such changes are rarely able to reduce the impact of the forces that have pushed the society out of equilibrium and, in fact, are likely to lead to a continuous decline in organization.¹¹

There is evidence to suggest that the recent war in Vietnam; the "God is dead" movement and associated "popularization" and "vulgarization" of organized religions (i.e., "Jesus Freaks"); the significant social, racial, and economic problems of our cities; the rapid rise in crime, drug and alcohol abuse, and divorce; economic difficulties; the general dropping out of the "system"; and, most recently and perhaps most extremely on a political level, the subversion of the highest office have created such a state of national demoralization that we are in the

midst of serious "cultural distortion" and are on our way either toward a revitalization movement or toward disintegration. The time is growing nearer when the average citizen in our society will ask how, on the one hand, the great recent sacrifices in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, which were carried out for some vague principle of freedom, democracy, and honor, could now support, on the other hand, the "style" of our own recent *free* elections for the highest, most prestigious, honorable, and important office. It is unquestionable that the growing anger, as the evidence emerges, can unleash some very devastating movements. Yet, according to John Platt, we are faced with the need for new levels of organization of the first order.¹² In this context, the "Period of Revitalization" is characterized as follows:

Once severe cultural distortion has occurred, it is difficult for the society to return to a steady state without the institution of a revitalization process. Indeed, without revitalization the society is apt to disintegrate as a system: the population will either die off, splinter into autonomous groups, or be absorbed into another, more stable, society. Revitalization depends on the successful completion of the following functions:

Formulation of a code. An individual or group of individuals constructs a new, utopian image of sociocultural organization. This model is a blueprint of an ideal society or *goal culture* [e.g., Maoist China]. Contrasted with the goal culture is the *existing culture*, which is presented as inadequate or evil in certain respects. Connecting the existing culture and the goal culture is a *transfer culture*—a system of operations which, if faithfully carried out, will transform the existing culture into the goal culture. Failure to institute the transfer operations will, according to the code, result in either the perpetuation of the existing misery or the ultimate destruction of the society (if not of the whole world).

Not infrequently the code, or the core of it, is formulated by one individual in the course of an hallucinatory revelation. . . . Nonhallucinatory formulations usually are found in politically oriented movements. In either case, the formulation of the code constitutes a reformulation of the author's own identity and brings to him a renewed confidence in the future and a remission of the complaints he experienced before. [This fits with the reestablishment of Purpose.]

Communication. The formulators of the code preach the code to other people in an evangelistic spirit. The aim of the communication is to make converts. The code is offered as the means of spiritual salvation for the individual and of cultural salvation for the society. Benefits promised to the target population need not be immediate or materialistic, for the basis of the code's appeal is the attractiveness of identification with a more highly organized system [restoration of Purpose], with all that this implies in the way of self-respect. Indeed, in view of the extensiveness of the changes in values, promises of material and social benefits meaningful in the old system would often be pointless. . . . Political codes offer honor, fame, the respect of society for sacrifices made in its interest. Refusal to accept the code, on the other hand, is usually defined as placing the listener in immediate spiritual, as well as material, peril with respect to his existing values as well as new ones. In small

societies, the target population may be the entire community; but in more complex societies, the message may be aimed only at certain groups deemed eligible for participation in the transfer and goal cultures. [Such seems to have been the case in the Russian Revolution and the development of Nazism in Germany during the 1930s.]

Organization. The code attracts converts. The motivations that are satisfied by conversion, and the psychodynamics of the conversion experience itself, are likely to be highly diverse, ranging from the maze-way resynthesis characteristic of the prophet and the hysterical conviction of the "true believer" to the calculated expediency of the opportunist. As the group of converts expands, it differentiates into two parts: a set of disciples and a set of mass followers. The disciples increasingly become the executive organization, responsible for administering the evangelistic program, protecting the formulator, combating heresy, and so on. As the executive part of the movement, the disciples also increasingly become full-time specialists in the work of the movement. In this they are economically supported by the mass followers, who continue to play their roles in the existing culture, devoting part of their time and money to the movement. The tricorned relationship between the formulators, the disciples, and the mass followers is given an authoritarian structure—even without the formalities of older or bureaucratic organizations—by the charismatic quality of the formulator's image. The formulator is regarded as a man who has been vouchsafed, from a supernatural being or from some other source of wisdom unavailable to the masses, superior knowledge and authority which justify his claim to unquestioned belief and obedience from his followers.

Adaptation. Because the movement is a revolutionary organization (however benevolent and humane the ultimate values to which it subscribes), it threatens the interests of any group that obtains advantage, or believes it obtains advantage, from maintaining or only moderately reforming the status quo. Furthermore, the code is never complete; new inadequacies are constantly being found in the existing culture, and new inconsistencies, predictive failures, and ambiguities are discovered in the code itself (some of the latter being pointed out by the opposition). The response of the code formulators and disciples is to rework the code, and, if necessary, to defend the movement by political and diplomatic maneuver, and, ultimately, by force. The general tendency is for codes to harden gradually, and for the tone of the movement to become increasingly militant, nativistic, and hostile both toward nonparticipating fellow members of the group, who will ultimately be defined as "traitors," and toward outsiders, who are "enemies."

Cultural transformation. If the movement is able to capture both the adherence of a substantial proportion of a local population and, in complex societies, of the functionally crucial technological apparatus (such as power and communications networks, water supply, transport systems, and military establishment), the transfer culture and, in some cases, the goal culture itself, can be put into operation. The revitalization, if successful, will be attended by a drastic decline in quasi-pathological individual symptoms of anomie and by the disappearance of cultural distortions. [This means the abhorrent crime level declines, e.g., the apparent crime rate in China, and Judge Richette's problems decrease.]¹³ For such a revitalization to be accomplished, however, the movement must be able to obtain international social conformity without destructive coercion and must have a successful economic system.

Routinization. If the preceding functions are satisfactorily completed, the reasons for the movement's existence as an innovative force disappear. The transfer culture, if not the goal culture, operates of necessity with the participation of a large portion of the community. Thus the movement's function shifts from the role of innovation to the role of maintenance. If the movement was heavily religious in orientation, its legacy is a cult or church which preserves and reworks the code, and maintains, through ritual and myth, the public awareness of the history and values that brought forth the new culture. If the movement was primarily political, its organization is routinized into various stable bodies—administrative, police, military, and so on—whose functions are to make decisions and to maintain morale and order. Charisma can, to a degree, be routinized, but its intensity diminishes as its functional necessity becomes, with increasing obviousness, outmoded.¹⁴

While we are clearly not in the midst of any revitalization movement on a national level and our society may be too pluralistic ever to achieve such a movement, it is clear there are currently many religious and quasi-religious revitalization movements occurring within our society. Communes and other experimental groups abound. When and if a revitalization movement occurs at a political level, it will necessarily involve the whole society in one way or another.

From the perspective of humanization and dehumanization, I believe, like our current search for Purpose, questions concerning humanity are also reflections or symptoms of our collective disillusionment and anomie, and thus symptoms of the serious cultural distortion that faces us. The very nature of this meeting and others like it increasingly suggest it is our problem. If we were in a period of "steady state," our Purpose and value systems, and hence our definitions of humanity and dehumanization, would be relatively simple and understandable in the context of our existence. The rapid changes in our system and those elsewhere that have been induced via rapid population growth and technological change have created critical problems to which most of the world's sociocultural systems, in general, cannot adjust. Hence, for individuals, there is widespread loss of organization and meaning, which is reflected in the increasing cultural distortions at a social level in our own society. There is no question that most national societies of the world are being caught by this process in one form or another, and the result is the massive and overwhelming dehumanization of man in the late twentieth century.

TOWARD A NEW SCIENCE OF MAN

As we begin to weigh the implications and possibilities of revitalization, a number of fundamental themes become clear. If we pause just for a moment and consider our place in history, it is immediately apparent we are in a time of remarkable change in knowledge of

ourselves and our surroundings—we are learning how to transform matter into energy almost as the transformation occurs on the sun; we are learning the lessons of travel to our moon and of the deep space which surrounds our planet; we can communicate, store, and retrieve our accumulated knowledge with phenomenal effectiveness; we are reaching back further into our past and are coming closer and closer to the reconstruction of man's history; we have taken apart and re-synthesized the very essence of life; we know more about the workings of our own minds and bodies than ever before. Yet we are at the apparent brink of one of the most severe crises of values, direction, and Purpose that have ever confronted us. Standing before us at the apex of a triangle are the vast achievements of modern technology and science. At one point of its base stand the specters of too little food, too many people, and too much disease, and at the other point of its base stands the massive and ever ready ability of certain societies to rain terror and destruction on one another and the world.

How we can circumvent the certain tragedies that enclose this rigid triangle is the greatest challenge and problem facing us. We are participants in this vast process whether we want to be or not—it is basically an inescapable involvement for the members of our society. As circumstances have it, we may hold the important keys to unlock this rigid triangle. Unfortunately, however, most people seemingly do not even know we have them, let alone know how to use them. We cross one great technological and scientific bridge after another, and yet, at this brink of phenomenal success, we seem to have forgotten the fact that we are human. We need a new humanism, one which is based in part on a new science of man.

We have outstretched our hands so far and so fast that we have lost our balance and, if not exceedingly careful, are in acute danger of falling. We have a science of everything except man. If time and chance are with us, we can move to understand man not just as an objective reality but as a subjective reality as well. We must meld our scientific and humanistic traditions together in a highly effective manner in order to adapt to the world we have evolved. Just as it is impossible to turn biological evolution backward, it is difficult to do so with social developments. We are too dependent on science and technology to throw them out and return to some primitive state; instead, we need to know how to make more intelligent use of them. We need to integrate the knowledge about ourselves in the subjective, spiritual, and humanistic sense with the objective knowledge we have already accrued. We need a science and a technology which is first and foremost human. Without developing a science of man in the very near future to yield new means of human adaptation to the

twentieth-century ecosystem, we stand the chance of collapsing into a state of extreme social rigidity where individuals, new ideas, and dignity will be controlled and stifled.

We can start by recognizing the "pseudo" and "pop" science which permeates too much of our thinking and creates vague and untrue generalizations. We must recognize that reductionistic methodology when applied to man may result in too great an objectification and dehumanization of his complexity. We should begin to place as much emphasis on the development of a *synthetic method* as we have upon the experimental and reductionistic methodology. I suggest, as Alfred Emerson has so ably pointed out, that even some of our most advanced scientific thinkers have missed the significance and importance of such a thrust toward a synthetic method. We must begin a new science of man that does not back away from holistic concepts but rather proceeds in the greatest traditions of human thought to develop new ways to integrate what knowledge we already have and will need to know in the near future. This new science of man could begin to develop new perspectives on human behavior and human social systems which are well founded upon evidence already available from the other biophysical sciences. Finally, these perspectives and scientific data could be used in various ways to begin to predict more precisely the underlying individual and social adaptations necessary for maintenance of the human condition in a rapidly changing world.

However, how we can accomplish this humanization of science and the scientization of humanity is the crucial issue. We are living in a time when we have come to realize ever so clearly that man is not a scientific machine. He is not a cog in an assembly line or even a machine-man interface—rather he is a thinking, living, emotional, and to himself real being. What science has not done is to recognize sufficiently that the *same* man who has created scientific method and theory has also created religion and humanization.

In other words we have for the most part not realized enough about the bases of *all* human thought processes. Too often we have tended to treat man's mental processes as some kind of black box to be interpreted at a future date—we must begin to realize that the very processes of rational, scientific, religious, and humanitarian thought are *all* highly interrelated products of man's higher cortical capacities. In not interpreting those fundamental relationships, we have made the basic error of assuming that there are somehow fundamental dichotomies (mind-body) that separate man's so-called rational thought from his emotional and humanistic thinking—this has tended to mechanize our view into a set of input-output routines.

In a new science of man, one area we must certainly begin with is a

heavy emphasis on interpreting the most elementary aspects of man's ability to think, such as recognizing the patterns, the limitations, and the interrelated qualities of all aspects of the human mind. We have recently seen some important signals of potential breakthroughs in this area as exemplified in the work of Piaget with fundamentals of cognition, in the work of Lévi Strauss with the cross-cultural universality of structural elements of myths, in the work of Chomsky and Lenneberg with language, and in the work of Eibl-Eibesfeldt and of Jolly and Chance in ethology; however, if we are going to develop a new science of man, we are going to have to go further.

We need to begin to develop our synthetic method and use it to integrate and synthesize our knowledge of the neurological and bioevolutionary sciences of man with the social and psychological sciences. In this new kind of unity we may well develop a whole new kind of insight into the nature of man. If we can begin to recognize that the structure and patterns of our thoughts as well as the fundamental nature of our thought processes have much to do with the way we perceive and explain reality, whether through the scientific method or through the more "subjective" elements of human thought, we will have come a long way toward holding up a new mirror that will reflect a rehumanized man.

With this new science of man we can begin to gain the necessary perspective on the basic needs that such phenomena as ethics and religion supply for both the individual and society. And in so doing, we will begin to prepare for the kinds of adaptation necessary for the continued humanity of man in the twenty-first century.

NOTES

1. Solomon H. Katz, "Evolutionary Perspectives on Purpose and Man," *Zygon* 8 (1973): 325-40.

2. Arturo Rosenblueth and Norbert Wiener, "Purposeful and Non-purposeful Behavior," in *Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist*, ed. Walter Buckley (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 232-37; Richard Taylor, "Comments on a Mechanistic Conception of Purposefulness," in *ibid.*, pp. 226-31.

3. Paul D. MacLean, "The Brain's Generation Gap: Some Human Implications," *Zygon* 8 (1973): 113-27.

4. However, this propensity and ability to explain unknown events is a characteristic of all humans. Adler has suggested that this need to explain, which is directly associated with human purpose, is a fundamental element and/or drive of the human psyche which accounts for such diverse phenomena as psychotherapy and the placebo effect (H. M. Adler and V. B. O. Hammett, "The Doctor-Patient Relation Revisited: An Analysis of the Placebo Effect," *Annals of Internal Medicine* 78 [1973]: 595-602; and "Crisis, Conversion, and Cult Formation: An Examination of a Common Psychosocial Sequence," *American Journal of Psychiatry* 130 [1973]: 861-72).

5. This fits with Dr. Kübler-Ross's comment that truly religious people do not have difficulty dealing with either their own death or that of very close relatives (see

Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, "Humanizing Terminal Care" [Twentieth Summer Conference, Institute on Religion in an Age of Science, Star Island, New Hampshire, July 28–August 4, 1973]).

6. It is interesting to note with regard to this paper that Professor Wallace and I have worked together for the last five years at the Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute. I had previously read his 1956 paper on revitalization movements, and decided to read his other papers on the subject, since I planned to include a serious discussion of the possibility of such movements in our own society. Much to my surprise I found that one of his major papers on the topic was presented at a conference of the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science in 1961 and published later that year by IRAS as *Religious Revitalization: A Function of Religion in Human History and Evolution*. However, contrary to his conclusion there, that it is unlikely such events could occur in our society, I have tentatively reached the conclusion that they are far more probable now than ever before.

7. Anthony F. C. Wallace, *Religion: An Anthropological View* (New York: Random House, 1966).

8. *Ibid.*, p. 158. This and other quotations from Wallace's book are reprinted by permission of the publisher.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

10. A quotation concerning "Watergate" illustrates this situation in our present society in the United States: "The Watergate subversion was far more than 'just politics.' It was a sinister attempt by arrogant and ambitious men to destroy gradually the two-party system and the democratic processes as we have established them in this country over a period of almost 200 years. . . . It was some of the President's most trusted aides who established a Department of Dirty Tricks. It was they who hired stupid lackeys, supervised by a former CIA agent of idiot morality, to burgle, break in and bug. It was they who taught clean-cut, handsome younger men to equate dissent with treachery, to despise the press, to treat the opposition party as 'the enemy.' It was they who substituted hate and vindictiveness for competition and fair play in the 1972 presidential campaign. To accuse one candidate of being a homosexual, to accuse another of consorting with a prostitute in the back of a car, to steal mail, to compromise the FBI and the CIA, to besmirch the hard-earned reputations of such men as L. Patrick Gray and Richard Helms by pressuring them to commit or approve deeds of dubious legality—these are the tactics of a police state, and their practitioners are the possessors of a fascist mentality, whether they know it or not. . . . There is no room in any American administration for a Department of Dirty Tricks. That bag belongs to political tyrants who have no faith in the values and traditions of the country" (L. Shearer, ed., "Intelligence Reports," *Parade*, July 22, 1973, p. 10).

11. Wallace, *Religion* (n. 7 above), p. 159.

12. John Platt, "The First World Century: Optimizing Man on Earth" (Twentieth Summer Conference, Institute on Religion in an Age of Science, Star Island, New Hampshire, July 28–August 4, 1973).

13. See Lisa A. Richette, "A Special Savor of Nobility: Confronting the Dehumanization in Children's Justice," this issue.

14. Wallace, *Religion*, pp. 159–62.