Notes

  1. . G. E. Myers, Self: An Introduction to Philosophical Psychology (New York: Pegasus, 1969).
  2. . W. T.Scott, “Tacit Knowing and The Concept of Mind,” Philosophical Quarterly  21 (1971): 22–35.
  3. . L. W.Brandt, “The Phenomenology of the Self‐concept,” Existential Psychiatry  6 (1967): 422–32; and Myers.
  4. . A. M.Valentine, “Zen and the Psychology of Education,” Journal of Psychology  79 (1971): 103–10. Looking over our shoulder, Descartes nods his head, saying, “Yes, yes‐the soul acts on the material world but has neither location nor extension in that world.” A parallel Hindu conception attributes consciousness to the universal atman, which has neither physical place nor form and which attends to, ignores, or resorbs the mind as obstacles and illusions are progressively removed (R. Otto, Mysticism East and West [New York: Meridian Books, 1957] and M. Ramana, Maharshi's Gospel [Tiruvannamalai, India: Ramanasramam, 1946]).
  5. . K.Gaarder, “Control of States of Consciousness. I. Attainment through Control of Psychophysiological Variables,” Archives of General Psychiatry  25 (1971): 429–35.
  6. . B.Gert, “Can a Brain Have a PainPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research  27 (1966): 432–36. For an illuminating discussion touching on “brain death ‘as the criterion for the death of the person, see L. R.Kass, “Death as an Event: A Commentary on Robert Morison,” Science  173 (1971): 698–702.
  7. . Cf. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson Publishing Group, 1949), p. 198.
  8. . One wag expressed this proposition as “Cogitat ergo non est.”
  9. . H. E. Sigerist, A History of Medicine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), vol. 1, Primitive and Archaic Medicine.
  10. . W.Richards, “The Fortification Illusions of Migraines,” Scientific American  224 (1971): 88–96.
  11. . R. J.Vetter and S.Weinstein, “The History of the Phantom in Congenitally Absent Limbs,” Neuropsychologia  5 (1967): 335–38.
  12. . Myers (n. 1 above).
  13. . Cf. the “autocerebroscope” of Herbert Feigl (H. Feigl, “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical,”” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958], 2:370–497).
  14. . R. W.Sperry, “An Objective Approach to Subjective Experience: Further Explanation of a Hypothesis,” Psychological Review  77 (1970): 585–90.
  15. . K. H.Pribram, “The Realization of Mind,” Synthese  22 (1971): 313–22.
  16. . H.Morick, “Cartesian Privilege and the Strictly Mental,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research  31 (1971): 546–51.
  17. . Here “analogue” takes only the common English sense–not the sense by which it distinguishes analog computer from digital computer.
  18. . G. A. Kelly, The Psychology of Personal Constructs (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1955), vol. 1.
  19. . Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post‐critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
  20. . Sperry (n. 14 above).
  21. . K.Gaarder, “Control of States of Consciousness. 11. Attainment through External Feedback Augmenting Control of Psychophysiological Variables,” Archives of General Psychiatry  25 (1971): 436–41.
  22. . D.Goleman, “Meditation as Meta‐Therapy: Hypotheses toward a Proposed Fifth State of Consciousness,” Journal of Transpersonal Psychology  3 (1971): 1–25.
  23. . An authentic spokesman of the Vedic tradition, Ramana (n. 4 above) specifically cautioned his devotees against trying to locate “I‐ness” in the head, saying that the region of the heart had more intuitive validity‐though, strictly speaking, conscious ness could have no particular place assigned to it in the physical world, since that world was no more than an illusion, while only consciousness was real.
  24. . Since analogues are conscious, the attribute self is conscious. Here “conscious” takes only the sense “present to awareness at some time.” An analogue that was present to my awareness yesterday need not have been verbally reportable then and need not be recallable now; but, awake and in my right mind, I can always be aware of some large subset of attribute‐self analogues.
  25. . A. A. Millie and A. Lenard, Wznnie ille Pu (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1960). Cf. Ryle (n. 7 above), pp. 195–98.
  26. . Ryle.
  27. . B. A.Farrell, “On the Design of a Conscious Device,” Mind  79 (1970): 321–46.
  28. . Sperry (n. 14 above).