Notes

  1. . Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson Publishing Group, 1949).
  2. . See A. R. Peacocke, “Reductionism: A Review of the Epistemological Issues and Their Relevance to Biology and the Problem of Consciousness,” in this issue.
  3. . U. T.Place,“Is Consciousness a Brain ProcessBritish Journal of Psychology  47 (1956): 44–50.
  4. . J. W. Cornman, Materialism and Sensations (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), and A. M. Quinton, The Nature of Things (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973).
  5. . J. J. C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963).
  6. . Ibid., pp. 94–95.
  7. . D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind (London; Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968). and D. Lewis, “An Argument for the Identity Theory,” Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966): 17–25.
  8. . Armstrong, p. 82.
  9. . R.Rorty,“Mind‐Body Identity, Privacy and Categories,”Review of Metaphysics  19 (1965):24–54, and P.Feyerabend,“Materialism and the Mind‐Body Problem,”Review of Metaphysics  17 (1963): 49–66.