Notes

1. . William A. Blanpied, Interdisciplinary Workshop on the Interrelationships between Science and Technology, and Ethics and Values (Cambridge, Mass.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1975), p. 9.
2. . Ian G. Barbour, Christianity and the Scientist (New York: Association Press, 1960).
3. . Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (New York: Harper & Row, Torchbooks, 1971); originally published by Prentice‐Hall, Inc., 1966, See D. M. MacKay's review in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (1967): 259–61.
4. . Barbour, Issues, pp. 4–5.
5. . Ibid., pp. 124–25.
6. . Ibid., p. 264.
7. . Ibid., p 269.
8. . Ibid., p. 270.
9. . Ian G. Barbour, Science and Secularity: The Ethics of Technology (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).
10. . Ian G. Barbour, Earth Might Be Fair: Reflections on Ethics, Religion, and Ecology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice‐Hall, Inc., 1972).
11. . LynnWhite, Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” Science  155 (1967): 1203.
12. . Barbour, Earth Might Be Fair, p. 151.
13. . Barbour, Science and Secularity, p. 56.
14. . Ibid.
15. . Ian G. Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms: A Comparative Study in Science and Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), p. 27.
16. . Ibid., p. 179.
17. . Ibid., p. 38.
18. . Ibid., p. 42.
19. . Ibid., p. 49.
20. . Ibid., p. 56.
21. . Ibid., p. 58.
22. . Ibid., p. 146.
23. . Barbour, Issues, p. 11.
24. . Ralph WendellBurhoe, “The Human Prospect and the ‘Lord of History,”” Zygon  10 (1975): 352–53.
25. . Ibid., p. 361.
26. . Ralph Wendell Burhoe, ed., Science and Human Values in the 21st Century (Philadelphia: Wesminster Press, 1971).
27. . Robert J. Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974).
28. . NicholasWade, “Robert L. Heilbroner: Portrait of a World without Science,” Science  161 (1974): 599.
29. . LangdonGilkey, “Robert L. Heilbroner's Vision of History,” Zygon  10 (1975): 224.
30. . Ibid., p. 231.
31. . Ibid., p. 233.
32. . Burhoe, “The Human Prospect,” p. 328.
33. . Claude Levi‐Strauss, Structural Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1963), p. 216.
34. . Ibid., p. 224.
35. . Ibid., p. 230.
36. . Ibid., p. 210.
37. . Cf. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 90.
38. . Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 28.
39. . “The Search for Someone to Believe In,” Time  (April 26, 1976), pp. 12–13.
40. . James Reston, New York Times (May 30, 1976), sec. E, p. 15; Reston's quotation is from Walter Lippmann's A Preface to Morals (1929).
41. . As quoted in Chicago Sun‐Times (June 9, 1976), p. 4.
42. . Publishers Weekly (February 9, 1976), pp. 42–43.
43. . “How Crime and Violence Will Be Stopped” (New York: Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, undated), unpaginated.
44. . See n. 42 above.
45. . Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, s. v. “naturalism.“
46. . Ibid.
47. . Stephen Toulmin, “Contemporary Scientific Mythology,” in Metaphysical Beliefs, ed. Alasdair MacIntyre (London: SCM Press, 1957), pp. 77–78.
48. . John Dominic Crossan, The Dark Interval (Niles, 111.: Argus Communications, 1975), p. 57.
49. . As quoted in Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna (New York: Simon & Schuster, Touchstone Paperbacks, 1973), p. 75.
50. . Bell (n. 38 above), p. 41.
51. . StephenEmlen, “An Alternate Case for Sociobiology,” Science  161 (1976): 736.
52. . Ibid.
53. . Donald T. Campbell, “On the Conflicts between Biological and Social Evolution and between Psychology and Moral Tradition,” American Psychologist (December 1975), p. 1120; reprinted in Zygon 11 (1976): 167–208.
54. . Steven Marcus, “Lionel Trilling, 1905–1975,” New York Times Book Review (February 8, 1976), p. 2.
55. . The rhetoric of such agencies as the National Endowment for the Humanities reflects an assumption that if a new cultural or mythological (they no longer avoid the word) synthesis emerges it will emerge as literature. On my analysis, however, literature is parabolic, not mythic. Escapist literature offers an alternative world which we are not expected to regard as a serious alternative to our own. Protest literature–and modern literature is full of protest–is parabolic in the fullest sense, undermining the accepted world without offering an alternative: what more modern and more utterly trite a slogan than “I don't claim to have the answers, I'm just raising the question? Between protest and escape, there is “serious literature,” challenging the accepted world precisely because, in one particular or another, it does offer a beautiful or disturbing alternative. All of these are valuable, but all are challenging; and, though finding a myth is a challenge, myth itself does not challenge: It is what receives the challenge. A mythological synthesis from literature is therefore a contradiction in terms. If the good sought in government‐sponsored humanities programs is, at some remove, a restoration of public faith, the government is wasting its money.
56. . E. O. Willson, “The Lyric Poet of Evolution,” Saturday Review (April 3, 1976), p. 28. Apropos the same metascientific challenge, cf. the following exchange between Campbell and the late Jacques Monod: “Monod:… the increase of the efficiency of a group is not a measure of the objective validity of (an) idea at all, as we know it only too well. (But) the second and more mysterious, and in some respects more interesting, selective course is the question, unresolved question, whether we are preconditioned through selection to accept easily certain kinds of interpretation and to reject without even considering them other kinds of explanation. I am rather strongly of the opinion that there is such a predisposition in our genetic make‐up, to the extent that the social level system has predetermined categories, and this exists and can be justified by considerations of natural selection…. a sort of wish to be brainwashed, as it were…. Campbell: If you agree now that these social customs are the products of a selective retention process, do you not end up then believing that they are functional, and in some sense wise Monod: There is no doubt at all…. Campbell:… In so far as these are functional, you must see in their functioning a kind of truth. Rather than looking at their literal inconsistency with science, could you not attempt to translate that truth into a more acceptable language in so far as religious language is competing as a scientific language, which you seem to assume it is and I agree that it has been Monod: I think so. I agree with you. I haven't tried to do anything of that kind, because it is beyond my capacity but I think it should be done… should be attempted” (as quoted in Theodosius Dobzhansky and Francisco Ayala, eds., Studies in the Philosophy of Biology (London: Macmillan Press, 1974).