Notes

1. . RalphWendell Burhoe, “The Human Prospect and the ‘Lord of History. Zygon  10(1975):299–375.
2. . Zygon, vol. 10, no. 3, September 1975. The Symposium on “The Human Prospect: Heilbroner's Challenge to Religion and Science” was held in Washington, D.C., on October 23–24, 1974, by the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science. The Advanced Seminar in Theology and the Sciences, held by the Center for Advanced Study in Religion and Science in conjunction with the Chicago Cluster of Theological Schools, met in the spring of 1976 on ten Thursday evenings, with attendance by some twenty persons mostly on Chicago‐area‐school faculties in theology and the sciences.
3. . Robert L. Heilbroner, An inquiry into the Human Prospect (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974).
4. . Charles P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
5. . My understanding of the barriers of communication was greatly amplified by my seventeen years as executive officer of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1947–64), where I was a common factor in all kinds of interdisciplinary meetings and conferences. The Academy is a very unusual institution with a tradition for interdisciplinary communication that evolved for nearly two centuries as the most outstanding people in their fields tried to communicate with similarly placed people in all academic disciplines and professional fields. My own polyglot education and interests added to my understanding so that I am quite aware from first‐hand experience of the seriousness of the communication problem in the top levels of today's culture.
6. . ArnoldW. Ravin. On Natural and Human Selection, or Saving Religion. Zygon  12(1977): 27–41.
7. . JohnA. Miles, Jr.Burhoe, Barbour, Mythology, and Sociobiology. Zygon  12(1977): 42.
8. . Max Planck, Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers, trans. F. Gaynor (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), pp. 33–34.
9. . Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 150.
10. . Ibid., p. 10.
11. . Ibid., p. 162.
12. . The reformation of religions provides a quite parallel dynamics in terms of crisis produced by newly experienced conditions, the failure of the old ideas, and the appearance of new prophets and visions, with final reconstitution of the system and a less turbulent period of normal orthodoxy. A. F. C. Wallace has written an acute generalization of this, using psychological and thermodynamic concepts among others to account for it: “Religious Revitalization,” an occasional paper of the Institute on Relgion in an Age of Science, 1961, which was republished in different form in his Religion: An Anthropological View (New York: Random House, 1966), mostly within pp. 29–38.
13. . See my “Appendix on the Publishers [of Zygon]: IRAS and CASIRAS,” Zygon 10 (1975): 116–122 and “The Institute on Religion in an Age of Science: A Twenty‐Year View,” Zygon 8 (1973): 59–80 for some of the history of the movement and the names of various participants. And for some of philosophy and problems of the movement see esp. my editorials in Zygon 1 (1966): 1–10, 9 (1974): 2–6, and 10 (1975): 2–11.
14. . See n. 6 above.
15. . For a classical statement of “The Case for Sociocultural Evolution” see the section of that title in “On the conflicts between Biological and Social Evolution and between Psychology and Moral Tradition” by Donald T. Campbell, Zygon 11 (1976): 167–209. See also the other papers in that September 1976 issue, which is devoted to “Religion's Role in the Context of Genetic and Cultural Evolution–Campbell's Hypotheses and Some Evaluative Responses.” Various others in the past two decades have been turning their minds again to the puzzle of sociocultural evolution after an eclipse following the failure of the social Darwinists to make a good case beginning early in this century. Some philosophers and historians of science have been suggesting that even the trends in science are a part of a natural evolutionary process, such as Karl R. Popper and Kuhn. Kuhn, e.g., writes: “The analogy that relates the evolution of organisms to the evolution of scientific ideas can easily be pushed too far. But with respect to the issues of this closing section it is very nearly perfect…. The resolution of [scientific] revolutions is the selection by conflict within the scientific community of the fittest way to practice future science” (n. 9 above, p. 171). See also H. J. Hamilton's paper (“A Thermodynamic Theory of the Origin and Hierarchical Evolution of Living Systems”) in this issue of Zygon for a hypothesis that ties sociocultural evolution to a principle that may govern all changes from one level of stable states to another from physical particles to civilizations. George Edgin Pugh's The Biological Origin of Human Values (New York: Basic Books, 1977) is an excellent and comprehensive recent development of the field. Richard Dawkins in his The Selfish Gene (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), esp. the last chapter, “Memes: The New Replicators,” has joined the growing group who is finding ways to solve the puzzles of sociocultural evolution independently of genetic evolution. An early search that was a pioneer in this recent wave of new work on sociocultural evolution was developed and edited by Hudson Hoagland and me as Evolution and Man's Progress (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962) and also at the University of Chicago's Darwin Centennial, published in parts of vols. 2 and 3 of Evolution after Darwin, ed. Sol Tax, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).
16. . I have seen published studies analyzing this type of scientific mind and personality who keep separate their scientific views from certain practical areas of their lives, but I cannot find them just now. I am relying on memory and my personal experience with the population of scientists for saying it is a relatively small class.
17. . The journal of the American Scientific Affiliation is a quarterly published since 1949. It states that the “purpose of the Affiliation is to explore any and every area relating Christian faith and science.” The “Affiliation is an association of men and women who have made a personal commitment of themselves and their lives to jesus Christ as Lord and Savior, and who have made a personal commitment of themselves and their lives to a scientific understanding of the world.” For a picture of their attitude toward my scientific theology see “Pseudo‐Science and Pseudo‐Theology: (B) Scientific Theology” by Richard H. Bube (the editor of the Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation) in Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation (September 1977), pp. 124–29.
18. . Again, there is a considerable literature on this topic, written usually by persons engaged in the psychosocial sciences (including such as Anne Roe and Charles Y. Clock), but I am relying on memory and experience in the scientific community for my estimate that this class is large.
19. . Miles (n. 7 above), p. 49.
20. . F. S. C. Northrop, “The Methods and Grounds of Religious Knowledge,” in this issue. I suggest Northrop's writing may be more significant than Whitehead's for doing theology in relation to the sciences.
21. . “If man, and no other than man, is responsible for those selections that lead to cultural change, what help is it to tell us that man is part of a larger reality, that of nature? We are simply avoiding the difficulties inherent in our situation by throwing them all upon nature” (Ravin, p. 35).
22. . In my papers I have sided with the biologist George C. Williams's harder position on no hope for altruistic behavior from genetic selection in his Adaptation and Natural Selection (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966) over the somewhat softer view taken by E. O. Wilson in his Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1975). I even take the starker view of Richard Dawkins in his Selfish Gene (see n. 15 above).
23. . Anne Roe and G. G. Simpson, eds., Behavior and Evolution (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958), pp. 519 if. Also see my “Lord of History,” pp. 313–14, for a general statement. The same message appears in many of my papers. See also n. 45 below.
24. . Kuhn has noted that in the development of new paradigms “almost always the men who achieve these fundamental inventions of a new paradigm have been either very young or very new to the field whose paradigm they change” (n. 9 above, pp. 89–90).
25. . J. Bronowski, “New Concepts in the Evolution of Complexity,” Zygon 5 (1970): 18–35, and Ralph Wendell Burhoe, “Commentary” thereon, ibid., 36–40.
26. . RalphWendell Burhoe. Natural Selection and God. Zygon  7(1972): 30–63; A.Katchalsky. Thermodynamics of Flow and Biological Organization. Zygon  6(1971): 99–125.
27. . My statements about the brain's role in cultural evolution are in many papers but also in the two papers Ravin is criticizing; for instance, in “Lord of History,” pp. 305–7, 309–10, and passim throughout the paper; in “Civilization of the Future,” Philosophy Forum 13 (1973): 149–77, passim.
28. . For instance, see my “Civilization of the Future,” pp. 161–62, or my “Lord of History,” pp. 314–17.
29. . See Kuhn (n. 15 above).
30. . In my “The Source of Civilization in the Natural Selection of Coadapted Information in Genes and Culture” (Zygon 11 [1976]: 263–303) I have given more details on how changes, in any part of the information either solely within the genes or in any other sources that shape any phenotype, must be adjusted to all other elements of the informing or shaping system–a process known in biology as coadaptation.
31. . For “idene” we are indebted to Henry Alexander Murray's quip for the cultural analogue of the gene in a conference of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1959 on “The Concept of Progress in Terms of Biological and Cultural Evolution.” Hudson Hoagland and Julian Huxley used “idea” (Nature 196 [1962]: 203). For “meme” see Dawkins (n. 15 above).
32. . Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), p. 111.
33. . “Epistemic correlation” is Northrop's term for what P. W. Bridgman calls “operational definition,” for what Henry Margenau calls the linkages between the conceptual field and the plane of experience, and for what other scientists and philosophers of science have differing terminology. The concept as I analyze it is primarily to show that scientists in general are never satisfied with merely symbolic games or tautologies, and they insist on an empirical connection, a connection of the verbal or other symbols to some preverbal experiences common to men in general, such as sense data. I believe it is this linkage or correlation between verbal and preverbal brain events that ties the sciences more closely than earlier logical philosophies to selection by the presumed “real world” or nature.
34. . My “Five Steps in the Evolution of Man's Knowledge of Good and Evil” (Zygon 2 [1967]: 77–96) provides more details of my scientific approach to epistemology, ontology, and axiology.
35. . See n. 26 above.
36. . We “believe that in Japanese macaques the ‘incest taboo,’ as a result of which male macaques to not mate with their mothers or sisters, is not genetically determined but has its source in a developmental process.” This conclusion, based on investigations reported by G. Gray Eaton on p. 102 of his “The Social Order of Japanese Macaques” (Scientific American 253 [October 1976]: 96–106), lends evidence even to prehuman culturetypic evolution of the incest taboo where offspring live together in troops ranging from fifty to one hundred fifty in which only a few would be as closely related as one‐half. I cannot find my reference to a recent paper (I think in Science) which on the side provided an account for the cultural taboo against incest among humans and its coadaptive virtue for the gene pool. If someone could supply me with that or related references, I would be grateful.
37. . See Alfred E. Emerson and Ralph Wendell Burhoe, “Evolutionary Aspects of Freedom, Death, and Dignity,” Zygon 9 (1974): 156–82, and Robert J. Lifton, The Life of the Self (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976).
38. . See reference to necessity for coadaptation of cultural to genetic information in n. 30 above.
39. . The intimate correlation of consciousness and brain is another problem that produces logical paradoxes in our language as we shift from the subjective to the objective mode of talking. They are really all the same, namely, human talking about human experiencing. But our language and conceptual system provide confusion when not used carefully. R. W. Sperry's papers (see, for instance, his “Science and the Problem of Values, “Zygon 9 [1974]: 7–21), the work of Susan K. Langer in Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967, 1972), vols. 1 and 2, and the work of Pugh in his Biological Origin of Human Values (n. 15 above) are all examples of new understandings of the identity of mind and matter and of new ways of clarifying our language to avoid the traditional ‐paradox.
40. . My papers have provided much evidence from various sources concerning this, but I think a most important recent presentation of it is Pugh's book.
41. . Brownoski (n. 25 above).
42. . Ibid., p. 33.
43. . My “Lord of History,” p. 360.
44. . Ibid., p. 368 (italics added).
45. . In 1957 I wrote in my “Salvation in the Twentieth Century,” published as chap. 6 in Science Ponders Religion, ed. Harlow Shapley (New York: Appleton‐Century‐Crofts, 1960), that the “thesis here presented is that religion is that organ or institution of culture which provides the most all‐embracing and fundamental integration of ideas and attitudes that move man to behavior that makes life possible. Religion is to human culture what the neuroendocrine motivational centers are to the animal body” (p. 69). “In human life, motivation [including that for self‐sacrificial social life] as well as know‐how must be provided in part by the culture; and it is this cultural patterning of motivation, of values, especially with regard to the prime necessities, or, as theologian Paul Tillich would say, with regard to the areas of ultimate concern, that we call religion…. It seems to be a reasonable interpretation that religions have evolved like the other elements of culture, such as language or agriculture, largely without any man's premeditated design. Moreover, the complexity and effectiveness of religion, like language or agriculture, are such as to defy any ready and facile rational analysis” (p. 71). This thesis of the operation of nonhumanly planned selection of viable designs in cultural evolution–which is quite overlooked by Ravin–has been central in my hypotheses for more than three decades. But only in the past few years have I been struck with the real integration of the genes and the cultural patterns through an extension of the phenomenon that the biological community has called “coadaptation,” which is developed in recent and forthcoming papers. The hypothesis hangs upon the empirical facts of the selection process and whether and how the multiple units in the “information” (the remembered and encoded symbol systems of genes, cultures, and other extrachromosomal and extraorganic repositories of information systems which structure the behavior of human systems) are selected by the viability of their common phenotype–the human societies or civilizations or, one could say, the human societal ecological niches. But it appears to me almost incontestable that a delicately balanced integration of all elements of the information system–coadaptation–is a sine qua non.
46. . My “Civilization of the Future” (n. 27 above), p. 15f (italics added).
47. . Ibid., p. 152 (italics added).
48. . My “Lord of History,” p. 310.
49. . Ibid., p. 301 and passim throughout the paper.
50. . On biological systems analyzed in terms of the thermodynamics of the “dissipative structures” of thermodynamic energy‐flow patterns see A. Katchalsky's “Thermodynamics of Flow and Biological Organization,” Zygon 6 (1971): 99–125, for instance, as well as Hamilton's paper in this issue.
51. . Kuhn (n. 9 above), p. 151.
52. . For the mind‐matter question see, for instance, the section on “Subjective and Objective” in my “The Phenomenon of Religion Seen Scientifically,” pp. 24–26 of chap. 1 in Changing Perspectives in the Scientific Study of Religion, ed. Allan W. Eister (New York: Wiley‐Interscience Series, 1974). There, among others, 1 cite the Nobel‐Prize physicist K. Schrodinger's as one of the best resolutions: “The reason why our sentient, percipient, and thinking ego is met nowhere within our scientific world picture can easily be indicated in seven words: because it is itself that world picture.” For the freedom‐determinism question, 1 still think my presentation in my “Lord of History,” pp. 336–46, is good.
53. . Some are listed in n. 39 above.
54. . Among several other places I have described the mythic character of the sciences in my “A Scientific View of the Role of Religion” on p. 156 of my Science and Human Values in the 21st Century (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1971).
55. . See Northrop (n. 20 above), Kuhn (n. 9 above), and Popper (n. 32 above). Also see Henry Alexander Murray's statement of the scientist “who favored the inclusion of the ‘truest’ scientific models and theories as a special class of myths. He called attention to the fact that for three decades or more scientists have been regarding their most valid concepts of imperceptible entities as well as their best‐confirmed theorems… as… convenient ‘myths …” (Daedalus issue on myth and mythmaking [Spring 1959], p. 218). See also Philipp Frank's similar statements, ibid. (Fall 1958), p. 159.
56. . See especially the accounts in Richard von Mises's Postivism: A Study in Human Understanding (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951) and in Philip Frank's Philosophy of Science: The Link between Science and Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice‐Hall, 1957) and many other works since, including Kuhn's, which quite clearly have shown the recognition of the relativity of scientific knowledge and the impossibility of man's having any absolute or final truth. Ravin's statement is on p. 33 of his paper. Grounds for understanding the unity of mind and matter were pioneered by such prominent (Nobel Prize‐winning) physicists as P. W. Bridgman (see his The Way Things Are [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959]) and Erwin Schrodinger (see his Mind and Matter [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959]).
57. . My acknowledgement of the incompleteness of science is customary, and is included for instance in my “Lord of History,” pp. 360–61, 365, and is more completely stated in my “Source of Civilization” (n. 30 above), pp. 267–68. I have had personal experience with what Miles and Kuhn speak of as the requirement of “death staring from the shadows” or of a “crisis” before a new paradigm can come into being. I can remember meetings when Henry Helm Clayton in 1937 tried to tell the meteorological community that they should take into consideration his evidence that the solar variations had an effect upon the earth's weather sufficient to be important for cycles and the forecasting of daily weather–and seeing the sages of the meteorological community laugh at him, only to repent twenty years later when some of them validated such claims. I remember talking with Robert Goddard in 1938 and hearing his unhappiness over the failure of the United States government or his colleagues in physics to take seriously his work in the development of rocket engines that might be important not only for military use but for going to the moon. Such stories can be multiplied ad infinitum as characteristic of both the history of science and of religion. The first men to recognize the inadequacy of an element of culture and to discover or invent a solution are usually outsiders until a severe crisis or death stares in the face of the larger community of which they are a part.
58. . For Campbell's picture see n. 15 above. My published papers developing hypotheses concerning a cultural heritage that provides a wisdom of the culture–analogous to and cooperating with Walter B. Cannon's genetically programmed wisdom of the body–goes back as far as my 1957 “Salvation in the Twentieth Century” (see n. 45 above, esp. p. 69).
59. . Various aspects of these reasons have been presented in several of my papers, esp. “Five Steps in the Evolution of Man's Knowledge of Good and Evil,” Zygon 2 (1967): 77–96, and “Source of Civilization” (n. 30 above).
60. . The generally accepted criteria for distinguishing science from technology have been presented in Zygon in various papers, but perhaps succinctly in R. B. Lindsay's “The Scientific and Technological Revolutions and Their Implications for Society.” Zygon 7 (1973): 212–43. Several of my publications have indicated why religion is an art or technology (it serves to fulfill human needs) and theology is a science in accord with the prevailing distinctions, one such publication being Science and Human Values in the 21st Century (n. 54 above), chaps. 7–8.
61. . See particularly my “Source of Civilization” (n. 30 above).
62. . See my “Lord of History,” p. 321, and consult C. F. von Weizsäcker's thesis in his The Relevance of Science (New York: Harper & Row, 1955).
63. . See, for instance, my “Bridging the Gap between Psychiatry and Theology,” Journal of Religion and Health 8 (1968): 215–26. See also Campbell's “On the Conflicts between Biological and Social Evolution and between Psychology and Moral Tradition” (n. 15 above).
64. . W. Widick Schroeder, “‘The Human Prospect and the “Lord of History’“: A Process Critique,” Zygon 12 (1977): 4–26; Donald W. Musser, “Two Types of Scientific Theology: Burhoe and Nygren,” ibid., pp. 72–87; Philip Hefner, “To What Extent Can Science Replace Metaphysics? Reflecting with Ralph Wendell Burhoe on the ‘Lord of History,’“ibid., pp. 88–104.
65. . von Mises (n. 56 above), p. 140.
66. . Northrop (n. 20 above).
67. . Eric J. Chaisson, “The Scenario of Cosmic Evolution,” Harvard Magazine 80 (November‐December 1977): 21–33. Harlow Shapley wrote “All Nature is God and all God is Nature” on p. 279 of his “Life, Hope, and Cosmic Evolution,” Zygon 1 (1966): 275–85.