Notes

1. . C. W. Reitdijk, On Waves, Particles and Hidden Variables (Assen, Holland: Van Gorcum, 1971), p. 130.
2. . For a historical survey of hidden‐variable theories, see Max Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), pp. 253–339.
3. . On the factual background of this saying see Ronald W. Clark, Einstein: The Life and Times (New York: Avon Books, 1971), pp. 414–23.
4. . See, e.g., Alan Richardson's discussion in The Bible in the Age of Science (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961), pp. 36–39. The eighteenth‐century deists, like Einstein and Reitdijk, held that a deterministic world order was divinely ordained but did not have to cast their arguments in opposition to twentieth‐century developments of quantum mechanics.
5. . For a discussion of the problems of biblical exegesis see Jerome J. Langford, Galileo, Science and the Church (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1976), pp. 34–78.
6. . Richardson, p. 28.
7. . Bernard Lonergan, A Second Collection, ed, W. Ryan and B. Tyrrell (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1979), pp. vii‐x, 223, 277, and Method in Theology (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972), p. 340.
8. . Bernard Lonergan set forth the basic elements of his cognitional theory in Insight (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958), pp. 272–75, 319–57 and in “Cognitional Structure,” in Collection, ed. F. E. Crowe (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), pp. 221–39.
9. . Lonergan, Insight, pp. 37, 45, 53, 106, 443.
10. . Ibid., pp. 71–74.
11. . Ibid., p. 28.
12. . Ibid.
13. . Ibid.
14. . The question of which group was first to discover the particle may never be settled. The Stanford group apparently collected the first data on the new particle, while the Brookhaven team seems to have been first correctly to interpret their data. The two groups became certain of their findings within days of each other, and agreed upon a joint announcement. See William D. Metz,“Particle Search Ends in an Amazing Coincidence,” Science, 186 (1974): 910.
15. . Lonergan, Insight, pp. 39–43, 142–48.
16. . Ibid., pp. 442–43, 516–19.
17. . Ibid., pp. 33, 76–78.
18. . Ibid., p. 77.
19. . Ibid., p. 78. See also pp. 36–46.
20. . Ibid., p. 38.
21. . Ibid., p. 38–39.
22. . Ibid., pp. 89–93.
23. . Ibid., pp. 46–47.
24. . Ibid., p. 46.
25. . Ibid.
26. . Ibid., p. 47.
27. . Ibid., p. 48.
28. . Ibid., p. 47.
29. . Lonergan cites besides the complicated problems of distinguishing types of insights, the philosophical doctrine he calls “mechanist determinism” as a source of the belief that world process is systematic (ibid., pp. 130–31, 254–55).
30. . Ibid., p. 48.
31. . Ibid., p. 51.
32. . Ibid., pp. 56–57.
33. . Ibid., pp. 57, 129–30.
34. . Ibid., p. 54.
35. . For a survey of these efforts and their limitations see Philip McShane, Randomness, Statistics and Emergence (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970) pp. 14–130, 149–69. See also J. Alberto Coffa,“Randomness and Knowledge,” in Proceedings of the 1972 Biennial Meeting, Philosophy of Science Association, ed. Kenneth F. Schaffner and Robert S. Cohen (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 103–15. An outline of the development of mathematical problem of randomness is presented on pp. 103–7. The remainder of the article, devoted to “physical randomness,” is vitiated by what Lonergan would call counterposition.
36. . Lonergan, Insight, p. 51.
37. . Ibid., pp. 49–50.
38. . Ibid., pp. 50–51.
39. . Ibid., pp. 59, 64.
40. . Ibid., p. 58.
41. . Ibid., pp. 59–60.
42. . Ibid., pp. 58–59.
43. . Ibid., p. 108. This idea is expanded on p. 110, where Lonergan wrote: “What concerns the statistical inquirer is, then, neither the purely systematic, nor the purely non‐systematic, but the systematic as setting ideal limits from which the non‐systematic cannot diverge systematically.”
44. . Ibid., p. 278.
45. . Lonergan published his positions in Insight, pp. 634–86 and in Philosophy of God and Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973). For an excellent discussion of Lonergan's approach to the problem of human knowledge of God see Bernard Tyrrell, Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of God (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974).
46. . Lonergan, Insight, pp. 641–43. See also Tyrrell, pp. 134–40.
47. . Lonergan, Insight, pp. 319–35.
48. . Ibid., pp. 644–46, 655–69.
49. . Ibid., p. 644
50. . Ibid., pp. 348–53, 637.
51. . Ibid., p. 645.
52. . Ibid., p. 649 (italics added).
53. . Ibid., p. 650.
54. . Ibid., p. 278.
55. . Lonergan argued in detail that knowledge of such a plan and purpose was indeed implied by the existence of an unrestricted act of understanding (ibid., pp. 655–57, 661, 663–64).
56. . Ibid., pp. 666–69.
57. . Ibid., p. 651.
58. . Richardson (n. 4 above), p. 28.