Notes

1. . These may be found in Harry Prosch's review of Richard Gelwick's The Way of Discovery in Ethics 89 (January 1979): 211–16. Prosch also discussed these issues at the 1979) American Academy of Religion meeting, and a report is contained in the Polanyi Society Newsletter 7 (Winter 1980): 5.
2. . Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 104.
3. . Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torch‐books, 1964), p. 202.
4. . Polanyi and Prosch, pp. 71–75.
5. . Ibid., p. 125.
6. . This synopsis hardly does justice to all the nuances of Prosch's interpretation, although I trust it is fair. In order to appreciate how he interprets the “reality” of our imaginative works, especially values, one should consult HarryProsch, “Polanyi's Ethics,” Ethics  82 (January 1972): 91–113.
7. . See the concluding paragraphs of Polanyi and Prosch, pp. 215–16.
8. . See John V. Apczynski, Doers of the Word (Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977), p. 186.
9. . The importance of this for Pannenberg can be seen, for example, in the discussion of Pannenberg's theology presented in Theology as History, eds. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (New York: Harper & Row, 1967). In his “Response to the Discussion” Pannenberg almost laments the fact that the focus was on conceptual issues instead of the “substantive” one concerning the truth of the historical relationship between the preaching of primitive Christianity and the present, p. 223.
10. . Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation,” Revelation as History, trans. David Granskou (New York: Macmillan, 1968; original German edition, 1961), pp. 125–58.
11. . Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, trans. Francis McDonagh (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976). The original 1973 German edition is entitled Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie.
12. . Ibid., pp. 35–55.
13. . Ibid., pp. 69–70.
14. . Ibid., pp. 102–3.
15. . Ibid., p. 149.
16. . Ibid., p. 151.
17. . Ibid., p. 163.
18. . Ibid., p. 168.
19. . Ibid., pp. 176–77.
20. . Ibid., p. 184.
21. . Ibid., pp. 194–95.
22. . Ibid., pp. 202–5.
23. . Ibid., pp. 216–17.
24. . Ibid., p. 220.
25. . Ibid., pp. 220–24.
26. . Ibid., p. 300.
27. . Ibid., p. 303.
28. . Ibid., p. 310 (original in italics).
29. . Ibid., p. 315.
30. . Ibid., pp. 321–22.
31. . Ibid., pp. 326–27.
32. . Ibid., pp. 327–32.
33. . Ibid., pp. 336–41.
34. . Ibid., p. 343.
35. . Ibid.
36. . Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Faith and Reason,” Basic Questions in Theology, trans. George H. Kehm, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970–71), 2: 59–63.
37. . See, for example, Pannenberg, “Insight and Faith,” Basic Questions  , 2:32–34.
38. . Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, p. 194.
39. . Ibid., pp. 42–43, 50–55.
40. . Ibid., pp. 320–21 and p. 321, n. 630.
41. . This is the problem Michael Polanyi describes at the beginning of The Study of Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Phoenix Books, 1963), pp. 11–12.
42. . Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, p. 217, n. 433.
43. . WolfhartPannenberg, “What is a Dogmatic StatementBasic Questions in Theology  , 1:203.
44. . Pannenberg, “Analogy and Doxology,” Basic Questions  , 1:216.
45. . Pannenberg, “What Is a Dogmatic StatementBasic Questions  , 1:204.
46. . Pannenberg, “Analogy and Doxology,” Basic Questions  , 1:226–30.
47. . As additional examples we may note briefly Pannenberg's claim that the “resurrection” is a metaphor whose meaning Christians do not really know. See Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus‐God and Man,” trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968), p. 187; “The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth,” Theology w History, pp. 114–15; and “What Is Truth?” Basic Questions, 2:24. Part of what Pannenberg intends to affirm by this is that a literal picturing of the resurrection as the resuscitation of a corpse is inadmissable. He must emphasize this because he holds that the resurrection is a historical event in the sense that we can assess the claim of the earliest Christian testimony concerning it. On the other hand, however, he must hold for systematic reasons that, even though the resurrection anticipates the totality of history, it still must allow the future to be open: if we do not know what it means, history apparently remains open. Polanyi's understanding of “metaphor” as a transnatural integration whose meaning is discerned by a self–giving integration would achieve most of Pannenberg's major points without the strange requirement that Christians would not really know what one of their central terms meant. We may also note that Pannenberg recognizes that an “intuition” is necessary for discerning the relationship between historical events. Yet he affirms that such a relationship, once discerned, must be expressed in historical hypotheses for confirmation. See “Redemptive Event and History,” Basic Questions, 1:50–51, n. 91. Against what are the hypotheses to be tested if the intuition is not allowed to function as an integral part of knowledge? Polanyi's understanding of our tacit reliance on particulars to discern their joint meaning could assist in clarifying Pannenberg's intention here.
48. . Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, p. 343.
49. . This critique is similar to the one made by Polanyi against the misconception that scientific hypotheses are impersonally tested against observation. See Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Phoenix Books, 1964); pp. 28–29.
50. . Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, p. 344.
51. . See Polanyi's account, for example, in Science, Faith and Society, pp. 7–19.
52. . Michael Polanyi, “Science and Man's Place in the Universe,” Science as a Cultural Force, ed. Harry Woolf (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964), p. 63.
53. . Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (n. 3 above), p. 378.
54. . See Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Anchor Books, 1967), p. 78 for one instance of Polanyi's explanation of this concept.
55. . Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 202.
56. . Polanyi has actually described four aspects of the structure of tacit knowing: the functional, phenomenal, semantic, and ontological. See The Tacit Dimension, pp. 9–13 and Michael Polanyi, “The Logic of Tacit Inference,” and “The Structure of Consciousness,” Knowing and Being, ed. Marjorie Grene (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 141, 212.
57. . Polanyi, “The Logic of Tacit Inference,” Knowing and Being, p. 141.
58. . Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, p. 24.
59. . Ibid., p. 23.
60. . MichaelPolanyi, “Faith and Reason,” Journal of Religion  41 (1961): 243.
61. . Polanyi, “Knowing and Being,”Knowing and Being, p. 129.
62. . See Polanyi, “The Structure of Consciousness” and “Life's Irreducible Structure,” Knowing and Being, pp. 211–24 and 225–39; and “Order,” in Polanyi and Prosch (n. 2 above), pp. 161–81.
63. . Polanyi, “Life's Irreducible Structure,” Knowing and Being, p. 238.
64. . Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 403.
65. . See, for example, Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society (n. 49 above), pp. 56–7 and his later rejection of this view in his new introduction to the Phoenix edition on p. 17.
66. . Polanyi, The Study of Man (n. 41 above), pp. 58–62.
67. . This interpretation is similar to Marjorie Grene's. See her The Knower and the Known (London: Faber & Faber, 1966), pp. 157–82.
68. . Polanyi and Prosch. pp. 78–79.
69. . Ibid., p. 92.
70. . Ibid., p. 125.
71. . Ibid., p. 109.
72. . Ibid., p. 153.
73. . Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 198.
74. . Ibid., pp. 197–98; see also Polanyi and Prosch, pp. 128–30.
75. . An earlier and more detailed expression of this may be found in Apczynski, Doers of the Word (n. 8 above), pp. 163–6j.
76. . Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 281.
77. . This appears to be the way Polanyi understood what I have termed the primary sense of religious meaning. See Personal Knowledge, p. 282. For a similar understanding of Christian belief as a skill, see Nicholas Lash, Theology on Dover Beach (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), pp. 45–59. Lash bases his analysis on insights derived from John Henry Newman.
78. . My use of “symbol” here is theological and includes properties that Polanyi ascribes to both “symbol” and “metaphor.” That is, in the primary sense of the meanings of religious expressions both the subsidiary and the focal elements are of intrinsic interest while at the same time in their primordial sense they stand for the ontological ground to which they point. This is a commonly, though not universally, accepted understanding of religious meaning. See, for example, AveryDulles, “The Symbolic Structure of Revelation,” Theological Studies  41 (1980): 51–73.
79. . This revised understanding does not restrict the meaning of revelation to the objective event conceived impersonally in its context in the history of the transmission of traditions; it requires rather the participation of the knower in the tradition so that the “doxological” character of the language of the tradition which indicates the religious meaning of the event can be understood.
80. . See Polanyi and Prosch, pp. 39–41 for an example of Polanyi's analysis of the kinds of unspecifiability of subsidiaries in tacit inferences.
81. . For a more detailed treatment of this issue from a Polanyian perspective, see John V.Apczynski, “Integrative Theology,” Theological Studies  39 (1979): 35–37.