Notes

1. . Aristotle De Sophisticis Elenchis 5. 167b14–15 “for from what is not nothing could possibly come to be” with Physics 8.1. Cf. Topics 2.2. 109b23, 4.6. 128b7‐9, 6.2. 139b20; Soph. El. 5. 166b37; De Generatione et Corruptione 1.3. 317b3, De Anima 3.7. 431a3‐4. But see note 16 below. For the unabashed definition of creation as the generation of “something out of nothing” (uysa min laysa), see for example, On Definitions by the ninth‐century Arab philosopher al‐Kindi. For the closing of the Academv. see Azathias Histoy of the Reign of Justinian 2.30‐31, C. J. de Vogel, Greek Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 1964), 3:590–91.
2. . Parmenides frg. 8 in Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, 145, in The Presocrutic Philosophers, ed. and trans. G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 273, text no. 347, line 6.
3. . See Aristotle Metaphysics 1.5, esp. 986b15; cf. 1.2–3, esp. 983136.
4. . See Aristotle Physics 1.8; cf. 1.4. 187a29, 1.7, esp. 190b, 8. 191b10. For Xeniades' elenchus see Sextus Empiricus Against the Logicians 1.53 (= Diels frg. 81). In the Topics Aristotle makes a point of distinguishing the theses and paradoxes of eminent philosophers from mere sophisms (1.11. 104b18).
5. . See for example Ibn Rushd (Averroes) Tahâfut al‐Tahâfut, ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1930), trans., S. Van Den Bergh as The Incoherence of the Incoherence. Typically: “This argument is in the highest degree dialectical and does not reach the pitch of demonstrative proof. For its premises are common notions, and common notions approach the equivocal…” (Bouyges, p. 5)–addressed to the claim that possibility does not require matter as a substrate.
6. . The rejection of the idea of creation in Greek (and Greek inspired) philosophical thinking fused what we would discriminate as religious and scientific/metaphysical objections at the presumed unseemliness of an interruption in the cosmic order. The linking of theological with “logical” arguments for the eternity of the world is a prominent feature of Aristotle's Physics and De Caelo, and the interaction of these themes has become even more prominent in the eighteen arguments of Proclus for the eternity of the world. See T. Taylor, trans., The Fragments that Remain of the Lost Writings of Proclus (London: Black, Young and Young, 1825), p. 38, and for the first argument, lost in Greek, Philoponus apud Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics A.‐R. Badawi, ed., Neo‐Platonici apud Arabes, Islamica 19 (1955) and Shahrastânî, Kitâb al‐Milal wa 'l‐Nihal, ed. Cureton (London: Society for the Publication of Oriental Texts, 1842), p. 338. For the necessity of cyclicity see Aristotle De Generatione et Corruptione 2.11, but cf. History of Animals 5.1; cf. Ibn Rushd Tahâfut al‐Tahâfut, pp. 41‐52, 88, trans. Van Den Bergh, 23‐30, 51.
7. . For Philoponus see S. Sambursky, The Physical World of late Antiquity (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. 170‐75; I. P. Sheldon‐Williams in The Cambridge Histo? of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967); R. Walzer, Greek into Arabic (Oxford: Cassirer, 1962), pp. 190‐96; W. Bohm, ed., Johannes Philoponus Grammatikos urn Alexandrien (Munich: F. Schöningh, 1967); and Philoponus' De Aetemitate Mundi contra Proclum, ed. H. Rabe (Leipzig: Teubner, 1899). Cf. Plato, Statesman 270d.
8. . See Simplicius' commentaries on Aristotle's Physics and De Caelo and the materials and discussions in Sambursky, The Physical World of Late Antiquity.
9. . See, for example, Ghazâlî, Munqidh al‐Dalâl, ed. F. Jabre (Beirut: UNESCO, 1959), pp. 12‐34; in The Faith and Practice of Al‐Ghazâlî, trans. W. Montgomery Watt (London: Allen and Unwin, 1963), pp. 22‐54; idem, Tahâfut al‐Falâsifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) ed. M. Boyuges, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1962), passim, since the method is that of argument, and there is a commitment to accept the outcome of argument; Maimonides Guide to the Perplexed (hereafter: Guide) Pt. 2, ch. 8, glossing Pesahim 94b, and Maimonides' famous assertion that the affirmation of creation and denial of eternity are not based solely on the authority of scripture, since scripture itself can be glossed if its apparent meaning does not accord with the otherwise known scope of possibility, Guide Pt. 2, ch. 25. This type of glossing was not the ad hoc invention of Maimonides but the well‐established practice of Talmudic exegesis long before it was rendered an exegetical canon by Maimonides' tenth‐century predecessor Saadya Gaon al‐Fayyûmî.
10. . Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, First Antinomy, trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1963; German eds. of Riga, 178111787), A426/B454‐A433/B461. In the Middle Ages Ibn Tufayl (d. 1187), for example, represented the arguments between creation and eternity to be insoluble by reason and to express functionally equivalent ideas. See his Hayy Ih Yaqzân, trans. L. E. Goodman (New York: Twayne, 1972), pp. 130‐34. Maimonides argued that eternalism could not be proved conclusively and that creation could not be proved necessary, although there might be grounds for preferring the latter to the former. See Guide Pt. 2, chs. 16‐18; Pt. 1, chs. 74‐76, and the discussion in L. E. Goodman, RAMBAM, Readings in the Philosophy of Moses Maimonides (New York: Viking, 1976), pp. 124‐204. Aquinas, of course, argued that it is an article of faith, incapable of demonstration, that the world began: Summa Theologica III, Question 46, Article 2, despite–or because of–his acceptance of Maimonides's contention that the issue is one of probable and preferable views, Question 46, Article 1, Reply. Cf. n. 16 below.
11. . See L.E.Goodman,“Did Ghazâlí Deny Causality?Studia Islamica  47 (1978): 83–118.
12. . See L. E. Goodman, Monotheism: A Philosophic Inquiry into the Foundations of Theology and Ethics (Totowa, N.J.: Allenheld and Osmun, 1981), pp. 67–69.
13. . See Ghazâlí, Taháfut al‐Falásifa, Discussions 1‐4, 10 and conclusion, p. 254.
14. . Thus Maimonides draws theistic conclusions from Peripatetic premises in his discussion of the Aristotelian view rather than regarding the medieval followers of Aristotelian neo‐Platonism as mere would‐be theists. See Guide Pt. 2, Introduction, ch. 1. Yet he seems to regard eternalism as too “metaphysical,” insufficiently concrete.
15. . See Guide Pt. 2, ch. 19; cf. L. E. Goodman, “Maimonides and Leibniz,” accompanied by a translation of Leibniz' reading notes on The Guide to the Perplexed, in Journal of Jewish Studies 31 (1980): 214–36.
16. . See Guide Pt. 2, chs. 15, 17, 18, see also Pt. 3, ch. 32, etc. It is significant for Maimonides that Aristotle dealt with the worlds eternity in the Topics, where probabilities, plausibilities and dialectical arguments are considered. He seems to have in mind here the passage in the Topics which he echoes in Guide Pt. 1, ch. 31: “some problems… it is useful to know merely with a view to knowledge, e.g., whether the universe is eternal…. Problems also include questions in regard to which reasonings conflict… others also in regard to which we have no argument because they are so vast, and we find it difficult to give our reasons, e.g., the question of whether the universe is eternal or no: for into questions of that kind too it is possible to inquire.” Topics 1.11. 104b7‐17. For Ibn Tufayl, see note 10 above. Mendel Sachs derives a striking version of emergent evolution from the passage cited at Guide Pt. 2, ch. 17, in his “Maimonides, Spinoza and the Field Concept in Physics, ”Journal of the History of Ideas 37 (1976): 128–129.
17. . See Ghaz^lí, Incoherence of the Philosophers, p. 254, where the (neo‐Platonic Aristotelian) philosophers of Islam are declared infidels on three counts and heretical on seventeen more, a charge which led to Averroes' formulation of a legal as well as a philosophical defense of philosophy, the Faql al‐Muqál, ed. G. Hourani (Leiden: Brill, 1959), and trans. by him as The Decisive Treatise in Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy (London: Luzac, 1967).
18. . See Guide Pt. 2, chs. 6, 13, 32; Pt. 3, chs. 16, 17, 20, 23, 25.
19. . See Ghaz^lí, Incoherence of the Philosophers, Discussions 1, 17 and L. E. Goodman (n. 11 above).
20. . Guide Pt. 3, ch. 17.
21. . Maimonides regarded the denial of providence, which he attributed to Epicurus and “the unbelievers of Israel” as demonstrably false: “The first doctrine is that there is no providence at all over anything. All that happens in heaven or elsewhere occurs either by chance or in accordance with the characters of things…. Aristotle demonstrated the impossibility of this theory and proved that it cannot be the case that all things are brought into being by chance.” Guide Pt. 3, ch. 17. The proof to which Maimonides refers is Aristotle's argument at Physics 2.5 to the effect that the processes of nature follow the same pattern, either always or for the most part, and that what is always or for the most part uniform cannot be the effect of chance. Maimonides cites this proof at Guide Pt. 2, ch. 20 with a view to demonstrating his own thesis that there is an overriding, unitary governance of nature. For if nature were governed solely by “the characters of things” there would be no explanation of the overall uniformity of nature, to which we refer as natural law. Maimonides assumes that the overall governing principle of nature is the divinity; but, as he points out, there is room for a wide variety of accounts of the character of divine governance. For further discussion of these issues, see L. E. Goodman, RAMBAM (n. 10 above), pp. 296–324.
22. . The account of creation in Genesis must be taken as poetry even by those who would take it “literally” since it involves artistic selection of materials–the inclusion and, very significantly, exclusion of detail. For a literary appreciation of the impact of this Biblical technique and its role in fostering both exegetical elaborations and a sense of historicity see Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1953–written 1942‐45), pp. 7‐23. For the impact of the particular “omissions” perhaps most striking in the Genesis narrative of creation–the description, ancestry, motives, “background” of Elohim–see C. F. von Weiszacker, The Relevance of Science, Gifford Lectures of 1959‐60 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).
23. . See Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Futo ad Imperatores, ed. and trans. A. Fitzgerald as On Destiny (London: Scholartis, 1931), and the discussion of Alexander's views in P. Merlan, The Cambridge History (n. 7 above), pp. 117‐23. Cf. Maimonides, Guide Pt. 3, ch. 16.
24. . Guide Pt. 2, chs. 22, 17, 18, 2‐7: Pt. 3, chs. 13, 19‐21, 25, 26, 31 and the discussions ad loc. in L. E. Goodman, RAMBAM (n. 10 above), pp. 177‐204, 330‐50, 363, 386‐403.
25. . Galileo Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems–Ptolemaic and Copernican, trans. S. Drake, 2nd ed., rev. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 7.
26. . Galileo, Dialogue, pp. 19‐32. Galileo fathers on Plato (in view of the creation story of the Timaeus) the view that the bodies which form the solar system were borne to their present locations by linear motions and then set in the circular motions since maintained, in much the manner that construction materials are brought to a site and then located within the structure being built (p. 20). He argues that bodies have no natural place or predilection for any particular spot and therefore will move from a state of rest only as a result of the application of force; further, that in moving from an initial state of rest to a given speed, any body will pass “through all gradations of speed.” The planets, on this model, were accelerated linearly in the genesis of the solar system, which Galileo describes as God's creation: taking the planet Jupiter as an example, “We may say with Plato that at the beginning He gave it a straight and accelerated motion; and later, when it had arrived at that degree of velocity, converted its straight motion into circular motion, whose speed thereafter was naturally uniform” (p. 21). It was not impossible, of course, for God to create circularly moving bodies, but in fact nature does operate on Galileo's gradualistic lines: an accelerating body is proved to accelerate through all the infinite “degrees of slowness” before it acquires any given speed (pp. 21‐28); and a uniform circular motion, such as that of the planets, would be impossible without a prior linear acceleration (p. 28). Galileo confirms this inference by reference to the observed locations and velocities of the planets (p. 29). The outcome is that the observed uniformity in the circular motions of the planetary bodies confirms not the eternity of the heavens, as had been imagined by Aristotle, but the Platonic hypothesis of fomatio mundi, since these uniform motions may (or by Galileo's account must) be traced back to an initial state of rest, from which the planets were accelerated linearly, through all the infinite gradations of slowness. That is, Galileo rests his heliocentric system of the planetary motions on what he takes to be the demonstration of the natural necessity of a starting point of all planetary motion, i.e., on a concept of creation conceived, as he makes clear, in terms of the Platonic idea of formutio mundi– arrangement of the cosmos' pre‐existing parts. Of course it is not surprising that Galileo should have employed the Platonic model as against Aristotle, for the Galilean view of the heavens as undergoing creation/evolution was very much, in keeping with the (Platonically interpreted) Judaeo‐Christian naturalisin about the celestial realm, which regarded the entire cosmos as generated and destructible. Aristotelian uniformitarianism, by contrast, was founded on the view that the heavens were eternal (ungenerated, indestructible, immutable except for local, rotatory motion) because they and the cosmos as a whole were perfect and divine. See De Caelo 1.9 and S. Sambursky The Physical World of Late Antiquity (n. 7 above), pp. 154‐66.
27. . Galileo, Dialogue, pp. 37‐100.
28. . Galileo, Dialogue, p. 99. The idea that diverse physical forms are adaptations to diverse environmental conditions is ancient and arises from Aristotelian and pre‐Ark‐totelian analysis of form as serving function. The concept was developed in the Stoic theory of pronoia as a synthetically naturalisticitheistic doctrine and, for example, in the Qur'cin and the Muslim speculative thinkers. See for example L. E. Cmodman, trans., The Case of the Animals verm Man Before the King of the Jinn, of the Ikhwân al‐Safâ (Boston: Twayne, 1978), pp. 56‐60 and notes 25, 29, 30 ad loc; cf. F. Rosenthal, trans., The Muqaddimah of Ibn Khaldûn (New York: Pantheon, 1958), 1:170‐73. But Galileo carries such traditional notions much further when he states that the conditions of the moon render it necessary that any forms of life found there would be very different from those found on earth: “I consider the moon very different from the earth. Though I fancy to myself that its regions are not idle and dead, still I do not assert that life and motion exist there, and much less that plants, animals, or other things similar to ours are generated there. Even if they were, they would be extremely diverse, and far beyond all our imaginings” (Dialogue, pp. 99‐100). To propose that radically divergent environmental conditions require a radical divergence in life forms, if any may be found, is to assert the crucial premise of all evolutionary theory. And to do so in the context of an explicitly developmental cosmology is particularly suggestive: especially when it is borne in mind that Galileo expresses uncertainty that any life forms are found on the moon. His suggestion of evolutionary adaptation seems to be transposed to the case on earth.
29. . Kenny writes, “Descartes' account of the solar system is disguisedly heliocentric and discreetly evolutionary.” Descartes (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 12. See René Descartes, Principles of Philosophy esp. 3:16, 17, 24, 26, 32, 47, 111, 112, 114, 115; 4:1, 189, 199, etc., trans. Elizabeth Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967; 1st Latin ed., 1644; 1st trans. ed., 1911), pp. 272‐74, 277, 280, 289‐93.
30. . Galileo, Dialogue, pp. 47‐56, 72, 97‐99.
31. . Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, Lowell Lectures of 1925 (New York: Mentor, 1960), pp. 15–22.
32. . William Paley's classic statement of the design argument was not published until 1802 in his Natural Theology, or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity collected from the Appearances of Nature (Houston, Tex.: St. Thomas, 1972), but the argument had been developing for centuries before. Its key notions are discernible in several of the pre‐Socratic philosophers and, of course, in myth and scripture. Explicit versions and variations of the argument are prominent features in the philosophies of Plato, the Stoics, Philo, Galen, Boethius, Thomas, and many of the scientific thinkers of the Renaissance and Enlightenment. Spinoza, Hume, and Kant were among the sternest critics, and Aristotle's and Spinoza's immanentism can be regarded as an inversion or alternative to the theory of an (externally derived) intelligent design in nature, rather than a faithful recapitulation of it. See Frederick Ferre, “Design Argument,” in Dictionary of the History of Ideas, ed. Philip Wiener (New York: Scribners, 1973), 1:670‐77. Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion were published posthumously in 1779; see the edition of Norman Kemp Smith (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, reprinted 1947).
33. . Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, 1859; variorum text of the six editions, ed. Morse Peckham (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959).
34. . Louis Agassiz' Hegelian, almost Plotinian, belief that species were the ideal variants of conceptually discernible life designs (not environmental adaptations) was rooted, he believed, not merely in secularized theology but in observation. See his Essay on Classification, ed. E. Lurie (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962; orig. ed., 1857). Bishop Samuel Wilberforce, similarly, founded his critique of evolution in what was made to sound like a rather strict empiricism–as though fixity were observed and natural selection were a purely speculative hypothesis (see nn. 36, 38, 39, and 41 below.) The epistemic double standard (by which species fixity is treated as an observation event and natural selection as a conjectural model, tendentiously in both cases) becomes a fairly regular feature of anti‐evolutionary polemic and is even mirrored in the dogmatism of some of the overanxious polemicists on the opposite side of the aisle, who come to speak of evolution (globally?) as (an empirically observed?) fact and creation (in all intensions?) as a fairy story.
35. . This trend of thought continues among contemporary creationists. Frank L. Marsh, for example, concedes the possibility of “microevolution,” i.e., environmental adaptation of isolated populations generating widespread subspecific variation, but urges that the Biblical species which “brought forth after their kind' were, as they remain, not cross fertile, at least not salua uniformitate: “Creationists who believe that Genesis portrays the created kinds as reproductively isolated from one another reject the suggestion that kinds may have been able to hybridize in antediluvian times. They take this position because they believe that an original kind which brought forth only 'after its own kind' could not hybridize with another kind. If such were to occur, then neither partner would be bringing forth after its kind. The assumed hybrid would be like neither of the parental types.” Variation and Fixity in Nature (Mountain View, Calif.: Pacific Press Association, 1976), p. 28. Marsh, like other creationists admits that there is “much that is heavily speculative” with regard to the problem of antediluvian cross fertility, but he insists on the purity of ultimate types in a fashion suggestive of a debate between modern essentialists and followers of Wittgenstein's family resemblance mode of organizing experience. The issue is clearly stated by three spokesmen of the Creation Science Research Center: “The complex nature of the genetic mechanism and the strong persistence of all basic taxonomical categories argue strongly for their original special creation. If all organisms have actually descended by evolution from common ancestors, it seems inexplicable that there should be any distinct categories of organisms at all. One would certainly expect that nature would instead exhibit a continual series of organisms, with each grading into the other so imperceptibly that any kind of classification system would be impossible.” William Boardman, R. F. Koontz, and H. M. Morris, Science and Creation (San Diego, Calif.: Creation‐Science Research Center, 1973), p. 68. The difficulty, however, is that to many biologists the genetic material seems to present just such a continuum as the creationists' spokesmen reject. But Marsh and others treat the evidence for a continuum as strengthening the case for special creation by demanding a broader concept of the biological species. If cabbages can be crossed with radishes, Marsh argues, this shows not that one kind can be brought forth from another but that we were mistaken in regarding cabbages and radishes as members of distinct kinds (Marsh, p. 35).
36. . Jackson's Oxford Journal, Saturday, 7 July 1860, p. 2, col. 6, as quoted by J. R. Lucas, “Wilberforce and Huxley: A Legendary Encounter,” The Historical Journal 22(1979): 319 : cf. Charles Hodge, What Is Daminism? (New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1874), p. 132. Among the contemporaries, for example, see the two collections of articles from the Creation Research Quarterly, edited by Walter E. Lammerts, Why Not Creation? (Nutley, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1970) and Scientific Studies in Special Creation (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1971).
37. . For an articulate summary of the value concerns centered on the problem of evolution as seen by a contemporary creationist see A. E. Wilder–Smith, Man's Origin, Man's Destiny (Minneapolis, Minn.: Bethany Fellowship, 1975), pp. 160–269. Cf. R. J. Rushdoony, The Mythology of Science (Nutley, N.J.: Craig Press, 1967), p. 32. See also Boardman, Koontz, and Morris, Science and Creation, p. 47. Darwin's counter–iconography is found in Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (2nd ed. rev.; London: John Murray, 1891), ch. 21.
38. . Samuel Wilberforce, review of Charles Darwin's Origin of Species in Quarterly Review 108 July 1860): 256, reprinted in Wilberforce, Essays, p. 92 and in Reginald Brimley Johnson, ed., Famous Reviews (London: 1914; reprint ed., Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1967), p. 279.
39. . Quarterly Review, p. 231, reprinted in Wilberforce, Essays, pp. 58–59 and in Johnson, ed., Famous Reviews, p. 270.
40. . See Ernst Mayr, Animal Species and Evolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966); Bernard Rensch, Evolution Above the Species Level (New York: Wiley, 1966).
41. . See The Athenaeum, 30 June, 7, 14 July 1860 and the discussion in J. R. Lucas, “Wilberforce and Huxley,” pp. 319–20, 325.
42. . Duane T. Gish, Evolution: The Fossils Say No! (San Diego, Calif.: Institute for Creation Research, 1973). For contemporary restatements of the problems of speciation and hybridization see Marsh, Variation and Fixity in Nature and Boardman, Koontz, and Morris, Science and Creation, pp. 49–94.
43. . Cf. J. A. Zahm, Evolution and Dogma (Chicago: McBride, 1896). Teilhard de Chardin's concept of the tenuousity of nascent forms affords a basis for the explication of the fragmentary character of the fossil record in the principle he calls (rather heavily) the “law” of the “automatic suppression of evolutionary peduncles.” See The Phenomenon of Man (London: Collins, 1966; 1st French ed., 1955), pp. 90, 120. Early forms are few and varied–exploratory and experimental, as it were. Only established forms are numerous and clearly defined. And experimental forms are frangible, perishable. Anti–evolutionary polemicists may regard this reasoning as somewhat ad hoc, subjecting it to criticism rather like that to which some anti–evolutionists were subjected for maintaining that fossils of seemingly millions of years' age were laid down by God solely to test human creatures' faith. To doubters Teilhard presents not the fossils but the well defined spectacle of the “tree of life,” asking rhetorically, whence this grew (pp. 138, 122–40)–a non–Linnaean question which derives its axiomatic rationality as a query of science solely from the idea of creation.
44. . Ronald A. Fisher, The Genetic Theory of Natural Selection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930) demonstrates mathematically the possibility of trans–specific evolution via discrete mutational steps within a manageable number of filial generations. For example, given an adaptive advantage of 20 percent as measured in augmented fertility, it is possible for a mutant variant determined by a gene with no dominance to increase its proportion in a breeding population from one–quarter of one percent to 95 percent within sixty generations. A dominant or partially dominant gene would be stabilized at a comparable frequency even sooner. See D. S. Falconer, Introduction to Quantitative Genetics (New York: Ronald Press, 1970), pp. 26–36, 186–207; cf. L. L. Cavalli–Sforza and W. F. Bodmer, The Genetics of Human Populations (San Francisco, Calif.: W. H. Freeman, 1971), pp. 71–88, 316–17. Given sufficient time and a reasonably large population, the emergence of stably fixed coadaptive gene complexes presents none of the mathematical difficulties once imagined to constitute an obstacle to evolutionary theory. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that some fairly small genetic differences can be sufficient to produce a harrier to crossbreeding and thus generate specific differences. The occurrence of observable genetic variation among populations attributable to differences in the adaptive advantage or disadvantage of single phenotypic traits was confirmed by H.B. Kettlewell in “Further Selection Experiments on Industrial Melanism in the Lepidoptera,” Heredity 10 (1956): 287 –301. Anti–evolutionists do not admit, of course, that genetic variation, even when responsive via population dynamics to environmental selection, can yield speciation. See, for example, Bolton Davidheiser, Evolution and Christian Faith (Nutley, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1975), pp. 203–5. Robert E. Kofahl, Handy Dandy Evolution Refuter (San Diego, Calif.: Creation Science Research Center, 1977), pp. 54–55, argues, “The change observed in Kettlewell's moth produces a different phase, not a new species. It is not evolution.” But, given the short time in which such phenomena as industrial melanism have taken effect, there does not seem to be any basis for a probabalistic objection to speciation via natural selection. Even the often repeated claim that there is no laboratory evidence to support the possibility of trans–specific evolution must be qualified by the recognition of the emergence of new strains of antibiotic resistant bacteria within the time frame of laboratory experience. The status of current knowledge on the question of trans–specific evolution is excellently reviewed for the nonspecialist in Peter R. Grant, “Speciation and the Adaptive Radiation of Darwin's Finches,” American, Scientist 69 (1981): 653 – 63. See also the discussion of the “punctuational model” in Steven M. Stanley, “Darwin Done Over,” The Sciences, Journal of the New York Academy of Sciences 21 (1981): 18–23. And see R. C. Lewontin, The Genetic Basis of Evolutionary, Change (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).
45. . See n. 39 above. Also J. R. Lucas (n. 36 above), pp. 315–20, argues convincingly that Wilberforce followed his review in the debate. The points about permanence, observation, and the clear line of animal/human demarcation come from the contemporary journalist's report of the debate preserved in The Athenaeum, 14 July 1860, p. 65, col. 1.
46. . Contemporary anti–evolutionists are particularly emphatic on the discreteness of the human from all other species. They explicitly reject the notion of a gradual emergence of human conscience and consciousness on the grounds that a continuity between humans and the apes would break the lines of continuity between humanity and God. Of the prehistoric strains known from the fossil evidence, Boardman, Koontz, and Morris write: “These ancient men are all true men, not ape–men…. Neanderthal Man, also was perfectly normal except that, as now believed, he was affected with rickets. Homo Habilis, though small, seems to have been quite modern in every other respect.” Science and Creation (n. 35 above), p. 41. Kofahl adds: “There is no evidence for the evolution of human intelligence” and cites Levi–Straws in support. Handy Dandy Evolution Refuter, p. 81. He continues (pp. 83–84): “The essential attributes of human nature are intellect, affections… moral capacity and will…. There is no reason to believe that non–living matter thinks, has feelings, has any sense of moral responsibility, or exercises will, or that chemical reactions can make an organism that does. Personal nature must, therefore, have come from a higher personal spiritual Source, not from an impersonal material source. This conclusion from the scientific evidence is just what the Bible teaches. We were created in the image of the infinite–personal Spirit, God the Creator.” And Davidheiser concludes: “The evolutionists definitely believe that early man was hardly to be distinguished from some sort of ape and made crude tools which can hardly be distinguished from naturally fractured rocks. According to the Bible the first man was created as such, talked with God, knew right from wrong, named the animals, and sinned. Early men were skillful in metalwork and the handling of musical instruments.” Evolution and Christian Faith, p. 337. G. F. Howe argues the case in a thoroughgoing manner in “Evolution and the Problem of Man” in Lammerts, ed., Scientific Studies, pp. 206–28.
47. . Darwin, Descent of Man, 1:194.
48. . See Critique of Pure Reason B431, A798iB826, pp. 383, 631 and Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L. W. Beck (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs Merrill, 1956; German ed., 1788), pp. 43–51, 117–20, etc. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper, 1956), pp. 99–104; cf. Lectures on Ethics (reconstructed by Paul Mentzer from student notes of the 1770s), trans. Louis Infield (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1978), pp. 252–53. Cf. Aristotle Nicomachaean Ethics 3.1–5.
49. . Thomas H. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays (1896; reprint ed., New York: AMS, 1970), pp. 31, 80–86.
50. . For contemporary anti–evolutionists the Spencerian approach seems to be salient. That evolution, if a law of nature, would justify the rule of violence and legitimate the domination of the weak by the strong is one of the principal moral objections raised by creationists against evolutionism. This reading, which becomes the basis of a critique of theistic evolutionists such as Teilhard, will not seem quite so strange when it is borne in mind that creationists believe the character and moral standards of the Creator will be legible in the laws governing creation. See Wilder–Smith (n. 37 above), pp. 167–80, 232. See also Davidheiser: “It is generally believed that Darwin did not condone the extrapolation of his natural selection theory into social relationships, but the fact is that he himself taught that human evolution proceeded through warfare and struggle between isolated clans.” Evolution and Christian Faith, p. 350. Cf. W. J. Tinkle, “Immorality in Natural Selection,” in Lammerts, ed., Scientific Studies (n. 36 above), p. 232: “If man evolved from the animals, it is easy to feel that he is still an animal at heart with a veneer of civilization. And if this evolution was accomplished by selfish initiative at the expense of other living things, it is easy to justify the same conduct now. In all fairness we must admit, however, that there are proponents of evolution who advocate moral behavior. But the ethical obligations of the scientists of which they write have been realized in spite of the doctrine of natural selection rather than because of it. The antisocial effects of the doctrine may be seen among persons whose moral characters are undeveloped, such as young people or persons who have never become morally mature. Our crime waves, which tend to become worse each year, are examples of the effect of selfish assertion.” So taken up are today's anti–evolutionists with the Spencerian/Malthusian model of evolution that few seem to be aware that the pictorial imagery of Tennyson (“nature red in tooth and claw”) has widely given way biologically to conceptions of adaptive radiation in which competition for survival, violence, domination and the like are very subordinate or unimportant concepts. Evolutionary success is measured in differential fertility rather than suppression, and the rapid evolutionary movements by which species can be modelled to have emerged will have been results of the differential capabilities of divergent types to exploit new ecological niches and opportunities. It is for that reason that so many ancient types persist–a mark of divine mercy and grace in evolution, to put the matter theologically. Racist and triumphalist readings of evolutionism do persist, however.
51. . Quoted in James R. Moore, The Post–Darwinian Controversies: A Study of the Protestant Struggle to Come to Terms with Darwin in Great Britain and America 1870–1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 212.
52. . See Moore, Post–Darwinian Controversies, p. 198. Cf. Henry M. Morris, Biblical Cosmology and Modern Science (Nutley, N.J.: Craig Press, 1975); George F. Howe, ed., Speak to the Earth: Creation Studies in, Geoscience (Nutley, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1975); H. M. Morris, ed., Scientific Creationism (San Diego, Calif., Creation–Life Publishers, 1976); Reginald Daly, Earth's Most Challenging Mysteries (Nutley, N.J.: Craig Press, 1976).
53. . H. M. Morris, The Remarkable Birth of Planet Earth (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1972); Gish, Evolution: The Fossils Say No! (n. 42 above), published in a “General Edition” with Biblical documentation and a “Public School Edition (non–religious text)”: John C. Whitcomb, The Early Earth (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1972); and John N. Moore and H. S. Slusher, Biology: A Search for Order in Complexity (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1974). The Institute for Creation Research in San Diego distributes most of these and numerous other publications including school texts, audiovisual materials, a technical monograph series, teacher's manuals, Biblical and avowedly “apologetic” tracts, and a periodic pamphlet series coordinated with broadcasting and speakers' schedules.
54. . Richard H. Overman, Evolution and the Christian Doctrine of Creation: A White–headian Interpretation (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967), p. 98.
55. . Hodge (n. 36 above), p. 177.
56. . Cynthia E. Russett, Darwin in America: The Intellectual Response 1865–1912 (San Francisco, Calif.: Freeman, 1976), p. 27. Contemporary creationists, by contrast, tend to avoid boxing themselves in. They insist on their characteristically broad definition of the species or “Biblical kind” and leave room for a nonliteral six–day creation and for wide variation within kinds in the antediluvian epoch.
57. . Morris, Biblical Cosmology and Modern Science, p. 57.
58. . See Overman, Evolution and the Christian Doctrine of Creation, p. 109.
59. . Wilder–Smith (n. 37 above), pp. 169–80.
60. . Minot J. Savage, The Religion of Evolution (Boston, Mass.: Lockwood Books, 1876).
61. . Chauncey Wright, “Natural Theology as a Positive Science,”North American Review (January 1865), reprinted in C. E. Norton, ed., Philosophical Discussions (New York: Holt, 1877), pp. 35–42; cf. Wright's letter to Professor Lesley, 19 January 1865, in James Bradley Thayer, ed., Letters of Chauncey Wright (1878; reprint ed., New York: Burt Franklin, 1971), pp. 67–71; cf. his letter of 1 October 1865 to Charles Eliot Norton, quoted in Edward H. Madden, Chauncey Wright and the Foundations of Pragmatism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963), p. 149.
62. . For Wright's reduction of theism to ethics, his dissolution of the Kantian bond between ethics and immortality, and his avowal of agnosticism and rejection even of the nexus between ethics and theology, see his letter to Abbot, 28 October 1867, “concerning the existence of a God and the immortality of the soul. The verdict of 'not proven' is the kind of judgment I have formed…. Practical grounds are really the basis of belief in the doctrines of theology. The higher moral sentiments have attached themselves so strongly to these traditions that doubts of them seem to the believers like contempt for all that is noble or worthy….” Wright repudiates “dogmatic atheism” as the expression of the “bad motives” of the “meanest and narrowest of men” but exposes Kant's belief that immortality is morally necessary as the reward of the worthy as a paralogism founded in an insufficient valuation of this present life. See E. H. Madden, ed., The Philosophical Writings of Chauncey Wright (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958), pp. 43–44. Wright's letters give the impression of a series of evasions, his philosophy complementing his personality in the desire to put off religious inquiries for ethical ones and ethical questions for critical ones–a style of movement in its way as “prophetic” as that of Hodge. One recalls Santayana's remark that chastity is a discipline but not a way of life.
63. . Henry F. Osborn, Evolution and Religion in Education (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1926), esp. pp. 45–67.
64. . See Harold W. Clark, Genesis and Science (Nashville, Tenn.: Southern Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 115–24. Also, Rushdoony (n. 37 above), p. 41; and Morris, Biblical Cosmology (n. 52 above), p. 16. See also Rushdoony's “The Premises of Evolutionary Thought” in Lammerts, ed., Scientific Studies (n. 36 above), pp. 3–6; cf. Davidheiser's attempt to portray Teilhard de Chardin as an idolator, a Communist or fellow traveller, a hypocrite and a heretic (n. 44 above), pp. 111–114. The discussion of Bergson in Jacob B. Agus, Jewish Identity in an, Age of Ideologies (New York: Ungar, 1978), pp. 232–81, esp. pp. 250–55, is far more tempered and judicious, but the thrust is the same: that Bergson is to Judaism as the faceless gods of the Babylonian seasonal rhythms are to the caring God of providence. Agus, however, is not a Fundamentalist.
65. . See Ghazâlî's Fadâ'ih al–Bâtiniyya, ed. A.–R. Badawi (Cairo: Dâru I'Qawmiyya, 1964), pp. 11–32.
66. . The moral and social evils of evolutionism as viewed from the perspective of the contemporary creationist movement are documented in the references above (esp. nn. 37, 50). Concerning racism, totalitarianism, and opportunism Boardman, Koontz, and Morris write “racism in its virulent forms is mainly a product of evolutionary thinking.” They go on to mention Adolf Hitler, Cecil Rhodes, and Benito Mussolini as “ardent evolutionists” and continue, “Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and practically all other leaders of Communist thought, past and present, have been racists in the tradition of Charles Darwin” (n.37 above), p. 43–44. The approach, and indeed many of the details, are fairly representative; cf. Wilder–Smith (n. 37 above), pp. 187–97; Rushdoony (n, 37 above), p. 53; Davidheiser, “Social Darwinism,” in Lammerts, ed., Scientific Studies (n. 36 above), pp. 338–43; and Morris, Scientific Creationism (n. 52 above), pp. 179–80.
67. . H. M. Morris, Biblical Catastrophism and Geology (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 12–13.
68. . R. J. Rushdoony, “The Premises of Evolutionary Thought,” in Lammerts, ed., Scientific Studies (n. 36 above), pp. 1–8, esp. pp. 5–6.
69. . Rushdoony (n. 37 above), p. 13; John W. Klotz, “The Philosophy of Science in Relation to Concepts of Creation vs. The Evolutionary Theory,” in Lammerts, ed., Why Not Creation? (n. 36 above), pp. 11, 14, 20; A. F. Williams, “The Genesis Account of Creation,” in Lammerts, ed., Why Not Creation? p. 36; Daly (n. 52 above), p. 387; H. M. Morris, “Science versus Scientism in Historical Geology,” in Lammerts, ed., Scientific Studies (n. 36 above), esp. pp. 119–23. See also G. W. Wheeler, The Two–Taled Dinosaur (Nashville, Tenn.: Southern Publishing Association, 1975), pp. 47, 113.
70. . See Kelly Segraves, The Great Dinosaur Mistake (San Diego, Calif.: Beta Books, 1977); Wheeler, Two–Taled Dinosaur, p. 35; cf. H. G. Coffin, “A Paleoecological Misinterpretation,” in Lammerts, ed., Scientific Studies (n. 36 above), pp. 165–68; Melvin A. Cook, “W. J. Meister's Discovery of Human Footprint with Trilobites in a Cambrian Formation of Western Utah,” and W. J. Meister, “Discovery of Trilobite Fossils in Shod Footprint…,” both in Lammerts, ed., Why Not Creation? (n. 36 above), pp. 185–93.
71. . Marsh (n. 35 above), pp. 37–38.
72. . See for example, George F. Howe, “Homology, Analogy, and Creative Components in Plants,” E. V. Shute, “Remarkable Adaptations,” and H. W. Clark, “The Plants Will Teach You,” all in Lammerts, ed., Scientific Studies (n. 36 above), pp. 243–68, 303–7. Cf. W. E. Lammerts, “Mutations Reveal the Glory of Gods Handiwork,” in Lammerts, ed., Why Not Creation? (n. 36 above), pp. 299–311.
73. . See H. M. Morris, “Science Versus Scientism in Historical Geology,”“The Power of Energy,” and T. G. Barnes, “A Scientific Alternative to Evolution,” in Lammerts, ed., Scientific Studies (n. 36 above), esp. pp. 107–18, 66–68, and 331–37.
74. . See E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology, the New Synthesis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976). For the incoherence of the idea of heritable (immorality, see Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), pp. 16–21, cf. pp. 22–49.
75. . Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity (New York: Knopf, 1971).
76. . The interest in extraterrestrial intelligence, which Carl Sagan in his own way promotes, is often rather typical of the problems inherent in any revival of pagan approaches to the cosmos in a synthetic intellectual environment such as that provided by modern natural science or its counterpart, universal, metaphysical religion. Like the devotees of island cargo cults, many of the devotees of the search for extraterrestrial intelligence look to a literal, physical beyond as the source from which superhuman wisdom or transforming grace will come, projecting attitudes of awe, and other values associated with humanity's search for self–transcendence into dimensions whose glittering sacredness is enhanced by the authority of science and the power of technology. But these projections rarely reach the level of veneration, perhaps because the comprehensive naturalism of science and scientism seems to require that even these extraterrestrial focal points of human values ultimately be treated as mere things.
77. . BetteChambes,“Why a Statement Affirming Evolution?The Humanist  January/February 1977): 23.
78. . See Julian Huxley's “Introduction” to Teilhard de Chardin's The Phenomenon of Man (London: Collins, 1966), pp. 23–26.
79. . See M. J. Goodman and L. E. Goodman, The Sexes in the Human Population (Los Angeles: Gee Tee Bee, 1981).
80. . Gallup Poll reported in Christianity Today 24 (April 1980): 50.
81. . Douglas R. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Basic Books, 1979).
82. . Carl Sagan, The Dragons of Eden (New York: Random House, 1977), p. 150.
83. . See Huxley (n. 49 above), p. 81.
84. . See Moore (n. 51 above), pp. 71–76.
85. . Dean Turner, Commitment to Care: An Integrated Philosophy of Science, Education, and Religion (Old Greenwich, Conn.: Devin–Adair, 1978), p. 126, cf. pp. 25–26, 66–67, 377 note 1.
86. . Northrop Frye, The Secular Scripture (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 6–20. Cf. Reinhold Neibuhr, “The Truth in Myths” in The Nature of Religious Experience: Essays in Honor of Clyde Macintosh (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937).
87. . Eric Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age, vol. 4 of Order and History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), pp. 112–13.
88. . DietrickThomson,“Turin Shroud: Nature and SupernatureScience News  , 3 October 1981, p. 2.
89. . Saadya Gaon al–Fayyümi, Kitâb… al–'Âmânât wa–'l–'ltiqâdât Treatise 1, Exordium, trans. S. Rosenblatt (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 38–39.
90. . We find it significant as we write (Spring 1981) that U.S. District Judge William Overton has struck down the Arkansas “creation science” law–not simply on the grounds that it interfered with free expression on the part of biology teachers and others but on the grounds that the law, by intention and implication, promoted the political establishment of a particular religious view. To separate creation from belief in a deity, Overton argued, “has no evidentiary or rational support.” Creation is ultimately and (in a practical sense) inevitably a religious doctrine. Similarly, as we finalize these notes in the Fall of 1982, we find that H. M. Morris has argued that, like creationists, “the evolutionist and humanist” also founds his position in faith in unseen powers, albeit in the powers of “omniscient chance.” See Impact, a publication of the Institute for Creation Research, 3 (September 1982): 1. The issue plainly is a religious one, although or because it has involved, on both sides, presumptions about the empirical implications of transcendental premises and the transcendental implications of empirical givens.
91. . The categories of causality presume the necessity of observed outcomes; but simultaneously, explanation paradoxically shares with myth the presumption that things might have turned out other than as they have. For some preliminary reflections on the attempt to segregate pragmatically the alternative modes of thought generated by this paradox, see L. E.Goodman, “Bahya on the Antinomy of Free Will and Predestination,”Journal of the History of Ideas  44 (January 1983).
92. . The idea that every relativity presupposes an absolute is Plato's, of course. Avicenna made the contrast of such correlatives the basis of his contingency argument, called the cosmological argument by Kant and rejected by Ghazâlî, on the grounds that it seemed to presuppose the eternity of the world and so left an opening for atheism. See L.E.Goodman, “Ghazâlîs Argument from Creation,“International Journal of Middle East Studies  2 (1971): 83–85; Monotheism (n. 12 above), pp. 63–69. For an anti–evolutionist's awareness on this point, see J. C. Whitcomb, “The Creation of the Heavens and the Earth,” in Lammerts, ed., Scientific Studies (n. 36 above), p. 30.
93. . For an analysis of some of this lineage in relation to contemporary evolutionary and thermodynamic theory, see Jeffrey S.Wicken, “Chance, Necessity, and Purpose: Toward a Philosophy of Evolution,”Zygon  16 (December 1981): 303–22.