Notes

1. . E. Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics (3d ed.; London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897), I, 170; E. Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), pp. 116–17; H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1944), pp. 207–8.
2. . G. R. G. Mure, Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press [paperback], 1964), pp. 128 ff.; W. Jaeger, Aristotle, trans. Richard Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press [paperback], 1948), pp. 371–72, 436 ff.
3. . Voegelin (n. 1 above), pp. 304, 116–17; Plato, Apology, 31el–32a3; Theaetetus 172c3–4; my article, “Phaedra's Death in Euripides and Racine: Moral Responsibility in Closed and Open Societies,” Cithara, VI (1967), 26–29.
4. . On the practicality of the Republic's ideal state, see J. Adam (ed.), Plato, Republic (2d ed.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963), II, 38, 44, 369–70. On Aristotle as the peak of classical thought, see E. Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy (13th ed.; New York: World Publishing Co. [Meridian paperback], 1959), p. 336.
5. . In this regard consider Goethe, Noten und Abhandlungen xum besseren Verstandnis der West‐östlichen Divans (Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1888): “Das eigentliche. einzige und tiefste Thema der Welt‐ und Menschengeschichte, dem alle übrigen untergeordnet sind, bleibt der Konflickt des Unglaubens und Glaubens.”
6. . Jaeger(n. 2 above), p. 428.
7. . E. Frank, “Die Begriindung der Mathematischen Naturwissenschaft durch Eudoxus,” in Wissen, Wollen, Glauben (Zurich: Artemis‐Verlag, 1955), pp. 154–55.
8. . G. Grote, Plato (2d ed.; London: J. Murray, 1888), I, 439, n. 2; 442–43; cf. S. Kierkegaard, Of the Differences Between a Genius and an Apostle and The Present Age and Two Minor Ethico‐Religious Treatises (bound together; Magnolia, Mass.: Peter Smith, Publisher, 1949), p. 153: “To honor one's father because he is intelligent is impiety.” On this point, see my article, “Kierkegaard and Socrates on the Dignity of Man,” Personalist, XLVIII (1967), 453–60.
9. . E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 184 ff.; 197, n. 29; G. B. Kerferd, “The Doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic,” Durham University Journal (1947–48), pp. 19–27; A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 239–40, 270–78; G. Krüger, Einsicht und Leidenschaft (2d ed.: Frankfurt: V. Klosterman, 1948), pp. 96 ff. See also the contrast between Protagoras and Descrates by M. Heideg ger, Nietrsche (Pfullingen: Neske. 1961), II, 135–73. Cf. my article, “The Sophistry of Plato's Protagoras and Cleitophon” (to be published in Sophia). The difference between Socratics and sophists is one of moral intention as Plato's Stranger (Sophist 253c6–254bI) and Aristotle (Rhetoric 1355b17–22) observe: cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics,
10. . E.g., R. C. Cross and A. D. Woozley, Plato's Republic (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), pp. 47–48, 58–59. Against this view, see Kerferd (n. 9 above): and my article, “Plato's Republic: Utopia or Dystopia?”, Modern Schoolman (May, J967), pp. 319–30.
11. . Cf. Mure (n. 2 above), p. 127; Krüger (n. 9 above), passim.
12. . E.g., M. Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” in H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (eds.),
13. . From Max Weber (New York: Oxford University Press [paperback], 1961), pp. 143 ff.; A. J. Ayer, “The Claims of Philosophy,” in M. Natanson (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 478 ff.; K. Löwith, “Max Weber und Karl Marx,” Gesammelte Abhandlungen (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1960), pp. 9 ff.; and n. 47 below. Also A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Mentor Press [paperback], 1949), pp. 4 ff.
14. . Theaetetus 166cl–167d4, 169d3–8, 171d1–172b6, 177c6–179a9. On these passages, see L. Versényi, Socratic Humanism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 31–32.
15. . Kräger (n. 9 above), p. 159; cf. Weber (n. 12 above), p. 143; K. Jaspers, Nietrrche und das Christentum (Munich: R. Piper, 1952), pp. 51 ff.; F. W. Nietzsche, Will to Power (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), aphorisms 222, 393. 433–34, 437, 453, 686–88, 696, 704, 751, 781, 888–89, 911, 930–32.
16. . See Krüger (n. 9 above), pp. 110 and 196, on the ontological tendency to teleology” in ancient materialism. On the difference between ancient and modern notions of philosophy and science in this regard, see W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962), II, xiii, 554. Thus, Guthrie (ibid., p. 500) rightly contends against a modern scientific interpretation of Democritus that “it can hardly be right to say that, besides being too small to be seen, his atoms ‘only existed in a manner of speaking, since one could discover what was really going on in the world only by hypothesis and rational inference.' This is not the logic of Democritus, who had learned his lesson from the Eleatics: What is reached by rational inference is the only thing that has absolute and unqualified existence. At the same time, it belonged to the physical‐that is, material‐world, since, for him there was no other”; cf. the criticism of ancient thought by J. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Mentor Press [paperback], 1950). passim, esp. pp. 12–16, 28, 87, 102.
17. . Frank, “The Fundamental Opposition of Plato and Aristotle” (n. 7 above), pp. 115–19; A. E. Taylor, Aristotle (2d ed.; New York: Dover Publications [paperback], 1955, pp. 55, 99; Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics (n. 1 above), pp. 397, 403 ff.; Cherniss (n. 1 above), pp. 458–59, n. 406. On reason's capacity to grasp the basic premises of science, see also M. Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 110 ff., 241 ff.; K. R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies (4th ed.; New York: Harper & Row [paperback], 1963), II, 10 ff.; Cherniss (n. 1 above), pp. 78 ff. How reason in man participates in the divine reason is a perennial problem of Aristotelian studies. On this difficulty, see G. Boas, “Some Assumptions of Aristotle,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, N.S., XLIX, Part VI (1959). 73 ff.; W. D. Ross (ed.). Aristotle's Metaphysics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), I, 141 ff.; Mure (n. 2 above), pp. 171 ff. In spite of this aporia, Aristotle is obviously conviced that participation in divine reason occurs; e.g., see Metaphysics 1072b15 and 24; Nicomachean Ethics 1177a17. See the remarks on these passages by Krüger (n. 9 above), p. 196; cf. Ross, op. cit., II, 379.
18. . On Aristotle's attitude, see L.Edelstein, review of J. H. Randall's Aristotle, in Journal of Philosophy, LIX 1962.159.
19. . See n. 16 above.
20. . See n. 42 below.
21. . W. Barrett, Irrational Man (New York: Doubleday & Co. [Anchor paperback], 1958), p. 73. Barrett refers to Plato here, although, we noted in n. 10 above, the same charge could be made against his Thrasymachus; see G. P. Grant, “Tyranny and Wisdom,” Social Research, XXXI (1964), 66.
22. . H. Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: World Publishing Co. [Meridian paperback], 1963), p. 132. Those lacking the requisite intellectual equipment must be persuaded by “royal lies” or religious myths. On this point, see L. Edelstein, “The Function of the Myth in Plato's Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Ideas,X (1949), 478. Although Arendt and Edelstein refer to Plato here, a similar attitude to religious myth characterizes Plato's Protagoras (Theaetetus 162d5–e7). In any case, reason, as Greek philosophy understood it, is not to be identified with some religious or mystical experience; see Barrett (n. 20 above), pp. 71 ff.; and my article, “The Problem of Piety in Plato's Euthyphro,” Modern Schoolman, XLIII (1966). 265–72.
23. . See n. 42 below.
24. . See n. 21 above.
25. . G. W. F. Hegel, “Die Schicksale des Sokrates,“ Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie2 (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1842), pp. 81–105; F. W. Nietzsche, “Das Problem des Sokrates,” Götzen‐Dammerung (Munich: W. Goldmann, 1964); Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City (New York: Doubleday & Co. [Anchor paperback], 1956), pp. 355 ff.; Dodds (n. 9 above), pp. 189 ff.; A. Koyré, Discovering Plato (New York: Columbia University Press [paperback,], 1960), p. 13, n. 10.
26. . T. Hobbes, Leviathan, M. Oakeshott (ed.) (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1946). chap. xxi, pp. 140–1; chap xv, p. 100. Hobbes even insists that men by nature superior to others nevertheless regard themselves as equal. The sophist, Hippias, on the other hand, regards the wise as related by nature, while the masses, related by the tyranny of convention (nomos), are by nature inferior (Plato, Protagoras, 337c6–e2); my article, “Phaedra's Death in Euripides and Racine” (n. 3 above), pp. 26–31; my article, “Plato's Republic: Utopia or Dystopia?” (n. 10 above), p. 320. nn. 2 and 3.
27. . Frank, “Faith and Reason” (n. 7 above), pp. 373 ff.; E. Frank, Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), pp. 159–60. In a similar spirit, I Cor. 1:20–22 is cited against the wisdom of Greek philosophy by M. Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik? (7th ed.; Frankfurt: V. Klosterman, 1955), p. 20. On Heidegger in this regard, see J. Robinson and J. B. Cobb (eds.), “The German Discussion of the Later Heidegger,” in The Later Heidegger and Theology (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 36 ff. 75; J. Collins, The Existentialists (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. [paperback], 1963). pp. 179, 209, 241–42. Consider also the remark by Thomas Acquinas quoted by V. J. Bourke, St. Thomas and the Greek Moralists (Milwaukee, Wisc.: Marquette University Press, 1947). p. 42: “Not one of the philosophers before the coming of Christ could with all his striving know as much about God and the things needed for eternal life, as would an old woman, by faith, after the coming of Christ.”
28. . J. H. Hallowell, “Plato and the Moral Foundations of Democracy,” in Plato: Totalitarian or Democrat (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice‐Hall, 1963), p. 136: “The life of wisdom and virtue, which Plato thought possible only for a few, is now conceived as being available through the grace of God to all men equally.” See also Bacon, Of the Advancement of Learning, in James Spedding and Robert Leslie Ellis (eds.). Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon (London: Longmans & Co., 1905), p. 135: “There was never any philosophy, religion, or other discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good which is communicative and depress the good which is private and particular, as the Holy Faith… [it] decides against Aristotle. For all the reasons which he brings for the contemplative [life] are private, and respecting the pleasure and dignity of a man's self.” On the “private” character of classical morality, cf. nn. 10, 11, and 14 above, and n. 47 below.
29. . J. Milton, Paradise Lost, IV, 11,513‐26, IX, 670–732; cf. Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, 1177b27–1179a33; Metaphysics, 982b28–983a5. From Aristotle's viewpoint, Satan's moral intention makes him a sophist, not a philosopher. On this point, see n. 9 above; F. W. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Helen Zimmern (New York: Modem Library, 1917), aphorism 152.
30. . T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (New York: Modern Library, 1948), I, 4. On the relation of Thomas to Aristotle, see E. Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 13; Frank, “The Development of Mediaeval Philosophy and its Relation to Modern Thought” (n. 7 above), pp. 198‐203; F. Copleston, “Mediaeval Philosophy,” in A History of Philosophy (New York: Doubleday & Co. [paperback], 1962), 11, Part 11, 118–21, 128, 130–31, 137, 147‐52; L. M. Régis, Epistemology (New York: Macmillan Co., 1959), p. 119; J. H. Randall, Jr. Aristotle (New York: Columbia University Press [paperback], 1960), pp. 96–97, 103, 136; E. Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons [paperback], 1938), pp. 17, 76 ff.; E. Gilson, God and Philosophy (New Haven, Conn.:
31. . Yale University Press [paperback], 1960), pp. 62–66, 76; H. V. Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 150–66. See also n. 26 above.
32. . Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (n. 29 above), I, 252–57; see K. Löwith, “Schöpfung und Existenz,” Wissen, Glaube und Skepsis (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958), pp. 68–86; R. Bultmann, “The Meaning of the Christian Faith in Creation,” in Existence and Faith (New York: World Publishing Co. [Meridian paperback], 1964), pp. 209 ff.; my article, “Phaedra's Death in Euripides and Racine” (n. 3 above), pp. 30–31.
33. . In this sense one might indeed characterize Thomas' thought as “enlightened common sense.” See M. C. D'Arcy (ed.), Selected Writings of Thomas Aquinas (New York: Dutton [Everyman's Library], 1946), p. xi.
34. . See no. 20 above.
35. . J. H. Randall, Jr., The Role of Knowledge in Western Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), p. 52; Löwith (n. 30 above), p. 86; M. B. Foster, “The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modern Natural Science,” Mind, N.S. (1934), p. 452, n. 1.
36. . See n. 47 below.
37. . F. Bacon, Novum Organum, I, aphorism 21; see ibid., aphorisms 2, 9, 10, 18, 30, 41, 48, 49, 61, 124. For a similar sentiment, see A. 0. Lovejoy, “On Some Conditions for Progress in Philosophical Inquiry,” Philosophical Review (1917), pp. 143 ff.; Nietzsche, Will to Power (n. 14 above), aphorism 466. On the need for faith, see Bacon (n. 27 above), p. 134; R. Descartes, Discourse on Method (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs‐Merrill Co. [Library of Liberal Arts paperback], 1956, I, 6; Foster (n. 33 above), pp. 448 ff.; nn. 42 and 45 below; P. Tillich, “All Is Yours,” The New Being (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), pp. 110–13; W. Herberg, Judaism and Modern Man (New York: World Publishing Co. [Meridian paperback], 1959), pp. 36 ff.
38. . See n. 27 above.
39. . Descartes (n. 35 above), VI, 40; Bacon (n. 35 above), I, end of aphorism 66: II, end of aphorism 52; Hobbes (n. 25 above); Locke, The Second Treatise on Government (Indianapolis: Bobbs‐Merrill Co. [Library of Liberal Arts paperback], 1952), II, 4‐7; VII, 87; IX, 123.
40. . Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (n. 28 above), aphorism 9; Nietzsche, Will to Power (n. 14 above), aphorisms 466–617, 1062, 1067.
41. . Cf. Hippias (n. 25 above).
42. . On this conflict of Nietzsche and classical thought, see K. Löwith, Nietztches Philosophie (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1956), pp. 181–84; G. Kröger, Die Herkunft des Philosophischen Selbstbewusstseins (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1958), pp. 45–57; Jaspers (n. 14 above), pp. 35 ff. If reason discerns no order of rank, the attempt to impose one can arise only from Satanic pride. Indeed, one can no longer legitimately distinguish between pride and vanity or arrogance as Aristotle had done. On this point, see A. O. Lovejoy, “Pride in Eighteenth Century Thought,” Essays in the History of Ideas (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons [Capricorn paperback], 1960), pp. 62–68.
43. . F. Rosenzweig, Franz Rosenzweig, N. N. Glatzer (ed.) (New York: Schocken Books [paperback], 1961), pp. 196–97. On Rosenzweig, see K. Lowith, “M. Heidegger und F. Rosenzweig” (n. 12 above), pp. 68 ff.
44. . On Descartes in this regard, see Kröger (n. 40 above), p. 157. According to Kröger, Cartesian science intends to liberate man from any external authority, even from the omnipotence of the biblical God. However, this enterprise is doomed to fail, since Cartesian or modem thought la& “die Antike Unbefangenheit,” the classical confidence in the absolute reliability of unassisted reason. For Descartes, as for Popper and Jaspers (n. 47 below), reason's insights are always subject to doubt. Cartesians must, therefore, engage in endless experimentation, striving to prove a freedom and, indeed, an existence based on nothing more than an un‐Christian faith.
45. . Krüger places himself in this Cartesian tradition when he ascribes classical confidence in reason to unreflective naíve forgetting of the role of subjectivity in knowledge; that is, the ancients, according to him, naïvely accepted their immediate apprehension of things as an awareness of self‐subsistent reality, too readily discounting the possibility of something like Descartes' omnipotent deceiver. I have discussed Krüger's ascription of naiveté to the ancients in “On the Sophistry of Plato's Pausanias,” Transactions of the American Philological Association (1964), pp. 265–66, n. 12.
46. . Rosenzweig (n. 41 above), pp. 206–7; cf. A. Nygren, Agape and Eros (2d ed.; London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1959), p. 670, n. 4 (citing W. Gundel); A. J. Ayer. “Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics,” Mind, N.S. (1934), p. 336; Nietzsche, Will to Power (n. 14 above), aphorisms 253,303,344,414,530,553–71, 786, 888‐89, 1036; F. Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom, tr. Thomas Common (New York: F. Ungar Pub. Co., 1960), aphorisms 122, 344, 377.
47. . Cf. G. Lukacs, “Dostojewski,” Der Russische Realismus in der Weltliteratur (Berlin: Aufbau‐Verlag, 1948), pp. 179–82; ibid., p. 183: “So ist das Experiment derverzweifelte Versuch in sich selbst einen festen Boden zu finden: zu wissen wer man ist…”; A. J. Ayer, “Philosophy and Science,” Ratio, V (1963), 162 ff.; Nietzsche, Will to Power (n. 14 above), aphorisms 676, 1041; Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom (n. 43 above), aphorism 319.
48. . Cf. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature (New York: Oxford University Press [paperback], 1960), pp. 176‐77; H. Arendt, The Human Condition (New York: Double‐day & Co. [Anchor paperback], 1958), pp. 269 ff. For the contrast with ancient notions of history, see my article, “Che cos' & la Storia? Interpretazione di Tucidide.” II Pensiero (1965), pp. 153–70.
49. . K. Marx, Thesen über Feuerbach, 2; cf. ibid., 11: “Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert, es kommt darauf an, sie zu verandern” (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953). Consider also Nietzsche, Will to Power (n. 14 above), aphorisms 552, 585, 593, 605, 972, 979.
50. . The exclusive, essentially private character of intellectual intuition renders it unscientific, according to Popper (n. 16 above), pp. 15 ff. Similarly, K. Jaspers condemns the “stable banality of rational directness” as “ontological perversion of philosophy,” since genuine philosophy offers no final insight but a faith whose essential incompleteness necessarily leaves it open to the message of other faiths (The Perennial Scope of Philosophy [New York: Philosophical Library, 19491, pp. 10, 57, 59, 61, 91, 118ff., 149, 154. 181–82). Thus, for both Jaspers and Popper, rational inquiry is radically co‐operative or communal, not private as infallible, timeless cognition, if it exists, must be; cf. Grene (n. 16 above), pp. 241 ff.; Lovejoy (n. 35 above), pp. 139 ff., 14647, 150 ff.
51. . Popper wrongly discounts the possibility of unerring intellectual intuition on the grounds that different philosophers have held opposing propositions as self‐evident; cf. Ayer (n. 12 above), pp. 470 ff.; Descartes (n. 35 above), pp. 5–6. However, this merely proves that they cannot all be right, not that one or more of them may not be right. Ultimately, I suppose, the sole “proof” of the impossibility of infallible cognition is inability to find it in one's self; cf. Republic, 527e3‐5; Jaeger (n. 2 above), p. 452; Hobbes (n. 25 above), end of Introduction, p. 6. But lack of evidence in one's self can hardly be viewed as a universal rule by those denying the scientific relevance of private, mental experience.
52. . See n. 12 above.
53. . Nietzsche, Will to Power (n. 14 above), aphorism 481.
54. . See n. 43 above.
55. . See n. 35 above.
56. . On this failure of science in its own domain, see Barrett (n. 20 above), pp. 32 ff.; Grene (n. 16 above), pp. 247 ff., on the different meaning of man's finitude in modern and ancient thought: cf. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1170a2–25. The existentialist, according to Grene (ibid., p. 249), “cultivates the internal wretchedness” of life in the essentially unintelligible world presupposed by modern scientific experimentation; cf. n. 12 above, Jaspers (n. 14 above), pp. 46 ff.; Löwith. “Schöpfung und Existenz” (n. 30 above), pp. 75 ff.
57. . See nn. 43 and 44 above.
58. . Rosenzweig (n. 41 above), pp. 206–7; Dewey (n. 15 above), pp. 59, 128–31.
59. . Löwith, “M. Heidegger und F. Rosenzweig” (n. 41 above), p. 91. On freedom of choice as the basis of morality, see I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 53 ff.; Ayer (n. 12 above), pp. 482–83. Berlin maintains that civilized man is distinguished from barbarians by his unflinching commitment to moral values of whose relative validity he is aware (op. cit., p. 57). In this regard, consider the statement made by the Nazi judge, Freisler, to the Christian resistance leader, von Moltke: Nazis and Christians have one thing–and only one–in common: Their respective faiths each demand the whole of man without reservations (cited by H. Rothfels. The German Opposition to Hitler [Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1948], p. 118): see my article, “Goethe's Faust and Plato's Glaucon: The Political Necessity for Philosophy,” Studium Generale, XIX (1966), 627 ff.
60. . On the notion of freedom as the basis of egalitarianism, see J. P. Sartre, “Cartesian Freedom,” Literary and Philosophical Essays (New York: Macmillan Co. [Collier paperback], 1962). pp. 183 ff.
61. . See n. 41 above.
62. . See n. 47 above.
63. . See n. 52 above.
64. . Barrett (n. 20 above), pp. 145 ff.; see Bacon (n. 27 above), p. 135: “But men must know that in this theater of man's life it is reserved only for God and Angels to be lookers on”; J. Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), p. 286. n. 30.
65. . W. Heisenberg, Das Naturbild der Heutigen Physik (Rowohlts Deutsche Enzyklopädie, 1955), p. 45; see C. Schmitt, Politische Theologie (2d ed.; Munich: Duncker undHumblot, 1934), pp. 21–22, 41–45, 49–66, 82–83.