Both evolutionary theory and Christian faith have a number of things to say about human beings. Evolutionists claim that humans are animals with a bipedal walk, an erect posture, and a large brain, while Christians maintain that, like everything else, human beings are created by God, but that, in contrast to other things on earth, we humans are also created in the image of God. This much is clear, but do either evolutionists or Christians also claim that there is such a thing as a human nature? 1 Or, even if evolutionary theory and Christian faith do not say so explicitly, should we nevertheless assume that they embrace such a view implicitly? Or are humans as a species not the kind of thing—in contrast to gold, say, or to an individual—which can have a nature? Might it even be morally and politically dangerous to maintain that there is a human nature? These are the questions that are brought into focus in this essay.

The No‐Human Nature View: For and Against

One objection to the idea of a universal human nature consists of the claim that the very notion constitutes a damaging form of ideological mystification. This objection could be expressed in a number of different ways. One version, which Robin Headlam Wells and Johnjoe McFadden relate to postmodern philosophy and literary theory, is the idea that the human nature myth is invented by the post‐Enlightenment state in order to control its citizens (2006, 2). Kenneth J. Gergen does not say anything in particular about who invented the myth, but rather wants us to consider its sociopolitical consequences. When it comes to what he labels “Evolutionary views of human nature,” Gergen maintains that “the implications are little short of disastrous” because of the implicit political conservatism (2003, 3).

Jean Howard claims that the key to what is new in postmodernism is “the attack on the notion that man possesses a transhistorical core of being. Rather, everything from ‘maternal instinct’ to conceptions of the self are now seen to be the products of specific discourses and social processes” (1986, 20). The way we behave and think is purely a matter of social conditioning and owes nothing to our biological nature. Human nature is, rather, a myth that aims at imposing one particular set of male Eurocentric values on the rest of the world. Antiessentialism, the belief that there is no such thing as a universal essence of human nature, is taken by these thinkers to be a core principle in contemporary research within the social sciences and the humanities.

Criticism against essentialism can also be found among those who subscribe to evolutionary biology. John Dupré writes: “What, if anything, is human nature? One philosophical tradition, regrettably revived recently, supposes that this phrase should refer to some real essence of the human species: an internal property of all and only humans that explains why they are as they are and why they do as they do. But we should all know now that even if there are some kinds of things that have essences, biological kinds are not among them” (2003, 109). He thinks that one of the greatest conceptual implications of Darwin's theory is that it put an end to essentialism in biology (2002, 155). Such ideas within biology go back at least to Ernst Mayr's attack on the essentialist species concepts of pre‐Darwinian biology (1963).

But other evolutionists, such as Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby, maintain rather that “the central premise of [the book]The Adapted Mind is that there is a universal human nature … the available evidence strongly supports this view of a single, universal panhuman design, stemming from our long‐enduring existence as hunter‐gatherers” (1992, 5). The idea here is that human nature can finally be defined precisely as the set of universal, species‐typical information‐processing programs that operate beneath the surface of expressed cultural variability. This collection of cognitive programs evolved in the Pleistocene epoch to solve adaptive problems regularly faced by our hunter‐gatherer ancestors, such as mate‐selection, language‐acquisition, cooperation, and sexual infidelity. Edward O. Wilson agrees, stating, “Human beings inherit a propensity to acquire behavior and social structures, a propensity that is shared by enough people to be called human nature. The defining traits include division of labor between the sexes, bonding between kin, incest avoidance, other forms of ethical behavior, suspicion of strangers, tribalism, dominance orders within groups, male dominance overall, and territorial aggression over limiting resources. Although people have free will and the choice to turn in many directions, the channels of their psychological development are nevertheless … cut more deeply by the genes in certain directions that in others. While cultures vary greatly, they inevitably converge toward these traits” (Wilson 1994, 332–33). And, last but not least, Helena Cronin claims: “Certainly, human nature is fixed. It's universal and unchanging—common to every baby that's born, down through the history of our species” (2000).

Species, Type, and Individual Nature

The question we have to address, then, is whether or not there is a human nature. In particular, how should we interpret evolutionary theory and Christian faith on this issue? Both conceptual confusion and substantial disagreement can be found in the debate.

What we have talked about so far is primarily the putative “nature” of a particular species, Homo sapiens, whether that species really does have a nature and, if it has, whether that nature is the product of biology, of culture, or of God (or of some or possibly all of these). Particular individuals or organisms exemplify different species. So if humans have a nature, then, for instance, Mikael Stenmark has the kind of nature that characterizes the species Homo sapiens. Let us call this, if it exists, “kind nature” or “species nature.”

Sometimes we appear to talk about nature in a different sense, and quite often this is what social and human scientists are most interested in. We speak about different groups—for instance, Scandinavians—and talk of what they have in common. We might think that certain properties characterize this particular group of Homo sapiens—for example, that they have light skin, blue eyes, and blond hair. We are not, then, thinking about another group of people who have been living for centuries in the Scandinavian countries—namely the Laplanders. These people are an ethnic group with other physical characteristics. So, besides nature in the first sense, we (or at least some of us) appear to talk about nature in this second sense. We then speak as if there are certain categories or groupings that can be distinguished and that enable us to recognize a person as belonging to this or that particular type. There is no acknowledged name for this possible sort of nature, so let us call it “type nature.” Among the most obvious examples of type natures—if they exist—are sex, gender, race, ethnicity, and social class. What characterizes Mikael Stenmark's type nature might then be that he is male, white, Scandinavian, and belongs to the upper middle class of Swedish society. Some would argue that if we want to understand his traits and behavior, we have to take into account not merely his species nature but also his type nature.

Type nature is also a crucial issue in evolutionary research. Robert Trivers maintains that “one can, in effect, treat the sexes as if they were different species, the opposite sex being a resource to producing maximum surviving offspring” (2002, 81). Or, as Peter Singer says, “Darwinian thought … gives us grounds for believing that since men and women play different roles in reproduction, they may also differ in their inclinations or temperaments, in ways that best promote the reproductive prospects of each sex” (1999, 17). The main reason why we could find this difference in type nature between men and women has to do with the fact that, in principle, a man might be the father to thousands of children, whereas a woman can give birth to a mere fraction of that number of offspring. The different roles of the sexes in reproduction have had the effect that men and women also differ in their inclinations or temperaments. This is the core of the theory of parental investment (Richards 2000, 67f). Alison Stone, on the other hand, argues against this kind of essentialism and against the idea that “there are properties essential to women and which all women share” (2004, 135). She maintains that essentialism about a type nature of women is descriptively false.

But besides being a member of a particular species and being a male Scandinavian, Mikael Stenmark might also have an individual nature—namely, all those things that make him different from other individual members of Homo sapiens or subgroups thereof, such as the property of having Elon and Alice Stenmark as his parents. This is a property he shares with only one other human being—namely, his sister Anna Nygren; but she also has the properties of being a female and a nurse, whereas Mikael has the properties of being a male and a professor. So Mikael's and Anna's individual natures are not identical even though they share the property of having the same parents.

We can roughly define these different categories of nature (if they exist) in the following way:

  • (i) 

    A kind nature or species nature is a cluster of properties essential for belonging to the particular natural or artificial kind that an object exemplifies.

  • (ii) 

    A type nature is a cluster of properties essential for belonging to a specific subset, group, or category of the particular natural or artificial kind that an object exemplifies.

  • (iii) 

    An individual nature is a cluster of properties essential for an individual's being the particular entity it is—properties without which it would not exist and be an instantiation of a particular kind and perhaps also of a particular type or types.

Essentialism and Accidentalism

How should we understand essentialism and antiessentialism in relation to these levels of nature? In particular, does it follow that if one maintains that there is a human nature, then one also embraces essentialism? Much depends on how we define the latter concept. I suggest that we define essentialism as the view that (some or all) objects or things have some of their properties essentially, whereas other of their properties are accidental. Essential properties, if they exist, are properties that these things could not lack and still be what they are. Those who deny this embrace antiessentialism, accidentalism, constructivism, or conventionalism, depending on what we want to call the denial of essentialism.

I will suggest that almost all of us are essentialists in respect of certain things, but not necessarily in respect of other things. Most would accept that I could not be other than human. If so, the property of being human is an essential property of mine, and so is being born to my parents. That I am a philosopher living in Uppsala and having short hair and no beard are, in contrast, accidental properties of mine. I could still be Mikael Stenmark and not be a philosopher, not live in Uppsala, and have long hair and a beard. If one thinks that individuals or individual things have some properties essentially, then I shall take that to imply that one accepts the idea that individuals or individual things have a nature.

Essentialist claims are made not only about individuals but also about kinds. Many of us would accept that things such as water or gold have some properties essentially; they have a kind nature. Water is essentially H2O. All samples of water do in fact have that molecular structure. Gold essentially has atomic number 79. Anything with a different atomic number is not gold. Thus, we would embrace essentialism in respect of water and gold, and probably in respect of many other examples of natural kinds as well.

The question we now face is whether biological species are natural kinds, things ontologically on a par with water and gold. Or if we do not want to talk about natural kinds, the issue is whether a species such as Homo sapiens has any essential properties—that is, properties that humans could not lack and still be human beings. But perhaps this is not enough to successfully identify a nature? Is it not obvious that humans have essential properties, properties such as being a living thing, being an animal, being a product of evolution, and having a skeleton? The problem with these properties is not that we do not have them essentially, but that they do not distinguish us from other species; they say nothing about what is peculiar to us.

Perhaps we could say that there exists a human nature only if humans as a group have some properties (whether biological, social, moral, or religious, etc.) that they could not lack and that—either individually or as a cluster—distinguish them from other natural kinds, species, or any other objects in the world. We might say that there is such a thing as human nature if there is a set of characteristics that define what it takes to be a member of the human species in contrast to being a member of a different species. Do humans have such properties or characteristics?

Biologists maintain that organisms belong to the same species if they are able to produce fertile offspring. Moreover, they would be quick to point out that the most distinctive anatomical properties of our kind are that we are the only vertebrate species with a bipedal walk, erect posture, and large brain (Ayala 1998, 36f). Birds too are bipedal, but their backbones are aligned horizontally rather than vertically. There is no creature on earth with a brain like ours. The brain of Homo sapiens is not just much bigger than that of every other species alive (taking into account relative body size), but it is also much more complex, which makes possible abstract thinking, categorization, and reasoning. Human beings are therefore rational animals. What characterizes us is that we can develop different languages, tools, technology, science, literature, arts, and moral and legal codes. These are distinctive anatomical and social properties of humans that make it possible to distinguish us as a kind, and we thus have a nature. They are independent of historical epoch, culture, ethnicity, sex, gender, age, class, political power, wealth, and so on, and make us different from other animals.

If this is right, it seems as if human beings do have a species nature. The properties of our species nature include, at least, being animals with a bipedal walk, an erect posture, and a large brain, who are able to produce fertile offspring only with other humans, and who are toolmakers capable of rational and moral thinking, linguistic, and artistic expression. If we have at least these properties as a species, then—contrary to Howard's views—we do possess a transhistorical core of being.

The Exceptionalist Objection.

The problem antiessentialists such as Dupré and Stone have with this kind of conceptualization of human nature is that not all humans have these characteristics. There are exceptional instances among human beings, for whom the properties I have identified as characterizing human nature do not pertain. Not all human beings walk: some are unable to, and others are born without legs. Some people are unable to talk, and some cannot have children. The vast majority of humans have 23 chromosome pairs (while the primates most closely related to us normally have 24). But not all humans have 23 chromosome pairs. Those with Down syndrome, for instance, have additional chromosomes, but are most certainly human. Certain members of the human species do not have each of the features in question, therefore making essentialist generalizations or talking about a human nature is false and misleading. Let us label this the exceptionalist objection.

The exceptionalist objection assumes that we are entitled to talk about the nature of things only if all things in that category have all of the properties identified as part of that particular nature. There need to exist necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the notion of human nature to be useful for description and explanation. When we talk about the nature of gold, this requirement seems to be satisfied. All samples of gold, with no exception, have atomic number 79, while nothing else has.

Perhaps essentialism entails that this requirement has to be fulfilled, 2 but do we have to accept essentialism to be able to talk about human nature or the nature of species? For a start, biologists do not think that each and every individual of a particular species has to have all the characteristics of that species for it to be possible to talk meaningfully about the nature of that particular species (recall that Wilson writes explicitly concerning these properties that they are “shared by enough people to be called human nature”), nor do I myself think it is necessary. Secondly, the definition of species nature that I offered only says that there must be a cluster of properties essential for belonging to the particular natural or artificial kind. It does not say that every individual that exemplifies that nature has to have each and every one of the properties in this cluster. It is sufficient for any individual of a species to satisfy enough of, rather than all of, the properties in the cluster. The idea of a human nature does not, and need not, imply essentialism; or, perhaps more accurately, the antiessentialists’ definition of essentialism is too demanding. Either way, the exceptionalist objection cannot be used against the account of human nature developed so far.

The Evolutionary Objection.

If we take an essentialist conception of species nature to entail that each species is constant through time, and consists of similar individuals who share a common, unchanging essence, then such a view is incompatible with evolutionary theory (Mayr 1982, 260). This theory asserts that current species have evolved from ancestral ones and that therefore species are not constant through time. We can call this the evolutionary objection. The fact that species are mutable undermines the idea of a species nature.

But evolutionary biologists such as Barkow and Wilson do not think that human nature is fixed in the pre‐Darwinian sense of having one shape once and for all. They do not see species as having the immutable forms or essences characteristic of much pre‐Darwinian biology and philosophy. Homo sapiens has evolved and, like any other species, will continue to evolve. On the other hand, these evolutionists do not think that there is evidence of any species‐modifying changes in our nature for at least the past 35,000 years, and probably for the last 100,000 years. Therefore, any development over the last few thousands of years could hardly have altered what we are or what our natural propensities are. Rather, human nature is universal and unchanging—common to every baby that is born. Our human minds and traits evolved in the late Stone Age to solve adaptive problems faced by our hunter‐gatherer ancestors in the environment they inhabited. Human nature is in this sense fixed, but it could evolve in response to changes in the environment or in culture. It is just that such change takes a very long time indeed.

Hence, these evolutionary biologists do not deny the impact of the environment on us or on any other species. In fact, the genes we have are an outcome of an adaptation to a particular historical environment. The environment is important, but since (a) human genes change very slowly, and (b) the human brain is genetically hard‐wired to have particular psychological mechanisms or traits that cause thought and behavior, it follows that (c) there are certain things in human society that we cannot change with much success because, in general, biological forces cannot be manipulated as easily as cultural forces. Human nature is essentially quite fixed. So such thinkers maintain that human nature is something that was shaped by natural selection many millennia ago, something that exists independently of prevailing social conditions, something all humans share, probably something that is innate, and something that is largely immune to social engineering.

We might not necessarily agree with Barkow or Wilson about what the content of human nature is, but that is beside the point. The point is that there are reasons to believe that there is a human nature, that we can meaningfully talk about it, and that the theory of evolution does not undermine such a notion. It is not that such an account is without problems, due to the fact that it entails that there are properties essential to humans that not all humans share to the same extent, but consider for the moment the opposite view and its plausibility.

Antiessentialism or accidentalism is the view that (some or all) things have only accidental properties and no (at least no nontrivial) essential properties, or no common nature. If one is an antiessentialist or accidentalist about humans, it then follows—because all properties are accidental—that one must accept that there are virtually no limits to the extent to which human beings might be different from the way that they actually are, and yet still be human. But can individuals be members of Homo sapiens and not be animal? Can one reasonably say that thing X is a human but lacks all of the properties we listed above: being animal; having a bipedal walk, an erect posture, and a large brain; having chromosomes; able to produce fertile offspring only with another human being; and capable of rational and moral thinking, linguistic and artistic expression? Furthermore, if all properties of humans are accidental, then human beings could become trees or credit cards and still be human beings! This seems at least counterintuitive, and I think we might conclude that the problems faced by human accidentalists are much more challenging than those which human essentialists have to deal with.

Christianity and Human Nature

How should one think, as a Christian, about human nature? Do human beings have a nature, and if so, what specific characteristics do Christians maintain are part of the nature of humanity?

I would maintain that a central element of Christianity is the idea that human beings are created in the image of God (imago Dei) and that they are the only creatures on earth that are created in such a way. The expressions “in our image” and “according to our likeness” are used of no other creature in the Bible, so there is something special about human beings compared to all other living things on earth (Gen. 1:26, 5:1). From these and other passages in the Bible, Noreen L. Herzfeld concludes that “all human beings participate in the image of God, regardless of gender or generation, … only human beings are created in this image, thus they are distinguished from the nonhuman animals, and … human life is to be valued because of God's image. However, none of these passages defines that image” (2002, 13).

If this is correct, then Christian faith contains the idea that human beings have a nature. Christians could not avoid being human essentialists, because an essential property of the members of the human species is that they are created in the image of God. This is not a property they could lack and still be human. All human beings, regardless of gender, race, and status, are made in the image of God. Moreover, the idea is that only they among the created things on earth have this property. All species have the property of being created essentially (by God), but only humans have the property of being created in the image of God essentially.

Not only Christians but others too think that there is something special about human beings. Even the evolutionists Kevin N. Laland and Gillian R. Brown begin their discussion about evolutionary perspectives on human behavior by saying, “The human species is unique. We contemplate why we are here, and we seek to understand why we behave in the way that we do” (2011, 1). No other animal is able to do this: they lack the property of self‐consciousness. Human beings in this sense seem to be different from other animals. To suppose that being self‐consciousness is at least one aspect of what it means to say that humans are created in the image of God would not be far‐fetched and would fit into a theistic evolutionary account. In being self‐conscious, at least, humans reflect the divine reality.

Whether or not we explicate the notion of imago Dei in this way, Christians seem to be committed to the idea that there is a universal human nature. Christians have also thought that other properties are part of human nature, such as the properties of having a free will, a higher moral significance than the other animals, and a natural religious disposition to believe in God, and being here on this planet for a reason, being immortal and sinners but also being able to do the good, and being subjects of God's saving grace, and so on (Stenmark 2009, 908–19). In short, the image of God refers at least to all of humanity's abilities that have an analogical parallel to God's nature.

Capacity‐Oriented and Relational Views of Human Nature

Nevertheless, many contemporary theologians seem to think that it is a mistake to argue in the way that I and these evolutionists do about human nature, and in particular as I have argued in respect to the imago Dei. 3 Instead of trying to define human nature in terms of capacities, abilities, or propensities, they claim that Christians should point out that humans are essentially relational beings. In recent discussions in theological anthropology, this relational view has been developed as an alternative to the more intrinsic or capacity‐oriented view (what these theologians call the structural view).

Now all things or objects stand in relation to one another, so the idea must be that there are some particular relationships that characterize humans and that this is the really important aspect of their being. My position here is that it is plausible to think that human nature is constituted not only of intrinsic properties but also of relational properties, and that Christianity might certainly add some crucial element here; but to think that human nature and imago Dei consist solely of relational types of property is not a feasible position. In short, it is not tenable because the possibility of entering into some of these relationships presupposes that one has certain abilities or capacities.

The property of being self‐conscious is a property I have in virtue of the way that I am. It is an intrinsic property of my individual nature. The property of being the father of Jacob and Beatrice is, rather, a relational (extrinsic) property of mine, because it depends on my relationship to other things. 4 In fact, the property says that I stand in a relationship to them that no other human being shares with me. But no matter how much I love my children, I would still be Mikael Stenmark without this property of being their father. It is not one of my essential properties (while the relational property of being the son of Elon and Alice is one of my essential properties). So relational properties can be extremely important, but nevertheless need not be essential to a thing's nature.

A crucial Christian belief is that human beings stand in important relationship to God. God loves humanity in a special way and calls us into a personal relationship. We ought to love God and simultaneously love our neighbors. God has given people a unique commission to be God's stewards on earth, and so on. We, of all creatures on earth, have been addressed in this way by God and are subjects of God's saving grace. According to Christian faith, these are extremely important relational properties of humanity.

I would like to make three comments here. The first is that it seems to me that most of these relational properties presuppose that we have certain capacities. If we did not have the capacity to love, we could not enter into loving relationships; if we did not have the ability to think and reason, we could not undertake a commission to be God's stewards on earth. We must have the capacity to relate actively to God, in order that we might relate actively to God, and so on. Hence, a purely relational view of human nature should be rejected.

The only relational properties in the list above that survive this objection are the unilateral ones: to be loved by God in a special way or being subjects of God's saving grace. But these properties say more about God's nature than about human nature. Consider an analogy: I love my children in an unconditional way. This means that we could say that a relational property of Jacob and Beatrice is being loved by their father in an unconditional way. But no matter how important this truth is for their lives, it would be very far‐fetched indeed to think that it says something about their nature. It is not an essential relational property of their individual natures.

The second remark I would like to make is this: At least some of these relational properties do no not meet what I would assume to be a minimal criterion for being created in the image of God—namely, that the image denotes that human beings reflect the divine reality in some important ways; to image God means to reflect God. If the imago Dei essentially contained the idea of being addressed in a special way by God or being given a mission to be God's stewards on earth, then these properties should reflect the divine nature. But who is God addressed by and who gives God missions? No one, as far as I can understand; therefore, these relational properties do not appear to reflect God.

The third and last remark is about whether some of the relational properties these theologians identify should be understood to be part of the essential nature of humanity. Christians believe that we are created to know things about God, to live in communion with God, to love God and our fellow human beings (and, I would add, therefore have capacities which make these things possible). The question now is whether relational properties like these should be considered to be an essential part of human nature. Some Christian theologians seem to think so, but I have my doubts.

Such a view would entail that one is not fully human unless one knows things about God, lives in communion with God, and loves God and fellow human beings. But could one not lack these properties and still be a human being? There seem to be millions of people who lack these relational properties, so should one then, as a Christian, say that such people are not fully human? 5 I would maintain that lacking these relationships does not take away people's humanity. Rather, it has the effect that their lives lack certain crucial elements or relationships, or at least that is what Christians believe. It is not that there is something missing in these people's nature, but in their lives. I am not denying that some relational properties are essential for belonging to humanity or the human species, but—just as in the case of me being the father of Jacob and Beatrice—relational properties can be extremely important, but nevertheless not essential to a thing's nature.

To conclude, both the theory of evolution and Christian faith say things about human beings and about humanity. I have argued that these claims can and should be taken to imply that they give an affirmative answer to the question “Is there a human nature?” What the content of this universal human nature should be taken to be, more exactly, needs to be further explored, as does the question of whether theism or, more specifically, Christianity can provide a more attractive and informed metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical framework for understanding human nature in an evolutionary perspective than its secular rival, atheism, or naturalism, can do.

   Acknowledgments

I gratefully acknowledge financial support from The Swedish Research Council that made the writing of this essay possible.

Notes

  1.  I develop, in Stenmark (2012), the question of what kinds of basic issue an adequate contemporary theory of human nature needs to address. ⮭
  2.  Notice, however, that the definition of essentialism that I gave earlier (p. 894) does not demand that such a requirement must be met. If we were to incorporate it in the definition given, then essentialism would be the view that (some or all) objects or things have some of their properties essentially and at least one of these properties is also unique and not shared by any other object, whereas other of their properties are accidental. ⮭
  3.  See, for instance, Cortez (2010, 18ff.), Schwöbel (2006, 47ff.), and Shults (2003, 217ff.) ⮭
  4.  Another example: mass is a physical, intrinsic property of any physical object, whereas weight is an extrinsic or relational property that varies depending on the strength of the gravitational field in which the object is situated. ⮭
  5.  One possible reply might be that the same argument applies to the essential properties I have identified as part of human nature earlier (the exceptionalist objection). But remember that I advocate a cluster view, and therefore I do not think it is reasonable to assume that millions of people lack the cluster of properties that I have suggested constitutes human nature, whereas that seems to be the case with this Christian cluster of relational properties. ⮭

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