In contemporary theological anthropology, theorizing about imago Dei is classified within three distinct groups: structural imago Dei, functional imago Dei, and relational imago Dei. Structural theories try to identify imago Dei with a particular cognitive faculty. Functional theories see imago Dei as a role: humans are representatives, or stewards, of the divine within the created order. Relational theories stress the fundamentally relational and communal nature of human existence, and, ultimately, understand humans as objects of God's address (Cortez , 14–40).

Recently, the structural approach has been challenged for various reasons. Marc Cortez thinks that we should “drop the structural approach entirely” (2010, 18–20, 29). Modern theological anthropologies emphasize relationality; it is “divine address” and consequent being‐in‐relation that constitutes imago Dei, not certain capabilities or faculties. F. LeRon Shults (, 11, 166, 174) insists that we should favor more “holistic” views on imago Dei, instead of structural theories. According to Shults, this is more in accord with contemporary philosophy, science, and biblical witness. In sum, the structural theories are less than ideal because they (1) denigrate the physical nature of human beings; (2) overemphasize theoretical and abstract analysis; (3) lead to control; (4) imply a static understanding of human nature; and (5) are philosophically, biblically, and scientifically outdated. In the following, I cannot address all these claims. However, Aku Visala's article (2014, this issue) will engage many of these matters in greater detail. Instead, I will concentrate on how rationality is viewed in contemporary cognitive psychology and how this understanding resonates with some classical views of imago Dei.

The Meaning of Imago Dei

Imago Dei is a peculiar concept in the sense that it is widely used but it has never had a fixed meaning. The reason for this is that theological anthropology has never been a central doctrinal or ecumenical problem. Consequently, there have been several ways to interpret the meaning of imago Dei in the history of theology. Although there are differences between the churches on this issue, they are not church dividing.

The doctrine of imago Dei is supposed to answer to a group of different, yet overlapping questions, which are often emphasized over another as the context changes. There are at least seven relevant questions, which are as follows:

  1. Question about : What is it that makes us images of God?

  2. Question about : How our being images of God makes us special in relation to other creatures?

  3. Question about : What it is about the image of God that makes us (all) valuable?

  4. Question about : Does image of God have a specific role in creation in relation to other creatures?

  5. Question about the of our being images of God: How has sin affected the image of God in us?

  6. Question of : In what way do we resemble God as his image?

  7. Question about the : How should we understand the nature of relation between God and humans.

Before proceeding further into contemporary debates, a few remarks need to be made about past debates. Traditionally, Catholic theology has emphasized the intellect as the locus of imago, while Protestants have located it in righteousness, that is, in the life that is lived according to God's will, which requires much more than the correct use of intellect (Jenson , 55).

These simplistic accounts easily give rise to problems regarding our current status. For example, if imago Dei is located in cognitive faculties, then angels (and possibly higher animals) are images of God as well (and suddenly being an image of God does not seem so special). On the other hand, if imago Dei is understood in terms of our righteousness, then we, as fallen creatures, are no longer images of God. In order to confront this conclusion, complex disputations ensued. One such example is the Flacian controversy among second‐generation Lutherans: are we, in fact, images of Satan (imago diabolii)?

It is true that, especially after the Reformation, suspicious glances were made across confessional lines, and theologians raised questions about the ways of interpreting imago Dei. But imago Dei never became a major topic in theological debate and, for this reason, churches today have only rather speculative and vague frameworks. Imago Dei merely functions as a placeholder for the aforementioned concerns.

Regarding Catholic and Protestant statements of imago Dei, I find it unnecessary to concentrate on their mutual differences because there is so much similarity. For example, Pope John Paul II writes in Evangelium Vitae (1995, 36) how sin “deforms” the image of God in us, which creates both individual and communal disorder: “When God is not recognized as God, the profound meaning of man is betrayed and communion between people is compromised.” In his recent study, Dominic Robinson (, 5–27) argues that the relational aspect of imago Dei has always been a central feature, regardless of the tradition.

Although it would take much more time argue for this properly, I merely suggest that all the traditional theories of imago Dei try to accommodate a combination of the aforementioned concerns according to the needs of the time. Of course, they tend to emphasize different aspects, which results in slightly different theological anthropologies.

The Meaning of Reason: Aquinas and Jenson

What is meant by reason and rationality, then? Is it something that only humans have? Reason, in most general terms, is an ability to perform inferences. Such an ability is not unique to humans. Animals, clearly, are able to perform inferences as well, although these inferences might be qualitatively inferior. A significant difference lies in the conscious realm of these inferences. When a deer sees a bear approaching, the deer forms a motivating proposition: “Flee.” Humans in the same situation would think and act in the same way, except that humans could, in principle, form it thus: “It is ‘I’ who makes this inference: Flee.” In other words, reason is conscious inference (Tattersall , 35–37).

In order to have relations and perform certain functions, we need to have the capacity to do so. Stones do not have meaningful relations and functions, but bees, cows, and humans do. More developed creatures have more complex and more conscious relations. Aquinas recognizes that all created beings have some kind of likeness to God (and therefore have some kind of capability to be relational), although humans are set apart as the only class of “rational beings.”

At this point, it suffices to say that for a being to be an image of God, it needs to have capability to reason consciously. However, while reason (as a faculty) is a central element of the imago Dei, it is not a necessary and not a sufficient one.

Before looking at contemporary discussions in cognitive psychology, we need to examine how theologians have interpreted imago Dei. Thomas Aquinas is chosen as an exemplar because of his canonical status and lasting influence on the Catholic tradition. The second representative for our consideration is a contemporary Lutheran theologian, Robert W. Jenson, who aims to address a wider ecumenical audience in his works. He is also one of the very few contemporary theologians who have produced a full‐fledged systematic theology.

For Aquinas, imago Dei means a “natural aptitude to understand and love God,” which appears in degrees based on person's progress in the way of salvation. Imago Dei in humans is a reflection of God's perfect understanding of himself, and Trinitarian love between Father, Son and Holy Spirit. As images of God, humans are capable of having similar, or at least analogical, relations. These relations are based on rational and structured nature of human cognitive psychology. But how do reason and rationality feature in Aquinas’ total view of human action?

In Aquinas’ philosophy of mind, an action is performed as follows. First, there is a sense experience that evokes a desire. Desires have a cognitive component that make them communicable to will and, consequently, to reason. Will, having experienced the desire, asks reason for guidance: is this, what appears to me as good, actually good? Then reason, based on its acquired notion of goodness and happiness either affirms or neglects will's proposal. Will is ultimately dependent on reason for its evaluations of what is good and that which promotes happiness. If reason does not have the correct understanding of the good, it leads us astray. Because reason is always involved, we are to some extent culpable even when we act “in ignorance.”

For Aquinas, reason is a capacity through which virtues are able to regulate our behavior. Virtue is a disposition to perform actions that are in accord with reason (Porter , 187). Aquinas claims, “For it was shown above that such was the rectitude of the primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason. Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according to the dictate of reason” (ST Q. 95. Art 3.Resp). In status originalis, this state was not natural but a gift of God: “Hence it is clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a supernatural endowment of grace”(ST 95.1. Resp), Aquinas writes.

Rationality appears here in both moral and communal contexts. Humans are rational when they live virtuous lives. In many ways, rationality can be seen as our conscious fight against our natural instincts gone haywire. Aquinas says: “For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or passion.” Here lies one unique aspect of human rationality that sets it against animals. Animals cannot, in the proper sense, be said to exercise reflection and discretion, i.e., actions that are proposed by will informed by virtuous reason.

Goodness of human beings is dependent on the extent we are able to actualize our rationality, and rational (and consequently good) actions are those that are willed in accordance with reason. Moral virtues and intellectual virtues are joined together by prudence, practical wisdom (i.e., phronesis). Phronesis is supposed to guide our actions so that we are able to choose the best means that go together with correct ends. Human reason is not like angelic perception, which is able to grasp every possible piece of knowledge at one instant; human reason needs time and proceeds in small steps (Kenny , 43). In Aquinas's system, rationality is an exclusively human feature; angels (and God) do not need it and animals do not have it. Although it can be debated in what sense Aquinas thinks that reason is a singular faculty, this does not undercut his general view that sees reasoning as a complex, embodied process, which aims towards harmony.

Robert W. Jenson offers an outline of imago Dei in the second volume of his Systematic Theology. Jenson both tries to answer the concerns presented earlier and keep the answers within the boundaries of evolutionary history as it now appears to us. For Jenson, to be the image of God is to be addressed by God and to respond to this address. According to Jenson: “In Genesis, the specific relation to God is as such the peculiarity attributed to humanity. If we are to seek in the human creature some feature to be called the image of God, this can only be our location in this relation. As the relation is the occurrence of a personal address, our location in it must be the fact of our reply.” Then he continues, “That we have the dispositional property of being apt to hear and speak is of course required for the occurrence of this converse but should not be regarded as itself the human specificity – and indeed, who knows how many sorts of things possess it?” (1999, 58–59).

Jenson does not see it necessary to investigate whether there was some particular point in human evolution when consciousness or some other capacity emerged, and whether this very moment was the first moment when humans (in the proper sense) came into existence. In Jenson's view, humans became images of God at the point when they were addressed by God and were able to give positive or negative answer, and this may, or may not, have coincided with the emergence of certain faculties. In this sense, imago Dei does not reside in the cognitive capacities but it is mostly constituted by divine address. However, being able to be addressed and to give answer requires some sort of capacities that need to be in place and functional.

In Jenson's account, the divine address is conjoined with communal and moral dimensions. This is apparent in his account of rationality: “Rationality is not a capacity, it is rather a virtue; and irrationality is not an incapacity but a sin, of despair. Rationality is epistemic openness to God's future: it is obedience to command, be prepared to change your mind. Test your opinions, by whatever are in any instance the appropriate warrants” (Jenson , 146–47). Virtue, of course, in this sense is the correct use of these capacities. It must be noted that the negative response to God's address is also an act that makes us images of God, though in the negative sense.

Being a rational person requires self‐awareness, a conscious realization of one's place in the universe. On Jenson's account, rationality as virtue forms a basis for relational understanding of imago Dei. It is noteworthy that moral responsibility is linked to how we use our reason and how our communal life is formed. Being imago Dei means being, among other things, morally responsible, and here we come back to the structure of human beings. What kind of being is capable of being morally responsible for its actions? In Jenson's case, this is due to human personhood, which for him is the locus of divine resemblance. As God is personhood consisting of Trinitarian relations, so humans are persons in their capability of forming relations (Jenson , 95).

Both Jenson's and Aquinas's account stress imago Dei as a unity of several capacities and functions, which, when properly executed, set the person in the right relation to one's self, fellow human beings, and God. Relational, functional, and structural elements of the imago Dei form a whole where everything has its proper place.

But let us now turn to contemporary science and how it depicts human rationality. For this overview, I have chosen three authors who have written extensively on rationality.

Contemporary Science and Human Rationality

Gerd Gigerenzer and Laplace's Demon

Interestingly, recent studies in cognitive psychology have suggested that humans are not that “rational” after all. Our decision‐making is very much like that of other animals. Human reasoning is to a large extent subconscious and not under our direct voluntary control. Therefore, the majority of our choices and actions are “irrational” or “a‐rational.”

Among others, psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer has argued that the picture of human rationality which has been influential since the Enlightenment is actually unfit for humans. According to Gigerenzer, this ideal of “unbounded” rationality was based on concepts such as omniscience, unlimited computational power, and a fully determined and predictable universe. Gigerenzer makes a sweeping claim that this idea was somehow borrowed from the Christian notion of the image of God. This alleged similarity to God was transformed into a secularized version of deity, namely Laplace's demon (the demon who is able to predict every future state of the universe because it knows every physical law and past states of affairs). This Laplacean vision of human rationality has dominated the social imagination of Western sciences for centuries (Gigerenzer , 116). It seems that it is particularly this vision of rationality that drives van Huyssteen and Shults in their rejection of classical models in favor of relationality (Schrag , 26).

Gigerenzer, however, thinks that this Laplacean notion is fundamentally flawed. Actual human minds have not developed to act in the way Laplace's demon is supposed to act: we are not omniscient, we have only a limited amount of time and energy, and we are quite poor at predicting the future. Therefore, defining the norm of human rationality using the demon as a yardstick is bound to give a very anti‐human notion of rationality.

From the viewpoint of evolution, human reason developed to solve particular tasks in particular environments. The guiding norm of this process was not logic but cost‐effective decision‐making. We had to be able to come to correct conclusion quickly and with only a few bits of information. Decisions we make are based, on the one hand, on our evolved abilities that come to us naturally without the need for time‐ and energy‐consuming reflection. On the other hand, our abilities and skills of judgment are to a large extent context sensitive. Some abilities work in certain contexts, while being totally useless in some others. In Gigerenzer's view, human rationality needs to be approached, not from the ideal picture, but from the perspective of actual, experienced world. In order to act rationally, we need to apply correct measures in right environments, and this does not happen by following an abstract, universal rule or norm (Gigerenzer , 120–21, 129). For Thomists, this sounds very much like the call for practical wisdom, phronesis.

Kahneman and Two Detectives

Psychologist Daniel Kahneman has developed an influential theory known as the dual‐process theory, which aims to give an account of how different models of reasoning function in decision‐making. Kahneman has imaginatively dubbed these two ways as System 1 and System 2 (Kahneman ). These systems are like two detectives who have their own special skills. When the problems are simple, such as catching a shoplifter, Detective 1 takes the case. When we are not dealing with a simple case like shoplifting but with a serial killer, Detective 2 has to step in. Detective 1 is very good in catching shoplifters because he runs fast, but he is not very smart. Detective 2 cannot run, but he can think.

After perception, System 1 kicks in automatically and if the object of experience is familiar, System 1 takes care of it without recruiting System 2. Decision‐making is in this case mostly intuitive. Only in the case when one perceives something surprising, strange, or difficult, does System 2 start to function; here we can talk about reasoning in the strict sense.

System 1 contains hundreds, if not thousands, of different modules that are designed to perform certain tasks. When a module detects certain triggering events, it turns on automatically. Think of, for example, a situation when you hear a loud “bang” behind you. Your physical reaction is immediate, and you do not consult your slower system regarding your preferred mode of conduct. You turn, crouch, and cover yourself before you are able to think about doing so. System 2 is simpler to comprehend as it contains basic modes of logical reasoning, which are universal and uniform. The characteristics of System 1 and System 2 are as follows:

System 1 System 2
Generates impressions, feelings and inclinations; when endorsed by System 2 these become beliefs, attitudes, and intentions Engages in conscious reflection and assessing of arguments
Operates automatically and quickly Slow
Nonvoluntary Energy‐consuming
Can be programmed by System 2 to mobilize attention when particular pattern is detected Voluntary
Executes skilled responses and generates skilled intuitions, after adequate training Follows general rules of logic
Links sense of cognitive ease to illusions of truth, pleasant feelings, and reduced vigilance System 1 can override System 2 if System 2 is “lazy”
Distinguishes the surprising from normal Can learn new things and adjust itself faster than System 1
Neglects ambiguity and suppresses doubt In proper contexts can exercise control over System 1
Is biased to believe and confirm
Exaggerates emotional consistency
Focuses on existing evidence and ignores absent evidence (WYSIATI)
Generates a limited set of basic assessments
Sometimes substitutes an easier question for a difficult one
Overweights low probabilities
Frames decision problems narrowly, in isolation from one another

Rationality, and consequent moral responsibility, can thus be seen as an ability of System 2 to correct System 1 whenever needed. And sin is (in some cases at least) what takes place when we fail to do this. “Rational override” takes place when System 2 sets System 1 straight. “Dysrational override” happens when System 1 thwarts System 2. In these cases our emotions, prejudices, and biases affect our decision‐making in a harmful way.

When Aquinas defines status originalis as a place where reason rules over will and emotion, this sounds very much like “debiasing” in modern cognitive science. In other words, ideal reasoning does not always proceed automatically; it needs to be controlled and supervised.

McGilchrist and the Battle of the Hemispheres

Ian McGilchrist, in his ambitious project to interpret the intellectual history of the world in the light of some results of neuroscience, echoes Kahneman. According to McGilchrist, human brains have two ways of processing information, which are more or less linked to two hemispheres, suggested by the title of the monumental book The Master and his Emissary (2009). The master is the right hemisphere and the emissary is the left. McGilchrist claims that human life flourishes when the hemispheres work in harmony, so that the left hemisphere works under the auspices of the right hemisphere. But if the emissary gets to control everything that humans do, this will cause serious harm to human existence. The world and its inhabitants are more and more seen as machines and their parts. McGilchrist offers a chilling picture of a dystopia where the left hemisphere rules supreme, which is not totally unlike our contemporary Western world.

Although there are structural differences between hemispheres, and while they do perform different functions, simplistic models, which appear in self‐help books and other popular products, need to be avoided. Left and right hemispheres are to a large extent metaphors of two different models of thinking, which, however, have physical and neurological basis. They are not prescribed and stagnated and we can train ourselves to adopt more left‐ or right‐leaning approaches to the world. Some central features of the hemispheres are outlined in the following graph:

Left Brain (Emissary) Right Brain (Master)
“Rational” “Intuitive”
Objective, measurable data Subjective experiences
Propositions Metaphors
Impersonal knowledge Personal knowledge
Static worldview Dynamic worldview, change
Desire to control Accepts that world is uncontrollable
Over‐confident Critical and self‐reflective
Excludes right brain Includes left brain

Gigerenzer, Kahneman, and McGilchrist all point to the fact that human thinking is fragile. The greatest threats to the life of mind are internal. This is a unique feature of human nature: it can bring about its own destruction through not being able to handle the internal conflicts and reach harmony. This inherent fragility sets rationality in a holistic framework. Rationality is not just a capacity, it is a skill that needs to be learned, and mastering the skill requires constant interaction with other people. This holistic structure of human rationality makes us unique and personal beings. From this understanding, it naturally flows that rationality is connected with moral responsibility and human flourishing.

Admittedly, the aforementioned diagnoses and the definitions of concepts differ to some extent. Gigerenzer thinks the intuitive mode of reasoning is fundamentally rational. Kahneman thinks human life goes wrong when there is too little control by System 2. McGilchrist thinks modern technological society is born out of preferring the systems residing in the left hemisphere. Even if their diagnoses have different emphasis, however, the proposed cure is the same. Being rational means being able to apply correct means in right environments. Thus, contemporary scientific models of rationality stress similar things as theological models: it is not about merely having a capacity but using it in a right way.

Conclusions

I began my inquiry by acknowledging the current trend to discard the structural approach in theological anthropology. To some extent, these claims are warranted, especially when they are targeted towards one‐sided interpretations (based on, e.g., Laplace's demon). However, contemporary relational models are in danger of committing similar errors. Consequently, arguing for a structural understanding of imago Dei would be too thin a definition. Instead, we need a more holistic understanding of imago Dei, which is able incorporate all relevant elements without unnecessarily setting any against each other. The relational view is in danger of being too narrow, if it neglects the structural elements of being human. A preferable definition of the imago Dei should be, in principle, able to address all the concerns listed above.

How, then, are we to speak of imago Dei without setting crucial elements against each other? One possibility is to use Aristotelian causes:

Divine address as the primary cause

Reason and consciousness as material causes

Moral responsibility and moral personhood as formal causes

Divine communion as the final cause

In this view, rationality consists of properly functioning modules and systems of inference. Proper functioning is structured around virtues that guide all actions of the agent both internal and external to him or her. Thus, rationality cannot be seen as a mere singular module or faculty, but more generally as a form of existence. There is no need to downplay the structural aspects of imago Dei because they are not exclusive in relation to relationality and moral personhood. If authors in the past have offered too restrictive views on human nature based on singular faculties, this does not mean that the structural concepts are now irrelevant.

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Celia Deane‐Drummond and the participants of the Human Nature and Imago Dei Workshop (Kellogg College, Oxford 2012) for helpful comments and suggestions.

Notes

  1. This article grew out of a presentation at a workshop that took place at Kellogg College at the University of Oxford, March 27–28, 2012. The workshop was part of the research project “Anthropos” at the Catholic University of Leuven, a project that seeks to develop a renewed theological anthropology rooted in the Christian tradition and in dialogue with contemporary science and philosophy. The workshop was organized by Helen De Cruz and Yves De Maeseneer and received funding from Helen De Cruz's Oxford Templeton Fellowship.
  2. Shults regards the priority of the category of “substance” over “relation” problematic in the light of Continental philosophy (such as Kant and Hegel). ⮭
  3. See also Van Huyssteen (, 134): “… an anthropology that finds the imaging of God only in the mental aspects of the human person inevitably denigrates the physical and directly implies that God, and the image of God, can be related only to theoretical analysis and control (cf. 19). Identifying a specific disembodied capacity like reason or rationality as the image of God by definition implies a negative, detrimental view of the human body – a move that inevitably leads to abstract, remote notions of imago Dei. In this sense, substantive definitions of the image of God can rightly be seen as too individualistic and static.” A few pages later (p. 136) van Huyssteen explains Karl Barth's view thus: “…the image of God does not consist of anything humans are or do, but rather of the amazing ability or gift to be in a relationship with God.” I, however, suspect that this is an overly simplistic way of presenting Barth's point. ⮭
  4. The list does not intend to be exhaustive. It merely illustrates the main concerns theologians have in speaking about imago Dei. ⮭
  5. Aquinas states in ST I.93. Art 3. Resp: “…we may consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is, the intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more perfect…” ⮭
  6. For example, Martin Chemnitz, the first Lutheran scholastic theologian, writes about imago Dei only in a Christological sense. See, for example, De duabus naturis in Christo 28 (46); 146 (150). In his Loci Theologici humans are treated as imago Dei only in the past sense. See Loci Theologici I, 242a–b (317); I, 211a (282). The main biblical context comes from the New Testament, for example, 2. Cor 4:4; Col. 1:5; Kol 3:10, 2; Cor 3:7, 18. The content of imago Dei is defined as follows in Examen Concilii Tridentinii 103b, 2 (323): “Illam vero imaginem seu conformitatem ad normam justitiae in Deo, lex divina ab omnibus hominibus in primo et ultimo praecepto requirit….” ⮭
  7. Flacian controversy concentrated on the nature of fallen human being. Notoriously, Matthias Flacius (1520–1575) claimed that after the Fall original sin is now our substance and thereby not merely an accidental property. ⮭
  8. See, for example, Calvin, Commentary on Genesis, 51; Gerhard, Loci II.8.13–16. ⮭
  9. The only major theme where possible disagreement lies is in the nature of sin after justification (concupiscense). See Joint Declaration (2000, 4.4). ⮭
  10. The psychological analogies of Trinity in human mind were usually seen as speculative and addressing too limited set of concerns and, for this reason, not of great value. For Reformation criticisms, see, for example, Calvin's comment on Augustine in Calvin, Commentary on Genesis (Calvin , 51). ⮭
  11. ST I.93. Art 6. Resp: “While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of “image” as we have explained above (1,2); whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a “trace.”” ST 93. Art 2. Resp: “It is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's image.” ⮭
  12. Reason cannot be necessary because there are some cases when the person does not have active reasoning capability but still has his or her status, as in the case of unconscious patients and newborn children. See also Deane‐Drummond (). ⮭
  13. ST I.93. Art 4. Resp.: “I answer that, Since man is said to be the image of God by reason of his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God according to that in which he can best imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory. Wherefore on the words, ‘The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us’ (Psalm 4:7), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image of ‘creation,’ of ‘re‐creation,’ and of ‘likeness.’ The first is found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed.” ⮭
  14. ST I.82ad2. See also Porter (, 255–57). ⮭
  15. Naturally, culpability results from the fact that reasoning is, as already observed, conscious action and therefore in relation to our conscience. Saarinen (, 29–30): “This [akratic] choice is not, however, ‘deliberate’ (ex electione). In keeping with this idea of consent, the akratic person does not act ‘from ignorance’ (propter ignorantiam), although he acts ‘in ignorance’ (ignorans) of the particular premise. This latter ignorance is a ‘vincible ignorance’ and, since the akratês does not overcome it, he is in some sense culpable: ‘by volitionally consenting to passion, which consent follows upon an erroneous judgement of reason, the incontinent man makes a bad choice…The incontinens chooses to be in a state of ignorance by freely choosing to follow rather than resist the inordinate inclinations of his sensible appetite.’” ⮭
  16. In this article, I concentrate on how rationality is attached to the practical moral virtues in Aquinas. However, rationality is also about the speculative and intellectual virtues, such as understanding, science, and wisdom. For the sake of brevity, I will not try to offer a complete view of Aquinas on this matter. It suffices to note that rationality is not just about intellectual activity but about good deeds as well—the two cannot be separated from each other. ⮭
  17. ST I.II.57.5. “…Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, the due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the end. And to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel and choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life.” ⮭
  18. ST I.81.3. “For in other animals movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites: for instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it has no superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not moved at once, according to the irascible and concupiscible appetites: but he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite.” It is, however, not so that it is merely making choices that makes us special, but the way the reason works. While animal reason is able to grasp only particular instantiations of things, human reason can grasp kinds being more universal and general in its approach. See Pasnau (, 323–4): “Compared with other animals, our intellect gives us an enormous advantage. Because we are able to conceive the world in terms of kinds, we can function in ways that other animals cannot. Our capacity for universal ideas allows us to draw inferences and make predictions on the basis of our classificatory schemes. It is not precisely our rationality, then, that distinguishes us from other animals, but our capacity for having ideas that are universal in comprehension. Rationality is a tactic developed to supplement the limited comprehensiveness of our ideas; it is ‘the result of the weakness of the intellectual light in human beings’ (58 .3 c). Reasoning is the crutch with which we hobble from one idea to another. God does not reason, no more than he rolls dice.” ⮭
  19. Stump (, 76). ⮭
  20. Tattersall (, 179–80). ⮭
  21. See also Gigerenzer (). ⮭
  22. See also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1139a22–35. ⮭
  23. For overview of these modes, see Johnson‐Laird (). ⮭
  24. Quoted selectively from Kahneman (, 105). ⮭
  25. It might be interesting to develop a theory of the Fall based on the evolution of these cognitive modules. ⮭
  26. On debiasing, see Larrick (). The picture Jonathan Haidt gives in his Happiness Hypothesis () is illustrative here. Aforementioned systems are like a rider on the back of an elephant: System 1 is the elephant and System 2 the rider. The rider cannot always control the elephant and the elephant gets the upper hand, which is a sign of the weakness of the will (akrasia). According to Haidt, we must learn to train the elephant in order to live happy and rational lives. ⮭
  27. A crucial issue, and a possible point of disagreement, which cannot be addressed here is the question of normativity. Aquinas' view of practical wisdom is flexible, but still bound by the natural law and the first principles, which do not change (such as: seek good and avoid evil). Apparently contemporary psychology does not have access to similar theoretically argued and normative notions of action. Although the issue remains here unresolved, it does not necessarily set psychology and theology against each other. ⮭
  28. Thus, for example, Corcoran (, 204): “Recognizing relations as essential to personhood requires recovering relations in our account of persons. It does not require replacing an ontology of particulars with one of relations as fundamental.” ⮭

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