Schellenberg's book on evolutionary religion has two main parts: a pessimistic part and an optimistic part. In the pessimistic part he argues in favor of evolutionary skepticism, a claim that according to what evolution teaches us and by reflection on the immaturity of our species, we ought rationally to doubt the truth of some religious claim and also the falsity of all religious claims (p. 49). The Door that Darwin has opened for us directs us toward the fact that the slow geological and biological processes leading to evolution of our species in the past thousand millions of years will go lumbering on, generating new life changes in a very long time from now (p. 23). “But anyone who really makes the shift from human to scientific time scales will see that we are still in the beginning” (p. 4). We are now in the infancy of our species regarding some two hundred thousand‐year history of homo‐sapience in comparison with three and a half billion years of evolutionary development (p. 3). Because we are evolutionary immature many of our beliefs are doubt‐worthy. But to what extent could this skepticism spread? Schellenberg proffers some criteria to specify the range of such an evolutionary skepticism. According to him we ought rationally to be skeptical in all subject matters in which we are dealing with beliefs that are precise (as opposed to vague, where the content of the belief is so specifiable that is capable of having serious alternatives), detailed (as opposed to simple, where the content of our belief is multifaceted and has many parts, so easily it could be undermined by alternative parts), profound (a belief whose content includes a deep understanding of how things are in the world, so it will have serious and enormous alternatives), attractive (human beings generally would wish the belief to be true, so it is vulnerable to be accepted wishfully rather than rationally), ambitious (the belief concerns matters that it is normally difficult for human beings to recognize, we should stop relying on it because of our immaturity), and controversial (pp. 49–51). Surprisingly, beliefs in traditional religions have all of these six properties and so they are “vulnerable,” “premature,” “inappropriate,” and “doubt‐worthy” (pp. 64–66). It is noteworthy that Schellenberg here demonstrates that old pessimism, based on naturalism, is premature and doubt‐worthy as well (pp. 58–64). The conclusion of the first pessimistic part of the book is as follows: “Surely the very least to be concluded from our limitations is that a long process of very high‐quality religious inquiry would be required to justify religious or irreligious belief. And surely the very least we can conclude from our immaturity is that we have not yet engaged in such inquiry. Thus, even more obviously than before, religious and irreligious belief are shown to be inappropriate and intellectually unjustified for beings such as we are” (p. 69).

In the optimistic part of the book he enumerates the features of a possible long‐term evolved future religion, what he calls a new form of religiousness that is diachronic instead of synchronic, cognitively modes, forward‐looking and patient, and attentive to the evolutionary benefits of redesigned religion (p. 75). He distinguishes between three types of transcendence: metaphysical (what factually is something more than or deeper than the world of physical nature explored by science), axiological (when its excellence and intrinsic value exceeds that of anything found in nature), and stereological (what being rightly related to it will make for more well‐being and fulfillment for the creatures than can naturally be attained) transcendence (p. 94). The ultimate divine reality may have all of these spheres of transcendence either ultimately (in a strong sense) or weakly. The nature of ultimate reality in the proffered evolutionary religion, which could be accepted or imagined that (as opposed to believed that) exists by future intelligent inhabitant of the earth is triply transcendent; however this imaginable concept of divine offers no additional details as to the nature of its transcendence (thin concept of ultimate reality as opposed to thick concept) (pp. 95–99). Based on these distinctions, he defines faith in Ultimism (the claim that there is a triply transcendent ultimate reality) as an imagination that a thin and strong transcendent ultimate reality exists (p. 99).

He argues that the evolutionary religion has several advantages over traditional religions especially theistic religions. Some of them (which seem more important to me) are as follows:

1. Tolerance: At every stage we must suppose ourselves to be at the beginning of a long process of religious development. Given this we should think of ourselves as relatively ignorant. Because of this admitted ignorance we should respect any other experience at all, whether of one's own community or with others. We ought to be open‐minded and attentive to ideas of other religions and modes of thought as well as science, art, and philosophy in order to enrich our understanding of the Truth and the ultimate reality (p. 108). This type of tolerance and open‐mindedness can hardly be found among believers in traditional religions who think that the whole truth is in their hands.

2. Avoiding self‐centeredness: Evolutionary skepticism as the main constituent of evolutionary religion leads religious persons to community‐mindedness and collaborative thinking as opposed to pursuing egoistic and self‐centered concerns. “And looking for value in unexpected places, one will surely find it in all the frustrating but at the same time fascinating twists and turns of other minds” (p. 113). Understanding this vital importance of religious community for truth‐seeking and flourishing of every individual, will lead one to put away egoistic concerns.

3. Looking forward as opposed to looking backward: Evolutionary religious people see religion as a developing process, and think of human beings as just getting started on the path toward religious insight and maturity. “This is just the opposite of the usual religious approach, which involves looking back in time to the authorative pronouncements or example of founder figures” (p. 83). The positive point of this forward‐looking is to allow more time for making progress toward truth in such a very controversial, ambitious, and profound subject matter.

Despite the fact that I admire the advantages of the proposed evolutionary religion, I have two concerns regarding the pessimistic and optimistic parts of this doctrine.

First, Schellenberg's basis for the evolutionary skepticism thesis, as he emphasizes and explains in the first chapter and throughout the book, is the deep time thesis for the future of human life. He believes that it is epistemically possible for human species to evolve for millions or even billions of years ahead. This epistemic possibility justifies the claim that possibly we are in the infancy of our evolutionary history and so we should embrace religious skepticism. But, there are serious philosophical arguments and also scientific investigations that undermine the epistemic possibility of deep time thesis. “Epistemic possibilities are claims we don't have any good reason to believe false, given our present evidence” (p. 42). Although Schellenberg has observed both of these reasons, he easily ignores their undermining effect on the epistemic possibility of the deep time thesis. Peter van Inwagen's doomsday argument, which has been introduced also by John Leslie and Brandon Carter, demonstrates that “there is a significant probability that the human species is going to become extinct: and not in a million or even 10,000 years, but within the next few centuries” (van Inwagen , p. 251). Contra Schellenberg's claim that human near‐extinction “is a possibility brought home to us by familiar doomsday scenarios involving such things as the impact of an enormous asteroid or the eruption of megavolcanoes” (p. 17), van Inwagen's argument is a type of inference to the best explanation of what we can see now in our human life and situation. Seeing the extraordinary population explosion of the last 200 years puts us in a state similar to one who looks at the coast of an island from its central crowded point. The island is very sparsely populated within several miles of the coast. At nearer places to her state the population increases. Very near to her the population increases extraordinarily. Would it be not reasonable for the observer to conclude that the island's center is just a few miles inland from her? It seems to me a reasonable implication. However, as van Inwagen puts it rightly, the observer should explain away the possibility that the island is too large (van Inwagen , p. 260). Here the scientific inquiries may provide independent reasons for thinking that the human species will come to an end soon.

Ironically, evolutionary investigations provide us, among other investigations, a source of undermining the deep future possibility. As Schellenberg himself has noticed (p. 30), in a paper published by the US National Academy of Sciences colloquium on “The Future of Evolution” held in 2000, Woodruff has declared that

In response to the on‐going rapid decline of biomes and homogenization of biotas, the panelists predicted changes in species, geographic ranges, genetic risks of extinction, genetic assimilation, natural selection, mutation rates, the shortening of food chains, the increase in nutrient‐enriched niches permitting the ascendancy of microbes, and the differential survival of ecological generalists…. If current area‐species curve‐based projections are correct, we could lose up to 50% of the planet's species in the next 1,000 years.…Under even the most favorable speculations about the 1,000‐year situation, there was serious concern about the ability of biodiversity to “bounce back” given the current prospects for tropical forests, wetlands, and coral reefs. (Woodruff , 5471, 5472, 5473)

Despite these scientific inquiries, Schellenberg claims that scientists at this colloquium were mostly concerned with the next 100 or 1,000 years, and if they turn their gaze to the really deep future they will be quietly optimistic (p. 31). It seems to me that one can infer from these scientific inquiries that we are currently living in an evolutionary crisis, heading toward mass extinction. This available evidence clearly discredits the epistemic possibility of future deep time. So I suggest that Schellenberg's skeptical thesis will be undermined as well.

My second concern is due to his optimistic and positive thesis, which is called Ultimism. According to it people in the future will have a nondoxastic attitude (imagination) toward a thin concept of transcendental ultimate reality. Perhaps so, but if some people with more powerful cognitive faculties think, or imagine, or accept, or assume that such a transcendent reality exists then what would prevent them from attributing to him some essential attributes?. If they have some religious experiences then it is not surprising to interpret their experiences as direct awareness of that reality who speaks to them, who advises them and guides them. Therefore the concept of ultimate reality will not remain thin. It will be thicker through day‐by‐day new religious experiences. Every new religious experience will enrich and deepen the old ones. So I think, and it is my main objection to Schellenberg's argument in his book, that ironically the evolutionary religion which Schellenberg imagines not only does not confront traditional religions but also conforms to theism—a claim that a thick and strong ultimate reality exists and is a source of morality for and well‐being of human beings. Keith Ward draws attention to the similar point as well. He says that Schellenberg's concept of Ultimism pictures the ultimate reality as ultimately valuable and the source of an ultimate good in which we can participate, which participation can probably only happen for many after death (p. 155). “I have to say this sounds like theism to me, especially since he espouses Anselm's formula for the ultimate, ‘that than which no greater can be conceived’” (Ward ).

Schellenberg has tried to generate a new synthesis from traditional religion's thesis and secular evolutionary science as the antithesis to be both religious and rational in order to be well fitted to stimulate and guide the next stages of human evolution (p. 158). His book is written eloquently and is thought‐provoking. However, despite the fact that Schellenberg's thesis in this book is original and subtle, neither the pessimistic nor the optimistic part of his main argument in favor of evolutionary religion seems productive.