Islamically Informed Cognitive Theory

The inception of the “Orientation” phase is characterized by the engagement of Islamic thought with cognitive psychology. During this initial stage, the Islamic filter (Badri ) exerts the most effect, primarily to inform cognitive psychology. Islamically informed cognitive theory may be subdivided into two groups of issues: “The evaluation of cognitive psychological theories and models by Islamic scholarship” and “the development of a stand‐alone Islamic cognitive paradigm.” The former comprises a communication, comparison, and an evaluation of concepts and explanations in cognitive psychology with Islamic scholarship, and hence constitutes the initial step toward creating commensurability. This is the domain where a common language has to be advanced and disciplinary assumptions have to be unearthed, initially by explicating both the psychological and Islamic perspective and mapping them over each other. We suggest a factual analysis from a philosophical, theological, and psychological angle, as well as a neuroethical evaluation.

A selection of popular ideas for discussion at the factual level of analysis includes the representation of computational operations in the mind, simulation of contents and experiences, minimization of prediction error, information‐processing functions that map onto allegedly modular brain regions, embodiment of higher order cognitive processes in sensorimotor control processes, and a potential continuity of lower and higher cognition. Furthermore, methodological tools such as different kinds of explanation (causal/aetiological, contrastive, manipulationist, functional and evolutionary, [neo‐]mechanistic, and computational) and levels of brain organization (from molecules to synapses, neurons, networks, maps, systems, the central nervous system, and behavior) as applied to research in cognitive neuroscience have not yet been collated with Islamic thought. The development of commensurability will undeniably present the following exemplary questions: Do terms such as “intellect” from an Islamic scholarly perspective and “cognition” from a cognitive psychological angle describe the same entity? Since brain mechanisms appear to explain the biological aspects underlying cognition, how do explanations of a biological nature map onto Islamic ideas? To what extent can we pose a nonexclusive explanatory pluralism? Which criteria can guide us in our research to avoid straying from the methodological naturalism of modern science to making assertions about the metaphysical nature of God's creation and its inherent secrets? Toward the more practical dimensions, what, for instance, is our matrix for differentiating diseases of the brain and cognition from those of spirituality/“the heart”?

Along with the development of commensurability at the factual level of analysis, there ought to be an Islamic bio‐/neuroethical layer of analysis or fiqh (jurisprudence or moral law) of cognitive scientific experimentation that assesses concepts, research objectives, and experimental practice with regard to their individual and societal implications. This area needs to be solidly grounded in Islamic ethics and many concerns will likely overlap with themes in Islamic bioethics. General principles need to be devised relating to the general thrust of such research, with specific rulings requiring specific discussion and decisions. This may involve (1) principles relating to the researcher (this would return to some variation of adab al‐tabīb/professional ethics), (2) principles relating to the topic (out‐of‐bounds areas of research that are a priori impermissible, e.g., effect of extramarital sex on an unhappy marriage; risk‐benefit in terms of more questionable areas of research), (3) principles relating to the subject (harm/benefit, autonomy, principle of least harm, rights, and so on), and (4) principles relating to the intervention (likelihood and extent of harm, “medicating with the haram,” and so on).

One example of an issue within the Islamic ethics of cognitive psychology and neuroscience is cannabis research that scrutinizes the prerequisites of recreational and medicinal cannabis consumption. Can Muslim neuroscientists conduct research on the link between pharmacological enhancement of endogenous and exogenous cannabinoids and goal‐directed behavior? Studying the dose‐dependent nature of cannabinoids’ reward‐related psychological effects can not only bear implications for explaining and treating motivational disorders, but also for cannabis decriminalization (Kubilius et al. ). Leaving aside that the Islamic permissibility of cannabis use can be debated in and of itself, such research potentially conflicts with Islamic legal maxims and precepts if its rationale is to simply push cannabis decriminalization policies for recreational cannabis use. However, the case differs when this research aims to elucidate that the societal harm of cannabis consumption outweighs its benefits (following the precept: “repelling harm is given preference over obtaining benefit,” “Dār'u al‐Mafāsid muqaddam ‘alā jalb al‐Masālih”) or to develop treatments for motivational disorders (clinical use). As such, Muslim neuroscientists might not take issue with research that provides more information on whether cannabis is truly useful in medicinal settings, while maintaining its harm societally and the opposition to its decriminalization. Here, a critical question is whether it would be considered to fall under al‐tadāwi bil muharram (medicating with the haram), which, according to some jurists, is permissible when alternatives do not exist, but here is being utilized not for direct medicating, but to see if such medicating is effective. It is this “one‐step‐removed” extension of the legal principle that needs to be separately considered as part of the fiqh of experimentation.

Muslim neuroscientists are likewise challenged by the experimental practice behavioral neuroscience entertains. For instance, heterochronic parabiosis is a classical method in which the cardiovascular systems of two differently aged rodents are surgically joined, and which has recently been employed to rescue cognitive impairments in an aged animal through exposure to blood of a younger conspecific (Villeda et al. ). As we see such highly invasive methods now combating age‐related cognitive decline, we must (re‐)evaluate their ethical admissibility. Similar developments will materialize with state‐of‐the‐art methods like human brain organoids, which are human stem cell–derived brain‐like structures that can be implanted into a mouse brain. This model is associated with much enthusiasm, and the first attempts are under way to put it to use for preclinically modeling cognitive dysfunction (Mansour et al. ). We should not only pour resources into evaluating our concepts and tools but also into establishing positions on prospective ethically problematic practices, before Muslim neuroscientists are faced with them in the flesh.

The second group of issues within Islamically informed cognitive theory considers the use of Islamic scholarship to construct an Islamic cognitive paradigm. This domain of ICTs employs the IP approach (Skinner , 2018) and thus derives its content from early Muslim scholars’ works, especially texts by the mutakallimūn, Sufis, and physicians. Scholars that may be of immediate interest for the construction of an Islamic cognitive paradigm are Abū Yaʿqūb bin Isḥāq al‐Kindī and Abū Ḥāmid al‐Ghazālī. This may denote the transition from the “Orientation” to the “Preparation” phase of the IIS interdisciplinary research process. An Islamic explanation of cognition and the involvement of cognitive processes in mental phenomena such as religious experience can be a result of the synergy of Islamic and psychological disciplinary insights in this group of issues. However, this is a rocky road with major conceptual and methodological challenges and laborious questions that lie ahead of us that must be prioritized and treated with the appropriate competence (including Islamic and secular philosophers of science and epistemologists) as we proceed.

The conceptual challenge in this second group of issues predominantly concerns the principles of deciphering psychological content from the Islamic texts and our definition of “Islamic.” Here, one needs to clearly distinguish between primary sources (scripture) and secondary models, the latter being more systematized, and also incorporate “foreign” models to a greater or lesser extent (Avicenna, Ghazālī). What are the criteria we should have at our disposal to decide whether something is authentically Islamic and when an erroneous labeling is in place? Can a study that investigates the cognitive processes that occur during Qur’ān memorization (Salehuddin ) or a study that decodes the brain mechanisms underlying religious cognition be deemed “Islamic,” or should we instead speak about Muslim religious experience? Can we extrapolate psychological concepts, such as a possible dichotomy between cognitive and affective processes, from Islamic texts? How do we avoid projecting all sorts of modern ideas on these concepts, given the diversity of significances the terminology may carry or allow? When the Islamic sources do not provide further hints toward the cognitive architecture of a concept, how do we integrate cognitive psychological data into the Islamic cognitive paradigm?

A careful discussion of contemporary psychological concepts during the evaluation phase and a subsequent juxtaposition of these concepts with a psychological “reformulation” of early Islamic scholarship may lead to the conviction that disciplinary insights are at odds. The following questions and the add‐adjust‐connect integration techniques may frame inquiries into an integration of divergent views: How did early Muslim scholars arrive at their implicit psychological concepts? How do we reconcile Islamic concepts with potentially contradictory empirical data from cognitive psychology? How strong should the influence of cognitive sciences be on modern Islamic studies after all? What sort of evidence from cognitive psychology is deemed acceptable to justify a departure from the traditional interpretation of a concept among Islamic scholars? Some of these issues are addressed in adjacent fields (Islamic bioethics, Islam and Science discourse, and so on); consider, for instance, how novel biological evidence has changed traditional scholarly views on ensoulment (Yusuf ).

Apart from concepts and theories, the methods that were instrumental to reach conclusions are another source of disagreement between disciplinary insights. A divergence from standard methodologies to (re‐)interpret results may be required. The intriguing question here is how an Islamic cognitive framework may incorporate empirical data that are provided by both cognitive psychology (for instance, empirically driven models of sensation, perception, attention, motivation, decision making, problem solving, learning, memory) and the traditional Islamic sciences (for instance, autobiographical narratives of experiential knowledge in poetry and diaries, instructional works for spiritual development of the Sufis). Anomalous findings between disciplines need to be explained. For instance, given that reductive physicalism limits its focus to observable brain activity, and monism equates this activity with cognition, can we make use of such research, while further acknowledging metaphysical effects on cognition and brain? Does it follow that an Islamic interpretation of empirical results, which incorporates the naturalistic outlook but goes beyond it to include elements of Islamic cosmology, is hence crucially distinctive?

Cognitive Psychologically Informed Islamic Religious Practice

The second major area of fundamental questions utilizes cognitive psychological knowledge to inform Islamic religious practice−possibly from within an Islamic cognitive paradigm. One case relates to executive functions (inhibitory control, working memory, or cognitive flexibility), which are of interest when ethically disparate intentions for a given action are competing and regulation of cognitive processes is necessary to establish and maintain ikhlās/sincerity in action. Executive control even takes center stage within the interdisciplinary team research process itself when discourse management and a conscious monitoring and regulation of our own cognitive processes (metacognition) and communication and coordination of various ideas and opinions (team metacognition; Keestra ) is critical.

In the far‐reaching realm of psychotherapy and counseling, initial work on cognitive restructuring from an Islamic perspective has been carried out (Hamdan ), and many spiritual and nonspiritual versions of mindfulness‐based practices have attracted enthusiasm among Muslim psychologists. This trend is referred to as the Californian Buddhist Sufi Paradigm and does not sit well with several interest groups, such as those that take issue with the theoretical grounding of mindfulness in Buddhist philosophy (Skinner ). Arguments for (e.g., its abundant health benefits) and against (e.g., the existence of Islamic contemplation practices—which yet seem to differ in their aim to increase knowledge rather than relaxation) the Islamic appropriateness of these practices should be weighed to elucidate if the cognitive aspects of mindfulness‐based practices can be utilized by Muslim therapists and Islamic authorities for Muslim patients and clients (see Figure ).

Unrealized scope of Islamic cognitive theories.

The Project of Interdisciplinary Construction of IP Theories

There are indeed models apart from the IIS model to engage contemporary psychology and Islamic thought in an interdisciplinary fashion, and to map the building blocks that need to be focused on when defining IP and the scope, methodology, and tools of its branches. Carrie York Al‐Karam () has proffered the Multilevel Interdisciplinary Paradigm (MIP; Emmons and Paloutzian ; Paloutzian and Park )—a model rooted in the psychology of religion and spirituality. The enormous amount of IP literature that is published in journals of this discipline merits the exploration of the MIP. Over time, a conviction may materialize that a model that is suited for research within the psychology of religion and spirituality in the United States may be more appropriate for contemplating aspects of the relationship between Islam and psychology than a model that is particularly ripe for handling empirical results from basic research by the natural, life, and social sciences in prevailingly secularized Europe. However, this can also be a distinctive strength of the IIS Model of Interdisciplinary Research when considering the scope of ICTs.

Both interdisciplinary models have in common that they evolved from the Western structure of knowledge, which might be contested when taking into account its historical development (Grosfoguel ) and the defining anatomy of the Islamic sciences (Ramadan ). The project of interdisciplinary construction can unwittingly bring in paradigmatic assumptions of human nature that are implicit in contemporary psychology. One alternative may be to construct a uniquely Islamically grounded theory based on branches of knowledge that already operate within the Islamic paradigm (Rothman and Coyle ). However, the criticism that interdisciplinary models are not entertaining a holistic approach has to be forestalled: their very value lies in the consideration and—if justified—harmonization of disparate perspectives across disciplines. Furthermore, it is possible that the way interdisciplinarity or any other contemporary integration methodology marries insights from distinct disciplines will become entirely redundant if we resort to the works of early Muslim scholars in the “Preparation” phase of the research process, and perhaps discover that these scholars had developed their own distinguishing framework in which mental processes and behavior are conceptualized (e.g., in the guise of ′Ilm al‐nafs, Nafsiyāt), and which we can explicate in a way that meets the requirements of modern psychological inquiry. This applies equally to contemporary Arab writings such as the intellectual heritage of Yusuf Murad who attempted to articulate an ′Ilm al‐nafs al‐takamuli, an integrative psychology that blends Islamic and psychoanalytical sources, in postwar Egypt (El Shakry , 23).

The Distinctiveness of Islamic Psychologies

Where do Islamic psychologies differ from mainstream psychology and, also, how are they similar to and different from Christian psychology? First, one basic difference is the metaphysical and epistemological framework in which the view of the human is grounded: “self qua self  ” versus “self qua Ultimate Reality.” Islamic psychologies are rooted in the Islamic intellectual heritage that is rooted in Islamic belief. The Islamic construction of the human entity—and its fundamental relationship to the Divine as well as created existence—allows for the development of a thoroughgoing psychology at fundamental, rational, cognitive, emotive, and behavioral levels. Second, another consideration is that Islamic psychologies are rooted in an Islamic epistemology that necessarily considers empirical evidence as a valid source of knowledge. Therefore, the construction of IP brings together difference sources of knowledge and this body of knowledge is vast in the construction of IP. This is also consistent with the way early Muslim scholars resynthesized Greek thought. The reason why they were very comfortable with dealing with Greek thought was because they could take what was philosophically and empirically sound and adopt it into an Islamically oriented health care practice. IP brings together Sufism, kalām discourses, legal discourses, and others. Third, Islam in its law and legislation necessarily considers cognition (ʿaql) as a prerequisite condition for taklīf, and significant impairment in it would permit rukhas (legal dispensations) or disability accommodations. Thus, mental illness and its considerations are built into the sharīʿah even in the primary sources.

Appraisal of the SALAAM Framework

A dimension that the presented interdisciplinary research methodology does not yet consider is the role of public engagement during the research process. Recent trends in interdisciplinary research have emphasized the benefit of participatory research approaches for knowledge enhancement (Collins et al. ; Tebes and Thai ). Incorporating the Muslim community—extra‐academic participants—into the research process can harness a clearer vision for the contribution of ICTs to practical psychology and Islamic religious practice by sketching out the practical needs of the Muslim community. Another dimension is the use of nonacademic knowledge that commonly necessitates a transdisciplinary methodology, which allows all stakeholders to engage in the dialogue process (Keestra ). It remains to be explored if, for instance, the experiential accounts of spiritual development of the Sufis qualify as nonacademic knowledge, and according to what criteria.

Prospectively, the “Orientation” phase of the SALAAM methodology should be employed in reasonable extents. It is not useful to parametrically screen through the vast array of cognitive processes with the aim to accomplish a one‐to‐one mapping of contemporary cognitive concepts and an Islamic evaluation and possible equivalent (Kaplick and Rüschoff ). At the time of writing, we consulted the cognitive atlas (), which listed an astonishing number of cognitive concepts—816 to be specific. Other categorizations such as the NIH Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) system—a currently developed brain‐based categorization of psychopathologies—summarized six constructs under the domain “cognitive system,” with 10 subconstructs in total. The number of concepts that should be scrutinized will probably lie somewhere between six and 816, and inquiries should be primed to target the main areas of cognitive psychology (sensation, perception, attention, learning, working memory, long‐term memory, language, and so on). The same constraint should be applied to the juxtaposition of Islamic thought with the core organizational principles and explanatory strategies of cognition. The result of the “Orientation” phase is a shared databank of concepts and epistemic tools.

However, restricting the extent of the “Orientation” phase does not imply that this is an easy endeavor and doable in a few months using a small research project that has no major funding. It will take time to train researchers and scholars from both psychology and Islamic studies in the Islamic and cognitive sciences, respectively, and to acquaint them with the skills interdisciplinary methodologies offer to research teams (e.g., metacognition, team metacognition, philosophical reflection of disciplinary assumptions, reflective equilibrium). Hosting institutions need to gather experts in regular seminars (or ideally launch a research group) on neutral territory with highly skilled moderators, who consider the way both expert groups traditionally engage in discussions. For instance, communication problems may arise from different interests in IP. While many scholars will naturally seek to integrate modern psychology into Islam in order to understand better the religious/spiritual meaning of Islamic principles, many Muslim psychologists aim to integrate Islam into modern psychology in most part to advance Islamically integrated psychotherapy. Others have a transcultural interest in an Islamically informed psychology (cf. Islam Filter Approach; Badri ; Kaplick and Skinner ). This interdisciplinary work setting, too, has already been explored in adjacent fields, for instance, in Islamic bioethics by the Initiative on Islam and Medicine Work Group and the Scientific Discoveries and Theological Realities project () that have worked toward the creation of a common vocabulary, and can serve as a role model for ICTs.

We assert that the actual profit of knowledge will eventually manifest in the IIS “Preparation” phase, when an Islamic cognitive paradigm construction based on the results from the “Orientation” phase is attempted using the early Muslim scholarly literature. Such a paradigm must tackle the big questions: Can the Islamic texts provide any novel perspectives that can undogmatically inform long‐standing debates in cognitive psychology? Would those perspectives bear any fundamental objection to the ontology of contemporary cognitive psychology? Are the arguments strong enough—even without propounding a priori religious truth claims—in order to trigger a revision of current ontology? Can we compare concepts even if the corresponding ontologies do not match or may even be incommensurate? With these questions in mind, the objective is not to criticize contemporary psychology for the sole purpose of dissociation, but for increasing our knowledge of human psychology and for finding treatments for psychological dysfunctions while considering an intellectual tradition that is very much neglected in contemporary psychological discourse.